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A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF INTERACTION IN A MAGISTRATES' COURT.
GORDON READ
Abstract
This thesis has explored the court from a dramaturgical perspective and has focused on 
the structure and procedural organisation, the power and influence indices and the individual 
and group roles and interactions, their aims and their conflicts.
The study has entailed the use of participant and non-participant observation but in 
particular a series of in-depth interviews. These involved magistrates, both lay and 
professional, Justices' Clerks, court clerks and a court usher, probation officers and advocates, 
both prosecution and defence. A certain amount of 'privileged' information has also been 
utilised during the research where this was considered to be both appropriate and ethical.
An unusual aspect of the study is that the researcher is also a magistrate, with a 
considerable number of years experience on the Bench, who made the decision to carry out the 
main body of his research in the courts where he adjudicated. It was recognised that he could 
be seen by the participants in the setting, not as an outsider carrying out a programme of 
research, but as an insider attempting to negotiate the dual roles of insider-magistrate and 
outsider-researcher. It is, therefore, not only a study of the procedures and the participants 
within the magistrates' courts but also the researcher's own conflicts and the methodology 
employed in trying to keep the two roles separate in order to carry out an objective piece of 
research.
The research findings suggest that there is considerable evidence to support the view 
that courtroom interaction, the organisation and the procedures often fall short of the abstract 
ideals of justice.
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INTRODUCTION.
The Researcher.
As a mature student in the late nineteen-eighties the researcher graduated with 
honours in Social Studies.
The researcher is also a magistrate of some considerable experience. He was 
appointed a Justice of the Peace on the Commission for the County of South Yorkshire in 
1975. At the commencement of the study the researcher was a member of his Bench's 
Probation Liaison Committee and had been appointed to the Lord Chancellor's Local Advisory 
Committee. By the conclusion of the research he had also been elected a Deputy Chairman of 
the Bench, Chairman of the Bench Chairmanship Committee, Chairman of the Probation 
Liaison Committee and a member of the Magistrates' Courts Committee.
It was the combination of these two roles, those of sociologist and magistrate, which 
presented the researcher with the unusual, if not unique, opportunity to carry out an 
ethnograhic study of the Magistrates' Courts both as an insider, and beyond his 'known world' of 
the Bench and the Retiring room into which he had been introduced and 'socialised'.
A synopsis of the study area.
The court is a Petty Sessional Division Court located in a metropolitan borough in 
South Yorkshire. The town and its outlying districts have a population of around a quarter of a 
million people. The ethnic communities account for approximately 2 per cent of the total 
population and are mainly Asian in origin. The area has a high unemployment rate which, as a 
percentage of the working population, is well into double figures, this being due to the demise 
of the coal and steel industries upon which the economy of the area was largely reliant.
At the commencement of the study in the early nineteen-nineties, the Bench consisted 
of 139 lay magistrates on the active list. Of these 53 per cent were male and 47 per cent 
female. In terms of ages, 2 per cent were under the age of forty years and 69 per cent were 
aged between fifty and seventy years. In respect of their occupational groupings, 40.3 per cent 
were placed in the professional, managerial or self-employed categories, 12.2 per cent were 
either lecturers or teachers and a further 11.5 per cent were described as supervisors. Those 
who were described as either 'other grades' or 'other employees' accounted for 16.5 per cent. 
Those not in employment, all female, accounted for 19.5 per cent. (Retired employees were 
categorised by the occupations in which they had been employed immediately prior to their 
retirement). Two magistrates had been appointed from the ethnic minority groups, that is 1.4 
per cent of the total. In an area which was overwhelmingly Labour in its voting behaviour, the 
Bench comprised of 41 per cent who were on record as supporting Labour, 36 per cent who had 
indicated on their appointment to the Bench that they supported the Conservatives and 9 per 
cent were aligned with the Liberal/SDP, the remainder were considered to have no particular 
political affiliation. In addition to the lay magistrates, the Bench also included a stipendiary
magistrate, a full-time, legally qualified magistrate who is normally a qualified solicitor and will 
have spent many years working in the magistrates' courts.
The staffing of the courts comprises of a Clerk to the Justices, who at this time was a 
qualified solicitor and who also acted as a deputy stipendiary magistrate in other courts. The 
Deputy Clerk to the Justices was a qualified hamster. On the legal side they were supported by 
a principal court clerk and eight court clerks, the vast majority who were either qualified 
solicitors or else in the process of qualifying. The courts were also served by six court ushers 
who were mainly employed on a part-time basis. The administrative staff had a complement of 
twenty-nine people who were variously dealing with court listings, magistrates' rotas, fines, 
compensation and maintenance payments, their collection and enforcement. The court is 
administered by its own Magistrates' Courts Committee, which consists of thirteen magistrates 
who are elected annually by the full Bench, in addition there is a Licensing Committee, Betting 
and Gaming Committee, Probation Liaison Committee as well as Youth and Family Panels. 
The conduct of existing magistrates and the selection process for the appointment of new 
magistrates is overseen by the Lord Chancellor's Local Advisory Committee. During the first 
year of the study, some 2,500 courts were held of which approximately 80 per cent dealt with 
matters related to adult crime. This workload involved the lay magistrates in 5,873 half day 
sittings, this equated to an average for the year of 43 sittings for each magistrate, almost one 
half day sitting each week.
The probation requirements of the court are provided by the South Yorkshire Probation 
Service. They have offices and facilities both in the town and the outlying districts, these 
include specialist facilities such as a community service unit, a motor project for dealing with 
some of the very serious road traffic offenders and a residential probation hostel. The routine 
daily presence in the courts is undertaken by probation officers and assistants who are 
specifically assigned to the 'court team'.
The area is policed as a division and sub-divisions of the South Yorkshire police. The 
majority of criminal prosecutions are brought to the court by the Crown Prosecution Service. 
Other prosecuting agencies include the Local Authority, the Department of Health and Social 
Security, the Health and Safety Executive, the TV and Vehicle Licensing Authorities, the 
National Rivers Authority and the British Railways Police. The town at the commencement of 
the study had approximately eighteen firms of solicitors, some who had found the demands on 
their services sufficient to justify the opening of 'branch offices' in certain outlying areas of the 
borough.
During almost the entire period of the 'observation and interviewing' phases of the 
research, the court was located on three sites. The main courthouse was a late nineteen- 
twenties building and was very typical of the architecture of that period. The building housed 
three courtrooms, the two main courtrooms with their high ornate ceilings and large and 
elaborate windows contained oak furniture and wooden seating which was set at various levels 
to emphasise the status of the occupants and the hierarchical structure of the court. The docks
were bedecked with brass rails and the whole scene was overlooked by large public galleries, 
although these were no longer in use. The cells which were used to house those defendants 
who for various reasons were appearing 'in custody', were located in the basement of the 
building. The waiting areas for these courts were two, often smoke filled, corridors in which long 
wooden benches provided the seating. ( See Appendix C). The interview facilities at the 
courthouse were considered by all parties to be inadequate and the catering facilities, a 'coffee 
bar*, were provided by the ladies from the local branch of the Women's Royal Voluntary 
Service. The magistrates' assembly room also doubled as the retiring room for all three 
courtrooms, and was even used on occasions as an additional courtroom. It was not 
uncommon to have all three benches deliberating on their decisions in the same room and at 
the same time.
The second site was, until the mid nineteen-eighties, a medium sized comprehensive 
school, part of which after its closure, was converted into a courthouse. The conversion was 
quite impressive, especially when compared to the main courthouse. Its three courtrooms ail 
had modem furniture and 'wall to wall' carpeting. The waiting areas, whilst more spacious and 
airy, did lack any catering facilities. Because the 'secure accommodation ' in the building was 
quite limited, this courthouse was normally used for Youth, Family or Road Traffic courts and 
for those matters which were at the lower end of the crime scale of seriousness. Despite the 
efforts made in the conversion of this building, much evidence that it had once been a school 
remained. One was never quite certain when adjudicating, and especially in the role of court 
chairman, whether one was playing the role of the headmaster in the classroom or else the 
magistrate in the courtroom, or indeed whether the roles were somewhat similar.
The third site consisted of the offices and administration, these were housed in a 
building of similar age to the main courthouse and situated some two hundred yards away from 
that building. As with the other court buildings, this building was quite inadequate to fulfil the 
requirements of the present day.
The town's need for a new courthouse was acknowledged by the Home Office and the 
Lord Chancellor's Department, the construction of the new building commenced during the 
period of my research. The new ten court courthouse opened for business in the spring of 1994.
CHAPTER 1 THE LITERATURE REVIEW.
1.1 THE COURTS AND THE PEOPLE.
1.1.1 THE MAGISTRATES
1.1.1.1 The magistrate - a custodian of a repressive instrument or the representative
of the collective view.
Some of the more radical researchers of the last thirty years have cast the 
magistrates in the role of the custodians of a system which they see as being both repressive 
and ideologically dominated. The magistrates are seen to operate in an authoritarian manner 
within a system which is primarily concerned with surveillance controls (Pearson, 1980, p79). 
Carien sees the major function of the magistrates as the 'protection of the institution of private 
property and the prevailing modes of capitalist production' (Carien, 1976, p12).
Not surprisingly, the perspective of those commentators who report from within the 
system is quite different. Members of the judiciary, including the magistrates are seen as being 
distinct and separate from both the executive and the legislature (The Magistrate, July/ Aug. 
1990, p134). Tuck sees the magistrate as being unique in the criminal justice system in that, 
they are in the best sense disinterested', they are not bound by sectional jealousies and unlike 
some of the participants, they have no axe to grind' (Tuck, 1992, p28). Sir Thomas Skyrme, a 
former Secretary for Commissions in the Lord Chancellor's Department, sees the magistrates 
as representing, The collective views of a cross section of the population'. In practice the 
magistracy, 'enables the citizen to see that the law is his law, administered by men and women 
like himself and that it is not the esoteric preserve of the lawyers' (Skyrme,1983, p8).
1.1.1.2 Never mind the width iust feel the quality. - The selection process.
According to the Magistrates' Association, 'justices need intelligence, common sense,
integrity, and the capacity to act fairly'. They must 'learn to act judicially'... 'Justices should be
accepted and respected members of the local community' (The Magistrate, June, 1990, p96).
Some writers have argued however, that some of these requirements, and specifically those
which target people who, '.. wield a certain amount of authority in the community', tends to
result in the magistracy being, '.. consistently selected from a small section of society'
(Fitzgerald and Muncie, 1983, p112) and in practice, therefore, the ideological view that the
magistracy should be seen to be fairly selected does not stand up to scrutiny (Pearson, 1980,
pp84-88). Some researchers have also identified that there is an additional unspecified
requirement, an emphasis on the candidate's ability to fit in to the ethos and the expectations of
the Bench (Parker et al, 1989, p173). This coupled with the candidates' ability to combine their
occupational commitments with the judicial and training requirements is also claimed to
legislate against some sections of society and in particular the 'working class' (Jackson, 1993,
p132). Any initiatives that have been implemented with the intention of attracting a greater
working class representation have failed (Pearson, 1980, p80). Many studies have found that
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the magistracy has an over representation of middle class, professional and managerial types, 
whilst both women and the ethnic minorities are under represented (Baldwin, 1976, p171. 
White, 1985, p14. Jackson, 1993, p132). In practice the fact that a high proportion of those 
candidates who are appointed have been put forward by existing magistrates does mean that 
the magistracy is quite often 'self-perpetuating' (Pearson, 1980, p85). Therefore because of 
such narrow and restrictive social backgrounds, a cross section of outlook and experience 
certainly appears to be lacking on the Bench, and it can be argued that the appointment of 
these individuals to positions of judicial power merely reflects and supports their social position 
and prestige in the local community (Fitzgerald and Muncie, 1983, p111). But this was not a 
view shared by the Lord Chancellor, in his address to the Magistrates' Association in 1991 he 
said, 'My office has looked at the last 40 submissions received from my local advisory 
committees. This survey reveals that of the 875 new justices appointed by me, 22.3 per cent 
were under 40, 32.5 per cent were between 40-45, 24.2 per cent were between 46-50, and the 
rest that is 21 per cent were over 50 years of age. 452 were males and 423 were females .. It 
seems to me that Advisory Committees have done well to find a reasonable spread of 
candidates’ (The Magistrate, Dec.1991/Jan.1992, p217).
1.1.1.3 With a wealth of life's experience, who needs training? Socialisation and 
training.
Not only are magistrates said to emanate from a narrow social base they are also 
considered to be badly trained and when discharging their duties are likely to consider their own 
practical experience as being of more value than any information provided and which has been 
obtained through penological theory or research (Parker et al, 1989, p73). Neither are these 
criticisms restricted only to those who observe the magistrates' courts from the outside. 
Samuels, JP, a barrister who writes regularly in The Magistrate, has also expressed an opinion 
that the training of magistrates is both inadequate and requires to be professionally organised. 
'Dreary lectures' or 'unreal sentencing exercises' need to be replaced by such issues as the 
psychology of the courtroom, the psychology of the defendant, communication, group 
dynamics, the art of chairmanship, the evaluation of evidence, the art of analysis, the art of 
judgement and the principles of sentencing (Samuels JP, 1991, p66). But not all training in the 
magistrates' courts is formal, Parker would argue that whilst magistrates are carefully 
socialised, in so far as, their general world outlook is channelled, in training, into the 
performance of specific tasks in an institutionalised manner1, informally senior magistrates can 
also exert a considerable influence on the socialisation and the performances of less 
experienced magistrates (Parker et al, 1989, pp83-84).
1.1.1.4 The lav magistrate - a symbol of power and authority or a vulnerable amateur.
In discussing the power which is invested in the lay magistracy, Raine and Willson
described them as the, 'most uninstitutionalised and powerful of the lay groups'. As members of
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Benches they are seen to enjoy special status and authority. Despite this 'special treatment' 
magistrates do admit to some feelings of vulnerability whilst undertaking their duties in the 
courtroom. The problem would appear to develop from a situation where although the lay 
magistrates are 'invested with legitimate power', very few of them have 'expert power1, and the 
level of vulnerability has tended to increase as the law and its application has become ever 
more complex (Raine and Willson, 1993, pp188-189). They also observed that magistrates and 
judges were also failing to win public confidence in their ability to do the job. Defence and 
prosecution lawyers, 'could frequently be heard expressing their views that the lay magistracy 
was becoming out of its depth'. Even the magistrates most stalwart defenders, the magistrates' 
clerks, began to express doubts about the lay system's 'capacity to deliver justice in the modem 
age' (p46). Parker et al. had found that some benches were still struggling to implement the 
1976 Bail Act some three years after it came into force (Parker et al, 1989, p58). The 
magistrates themselves acknowledged that there were shortcomings within their ranks and that 
some magistrates, 'are alas not up to the job. We all know them' (Samuels, 1991, p66).
Magistrates are expected to absorb and assess a great deal of information in a short 
space of time and in order to convert it into a usable form they quite often have to manipulate 
it. This can be done in a number of ways. They might 'screen out certain elements, scale down 
or scale up, they will schematize the data to make it more acceptable to them and they 
selectively highlight what they feel is crucial' (Brown, 1991, p13). Neither do magistrates 
necessarily see the need for sentencing guidelines, explaining away the wide variations in 
sentences by stressing the human factors, the proclivities of the sentencers or the sentencing 
traditions which operate within the local jurisdictions (Parker et al, 1989, pp16-17). But neither 
are the magistrates necessarily free agents. As Carien found, not all magistrates find that 
justice as they might want to perform it as individuals is congruent with justice as they feel the 
public might want it perfomed (Carien, 1976, p64). Paul Firth, the then Clerk to the Rotherham 
Magistrates was quoted in the local press as saying, "Magistrates are becoming more and more 
constrained and feel that they are applying the law first and justice second" (The Advertiser, 
March 12/1993). In general the lay magistrates are also accused of not intervening enough, of 
being afraid to ask questions, of adopting a play safe attitude (Crowther, 1990, pp26, 89). This 
view was also supported by Parker who saw the lay magistrates as the only lay people in the 
court machinery,'.. they recognise their limitations, they are not there everyday', neither as a 
policy do they receive any legal training. As a result, '..they have no interest in making fools of 
themselves... They learn to value the formulae they are given' (Parker et al, 1981, p66).
1.1.1.5 Professional justice is better justice, assumption or fact? The professional -
amateur debate.
As has already been discussed there has been a growing concern about the standard
of justice which is administered in the magistrates' courts and one often quoted solution is the
professionalisation of justice (Walker and Starmer, 1993, pp148-149) This proposal, of course,
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must be based on the assumption that professional justice is better justice. But is it? In support 
of the argument it is claimed that in their training lawyers are trained to think logically and 
abstractly and to conceptualise and evaluate arguments from a number of different 
perspectives. People who have not received this type of training or who do not have this type 
of background, and that is the majority of lay magistrates, are more likely to think affectively, 
that is from feelings and from set points of view. Because of this, affective thinkers, and hence 
the majority of lay magistrates, are more likely to reject those opinions which conflict with their 
own (Boon, 1993, p74). Concerns are also expressed about the resource efficiency of 
magistrates' courts, the time taken to dispense with cases, the delays, the number and lengths 
of adjournments. In Samuels’ words, 'The present system of administration in the magistrates' 
courts is little short of scandalous' (Samuels, 1991, p66). It is generally accepted that 
stipendiary justice is both quicker and cheaper than lay justice. An example of this, as 
demonstrated by Crowther, is the additional time taken by advocates because lay magistrates 
do not intervene or question enough and give no indication of what they are thinking until they 
announce their verdicts. Advocates consider, therefore, that there is a need to cover all 
eventualities 'and argue their cases at three times the length before the lay justices than they 
employ before the stipes .. treating the lay justices, sitting perhaps once a fortnight, as they 
would a jury’ (Crowther, 1990, p23). But Walker and Starmer are less certain that professional 
justice is unfailingly superior to lay justice. They remind us that all verdicts depend on facts as 
well as law 'and there are many who still believe that the minds of the lay magistrate are more 
accurate fact diviners than those of lawyers' (Walker and Starmer, 1993, p148). This argument 
is one which also receives the official support of the Lord Chancellor’s Department who feel 
that an errosion of those ' .. precious qualities of local knowledge and common sense that a 
group of lay magistrates could be expected to bring to justice' would be detrimental. (Raine and 
Willson, 1993, p46). Despite this there are continuing signs of creeping professionalism within 
the magistracy with 'flying, itinerant, regional stipendiary magistrates increasing in number*. 
This is a welcome trend according to Samuels, because they are professional lawyers, they can 
take the long complicated legal cases, they can also deal with some of the more sensitive 
cases (Samuels, 1991, p66). Badge, a Senior Metropolitan magistrate, considers that whilst 
there is a definite role for the professional magistrate this needs to be clearly defined and to 
fully professionalise the magistracy would not be an acceptable alternative,' .. because trial 
before a lay bench is a trial by one's peers, and as such is priceless' (Badge, 1989, p196).
1.1.2 THE MAGISTRATES' CLERK.
1.1.2.1 Manager, administrator, mentor, intermediary, helper - the many roles of the
magistrates' clerk.
Magistrates' clerks fulfil many functions in the magistrates' courts. Their primary
function is to advise the magistrates on their legal powers, on the law and procedures, either in
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the courtroom or the retiring room. Another part of their role is to manage the business of the 
day and to ensure that the courts run smoothly. They also have the task of administering legal 
aid and when this not granted, or in cases where the defendants choose not to be represented, 
it falls to the clerk to assist the unrepresented defendant in the courtroom. In addition to these 
everyday tasks the Justices' Clerk also has the responsibility for training the lay magistrates. 
Without the clerks it can be quite justifiably claimed that the courts would not and could not 
work (Ralphs and Norman, 1992, p123). In performing these functions the clerks have a 
positive duty to prevent the courts from making mistakes in law (Crowther, 1990, p25), and a 
concern to protect the magistrates from getting it wrong in public (Parker et al, 1989, p59). 
They are supposed to provide legal advice to the magistrates but not to influence 
(Darbyshire,1980, p202). Because of their powerful position in the administration of legal aid 
they can influence the level of representation in the magistrates' courts (Sanders and Young, 
1994, pp258-260). It is also claimed that their duty in assisting the unrepresented defendants is 
often moderated by their allegiance to the rules and the courts (Astor, 1986, p232).
1.1.2.2 Head of the household, family solicitor or merely the butler?- the relationship 
between the clerks and the lav magistrates.
The Le Vay report, 'Magistrates' Courts: a report of scrutiny', describes the role of the 
magistrates' clerks as a combination of a butler and the family solicitor. The 'butler’s role' 
permits the clerk, deferentially to challenge the magistrates' wishes without challenging their 
authority,.. the 'family solicitor is traditionally permitted to enter delicate areas and intervene, 
'citing precedents, rules and regulations without challenging the status of the patron' (Home 
Office,1989. Raine and Willson, 1993, p164). This also concurs with the views of Samuels, who 
sees the clerk as being , ' . .  friendly, helpful, patient and deferential, yet clear and firm and able 
and willing to speak his mind in a cogent, forthright and frank manner whenever this is 
necessary (Samuels, 1981, p84). In days gone by some clerks ruled the lay benches with a 'rod 
of iron', but abuses of authority by clerks are now rare (Crowther, 1990, p25). Over the years 
close relationships have been developed with a high level of mutual respect for each others' 
responsibility and expertise, although some odd pockets of contention do occasionally surface. 
A survey amongst magistrates did reveal that, '.. domineering clerks are still seen as an 
occasional hazard' (The Magistrate, Nov. 1990, p185). Although the Clerk to the Bradford City 
Justices was reported as bemoaning the fact that, The professionally qualified court clerk 
regrets that he is seen as something of a servant, to speak when spoken to, and to offer advice 
when he is asked' (The Magistrate, July 1989, p109).
1.1.2.3 Court clerks do influence, it could not be otherwise.
As has already been indicated the role of the clerk is to provide legal advice but it is
not to influence. Nevertheless the clerks do occupy a very powerful position in the sentencing
process (Darbyshire, 1980, p201). In practice it is inevitable that the clerk does in fact influence
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the sentencers. 'It is admitted. It cannot be otherwise' (Crampton, 1979, p210). But does this 
influence exceed what is expected from the clerk's defined role? McLaughlin found that, 
magistrates appear willing to include their clerks in the decision process to a degree beyond 
that allowed by law' (McLaughlin,1990, p365). Parker et al. observed that,' ..the tone and style 
of the regime set by the clerks at the beginning of a session impinges gently but firmly upon the 
magistrates'. Neither was this the only area where Parker found evidence of the clerks’ 
influence. Their role in the training of magistrates also gives them a high degree of influence, 
an influence which those magistrates with little knowledge of other courts may not even be 
aware (Parker et al, 1981, p66: 1989, p99). Not that the clerks use their influence in order to 
'clone' magistrates, 'but it does leave the way open for all Justices' Clerks to influence their 
magistrates at an early part in the magistrate's career* (McLaughlin, 1990, p362). So how 
influential is the clerk? As a result of her research Darbyshire concluded, that the court clerks 
did have considerable influence not only in matters of law, but also on decisions concerning 
fact and sentencing (pp 202-203). One of the solicitors in the McLaughlin study stated, "I don't 
look for who is sitting on the bench, but what is important is, who is the court clerk, this is 
decisive" (p367).
1.1.2.4 Magistrates make decisions, their clerks offer advice?
In principle the magistrates are the decision makers and their clerks are in the 
business of offering advice. However Darbyshire found that the clerks whom she interviewed, 
'.. took it for granted that the lay justices would invariably accept their advice on law and 
although it was the bench who announced the ruling on a point argued before them, they were 
merely repeating the clerk's decision' (Darbyshire, 1980, p201). Neither do the magistrates 
disagree with this perception,'.. as a matter of good practice, justices should accept the clerk's 
advice on matters of law, practice and procedures (Ralphs and Norman, 1992, p40). But the 
clerks have been accused of exceeding their remit by, busying themselves in pre-court 
negotiations and tidying up many cases before they reached open court' (Parker et al, 1981, 
p50). They were also observed, '.. wheeling and dealing in more informal settings’, such as 
immediately prior to formal hearings and negotiating at pre-trial reviews (Sanders and Young, 
1994, p298). Some also considered that the court clerk had a great potential for secretly 
influencing sentencing decisions without any recourse to public checks' (McLaughlin, 1990, 
p260). In 1983 it was being suggested that the clerks should be subjected to stricter rules and 
that the clerk-magistrate consultations be subject to a greater level of safeguards and openness 
(Heaton-Armstrong,1983, p341). However by 1989, Badge was suggesting that not only should 
the clerks be allowed to give advice to the justices but the Clerks to the Justices should also be 
given limited judicial powers in the interests of efficiency (Badge, 1989, p196).
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1.1.3 THE ADVOCATES.
1.1.3.1 The nature of the art is persuasion - The defence advocates.
The heading for this section is the view expressed by Lord Scarmen in his forward to 
Crowther's book, 'Advocacy for the Advocate', first published in 1984. Pannick writing in 1992, 
extends this single statement quite considerably, 'The task of the advocate is to be 
argumentative, inquisitive, indignant or apologetic as the occasion demands and always 
persuasive on behalf of the person who pays for his voice' (Pannick, 1992, p1). In the 
discharge of his office the advocate must always remember that whilst he has a duty to the 
client, there is also a duty to one's opponent, the court, the state and to oneself (Lord Atkin 
cited in Crowther, 1990, p136). It is not the duty of the advocate to judge the client (Samuels, 
1990, p8), but to put before the court all that the client would have done and said himself or 
herself had they had the ability to do so. The advocate is said to earn his living,'.. propounding 
views to which he does not necessarily subscribe and which are sometimes anathema to him, 
on behalf of clients whose conduct may not interest him, will often offend him and can 
occasionally cause him outrage ..' (Pannick , 1992, p1). But there are limits to which the 
advocates are expected to go in the representation of their clients. As early as 1889 in the 
Court of Appeal, Lord Esher stated," .. counsel is not bound to degrade himself for the purpose 
of winning his client's case". Neither is it the advocate's job to deceive or mislead the court. 
The advocate should put to the court what is known to be true, the advocates should check out 
the truth of what they are told as far as they can. However unless they actually know that 
something is untrue they are still entitled to put it before the court with a rider which indicates 
that the reliability of the information has not been established, "I am instructed by my client..." 
(Samuels, 1990, p8). Because of the 'professional standards' within which they should operate 
the advocates can sometimes find themselves in the difficult situation of trying to explain to 
their clients why they are prevented from taking the steps and making representations in the 
way that the client would wish, especially if the standards and the suggested method of 
representation clash. But how do the advocates satisfy the demands of the client and the 
demands of the court, or indeed do they? To some it appears that the key value of the solicitor 
in the courtroom is to ,'.. aid the smooth running and administration of the court by 'sorting out' 
the awkward defendant by providing a line of communication between accuser and accused, 
unhindered by language problems' (Williamson, 1980, p51). In the United States, Emerson saw 
the lawyer's 'pitch' as emphasising,'.. the strong points of the delinquent's life and character, 
note any features of his general situation that tend to diminish responsibility for the commission 
of a serious delinquent act by appealing to sociological and social frameworks' (Emerson, 1969, 
p189). Likewise in England, the Carien study was told by some defendants ' ..that the solicitor 
who works regularly in one court is often more prepared to accept the police version of events 
than their own, and that the best the solicitor is prepared to do in court is not to represent their
own views, but instead to represent them as a character worthy of clemency, treatment or a 
second chance' (Carien, 1976, p91).
1.1.3.2 Clients or commodities - the mvth of legal representation.
In the previous section the role and the responsibilities of the advocate were 
discussed in some detail, but as has already been indicated by the views expressed by some of 
the observers from outside of the legal profession, not everyone sees the advocates in the role 
of the 'champion of the defendant'. For example Carien claimed that'.. technically the solicitor 
is supposed to represent the interests of his client in court, this supposition is mythical' (Carien, 
1976, p91). Solicitors were often seen as being so closely in tune with the Bench's sentencing 
policy that they were seen as part of an integrated 'back loop' which acted to reinforce Bench 
practices. It was even claimed that the solicitors who appeared regularly in the same court 
developed their mitigation rules in line with the operational rules of that court (Parker et al, 
1981, p59). Studies in the Crown Court found that the defendants frequently found it difficult to 
decide whose side their barrister was on, 'so closely did he appear to be involved with the 
prosecutor" (Baldwin and McConville, 1977, p85). One of the Guildford Four, Paul Hill, recalling 
the events of his trial wrote, 'I used to watch our barristers in court... In the conventions of the 
English bar it is said that such men are merely advocates doing their job, that they have no 
personal interest or feeling towards the defendant. That is untrue. Havers and Hill revelled in 
what they were doing, it was written on their faces. Yet, and at first it was odd to see, our 
barristers, the men fighting for us, seemed not to harbour any antipathy towards Havers and 
Hill. Indeed, they were pally, they seemed more at ease talking to them than to us. I got the 
impression that any of our barristers could easily have gone to Havers' seat and taken over the 
running of the prosecution. They were no different' (Hill, 1990, p135).
Criticisms were also made of solicitors because it was said that they tended to view 
many defendants, and particularly those who were legally aided, as commodities to be sought 
after and accumulated and to have little interest in their cases (Bankowski and Mungham, 
1976, p58). This claim was also supported by the experiences of some of the defendants in the 
Carien study, who on being directed to apply for legal aid found that they were subjected to an 
outside court training on what they had to say inside. Such training often being in the last ten 
minutes before a case was heard and often by a young solicitor whom they had never seen 
before (Carien, 1976, p91).
1.1.3.3 It's iust a game to them, they don't see it as someone's whole life at stake
Parker et al, found that magistrates made reference,'.. to unprepared advocates who
ask for adjournments on the slightest grounds, this causing delays in the administration of
justice'. They also perceived defence lawyers as inhibiting their search for the 'truth of the
case'. At worst they were seen to distort the truth by presenting only the defendant's side, and
by their mere presence they obstructed any possibility of direct communication between the
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bench and the defendant. (Parker et al, 1989, p98). However some of these criticisms were 
considered by some of the 'more informed' members of the judiciary to be misguided. Samuels 
wrote, 'Magistrates are sometimes too ready to condemn their [the advocates] conduct and 
ethics, without perhaps fully appreciating the problems and difficulties besetting the advocate 
dealing with a client facing a criminal charge' (Samuels, 1990, p8).
Neither have the probation officers been slow in expressing opinions about the 
defence solicitors. One probation officer told Carien, 'The trouble with solicitors, .. it's just a 
game to them. They don't see it as someone's whole life at stake" (Carien, 1976, p53). 
Although it must be admitted that not all defence solicitors are viewed in the same way. Some 
are seen as able, professional, well prepared and conscientious, while there are others who are 
seen as being on easy money, not making a real effort to present their client's case, poorly 
briefed, just trotting out the usual stock phrases (Brown, 1991, p85), and using social enquiry 
reports [pre-sentence reports] for scripting pleas of mitigation (Carien, 1976, p55).
1.1.3.4 The 'ministers of justice' - the prosecutors.
In the nineteen seventies, most of the prosecuting in the magistrates' courts was
undertaken by the police themselves, a situation which at the time was seen to be not without
its problems. Whilst it was not disputed that many of the police officers who prosecuted were
both very competent and very experienced, they were not,'.. as people who had investigated
the cases themselves, altogether detached and impartial' (Green, 1990, p195). In practice 'the
prosecuting counsel should not attempt to obtain a conviction by all means at his command. ..
He should lay before the Court fairly and impartially the whole of the facts which comprise the
case for the prosecution and should assist the Court on all matters of law applicable to the
case' (Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales, 1990). The Crown Prosecution
Service (CPS), was formed in 1986 to cany out the prosecutions on behalf of the police. The
CPS considers itself as, '.. being essentially reactive. Rather than setting its own prosecution
policy, it sees its job as carrying out, efficiently, police prosecution policy (Leng, McConville
and Sanders, 1992, p134). But the CPS do have the responsibility for deciding if a matter
should be prosecuted in the courts. When deciding whether or not to proceed with a
prosecution, the CPS lawyer has to decide whether certain criteria have been satisfied. 'Firstly,
.. is there sufficient substantial, admissable and reliable evidence that a criminal offence has
been committed and is there a realistic prospect of conviction?' If the answer is yes, then it
should be asked, ' ..does the public interest require a prosecution?' (In the Public Interest, A
CPS pamphlet). If a prosecution is proceeded with, it is the job of the CPS lawyer to put the
facts fairly and impartially before the court, the prosecutor must always ensure that all relevant
legislation and authority, whether in favour of the prosecution or otherwise, and any procedural
irregularities are brought to the attention of the court. The duty not to mis-lead the court places
on the advocate a positive responsibility to ensure that any factual information is .. completely
accurate (National Standards of Advocacy: A Guide for Crown Prosecutors). Even before the
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onset of the CPS, McBamet saw the prosecutors as being at something of a disadvantage in 
their dealings in the court in that, the prosecutor seems to be given all duties and the 
defendant all the privileges. The rhetoric poses the trial as a test for the prosecution. The 
accused need do nothing'. Although in practice it was also seen that this advantage was 
somewhat eroded in that the defence had unequal access to information (McBamet, 1981, 
pp102,111). Whilst the prosecutor is expected to comply with the standards as outlined above, 
'.. there is no reason why the prosecution should lean over backwards to help the defence in 
their mitigation of a case, but there is every reason for assisting the unrepresented defendants 
to the best of their ability' (Crowther, 1990, p33).
1.1.3.5 The gap between the standards and the actual level of performance.
But despite all of the performance standards and claims of fairness and impartiality, 
the prosecutors still manage to be the objects of criticism. In 1977 the defendants complained 
that in the final analysis, it is the prosecution version of events that is accepted by the courts, 
.. even though it is, in their view, frequently incomplete and distorted, and is therefore viewed 
by the defendant with a sense of injustice' (Baldwin and McConville, 1977, p113). Even with the 
creation of the CPS, the magistrates were very critical of, ' .. young, inexperienced CPS 
lawyers, unprepared, inarticulate and unknown. .. They also questioned the level of 
discontinuences on prosecutions (Raine and Willson, 1993, p30). In the study area, the CPS 
were critcised for watering down charges with the result that,'.. violent offenders are escaping 
justice because assault charges are being downgraded by the prosecutors who want to cut 
costs' (The Advertiser, March 12/1993). Crowther also questioned some of the facts that the 
CPS were producing to the courts, and in particular the defendants' antecedant histories, which 
he suspected, were seriously wrong in more than 50 per cent of cases' (Crowther, 1990, 
p138).
1.1.3.6 A source of unbiased information.
Do the criticisms outlined in the previous section affect the influence that the CPS has 
on the decision makers? Parker et al concluded that most of the critical comments related only 
to the professional competence and efficiency of the prosecutors. They were not seen as 
introducing bias to the proceedings by attempting to make things appear worse than they really 
were. Their conclusion was, 'It may well be that the prosecutors, distanced from the offender in 
terms of source information, and distanced from the sentencing process in terms of making 
recommendations to the court, were seen as a source of unbiased information' (Parker et al, 
1989. p99).
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1.1.4 THE PROBATION OFFICER.
1.1.4.1 The Probation Service, a criminal justice or a social work agency?
In the 1970s the Probation Services were seen almost as independent social work 
agencies with the function of 'advising, assisting and befriending the defendants/clients'. The 
Probation Service of 1993 is seen in a very different light with officers required to work within 
agreed policies and with a much greater level of accountability both internally as well as to 
central government (Raine and Willson, 1993, p29). First and foremost the Probation Service 
has to respond to the wishes of the court. It is a criminal justice agency, and as officers of the 
court the probation officers must implement programmes in the way envisaged by the courts 
(Jones et al, 1992, p40). Historically the Probation Service has also been seen to have had a 
predominantly rehabilitative approach, for example a probation order was not necessarily 
viewed as a punishment, a situation which the Criminal Justice Act of 1991 sought to redress. 
Amongst its many recommendations was one where the person convicted of a crime should be 
referred to as 'the offender1 rather than ' the probationer* (Wasik and Taylor, 1991, p49). There 
was now a government requirement for the officers to be agents of the court overseeing the 
sentences of punishment in the community, '..a role which many probation officers resist' 
(Graef, 1993, p6). Graef claims that the criminal justice system sees the probation officers as 
being on the side of the criminal but he argues that if they are, then this is only in response to a 
positive requirement, because 'nobody else in the system looks to the offenders' needs'. 
Others consider that in pursuing the role that it has, the Probation Service has provided the 
maintenance of a necessary equilibrium between the interests of criminal justice and those of 
social welfare (Harris, 1988, in a paper presented at Madingley College, cited in Jones et al, 
1992, p42).
1.1.4.2 There is a requirement to plav to the rules of the game.
In The Probation Handbook', probation officers are advised that, '.. the court game 
has to be played by the rules, whatever your feelings about that may be' (Jones et al, 1992, 
p78). In their 1981 study of the magistrates' courts, Parker et al. also found that most of the 
probation officers in their sample subscribed to the necessity for game playing. It was also 
found that in the actual courtroom setting, the presentation and performance of the probation 
officers was characterised by 'passivity'. Apart from actually providing reports, which had been 
prepared by the Probation Service at the request of, and for consideration by the sentencers, 
the officers generally kept a low profile (Parker et al, 1981, p129).
1.1.4.3 Well meaning but soft vet sometimes cruelly unfair - The Probation Service's
relationships with the other court users.
In their study of the early nineteen eighties, Parker et al, found that probation officers
were critical of the majority of Benches for being too middle aged, too middle class and often
11
lacking the necessary insight into the social world of those they judged. Neither were they 
satisfied with the performance of many defence solicitors and particularly those who practiced 
in the juvenile courts, whom were described as, ' ..money making, middle class plagiarists'. 
With regard to their relationships with the police, these were considered by most probation 
officers to be 'quite good' (Parker et al, 1981, pp133-134), although it was recognised that the 
police considered them to be, '..well meaning but soft' (Carien, 1976, p51).
It was not only the police who held this view. Later in the decade, Parker et al found 
that there was a consensus that the Probation Service was still seen as being more concerned 
about helping people and not tough enough for the more heavily convicted offender (Parker et 
al, 1989, pp94-95). Samuels was also critical of the Probation Service and in particular their 
apparent total rejection of the use of custody as an alternative in sentencing. He wrote, 'Nobody 
likes custody. But alas sometimes it is really inescapable or virtually so. Yet the Probation 
Service always recommend a non-custodial sentence, refuses to face up to a custodial 
sentence'. This policy can also be unfair on the defendant in that it can raise false hopes. 
Samuels warns, 'Beware of raising false hopes and expectations. A recommendation for 
probation or community service when custody is very likely, and indeed happens, may be a 
very cruel practice'. Samuels also expressed his concern about the lack of two way 
communication between the magistracy and the Probation Service, communication which he 
considered to be essential for the good of the criminal justice system, the public and the 
defendant (Samuels, 1989, p121).
1.1.5 THE DEFENDANT
1.1.5.1 To be or not to be - a cool, calculating strategist, or a diffident, remorse 
dominated apologist
Defendants have been described in numerous ways, rights assertive, the strategist,
remorse dominated and passive (White, 1985, p60-61). In reality however, expressions of
genuine remorse are exceedingly rare and very few defendants could be said to be contrite,
indeed, 'expressions of cynicism, bitterness and anger are far more common' (Baldwin and
McConville, 1977, p108). This view confirmed the earlier findings of Carien who had observed,
'indifference, fear, contempt or hatred', as the most marked features of the defendants'
attitudes towards the courts (Carien, 1976, p33).
The defendants in court have been observed as being, typically confused, worried
and relatively inarticulate', conditions which the court procedures do little to alleviate. First time
offenders in particular expressed their sense of confusion and a feeling of being excluded from
the process (Bottoms and McLean, 1976, p134). Even in Sweden, where there is less formality
about the court hearings, one study found that 90 per cent of the defendants in the sample
claimed that they still felt vulnerable and exposed in the courtroom (Adelsward, Aronsson arid
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Linell, 1985, p7). Not that a demonstration of confidence by the defendants would necessarily 
be welcomed by the courts. In the opinion of McBamet, defendants are not expected, 'to play 
the role of the confident punch pulling advocates, .. because it clashes with the incompetence 
and deference routinely demanded of the lower classes who dominate the courts. .. The 
defendant may be diffident, nervous, contrite, he may not be cool, calculating or tricky, unless 
of course he is that rarity, an unrepresented, middle class defendant(McBamet, 1981, p135). 
According to Carien, the defendant in the magistrates' court, 'is by definition an incompetent 
member of society' (Carien, 1976, p129).
1.1.5.2 The blindfolded man in a maze - one defendant's perception.
Within the contests of the court, the defendant has been described as, ' the dummy 
player absorbing both the gains and losses of all the other contestants’ (Carien, 1976, p42), or 
as 'a pawn in the information games of the courtroom' (Brown, 1991, p13). They are unlikely to 
understand in more than a superficial way what is taking place, let alone participate effectively 
in the proceedings. Defendants are seen to be external to the network of intimate relationships 
which comprise the regular make-up of the court, a network whose objectives are not 
necessarily concordant with those of the defendant (Baldwin and McConville, 1977, p84). The 
defendants themselves expressed dissatisfaction with their courtroom experiences, an 
experience which often left them feeling frustrated and alienated in a ceremony which 
frequently appeared to them as being unreal. As one defendant described his experience, "I 
never made any decisions, they were all taken for m e... I was just being dragged along on the 
tide of what they [the solicitors and barristers] said. It's just like a blindfolded man being guided 
through a maze. I had to go, but I wasn't sure where I was going" (Baldwin and McConville, 
1977, p86).
1.1.5.3 Defendants don't expect to receive justice ...
Many defendants do not expect justice to be done in the magistrates' courts, which
are seen as amateurish and pro-police. Neither are their opinions of the Crown Court much
better. In the opinion of one persistent offender,".. the legal system is bollocks 'cos in the end
it's up to the judge and his views and attitudes on life. And all them judges, they're brought up
in upper class backgrounds, and they can't look at life from our point of view. .. The law puts
more of a sentence on money than they do on peoples lives, I think that's disgusting' (Graef,
1993, p109). As has been indicated in previous sections, many would argue that if 'magistrate'
was substituted for 'judge' and 'middle class’ for 'upper class’, there would still be a large
element of truth in this defendant's statement. But if the defendants do not have confidence in,
or respect for the courts, how do they cope with the situation in which they find themselves?
One way is for the defendant to mentally withdraw from the process and, 'let the proceedings
take their course as if they were not present' (Baldwin and McConville, 1977, p92). Another way
is to play along with the situation, a ploy which Blumberg called the 'cop-out' and which is in
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essence a charade. In doing this, the accused is expected to project an appropriate and 
acceptable degree of guilt. Providing that the defendants play their part, the judiciary will 
assume that the defendant is contrite and is showing remorse and this will be taken into 
account in the ultimate decision. Blumberg saw this as, 'a highly structured system of 
exchange, cloaked in the rituals of legalism and public professions of guilt and repentance. .. 
For the accused, his conception of self as a guilty person is largely temporary. In private he will 
quickly re-assert his innocence' (Blumberg,1967a, p89).
1.1.6 INTER-GROUP INTERACTION
1.1.6.1 Interaction in the magistrates* courts is a matter of uneasy compromise.
In reviewing Parker’s study of the courts in the early nineteen eighties, Cavanagh 
expressed the opinion that, 'If team is an appropriate expression at all, .. then there are three 
teams, the prosecution, the defence and the bench, each performing its own function which is 
different to that of any other* (Cavanagh, 1981, p192). But however disparate these teams are, 
it is essential that they develop good working relationships. As one Chief Clerk informed 
Carien, "..the chief thing about a court if it is going to function at all, is that we all have to get 
on with each other "(Carien, 1976, p43). Not only is it the courts which are dependant on good 
inter-team relationships, so is the whole of the criminal justice system. Writing in 'The 
Magistrate', Faulkner, the Principal Establishment Officer at the Home Office, told its readers 
that in carrying forward the government's policies on sentencing, supervision of offenders, the 
treatment of victims and the prevention and reduction of crime, the successful implementation 
of these policies depended on the effective cooperation between the courts, the operational 
services, the practicing legal profession and voluntary organisations, a sense of common 
purpose which could not be imposed. He added, 'Effective cooperation is not easy to achieve. 
There are deep differences in the background, outlook, expectations of both the services and 
those who make their careers in them (Faulkner, 1991, p73).
So how do these teams cooperate in order to achieve this sense of common 
purpose? According to Carien, only with some difficulty. Situational alliances are formed which 
prevent, 'constant open conflict between overtly opposed professional teams within the court’. 
But even so the the pervading mode of interaction between the different legal and enforcement 
teams represented in the magistrates'courts .. is one uneasy compromise'. But not all alliances 
are formed for the 'common purpose'. It is accepted that some alliances are made in order for 
teams to either, 'maximise their gains or to minimise their losses'. For example, solicitors will 
use their credibility as 'good .lawers with a social conscience', in order to obtain information 
from probation officers. In turn, many probation officers feel that they can do a better job for 
their clients if they have built up good relationships with the police. All of the groups feel that 
there is a need to be in good standing with the magistrates.
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Whilst it is acknowledged that these alliances do exist, and that they are in the 
opinion of many court professionals, 'an inevitable and integral part of the game’. It was 
considered important that the existence of these alliances should not be apparent to either the 
defendants or the magistrates. The 'images of justice must not be tarnished by careless 
explication of subterranean assumptions of court solidarity' (Carlen, 1976, pp 42-60).
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1.2 TRADITIONS. RITUALS. EFFICIENCY AND JUSTICE.
1.2.1 THE RITUALS. LAYOUTS AND LANGUAGE OF THE COURTS.
1.2.1.1 Magistrates' Courts - the image and the reality.
In 1981 McBamet wrote, to enter the lower courts is to be taken aback by the 
casualness and rapidity of the proceedings'. In support of this statement she claimed that the 
things which are normally associated with the courts of law, the solemnity of the occasion, the 
skills of advocacy, the adversarial joust, the slow and careful precision of the evidence were all 
conspicuous by their absence. The way in which the courts were conducted may even have 
conveyed the impression that the business which was being dealt with was 'trivial'. But was this 
by accident or design? In the opinion of McBamet it was not due to any oversight, but an 
impression cultivated overtime in order that the magistrates' courts could operate without 
consideration to a pre-requisite of true justice, due process. As she reminds us the offences 
and the penalties may seem trivial to the onlooker but are often seen as being far from trivial 
by the recipients of the penalties (McBamet, 1981, p123, pp143-147).This last point was also 
graphically illustrated by one of the defendants interviewed by Carlen in her study of the 
Metropolitan Magistrates’ Courts. The defendant told her, "It looks like a game, but when you 
get sent down you know it's bloody well for real" (Carlen,1976, p94).
It is also claimed that much of the research which has taken place in the English 
justice system during the last thirty years has shown that the perception that the English trial 
system is the fairest in the world is also misconceived and that the only people who still persist 
with this view, 'are those whose aquaintance with other jurisdictions are minimal' (Baldwin and 
Bottomley, 1978, p131).
Whilst recognising that there are large numbers of both practitioners and observers 
who see the British justice system as being in crisis, Allan Green, a former Director of Public 
Prosecutions argued that this could well be a matter of degree and even one of perspective. In 
expressing his own view, he saw it more as a 'crisis of confidence in relation to the system 
which is basically sound' (Green, 1990, p191).
1.2.1.2 A symbolic reassertion of order and authority, or a means of self-justification -
Rituals and symbolism.
Rituals, including the ritual of criminal justice, are ceremonies which, through the
manipulation of peoples emotions, prompt particular value commitments on the part of both the
participants and the onlookers and therefore act as a kind of 'sentimental education' which
generates a particular mentality and a particular sensibility. In the opinion of Garland, many see
the rituals which are embodied by the criminal justice system as a focus for the diffuse
concerns, worries and emotions that constitute the public mood in relation to crime. The
procedures are seen as more than just some instrumental mechanisms by which individual
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offenders can be processed, they are seen ' as symbolic reassertions of order and authority 
which help deal with the feelings of helplessness, disorder and insecurity which crime 
introduces into their lives' (Garland, 1990, pp67-68).
In her study of the magistrates' courts, Carlen demonstrated how spatial organisation, 
temporal routines and linguistic codes were all employed by the courts, not only to emphasize 
the symbolic meaning of the occasion but also to underline the existence of a hierarchical 
structure in which the various participants are allocated their places dependant upon their 
status. The rhetorical presentation of both the legal and judicial personnel is reinforced by the 
use of 'supportive props and scenic devices of the temporal and spatial conventions', also used 
is, 'collusive inter-professional showmanship'. In support of her arguments, Carlen cites a 
number of examples. One of these is the way in which the magistrates' entrance to the 
courtroom is, 'both staged and heralded'. Another is the way that the usher ensures that the 
magistrate, 'is granted deference throughout the court hearing'. Carlen also noted that there 
was a concerted effort among the professional groups to portray an appearance of 'authority 
and wisdom’. This is done by the use of a self-justificatory vocabulary where among others, the 
magistrate becomes, 'Your worship', and the clerk to the court, the learned clerk'. The fixtures 
and fittings of the courtroom also have their legal and presentational significance. These 
include the raised position of the bench which denotes the status of the magistrates, the railed 
and guarded dock which denotes the captive state of the defendant and the witness box, which 
without any of the symbols of detention signifies the voluntary status of the witness (Carlen, 
1976, pp21,31).
But there are those who argue that not all of the courtroom procedures are 
implemented in order to emphasize the symbolism of the courts, but that many have been 
developed overtime for good practical and organisational reasons (Atkinson and Drew, 1989, 
pp222-232). However there are still those who would argue that the court procedures have 
been symbolised to such a level that, the inexperienced defendant can often be placed at an 
acute disadvantage' (Fitzgerald and Muncie, 1983, p85).
1.2.1.3 The wav in which people are positioned in the courtroom can be crucial to
their ability to participate in the proceedings.
The spacing and placing of people on formal occasions, such as a court hearing, can
be strategic to their ability to effectively participate in the proceedings. A situation which Carlen
claims is often exploited in the magistrates’ courts by the way that the defendants, the main
protagonists in the drama, are usually allocated the position farthest away from the
magistrates. A policy which is seen to create a great deal of misunderstanding due to the
defendant being excluded from hearing much of the dialogue and therefore causes the
proceedings to be regularly puntuated by a series of 'pardons' or 'blank stares' (Carlen, 1976,
pp21-23). In addition, the rules of spacing and placing on ritualistic occasions will indicate the
roles of those who are officially involved in the proceedings, define their territorial rights and
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define the relative status of the people present (Emerson, 1969 p175: Carlen, 1976, p21). In 
the traditional English courtrooms, spatial dominance is often achieved by means of structural 
elevation, with the magistrates raised up above the rest. The defendant is also raised to a 
higher level than the other participants, not as high as the magistrates, but high enough to be in 
the public view.
But are these spatial arrangements designed as part of the ritual, or are there also 
practical advantages in organising the physical features of the courts in the way that they are? 
Atkinson and Drew suggest that in order to satisfy the requirements of, 'public audibility and 
understandibility', in what is in reality a 'public' court, then to see and categorise who is 
currently talking would seem crucial if monitoring by all those present is to be a practical 
possibility', even though it is conceded that for some of the participants the process may seem 
both oppressive and unpleasant (Atkinson and Drew, 1979, p222). But in using this argument 
they do query whether the occasion does need to be repressive or whether the proceedings 
should be humanised along the lines which have been adopted by the Swedish courts. In the 
lower courts in Sweden, the judges do not sit on a raised platform, nor are the defendants 
confined in a dock, neither is there a requirement for people to stand whilst addressing the 
court. Instead the judge sits behind a desk, the defendants sit with their advocates, and the 
prosecution and the defence sit facing each other across a distance of five or six metres, from 
behind tables which are set apart from the public.
1.2.1.4 The legal language, a method of symbolic control.
Whatever else is said about the proceedings in the magistrates' courts, there appears 
to be very little disagreement in 'the fact that talk is all pervasive and a highly significant 
feature'. The fact that the language used has been designed in order to provide for a, 'higher 
degree of specifity and standardisation', than that used in the more general areas of social life, 
is one of the reasons that some observers of the court scene are critical of the legal procedures 
(Atkinson and Drew, 1979, p10). Indeed Carlen argues that the use of formal language, a 
language which is unfamiliar to the vast majority of defendants, means that they play the 
'information game' under a handicap (Carlen, 1976, p81). Neither is this situation unintentional, 
but a policy by which the boundaries of formal symbolic control in the courts are created 
(Carlen, 1976, pp98-104).
Clerks to the courts are under a statutory obligation to state the detail of the specific
offence with which the accused person is charged, in ordinary language and avoiding as far as
is possible the use of technical terms. It is also conceded that many of the magistrates and
clerks do go to elaborate lengths to explain to the defendants the meanings of the legal
phraseology which needs to be used, but often to no avail. The defendants either do not hear or
still do not understand (Carlen, 1976, p22). In fact some would argue that the situation can
even be exacerbated. Defendants, who are already fearful by being in an unfamiliar
environment and frequently in the dock, can be further confused by attempts to explain the
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formal rules and legal meanings to them (Fitzgerald and Muncie, 1983, p85). Difficulties in 
hearing are said to be endemic in the magistrates' courts, but Carlen argues that poor 
accoustics cannot bear the total responsibility for what is in reality a 'chronic breakdown in 
communication'.
Neither does the problem rest solely with the spoken word. There are also criticisms 
of the documentation which is used to communicate with people who are not regularly involved 
in the courts. 'The convoluted legal phraseology of court summonses and other documents 
place some defendants and witnesses in some confusion about what to do' (Raine, Feb.1991, 
p5). Neither is everything that is communicated within the actual courtroom necessarily 
communicated orally. Carlen observed that to cope with the mass of 'situationally evolved 
knowledge' which needs to be instantly decoded 'an elaborate system of signalling has 
developed between the regular court officials, a system from which the defendant is excluded'. 
The system consists of a network of signs, gestures and cues, and Carjen claims that things 
which cannot even be said within the confines of the magistrates' room, can be written in 
between the lines of the social enquiry report [Pre-sentence report] (Carlen,1976, pp75-76).
1.2.2 PROCEDURE AND CONTROL.
1.2.2.1 A presumption of innocence or an implicit assumption of guilt The 'due 
process' and ‘crime control' models in the magistrates' courts.
In the nineteen sixties, the American scholar Herbert Packer, reasoned that systems
of criminal justice needed to be examined to determine to what extent they corresponded to the
theoretical models of 'due process' and 'crime control'. In the due process model the major
principles were a presumption of innocence and a requirement that the guilt of the accused be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. It suggested a system where the onus of proof was placed
firmly with the police and the prosecutors. The due process model represented a formal and
judicial criminal justice system. In the crime control model the formal judicial procedure is
replaced by more informal administrative processes. It is a system where the emphasis is
placed on the speedy processing of suspects and defendants, where the presumption of
innocence is replaced by an implicit presumption of guilt. In identifying these two models
Packer admitted that in isolation they could not accurately define what went on in the courts
and neither was he setting them up as models for what should be, 'but just as a convenient way
to talk about the operation of a process whose day to day functioning involves a constant series
of minute adjustments between the competing demands of two value systems' (Packer, 1968,
p153). A decade or so later Packer's theories were in fact questioned by King who, whilst
agreeing that they could be adequately applied to the trial situation, considered that they were
not adequate for explaining the procedures which were used when dealing with guilty pleas.
King identified a further four models, the 'medical model', the 'bureaucratic model', the 'status-
passage model' and the 'power model'. King claimed that whilst each of the six models satisfied
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a different social function, there was considerable overlap and none should be considered as 
mutually exclusive. The aim of the due process model was justice, whilst the crime control 
model was more concerned with punishment, the aim of the medical model was rehabilitation, 
whilst the bureaucratic model concentrated on the efficient and economic management of 
crime and criminals. Of the final two models, the status-passage model tried to ensure the 
public shaming of the defendants, its two key words being denunciation and degradation, the 
power model was there for the maintenance of class domination, to reinforce class values, to 
alienate the defendant and to emphasise the differences between the judges and the judged 
(King, 1981, Chapters).
The proponents of the English justice system have no doubts that the system 
conforms in every way with the due process model and even the critics admit that the model 
does conform with the rhetoric of the English system. These supporters see the crime control 
model as being inapplicable and inappropriate and usually reject it totally, a rejection which 
White suggests is somewhat premature. In support of this argument he makes reference to the 
high number of guilty pleas which are processed by the courts, a procedure where no proof of 
guilt is required, where there is no independent assessment of the evidence and where the 
adversarial procedures on which the court system is based are almost totally absent. The 
processes which have resulted in the conviction have mainly taken place in the police station 
where 'all the evidence shows routine violations of the rules designed to protect the interests of 
the suspects' (White, 1985, p114). Neither is White’s view an isolated opinion. McBamet 
suggests that the lower courts are deliberately structured in defiance of the ideology of justice 
and are therefore much less concerned with this ideology than they are with direct control. 
'Almost all criminal law is acted out in the lower courts without traditional due process' 
(McBamet, 1981, p153). Carlen describes the notion of due proces as 'an euphemistic gloss on 
the articulated play which occurs between legal and enforcement personnel' (Carlen, 1976, 
p42). More recently Sanders and Young wrote, 'It is no exaggeration to say that the magistrates 
are crime control courts overlaid with a thin layer of due processing'. They purport that at every 
stage in the procedure the defendants are 'saddled with handicaps' which reduces their 
willingness or ability to insist on their rights in the courts (Sanders and Young, 1994, p304).
1.2.2.2 A iust criminal justice process should meet certain minimum criteria -
The need for procedures.
There is a requirement for a just criminal justice process to fulfil certain minimum
criteria. The system needs to be open, with individuals aware of what is happening and why.
Those involved should know how they can influence the course of events, especially for the
matters which concern them. The powers and extent of the discretion of the decision makers
needs to be explained at all stages of the process and these powers should be subject to
scrutiny. The reasons for decisions should be made explicit (Baldwin and Bottomley, 1978, p5).
But there is also an argument that if these requirements are to be met then the procedures
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need to be formalised, The adversarial elements which underpin the process need to be 
subjected to controls. The verbal exchanges which are a fundamental element of the 
proceedings, take place in a setting where there are often several parties with competing 
aspirations and goals, and who all wish to put forward their version of the argument.The order 
in which they are allowed to put their arguments and even the way in which they are allowed to 
present the argument may well need to be predetermined, or even limited. If not there is always 
the danger that just anyone who is present may begin talking as and when it suits them and 
without due consideration for the other parties present. It is argued that this formalisation not 
only assists in the control of the proceedings but also aids the collection of 'relevant and 
impartial evidence’ , as well as contributing to the assessment of its validity. Atkinson and Drew 
state that there is an argument that this formalisation of the legal procedures can be seen to be 
necessary in respect of the verbal exchanges which take place 'on the grounds that, were 
mundane ways of talking left unattended to arrive at decisions on the sorts of matters dealt with 
by the courts, all safeguards against the ad hoc, prejudicial, biased and haphazard resolution of 
disputes would be lost (Atkinson and Drew, 1979, p9).
In theory the criminal court trial is seen as a relatively well defined communication 
situation. There is a clearly detailed structure with certain fixed norms of interaction. There are 
rules which govern the way that certain topics should be treated. The participants are subjected 
to a system of 'taking turns'. However, 'in actual practice there is considerable variation. Actor 
roles and interaction rules are implemented somewhat differently and participants make 
different assumptions about the major goals and functions of the trial'. On the one hand the trial 
is a well defined situation, on the other hand it is complex and involves subtle accommodation 
processes and compromising attempts at attaining several and conflicting goals (Adelsward, 
Aronsson and Linell, 1985, pp30-32).
1.2.2.3 Whose system is it. the professional court users or the accused?
So there are procedures and there are rules, rules which have been developed to
ensure that a sense of order is maintained throughout the proceedings, which otherwise might
well deteriorate into an indecisive and unedified 'free for all' if people were allowed to join in
and make verbal contributions when and how they pleased. But Baldwin and Bottomley argue
that procedures on their own, however 'just' they are claimed to be, are inadequate if they fall
short of the ideals of justice. In their view, the criteria against which new procedures and
policies should be measured are those of a criminal justice process responsive to society and
answerable to it, rather than a more private kind of justice which revolves around concerns
such as professional status and organisational efficiency, thereby elevating self-interest and
bureaucracy above the ideals of a more truly social justice' (Baldwin and Bottomley, 1978, p5).
Other observers have also been critical of the way that the legal system gives the appearance
of being organised around the needs and the priorities of the professionals, including the
magistrates, and where the role of the laity is regulated to fit in with them (Raine and Willson,
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1993, p183). This view was endorsed by Low who had told a conference in Cambridge some 
twenty years earlier, "We can almost see the legal system responding before our very eyes to 
the needs of the professional classes, rather than those of the accused persons whose ends it 
is manifestly intended to benefit" (Low, 1973, p17). Carlen claimed that the procedures enabled 
the 'mandarins of justice' to control the legal situation, to control both the type and level of 
information, and also to suppress, 'alternative performances evocative of unpermitted social 
worlds'. In fact whenever the legitimacy of the legal and judicial processes are put under threat, 
remedial routines are invoked to redress the situation (Carlen, 1976, pp104-105).
1.2.2.4 The case of the disadvantaged defendant.
Not only is the defendant put in a position where he or she is unable to challenge the 
court, but the procedure or 'procedural pedantics', routinely exclude the defendant from being 
able to effectively participate in the proceedings of his or her own trial (McBamet, 1981). If this 
view appears to some to be rather extreme or radical, it is not an isolated opinion but one which 
has been expressed in a number of different guises by many of the social scientists and 
criminologists who have earned out studies in the courts during the last thirty years. In the 
nineteen sixties Cavanagh concluded that the court situation, the size, the formality, the 
attendant publicity, the requirement to conform to a set of rules which appeared familiar to 
everyone but the defendant, must put that defendant at a disadvantage (Cavanagh, 1967, p31). 
Baldwin and Bottomley considered that anyone who has seen inarticulate and frightened 
defendants struggling to engage in the technical business of cross-examination in a straight 
forward case, even in the lower courts, will have felt the same sense of frustration and 
humiliation that the defendants must have experienced. In their opinion this 'cannot be squared 
with justice' (Baldwin and Bottomley, 1978, p131). Others argue that there exists fundamental 
and inherent biases in the judicial process which operate very much to the detriment of the 
naive, the inarticulate and the powerless (Baldwin and McConville, 1977, p95). Atkinson and 
Drew discovered that defendants had been described in various ways, baffled, bullied, 
thwarted, misunderstood, coerced, oppressed and manipulated. Neither were these numerous 
and unpleasant experiences.considered to have resulted from pure coincidence, but rather as a 
result of the activities and utterances of judicial and court officials and from the way that the 
occasion is organised (Atkinson and Drew, 1979, p11). Carien's detailed study of the 
magistrates' courts concluded that the trials in the lower courts far from being an impartial 
weighing of each side's case, as is claimed in the rhetoric of the legal system, are in reality no 
more than elaborate games, rituals, in which those who regularly participate know the rules, 
whilst the defendants are just there to act as the 'dummy players' and absorb the gains and 
losses of the other players. If the defendant steps out of the prescribed role and challenges the 
absolutism of the legal rules on the. grounds of ' ..an overt appeal to commonsense, the 
defendant's challenge can be portrayed as being either out of place, out of time, out of mind or 
out of orderi (Carlen, 1976, p104).
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The plight of the defendant has been recognised by those within the system. Indeed 
in Sweden attempts have been made to make the criminal trial much less formal and solemn. 
Despite this, an overwhelming majority of defendants still maintain that standing trial remains 
an upsetting experience (Adelsward, Aronsson and Linell, 1979, p7). Whilst nothing as 
'revolutionary' as this has been undertaken by the English courts, Rosemary Thompson, then a 
Deputy Chairman of the Council of the Magistrates' Association, wrote to its members on the 
subject of 'Dealing with Disadvantage'. She reminded the magistrates and particularly court 
chairmen, 'how alien and unfamiliar a court actually is to defendants and witnesses'. How 
difficult it is for those who are not familiar with the courts to identify the various roles, and how 
baffling the procedures can be. She was particularly critical of the language which she 
described as arcane and which 'assumes that everyone in court is well educated and articulate'. 
So how can the court chairman assist the situation and ensure that both the witnesses and 
defendants are able to communicate to the court and say what they want say without too much 
unnecessary stress? The things which Thompson considered to be totally inappropriate were 
'overbearing, domineering or uninterested demeanours'. So too is the language which is too full 
of legal expression and jargon. The chairman needs to be alert to non-understanding and ready 
to explain decisions in the simplest and most everyday language which is consonant with the 
dignity of the court. It needs to be recognised that witnesses do attend court in order to help the 
judicial process and that defendants are innocent until proved guilty. Neither group should find 
that the experience of attending at court itself causes greater anxiety and tension than is 
inevitable. The chairman should ensure therefore, ' ..that they deal with everyone with 
perception, understanding and sensitivity to any kind of disadvantage they may feel' 
(Thompson, 1992, pp111-112).
1.2.2.5 The courtroom ceremony, unnecessarily humiliating or an appropriate part of
punishment process?
The courtroom ritual has been perceived as a degradation ceremony, a ceremony
which allows society to express its moral indignation by affecting the ritual destruction of the
accused, who is portrayed as an enemy of the people and their consensus values. It is in reality
'a ceremonial stripping of a man of his dignity' and acts as a prelude to the judicial punishment.
The courtroom proceeding is organised as a ceremonial confrontation between the legal order
and the person who is said to have violated that order, a confrontation which has been
purposely designed to induce a certain type of impact on the violator. To this end the courtroom
ceremony 'is characteristically organised to degrade and humiliate the delinquent involved'
(Garfinkel, 1956, pp420-424: Emerson, 1969, pp172-174: Carlen, 1976, pp23-24). Indeed,
Carlen claims that 'bewilderment and embarrassment are openly fostered and aggravated,
uncertainty coolly observed and manipulated' (Carlen, 1976, p20). Neither is this practice
universally condemned, indeed there has always been a school of opinion which has regarded
the inconvenience and the humiliating experience of the court appearance as an appropriate
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part of the punishment (Raine and Willson, 1993, p125). But is the degradation ceremony 
common to all courts? The Parker et al study of the early eighties found that whilst the 
'countryside court1 behaved in a 'disagreeably aggressive and bombastic way' towards the 
defendants, the proceedings in the 'city court’ were characterised by civility to all including the 
defendant and his parents by due process (Parker et al, 1981, p49). The fact that there is some 
unacceptable treatment of the defendants appears not to be in dispute. It is a matter which has 
also been condemned by people within the court system as being 'grossly improper1. (Young 
and Clarke, 1980, p24). In their book, 'Chairmanship in Magistrates' Courts', they write, 'Every 
person whatever he may have done, or be alleged to have done, deserves to be treated with 
the dignity that is due to him as a person... It should never be forgotten that the defendant is a 
human being, with the same sensitivity as everyone else'. They do, however, insist that 
courtesy needs to work both ways and if a witness or a defendant shows disrespect or contempt 
for the court then, '..the chairman should not hesitate to rebuke him'. Ralphs and Norman 
writing twelve years later were also advising court chairmen that, The court should never 
further diminish the defendant's dignity'. (Ralphs and Norman, 1992, p17). The Leeds District 
Magistrates' Court issued a set of guidelines to its regular court users in which it stated, The 
main purpose of this document is to reinforce the authority of the court and to ensure that the 
dignity of all court users is recognised and respected. .. Magistrates, officers of the court and 
court staff should address one another and defendants, witnesses and members of the public, 
in a respectful and courteous manner appropriate to their position' (Leeds District Magistrates' 
Court, 1994). Raine during his research in the courts found it reassuring 'that the majority of 
users perceived their personal treatment by the court officials to be satisfactory, though in 
some respects considerable scope for improvement was identified with implications for the 
training of those dealing with the public, this applying particularly to court staff (Raine, 1991,
p6).
But how does the 'degradation ceremony' affect the defendant? Emerson expressed 
the view that, 'Blumberg's finding that the criminal convicted on a guilty plea quickly reasserts 
his innocence,[previously discussed], does not as the author argues, unequivocally indicate that 
the courtroom ceremony is without profoundly degrading effects. Indeed it is a plausible 
suggestion that the post guilt proclamation of innocence reflects exactly the need to re-assert 
and re-establish self on favourable terms after a deeply humiliating experience' (Emerson, 
1969, p214). ,
1.2.2.6 The squalor of its environs. The court waiting areas.
Not only were the courts criticised for the way in which the defendants were treated in
the courtrooms, the waiting areas of many old court buildings were also described as
antiquated, crude and squalid. Conditions which prompted Carlen to comment that, '..the stark
contrast between the ceremony of the courtroom and the squalor of its environs, as well as the
chronic organisational conflicts within the courts, mirrors the contrast between legal rhetoric
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and judicial reality'. Not only was it the squalor of the waiting areas which was criticised but also 
the long waiting time which the defendants were often expected to endure, a time when they 
are said , ' to become more and more nervous, harbouring fears, usually unfounded, that they 
will be sent to prison'. These waiting areas often lacking the necessary facilities to enable the 
defendants to either consult with their solicitors, speak with their probation officer or obtain 
refreshment (Carlen, 1976, p27: Raine, 1991, p5). Not only was it the defendants who were 
subjected to this far from satisfactory environment, witnesses and victims were also expected 
to wait for long hours in the same room as those they were testifying against (Raine and 
Willson, 1993, p36). These were all unsatisfactory situations which warranted change. While 
some were perhaps dependent upon the provision of new buildings, it was also suggested that 
some situations could be improved by, '..block listing to reduce waiting times and smiling staff 
to keep tempers sweet and so on' (Raine, 1993, p50).
1.2.3 JUSTICE AND EFFICIENCY.
1.2.3.1 A Lebanese bazaar, a washing powder commercial, or justice in a magistrates' 
court?
The magistrates' courts have frequently attracted criticism from researchers for the 
way in which they dispense justice and in particular,' ..for their role as a conveyor belt for the 
guilty pleas which constitute 95 per cent of their caseload (McBamet, 1978, p23: 1981a, p181). 
Rosett gained the impression that the guilty plea process,' ..looks more like the purchase of a 
rug in a Lebanese bazaar than like the confrontation between a man and his soul' (Rosett, 
1967, p75). Bottoms and McClean expressed the opinion that the process had much in 
common with a commercial for a washing powder, 'it was slick, rapid and familiar’. A process 
where the emphasis had been placed on speed rather than on fairness (Bottoms and McClean, 
1976, p137). Carlen insists that in the magistrates' court the ideals of justice have been 
'subjugated to organisational efficiency' it is a place where, 'contrived alliances and tacit 
understandings between court officials ensure that the cases are disposed of as quickly as 
possible' (Carlen, 1976, p95). Others have argued that the need for speed has routinised 
magistrates' justice too much (White, 1985, p61), and that many of the injustices which occur 
are essentially the product of a system that gives too little protection to the innocent and too 
often sacrifices the needs of the individual to the requirements of bureaucratic efficiency 
(Baldwin and McConville, 1977, pi 15). McBamet concluded that the positive characteristics of 
summary justice are not legal as much as they are economic and bureaucratic. In short it is 
fast, easy and cheap (McBamet, 1981a, pp189-192).
Lord Donaldson sitting in the Court of Appeal in 1989 stated, "Time spent in court is
costly both to the nation and the parties. It is therefore vital that it is used economically and
effectively" (cited in Pannick, 1992, p194). Samuels as we have seen considered the
administration in the magistrates’ courts, '..little short of scandalous', and that the magistrates'
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courts must qualify as the most inefficient public institution, in which there are 'unacceptable 
delays, users are deeply frustrated, cost is excessive, injustice, alas, inevitably results' 
(Samuels, 1991, p66).
1.2.3.2. Justice delayed is justice denied, justice rushed is justice denied -
Adjournments and delays in the magistrates' courts.
As has already been indicated, a great deal of concern has been expressed by those 
who work in the magistrates' courts about what they see as the inefficiencies within the system, 
and of particular concern are the number of adjournments and the lengths of the delays. The 
Magistrates' Association's Legal Committee communicated to its members its concern about 
the substantial increase in adjournments. Adjournments were requested by prosecutors who 
required time either to prepare advanced disclosure, to review cases in order to decide the 
appropriate charges, or time to obtain further evidence. These were just some of the reasons 
given. On the other hand, the defence request adjournments so that legal aid applications can 
be dealt with, because they have not received the advance disclosure to which they are 
entitled, or just simply because they need to take instructions. Both parties ask for 
adjournments because of the non-availability of witnesses. The committee did remind the 
members that the granting of adjournments is not an administrative decision but a judicial 
decision (The Magistrate, 1993, p69). The question is should adjournments be granted as a 
matter of course? Some argue strongly that the preparation of cases, whether prosecution or 
defence, should not be hurried, 'even if some delay seems wilful on the part of the defendant, 
because to do so would compromise justice' (Raine and Willson, 1993, p152). Alternatively, 
Green, a former Director of Public Prosecutions argues that when there is a delay in the 
proceedings, when cases are adjourned, then witnesses’ memories fade, witnesses move away 
and cannot be brought back to court, and so it is often in the interests of justice that the 
defendant is brought to trial speedily. In Green's opinion, 'Justice delayed is justice denied'. 
However he also concedes that on occasions, ' ..justice rushed is justice denied as well' 
(Green, 1990, p195). Crowther, a banister, a former stipendiary magistrate and Recorder, in an 
address to the Middlesex Area magistrates was critical of the magistrates and their part in 
contributing to the increased delays and costs in their courts. He said, "Lay magistrates are 
often too tolerant of requests for adjournments by defendants, solicitors and the GPS. These 
have become so easy to gain that magistrates no longer ask themselves what is reasonable. If 
they were refused more often, word would soon get around and motivate others to move more 
quickly" (The Magistrate, 1990, p198).
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1.2.3.3 The three E's. economy, efficiency and effectiveness.
In the early nineteen nineties much of the emphasis in the magistrates' courts had 
shifted and was more concerned with managerial organisation and administrative performance. 
The three E's of economy, efficiency, and effectiveness had become the watchwords of the 
court administrators. The previously mentioned LeVay Report, combined with other initiatives ( 
such as perfomance related pay schemes and fixed term contracts for senior staff, were seen 
as the way forward, a way of creating a more efficient management structure, improved 
management performances and the way to develop a better quality of service for those having 
to use the courts. Policies which prompted the then chairman of the Bar, Anthony Scrivener 
Q.C., to condemn the proposals as being more appropriate to " ..a meat packaging factory" 
(Raine and Willson, 1993, pp111-116: Walker and Starmer, 1993, p155: Rozenberg, 1994, 
p50). In 1992 the Home Office introduced a new set of performance related criteria which 
would be used in deciding a court's funding allocation. Courts would in future be allocated their 
finances dependant upon how many cases they handled, how efficiently they enforced the fines 
they had imposed, and to a lesser extent the speed and quality of their work. Scrivener also 
criticised this initiative as being 'designed to save money rather than to dispense justice' 
(Rozenberg,1994, p51). Concern was also expressed by the court administrators themselves. 
J.D.Green, the Clerk to the Justices at St.Helens, publicly condemned these proposals and 
argued that, 'The product of justice will .. be increasingly disregarded and the budgetary 
rewards will go to the courts with the efficiency of the sausage machine' (Green, 1992, p19).
There were also strong arguments that this pre-occupation with managerialism had 
affected the nature of the justice which is dispensed in the courts. Jones was of the opinion that 
'there has also been a shift away from a formal commitment to rational justice and the 'rule of 
law' to managerial justice'. She claimed that in the new criminal justice system, recognising the 
rights of the accused persons can be seen as being inefficient and uneconomic. The due 
process of law is seen as being too expensive, too inefficient and too ineffective. In any case 
the'old system'let too many guilty people go free. (Jones, 1993, p200).
Since the initial proposals were introduced, the Lord Chancellor, due to a rising tide of 
opposition has found it necessary to make a number of concessions, and the proposals 
concerning fixed term contracts for senior staff and performance related pay have been totally 
withdrawn (Rozenberg, 1994, p277).
1.2.4 POWER AND INFLUENCE.
1.2.4.1 The message sent is not always the message received.
The power of the clerk, solicitor or magistrate is illustrated by their ability to convert 
the message which the defendant is trying to convey into one which is more aligned with their 
own perceptions of the criminal justice system and the decision making process (McBamet, 
1981a, pp181-183: Brown, 1991, p112).
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But who possesses the real power, and who exerts the greatest influence? Brown has 
no doubts, not only does the final decision rest with the magistrates, they also have an 
advantage in 'the politics of translation'. In practice 'they can refuse to consider information 
which is not presented in an acceptable way and thus establish obligatory passage points. They 
are potentially, therefore, the most powerful of the would be definers' (Brown, 1991, p10). But 
in arriving at their decisions, which factors have the greatest influence on these magistrates? 
Parker et al concluded that, 'sentencing is more influenced by the magistrates own moral 
judgement of the defendant's character than by anything else'; This preference for one's own 
judgement is created, 'because of the belief that few of the courtroom actors who make 
sentencing recommendations to them can be trusted as free of bias in favour of the defendant' 
(Parker et ai., 1989, p102).
As has already been discussed, the relationships between the magistrates and their 
clerks are somewhat complex. These range between the magistrates being described as, ' the 
puppets of the clerk' (Parker et al, 1989, p100), and the clerk being depicted as, 'being very 
much like the butler* (Brown,1991, p102: Raine and Willson, 1993, p186); But what is not in 
doubt, and as discussed in an earlier chapter, the magistrates' clerks and their court clerks, 
whether as the 'puppet master* or even as the 'butler*, are very important and influential people 
in the magistrates’ courts.
Previous discussions have identified some of the perceptions which the magistrates 
possess about advocates. There are defence advocates who are seen as unprepared and who 
inhibit the magistrates' search for the truth of the case. Prosecutors are often seen as being 
young, inexperienced, unprepared and inarticulate, but they are also seen as a source of 
unbiased information. But how influential are the advocates? In the opinion of Carson, their 
influence can be quite considerable. Because it is the advocates who decide not only what 
questions will be asked, but also how the questions will be directed, this function effectively 
gives the advocate the power of- a censor. In reality, 'the lawyer determines what the court 
hears almost as much as if he or she were to both ask the questions and. give the answers' 
(Carson, 1990, p38).
Finally, how much influence do the probation officers have, or to be more precise the 
reports which they prepare and present to the sentencers? As has already been shown, the 
probation officers are seen by some to be well meaning but soft and as being too much on the 
side of the defendants. The Probation Service has been criticised for its unrealistic and totally 
negative approach to custodial sentences. There are magistrates who have accused the 
probation officers of trying to usurp their powers, others accuse them of making unrealistic 
recommendations. However it is generally agreed that the probation officer is closer to the 
defendant and therefore has a more intimate knowledge of the defendant than the magistrates 
themselves. Because of this the reports which they present are seen as a valuable aid to the 
magistrate's own assessment of the defendant's character (Parker et al, 1989, p95).
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1.2.4.2 'Plea bargaining has no place in the English criminal justice system'.
The heading for this section is a quote attributed to Lord Scarman and was made in 
1978 (R v Atkinson cited in Raine and Willson, 1993, p131). Some fourteen years later Pannick 
was advocating that the lawyer is paid to argue the point, not to decide it (Pannick,1992, p133). 
Yet in 1976, Carlen wrote, 'Everybody knows that there is much negotiation between police, 
counsel, defendants and probation officers outside the court. .. But in the open court the law is 
displayed as a symbol inviolate, a power transcending machinations of the powerful and self 
interested' (Carlen, 1976, p113). This aspect of the 'proceedings' was also a cause of concern 
for Baldwin and McConville who argued, 'If a reduction in sentence for a guilty plea is 
administratively necessary it should, in our view, be so stated and not disguised in the legal 
play of words which may be convincing to lawyers, but would be viewed by anyone else as 
mere cant and hypocracy' (Baldwin and McConville, 1978, p125). In the early nineteen eighties 
there was still a great deal of evidence which indicated the continuation of pre-court, out of 
court and indeed in court negotiating. The three major players in this activity were the clerk, the 
prosecutor and the defence solicitor. The people who were notably absent were the magistrates 
'who were almost totally ignorant of the extensiveness of attempted pre-court negotiations' 
(Parker et al, 1981, p50).
Now in the nineteen-nineties there is no longer the need for these covert activities. 
There has been an official shift of emphasis, the introduction of a number of new initiatives, 
among which were the introduction of administrative penalties. These included fixed penalty 
procedures, cautioning by the police and vehicle rectification schemes. In addition pre-trial 
conferences and reviews were introduced, the latter providing 'fertile ground' for plea, or charge 
bargaining. All are procedures which could imply some transfer of decision making away from 
the judiciary and towards the other agencies (Raine and Willson, 1993, Chapter 6). Some of 
these procedures have also conferred broad discretions upon the police and the CPS in relation 
to prosecution decision making. In fact it can be argued that the CPS now possess the power to 
veto any prosecution and is therefore the ultimate gatekeeper of the criminal courts (Leng, 
McConville and Sanders, 1992, p132).
So what is plea bargaining, or charge bargaining as it is sometimes called. It typically 
involves the defendant agreeing to plead guilty in exchange for the prosecution withdrawing the 
initial charge and substituting a less serious charge in its place. In the strictest sense it can be 
argued that the parties involved in the 'deal' have supplanted the magistrates in their role as 
the decision makers. The law in practice places little constraint on the prosecutor's ability to 
'charge bargain'. The Crown prosecutors have the authority to make additions, deletions or 
alterations to charges. Having said that the 'Code for Crown Prosecutors' does stipulate that, 
'The overriding consideration will be to ensure that the court is never left in the position of 
being unable to pass a sentence consistent with the gravity of the defendant's actions .. 
Administrative convenience in the form of a rapid guilty plea should not take precedence over 
the interests of justice'.
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But the administrators and advocates have not been slow to recognise the opportunity 
for economic benefits. The pressure which is being put on the court managers to achieve 
greater efficiency has encouraged a trend towards pre-trial intervention (Walker and Starmer, 
1993, p155). The strategy can also be adopted to increase the chances of a case being decided 
in the magistrates' court, (assuming that the lesser charge is a summary offence or an offence 
which is triable in either the Crown Court or the magistrates' court). Summary justice is cheaper 
and this is a way of saving money (Raine and Willson, 1993, p131).
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CHAPTER 2 THE METHODOLOGY.
2.1 SELECTION OF THE TOPIC - A practical research programme based on personal
interest.
According to Jorgensen, the selection of a topic can be dependant upon a number of 
different factors. It can be a matter of personal interest, a subject of some scholarly concern, or 
it may even result from a matter which is viewed as problematic by other people and is 
therefore considered to be worthy of investigation and analysis. In referring to those topics 
which are derived from personal interest, he expressed the view that, 'Personal interests hold 
potential for new insight and creativity, inspired by emotional and intellectual identification with 
the topic of study... These interests may be what sustains a participant through months or even 
years of demanding labour1 (Jorgensen, 1989, p27).
Whilst my own choice of topic could be said to be a matter of scholarly concern, the 
real stimulus was very much a matter of personal interest. My interest in the proceedings in a 
magistrates' court was derived from my experiences as a lay magistrate and the knowledge 
and outlook which I had acquired as a social science undergraduate. A combination in which 
some may consider there are a number of conflicting components. Haralambos claims that the 
sympathies of many sociologists tend to lie with the deviant. (Haralambos, 1985, p451). Indeed 
Becker has argued that in practice the agents of social control, the police, the judges, the 
probation and prison officers are the real villains of the piece, Those who process the deviants 
and slap on labels' (Becker, 1963, pp155-162). As a magistrate of some experience, I was well 
versed in the court, its procedures and its people. Whilst not accepting everything that I 
witnessed in the courtroom at its face value, the questions which I was prompted to ask were 
generally constrained by my knowledge of the environment into which I had been socialised. 
However as a social science student, I had been introduced to the works and concepts of the 
symbolic interactionists and in particular to the works of Goffman. I was specifically interested 
in his theories of dramaturgy and role playing (Goffman, 1959), both of which I could associate 
with my own experiences of the courtroom. It was therefore, from these arguably different 
perspectives that the topic which I had chosen to research originated.
But it is not always sufficient just to have a personal or philosophical interest in the 
topic, there can also be more practical matters which need to be considered. As a lone part- 
time researcher, constrained by the demands of a full-time occupation in the steel industry, and 
with only a limited amount of time which could be allocated to a research project, this also had 
to be an influential factor in my choice, albeit a consideration which was subordinate to the 
more theoretical factors. But it did mean that the project had to be relatively small and it had to 
be in a setting which was both easily accessible and conveniently located. My choice did 
indeed heed McNeill's warning that a lone researcher can only be involved with relatively small 
groups or a clearly delimited social context and that when choosing the topic, observers must 
always consider the matter of access and be aware that some institutions or groups do have 
the power to restrict or even refuse access to researchers (McNeill, 1990, pp125, 71).
In selecting my own topic I did have a personal interest, based not only on a wealth of 
experience gained as a magistrate, but also the newly acquired academically motivated 
questioning approach of a social scientist. 'A qualitative study of the interaction in a 
magistrates' court', did meet the criteria of studying a relatively small group. Because of my 
standing in the magistrates' court as an 'insider1,1 did not foresee too many problems in gaining 
access to either the group to be studied or even to some of the less accessible areas of the 
setting.
2.2 THE LITERATURE SURVEY - Magistrates' justice, the 'just world' of the insider or 
the 'repressive world' as portrayed bv some observers?
In my naivety I thought that a research project consisted of selecting a topic, gaining 
access to the study setting, carrying out a number of overt or covert observations, conducting a 
number of interviews and discussions with the relevant members of the group being studied 
and then withdrawing from the setting in order to write and submit a thesis. To my surprise my 
supervisors told me that it could take the best part of a year to even review the relevant 
literature and only when I had done this would I be properly prepared to enter the setting as a 
researcher, a setting in which I had been personally involved for fifteen years. They were right,
I was wrong.
The benefits which can be obtained from a review of the literature are considerable. It 
allows the researcher to consult previous knowledge and experience, or in my case, knowledge 
and experience gained from a different perspective. It enables the researcher to consider, and 
to utilise where necessary, the discussions which have already taken place in the particular 
area of interest and to use these, where appropriate, in support of an argument. This is in effect 
borrowing the authority of earlier researchers (Gilbert, 1993, pp29-30). A research of the 
literature may also stimulate ideas, assist in the formulation of specific research questions and 
assist the researcher to 'devise a theoretical or analytical framework' (Arber, 1993, p35).
In my particular case the result of the literature research had a more unusual
outcome, the initial reaction being something of a culture shock. At the outset it was suggested
that I should read 'Magistrates' Justice', Carien's study of the magistrates' courts which had
been published in the mid-nineteen seventies, a period which approximated to the time that I
had been appointed to the magistracy. Through this work I was introduced to Garfinkel,
Emerson and Blumberg. Sometime later I was reading, amongst others, McBamet, Bottomley,
Baldwin, McConville and the studies of Parker et al. Who were these people I asked, and how
could they describe the law courts, and in particular the magistrates' courts, the courts with
which I was so familiar, in such derogatory terms? I came across unfamiliar phrases such as
'an organised system of complicity' (Blumberg, 1967). 'This courtroom ceremony is
characteristically organised to degrade and humiliate the defendant' (Emerson, 1969, p174).
'The courtroom proceeding is one of those barbarous ceremonies..' (Goffman, 1952, p503). I
saw the courtroom procedure described as a 'ceremonial stripping of a man of his dignity'
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(Garfinkel, 1956, pp420-424). Carlen used such expressions as 'ritualistic control of the 
situation', the 'convoluted control of information' and ' the suppression of alternative 
performances'. She perceived the function of the courts as the 'protection of the institution of 
private property and the prevailing modes of capitalist production' (Carlen, 1976, p12). 
According to McBamet, the lower courts were 'deliberately structured in defiance of the 
ideology of justice' and that 'almost all criminal law is acted out in the lower courts without 
traditional due process' (McBamet, 1981, p153).
If this was how the courts were perceived, what about the magistrates? What about 
me? Parker et al questioned our competence. We were seen to be predominantly middle aged, 
middle class, not legally trained, in fact not very well trained at all. We were not considered to 
be very 'streetwise' and often lacking the insight into the social world of those we judged. When 
in court 'they put on a mask and play in role and become highly selective in which parts of their 
life experienced selves they employ when acting as magistrates'. But neither are we interested 
in making fools of ourselves and in order to conceal these shortcomings, we learn to value the 
formulae which we are given. Parker also argues that contrary to popular opinion neither is 
magistrates'justice cheap ( Parker et al., 1981, pp66,134:1989, pp171-173). All very damning 
and at that time these were comments which received anything but my whole hearted approval.
So how does a mixture of a 'subjective participant' and an 'objective researcher* react 
to these types of criticism? Is the magistrates' court the world of the insider, where despite its 
admitted shortcomings, the aim of the system is seen as the dispensing of justice as impartially 
and as efficiently as it can, a place where the members of the community can be judged by 
their peers? Or is it the world as viewed by some observers, a degradation ceremony designed 
to humiliate the defendant whilst protecting the institution of private property and the prevailing 
modes of capitalist production? When reviewing the Parker et al study 'Unmasking the 
Magistrates', J.E. Towler J.P. wrote, 'Draw breath,.. suppress indignation, count to ten, .. Home 
truths are never comfortable, but to see yourselves as others see you is often salutory, and 
even half truths deserve attention.'(The Magistrate, 1990, p91). With this advice in mind I was 
able to set out one of the main objectives of the research, 'To evaluate how in reality courtroom 
interaction conforms to the abstract ideals of justice'. In addition, the literature survey 
succeeded in stimulating a number of ideas and it also assisted me in formulating a number of 
specific questions for my research, questions which in practice helped me to distance myself 
from the more familiar insider role with which I was automatically associated.
2.3 THE SELECTION OF THE SETTING.
2.3.1 To plav on mv home ground or to try and arrange an away fixture.
Should I choose my own court as the setting for an in-depth study of courtroom
interaction? A setting of which I had a detailed and intimate knowledge, not only of the court
and its procedures but also of its people? Or should I select a 'foreign' setting, a court where I
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would be less familiar with the organisation, more detached from its people and even more 
importantly, a setting where I would not be immediately recognised and responded to as an 
insider, as an influential member of the group being studied, but rather in the preferred role of 
the researcher? The geographical location and the practical benefits to be gained from 
researching in my own court were overwhelming in terms of both time and convenience, but 
the question I kept asking was, could I remain in my own court and still be objective? What 
advice could I glean from the literature? What had other researchers concluded? I read that 
participant observers often selected field settings based, in part, on their previous involvement 
in the setting (Adler, 1981: Hayano, 1982: Rambo, 1987). Indeed the researcher may already 
be a participant before deciding formally to conduct research in the setting (Jorgensen, 1989, 
pp30-31). But as Jorgensen also pointed out, there are a number of other considerations which 
need to be dealt with before the appropriate decision can be taken. Is the setting accessible? At 
least I knew that my own court was. Is the range of participant roles that the researcher can 
assume adequate for what is trying to be achieved? I was already a participant, I also knew that 
I could observe, although I could not be sure how the 'subjects' would respond to my 'new role'. 
In addition I also had ready made contacts with some of the other groups and agencies who 
were associated with the courts although in some instances any access to these areas might 
well have to be facilitated by a 'gatekeeper1. Will the researcher be able to remain in the setting 
long enough to obtain the required information? In my own court I knew that there were no 
limits. Whilst I knew the answers to these questions in respect of my own court, I was not so 
confident in answering them for other courts. Neither, Jorgensen reminds us, are ail settings 
totally open. Within most complex organisations there are 'cliques of people whose activities 
are kept secret from non-members'. Even 'public' establishments are not always totally visible 
to the general public and that includes researchers. Appropriately Jorgensen mentions the 
criminal trial as a typical example, 'Almost everyone may observe a criminal trial. ..Access may 
be gained by assuming the role of a spectator, a role readily available to most people. Each of 
these settings however also contains backstage regions, closed to just anyone. ..Not everyone 
is invited to the judges' chambers'. Well again there should be no difficulties in my own court 
with this aspect either, I am a member, I am the 'judge'. The selection was made. The location 
of the court was convenient fora part-time research project. I could even combine some of my 
research effort with my formal court duties, or so I thought, and I had access not only to the 
setting in general, but also to some of the less accessible regions ate well. The advantages of a 
'home fixture' were too numerous to ignore. As Jorgensen concluded, 'The more you know 
about a setting, the easier it is to make an informed decision whether or not it will be possible to 
investigate the topic of interest' (Jorgensen, 1989, pp40-45). I knew my setting well and I had 
made an informed decision.
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2.3.2 An appropriate setting to enable the objectives of the study to be fulfilled.
The setting, as previously described, is a medium sized and very busy court. It 
possesses most of the elements which one would expect to find in a typical magistrates' court. 
In addition it is a court which was in a state of change, preparing to move from an inadequate 
set of old buildings into a new ultra-modern courthouse. It was also in the act of bringing its old 
and laborious recording and financial systems into the twentieth century and the age of 
computerisation. The court also had the benefits of having a mixed bench, lay magistrates and 
a stipendiary magistrate, which presented the opportunity to compare 'amateur1 and 
'professional' justice. Along with all other courts it was having to contend with the policies of 
efficiency which were being imposed by the 'political masters'. A proposed reorganisation in the 
managerial structure of the courts, performance indicators, cash limiting and fixed term 
performance related contracts for senior members of staff. The court and its magistrates were 
having to grapple with the various and sometimes quite demanding changes in legislation, the 
Children Act 1989, the Road Traffic and Criminal Justice Acts of 1991 to name just three. The 
setting was therefore considered by the researcher to be eminently suitable for the purpose of 
the research.
The researcher was also 'at home' in this environment. He had been a member of this 
particular Bench for a considerable period. As an experienced and 'senior* magistrate he 
chaired the courts on a regular basis. He had been a member of the Probation Liaison 
Committee for a number of years and also sat on the 'court team ' and 'bail hostel' sub­
committees. For two years prior to the commencement of the project he had also been a 
member of the Lord Chancellor’s Local Advisory Committee and as such was involved in the 
interviewing of candidates for the magistracy. During the early part of the research period he 
was elected to the Magistrates' Courts Committee.
To prevent a totally 'blinkered' view based solely on the events of one court, plans 
were also made for the observer to attend at other magistrates' courts at Hull and Sheffield as 
well as the Crown Court at Doncaster. These visits were intended to enable these courts to be 
used as comparator courts and also to expose the researcher to less familiar environments.
2.4 PERMISSION AND CONSENT - The privileged insider.
It is one thing to select the desired research setting, it can prove to be far more
difficult to gain access to that setting. Not everyone welcomes being put under the microscope
and this applies particularly to the powerful elites and institutions. The experience of some
researchers indicates that to some closed groups research may be 'ideologically anathema'.
Other groups feel threatened, that they may be exploited or else the research may result in
damaging disclosures (Homsby-Smith, 1993, p54). On the other hand there are some who
claim that the reason for the reluctance of bureaucracies and the powerful people who control
them is simply to obscure the truth (Encel, 1978, p47). What does not appear to be in doubt is
the ability of these groups to either deny access completely, or to vastly reduce the amount of
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access. Even the so called open institutions may become decidely closed and react 
defensively, erecting barriers against anything which is perceived as an external threat from 
hostile intruders (Homsby-Smith, 1993, p59). Even where access is granted to a setting this 
may require extensive negotiation with, and permission from a 'gatekeeper, if not for access to 
the setting itself, permission may well have to be negotiated to access some of the less public 
elements of the setting (Arber, 1993, p37). My only knowledge of these and other pitfalls was 
what I had read in the literature. At no time did I experience this type of response although I 
was aware that other requests to the court to assist in academic research had been refused. I 
also realised that in the past both the courts and the magistrates had been subjected to quite 
severe criticisms, my own review of the literature had indicated as much. I was soon to realise 
that I was a privileged researcher, and this of course was due to my 'insider* status. I was not 
seen as the hostile intruder or as an external threat, it was also considered unlikely that I would 
be interested in exploiting the situation or that I would make any damaging disclosures. But 
these are all assumptions, in reality it was not considered necessary to discuss such matters. 
Neither did anyone try to hijack the agenda (Fielding, 1993, p160). What I was offered was a 
very positive promise of support.
Jorgensen writes, The most ideal situation is one in which the authorities and other 
participants in the setting welcome the researcher, where overt access is gained by seeking 
permission from the highest possible authority and convincing everyone in the setting that the 
researcher can be trusted. The more the people in the setting, especially those in positions of 
authority, are prepared to support the research, the more likely is successful access to the 
setting (Jorgensen, 1989, p46). In my case most of the criteria set down by Jorgensen 
appeared to have been achieved.
But can constraints be inadvertently placed on the researcher, not because there is a 
lack of trust but because there is a high degree of trust? Can an assumption that 'we are in safe 
hands with this researcher*, or 'this researcher will not reveal any damaging disclosures', in 
practice inhibit the researcher's 'quest for the truth of the matter1? This was a dilemma to which 
I gave a great deal of thought. I concluded that as a social scientist I must ensure that the 
research would be carried out with a high level of objectivity and in reality I did not see my 
research being constrained to either a greater or lesser extent than that of any other researcher 
who would also be bound by the ethics, the rules of confidentiality and the protection of the 
individuals anonymity and privacy which are said to be the cornerstones of any social research.
2.5 RESEARCH DESIGN - Some researchers seem to have loose notions.
'Some researchers seem to have loose notions of what they are intending to
investigate once they have negotiated access to a research site' (Bryman, 1988, p67).
Bryman's statement was an accurate description of my own situation. After I had negotiated my
access to the courts. I did not really appreciate what the next steps should be, what was
expected of me, and I entered the study area with only the most basic of plans. Once again it
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was back to the literature, back to the 'drawing board1. The literature referred to a research 
design, an approach which was likened to a 'blue print', a procedure which should be defined 
and organised 'so that it allows the researcher to see how each step will follow the one before' 
and in so doing will enable the reseacher to develop a knowledge and understanding of the 
situation (Fetterman, 1989). A good research design allows the researcher to develop a 
systematic and knowledgeable approach to the research as well as providing a system for 
managing valuable time and a method of checking actual progress against a plan. The basis of 
the research design in the opinion of Pelto, is that 'it involves combining the essential elements 
of investigation into an effective problem solving sequence' (Pelto, 1970, p331: Fetterman, 
1989, p18: Arber, 1993, p33). According to Fetterman , a useful research design 'limits the 
endeavour, links the theory to the method, guides the ethnographer....' (Fetterman, 1989, p18).
But are loose notions or loose strategies necessarily a bad thing in ethnographic
research? Should research be subjected to a set of rigid rules and conditions? Filstead argues
that 'qualitative research is concerned with the discovery of theory rather than the verification
of theory' (Filstead, 1979, p38). Jorgensen expresses an opinion that, 'Whilst the researcher
may have a theoretical interest in being there, exactly what concepts are important, how they
are or are not related and what therefore is problematic should remain open and subject to
refinement and definition based on what the research is able to uncover and observe’
(Jorgensen, 1989, p18). Whilst not being a supporter of researchers with loose notions, Bryman
appeared to support the principle of open strategies when he wrote, 'an open research strategy
widens the opportunity of uncovering entirely unexpected issues which may be of interest to
researchers and beneficial to research, areas which may not have been visible to them had the
scope of the study been foreclosed by a structured, and hence a potentially rigid strategy'
(Bryman, 1988, p67). My own mentor, Ashworth, wrote that in 'insisting on the refutibility of
theories, the testing of the hypotheses, the setting up of the research needs, if appropriate, to
allow the data to run counter to expectations if that is how the world actually is' (Ashworth,
1987, p8). With regard to my. own research, my preconceived ideas and familiarity with both
the setting and the people within it, I considered a more open approach as being particularly
appropriate. However Ashworth did add the proviso that in arguing that qualitative research can
deliver adequate descriptions with demonstrable validity this adequacy and validity does
depend on the correctness of the research procedure. The question of validity echoes
throughout the literature. It is argued that social scientists are likely to exhibit greater
confidence in their findings when these are derived from more than one method of
investigation, direct experience and observation, interviews with a range of different informants
and documentation are all suggested as ways of gathering information. By using a variety of
techniques, the influences or leads drawn from one data source can be corroborated by another
(Denzin,1970, p310: Lacey,1976, p60: Fetterman1989, p89: Jorgensen,-1989, p53). It is also
suggested that it is extremely important to ask whether or not and the extent to which the
researchers' procedures have provided direct access to the insiders' world. Limited access
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generally results in less valid and reliable findings (Jorgensen 1989, p37). In the familiar world 
of the courts, as an insider who had already forged many relationships over many years, as a 
member of various committees and as the recipient of a great deal of documented information,
I envisaged little difficulty in fulfilling most of these requirements.
2.6 THE SURVEY PERIOD - An insider trying to get out not an outsider trying to get in.
Certain authors recommend that the research process should be divided into a 
number of separate phases, the favoured number indicated is three. The initial phase, 
described as both the 'passive stage' (McNeill, 1990, p79) and the 'survey period' (Fetterman, 
1989, p18), is a period in which the researcher seeks to gain an understanding of the culture, a 
time to learn the basics, to become familiar with the language, and to identify the various 
retationships which exist (Bryman, 1988, p150). It is seen as a relatively unstructured period, a 
period when information is gathered by means of informal conversations and informal 
observations. The second phase is the 'interactive stage’ (McNeill, 1990, p79) or the 'post- 
survey period' (Fetterman,1989, p18). This is a more structured period during which the 
researcher needs to identify not only the significant themes but also any gaps and problems 
which exist within the research. By means of observation and formal interview the researcher 
should by this time have started to penetrate the 'fronts' which are invariably erected against v 
the outsider. The final phase, normally referred to as either the 'review or re-appraisal', should 
be a highly structured phase. By this time the researcher should have identified the certain 
relevant patterns of behaviour, the goal of the researcher should be clear and he or she should 
be in a position to test their ideas. This is also the time when a review of the earlier phases 
should be undertaken. This is also the point of the project when the researcher should be giving 
some thought to the timing and method of withdrawal from the group.
While I found all this theoretically and academically interesting, how could it be
applied to my own project? There was no doubt that some of it was relevant, particularly the
second and third phases. Although I wasn't an outsider I could still envisage some people
erecting 'fronts' against this 'part-time amateur sticking his nose into the world of the courtroom
professionals'. Another problem to consider was in the third phase, whilst I would have to
decide a time to withdraw from the setting as a researcher, in reality I could remain, and would
expect to remain, in the study area for many more years as a magistrate, I wasn't in a position
where I could just 'cut and run'. But what about the initial period, the 'survey period', a time of
informal conversations and informal observations, a time to gain an understanding of the
culture, to learn the language, to familiarise oneself with the setting and its people? I
considered that I had already carried out a survey period of approximately fifteen years
duration. But should the idea of a survey period just be simply rejected? I still had a problem. It
is true that I was not an outsider trying to gain access, but I was an insider trying to distance
myself from the inside in order to carry out an objective, valid and relatively unbiased piece of
research. As a 'senior* magistrate, I not only knew the people within the setting but they knew
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me. They did not know me as a social science graduate who was undertaking research but as 
someone who regularly presided in the courtroom and who tradition demanded that I be 
addressed as either 'Your worship' or 'Sir1. My requirement from the initial phase therefore was 
to disentangle myself from my more familiar and formal role in order that people would function 
'normally' when I was present in court in my informal role, to recognise my role as a researcher 
and during interview to describe things 'as it is' and not the way they think that I think it should 
be.
2.7 FAMILIARITY AND STOCK OF KNOWLEDGE - Can 'insider' researchers see the 
wood for the trees.
There is within the methodology a deal of discussion about the advantages and
disadvantages of a researcher's familiarity with a setting and the value or otherwise of the
'stock of knowledge' with which the researcher may be armed when entering that setting. This
discussion went straight to the crux of one of my concerns, my own familiarity with the study
area. One side of the argument suggests that personal experience gained from direct
participation in the world of the insider is extremely valuable and especially if that experience
has been specifically derived from having performed membership roles in the setting.
Jorgensen refers to a number of examples to support this argument. Two of these are the
research studies of Ferraro and Rambo. In the first example it is said that Ferraro's interest in
wife battering came about from her own first hand experience as a battered wife, and because
of this she was able to set up a quick rapport with other women who had suffered similar
experiences. In the second example, Jorgensen suggests that Rambo's previous subjective
involvement in the world of the exotic dancers which she subsequently researched, 'resulted in
a much more accurate (objective) description than would have been possible by any other
strategy' (Jorgensen, 1989, pp 27, 65). McNeill holds the view that insider knowledge can be
advantageous because the central characteristic of social action is that it has meaning for the
people who are involved in it and in order to achieve this you have to start from where they are
(McNeill, 1989, p69). Alternatively outsiders are seen to have none of these advantages. Some
argue that outsiders cannot hope to acquire more than a crude notion of the insiders world until
they understand the culture and the language which is used to communicate its meaning
(Jorgensen, 1989, p14). It is also said that newcomers may lose their way in a maze of
unfamiliar behaviours and situations (Fetterman, 1989, p41). Neither is this lack of
communication necessarily a ploy on the part of the insiders to conceal the reality, many of the
groups 'own taken for granted pre-suppositions are not conscious and therefore cannot be
elucidated to newcomers' (Ashworth, 1991). But there are counter arguments. There is an
argument which says that as an outsider looking in, the researcher can overview the scene
noting major and distinctive features, relationships, patterns, processes and events. This is
extremely important because insiders do not view their world from this standpoint, and once
this newness gives way to familiarity then this original awareness will be forever lost
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(Jorgensen, 1989, p82). Another concern which has been expressed is that although 
ethnographic research into one's own culture may not take as much time to reach the same 
point as someone who is less familiar, familiarity can result in some events being taken for 
granted leaving important data unnoticed and unrecorded (Fetterman, 1989, p46). This concern 
was also expressed by Ashworth, who, whilst accepting that the rich fore-understanding of an 
insider puts them in a good position to do relevant incisive work, questioned whether they lack 
critical distance, fail to see viewpoints other than the ones they are used to, and perhaps are 
unable to perceive the taken for granted framework which maintains the social fabric that they 
know, (but unreflectively), so well (Ashworth, 1987, p13). It is important at the outset of an 
enquiry to remain open to the unexpected and especially if the researcher has previous 
experience in the setting. Jorgensen writes, 'previous knowledge may be inappropriate, 
somewhat slanted or even incorrect'. As a researcher one should be properly critical of 
personal experience. He warns, 'Your experiences, because they are your experiences, are 
subject to even more critical examination than the experience of the other members 
(Jorgensen, 1989, p93).
In an assessment of my own experiences and my own efforts to recognise them, 
Ashworth described the situation very accurately when he wrote, 'Many features of attunement 
to the stock of knowledge at hand are clear in the ongoing work of my student Gordon Read. 
He is engaged in an ethnographic study of the magistrates' court. .. Read is himself a senior 
magistrate having served for some fifteen years as a Justice of the Peace .. It has taken 
Gordon Read a great deal of time to begin to problematize the magistrates' court with which he 
is so familiar. To do this he had to absorb research literature, especially literature 
unsympathetic to the current working of the legal system, he has had to spend time sitting in 
the public area of the court during hearings presided over by other magistrates and has had to 
find ways of putting himself imaginatively into the position of the other players in the courtroom 
drama, the various legal officers, the witnesses, the court functionaries and the accused 
person. His membership in the stock of knowledge is an hindrance to observation, though 
participation in the social world is second nature (Ashworth,1991).
Ashworth was right, I had participated in the court setting for a decade and a half. As
a magistrate I prided myself as being part of an honest if sometimes inefficient legal system. I
may on occasions have questioned the ability of some of my colleagues, particularly in the role
of court chairmen. I never doubted their motives, integrity or their commitment to the
dispensing of justice. I also recognised that solicitors varied not only in the levels of their
advocacy, but also in their comittment to their clients and the respect they showed to the courts
and the benches who adjudicated in them. I could also be critical, and in open court if the
occasion so demanded, about the presentation of and proposals contained in the Pre-Sentence
Reports which had been prepared by the Probation Service. Despite these criticisms I must
admit that I held a rather comfortable view of the magistrates’ courts from my elevated position
on the bench. It was therefore essential in the interests of accuracy and objectivity that I did
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seek and absorb the alternative perspectives in the ways described by Ashworth and detailed in 
the literature.
2.8. ENTRY AND GAINING ACCEPTANCE.
2.8.1 After fifteen years of involvement in the setting, they now told me it was time 
that I became inconspicuous.
In reading the methodology literature, I found that the advice offered by people who 
had experienced entering a research setting was generally consistent. The advice was that in 
the initial stages the researcher should attempt to be as unobtrusive as possible, to blend in 
with the setting and to 'avoid anything which would call attention to oneself (Jorgensen, 1989, 
p73). The participant observer needs to become a part of the scenery and hence largely 
invisible (Bryman, 1988, p113). 'All researchers agree that it is important to remain 
inconspicuous at this stage' (McNeill, 1990, p77). On the face of it this appeared to be very 
sensible and pertinent advice. But what about the researcher who has already been a 
participant in that setting for fifteen years, a participant who has done anything but blend into 
the setting? How can that person suddenly exchange the role of a participant to that of an 
observer and succeed in becoming inconspicuous? For fifteen years I had entered the setting 
in the role of the magistrate, I had entered the courtroom through the entrance which is 
reserved for the magistrates. For a number of years I had regularly presided in those courts. 
Now I wished to enter the courtroom not as a magistrate but as a social scientist, as a 
participant observer. I wanted to enter the courtroom through a different entrance, I wished to 
be unobtrusive, I wanted people in these initial stages to forget that I was there and to perform 
their usual roles.
Not surprisingly, I decided that the odds for achieving this were somewhat stacked
against me. However not to be defeated, I reasoned that if I entered the courtroom in my
accepted role as a magistrate, I could observe both the court proceedings and its actors from
my elevated position on the bench. This would mean that I could carry out my observations of
the courtroom at the same time as I was fulfilling my judicial duties. This method would not only
overcome my dilemma but it was also seen as an effective way of ensuring that my precious
time was well utilised. The fact that I would be observing covertly did not present a problem for
me, I considered this method to be justified in that it was one way of ensuring that the actors
behaved normally during my observations in the courtroom, something which could not be
guaranteed if I announced myself and then observed overtly from the well of the court.
Unfortunately this was not to be quite the simple solution I had assumed, the combining of the
two roles was not as easy as I thought it would be. As Ashworth accurately described the
situation, 'In Read's case, he fondly hoped that he would be able to be a scientific observer in
the court while participating in its action. This proved to be quite impossible when he was
presiding, since he had proper concern for the fatefulness of the proceedings, and could not
allow himself to adopt a cool observational attitude in which the stock of knowledge is
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meditatively, even playfully, questioned' (Ashworth, 1991). Even when sitting as a 'winger4, I 
still found that the need to focus my attention on specific aspects of the proceedings and the 
facts of the case precluded me from viewing the courtroom procedures and its actors from any 
perspective other than as a magistrate.
Whilst I did not totally abandon this method of participant observation, it was 
relegated well down the list of techniques for obtaining information. It now appeared that the 
only course of observation available to me was to survey the proceedings from the well of the 
court. But as I have already indicated there was no way that I could pursue this option and still 
remain unobtrusive. So how could I limit the adverse effect? How could I ensure that people 
acted 'normally' in the court setting? How could I encourage people to react to me as a social 
scientist and not as a member of the magistracy? How could I persuade people to tell me about 
things as they see them and not as they think I would like them to be? How could I guard 
against some of the actors agreeing to cooperate in the research because they considered it to 
be in their longer term interests to do so? At the time of entering the setting as an observer, I 
seemed to have all of the questions and very few of the answers.
I did enter the well of the court, and if I had entertained any ideas that I would be able
to adopt a low profile then any such thoughts were quickly dispelled. Even though I had
indicated my intentions to the Clerk to the Justices, these had obviously not been
communicated to the other court users. I had read that, by and large, ethnographers prefer to
be open about their participation, but frequently display concern about the effect of their
presence on the people they observe (Bryman, 1988, p112). So what was the reaction to my
unexpected appearance in an unexpected role in the courtroom setting? From the lay
magistrates who were sitting on the bench I received enquiring looks, there were whispered
conversations. Was this the first step in the strongly rumoured and much feared appraisal
system for magistrates? That was one theory. I also received a bemused look from the court
clerk. Why had I entered the court through the wrong door and why was I sitting in the seats
adjacent to those normally occupied by the general public? (The reason for sitting in that
specific position was that I thought it would afford me a good vantage point for observing the
court whilst at the same time being out of the normal sight line of the majority of the court
users). Was I there on behalf of the 'boss', the Clerk to the Justices, to check on the efficiency
or otherwise of the court ushers? At least one court usher thought that I was. Many people who
attend in the courtrooms are subjected to a series of questions, my initial experience was little
different, I too was questioned, albeit very politely. Solicitors, probation officers, police officers,
court clerks and court ushers were all keen to have their questions answered, their curiosity
satisfied and any apprehensions they had, hopefully reduced. Possibly the most surprised
person was the stipendiary magistrate. His reaction was to despatch the court usher to request
my attendance in his office at the end of the morning session. Now it was my turn to be
worried, I had never appeared before a stipendiary magistrate before. In answering all of their
questions I was guided by the advice that 'in participating overtly it is important to deal with
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people's questions openly and directly, you need to normalise your presence in the field' 
(Jorgensen,1989, p71).
2.8.2. Gaining acceptance in the setting did not appear to present a problem, but in 
which role was I accepted?
The quality of data is improved when the participant observer establishes and
sustains trusting and cooperative relationships with the people in the field (Jorgensen, 1989,
p69). Only by getting close to their subjects and becoming insiders can qualitative researchers
view the world as a participant in the setting (Bryman,1988, p96). One way of achieving this
according to the methodology literature is to maximise trust with a few key people in the
setting, although in doing this one needs to guard against being seen as involved with the
authority structures of the organisation, such impressions could affect the behaviour of those
being observed, especially those confined to subordinate roles in the organisation
(McNeill,1990, p76: Jorgensen,1989, p45). Reactions to the observer will vary, being
demonstrated by a whole range of emotions, suspicion, contempt, hostility, indifference,
curiosity, friendliness, over deference. Participants may be obstructive and totally
uncooperative, others may see the relationship as being intrinsically valuable and a source of
prestige and power (Jorgensen, 1989, p74).
Much of what I read gave me cause for concern, not that I anticipated an hostile
reception, my concerns were to the contrary. To many people I was an insider, I had been a
member of the Bench for many years and as such I was confident that I already had the
respect and trust of the majority of my magisterial colleagues. In addition I had always
considered that my working relationships with the court staff, the court clerks and court ushers,
had been very good. As has already been indicated I certainly had the trust and the support of
the Clerk to the Justices. But what about the other court users, the prosecutors, the defence
advocates, the police and the probation officers? Did they see me as an insider or was I just
one of those lay magistrates, the amateurs who put in an appearance once a week or once
every other week, and are not really true insiders? I was much less certain about what their
response would be. Others might argue that I could be viewed as slightly more than just
another lay magistrate. As I have already indicated I also sat on a number of the more
'influential' committees within the system and I had set out on my research with the full support
of the Clerk to the Justices. As a member of the Magistrates' Courts Committee, which in
essence acts as the management committee for the courts as well as being the employer of the
court staff, it would not have been unnatural, therefore, for people to associate me with the
'authority structure of the organisation'.
So how does one minimise the adverse effects, penetrate the fronts, smooth the path
and gain acceptance, not just as an insider, because that status already existed, but
acceptance as a researcher, a participant observer? I was told that time is generally an ally, the
longer or more frequently that the observer is in the setting, the more people are likely to
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perceive you as non-threatening and take your existence and presence for granted. From my 
own experience I would certainly subscribe to that point of view. But I still had something of a 
problem in that I was still having to perform a 'dual' role because my visits to the well of the 
court were being regularly interspersed with attendances at court in my more 'normal' role as a 
magistrate, the decision maker and sentencer. I had read that it is important to reassure the 
insiders that you are not there to harm either them or their interests. In practice I was never 
made to feel that this was ever an issue. However, in order to dispel any possible 
misconceptions, I did discuss my research plan with them, I did answer their questions as 
directly and as honestly as I could and I also gave them assurances regarding their anonymity 
and confidentiality.
From the very outset information, advice and help was forthcoming, cooperation 
within the research was promised. This came from colleagues, both lay and professional, from 
the defence advocates, and providing that the appropriate request was put in writing I also had 
a promise of cooperation from the Probation Service. Potential allies and 'key actors' were 
identified. These were the court clerks whom I considered to be at the centre of the courtroom 
proceedings, the court ushers who like the legendary 'office tea lady' seemed to have some 
knowledge of everything and everybody, and the Clerk to the Justices whom I was confident 
had the authority and the influence to open those doors which I might find were initially closed 
to me. These were also people with whom, as I have already indicated, I enjoyed good 
relationships.
Jorgensen also advises that, 'Morally respondent participant observation requires that 
you be alert for ways of providing something of value in exchange for what you can get from 
insiders' (Jorgensen, 1989, p72). In practice I found that this theory can be somewhat 'double 
edged', because whilst I was willing to respond positively to certain suggestions, I found that 
there were some expectations placed on me which I was unable or unwilling to deliver. On the 
one hand I was asked by two senior magistrates if I would observe and give feedback on their 
performances when presiding in the courtroom, this I was willing to do. I was asked by the 
Deputy Clerk to the Justices, who had delegated responsibility for the training of lay 
magistrates and certain members of staff, if I would consider developing a training module for 
lay magistrates in conjunction with my research, I was delighted to be asked. However my 
presence in the courtroom also resulted in my becoming a 'sounding board' for some people's 
concerns. I was asked for my opinion on the way that certain advocates behaved in court? How 
I viewed the way that some court clerks disrespectfully treated the magistrates? After having 
observed a trial I was approached by the prosecution advocate and asked to pass an opinion 
on the magistrates' decision. As a magistrate I might have passed an opinion on some of these 
matters, certainly not all. As a participant observer I had no desire to become involved, I did 
not wish to alienate any of the insiders, I felt the need to maintain a neutral position. But 
keeping on the right side of people is not always possible, because whilst I could pursue this
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policy as a participant observer, it was not a policy which I could necessarily, or even wish to, 
adopt when I was sitting on the bench.
Just the simple fact that I was present in the courtroom caused some problems which 
it could be argued were detrimental to participant observation. On the first morning when the 
bench retired to deliberate on a case, I observed that the formality of the court ceased abruptly 
and the whole of the courtroom took on a relaxed atmosphere, some actors formed into groups 
where there was a general hubbub of conversation and laughter, advocates in loud voices 
appeared to be competing in trying to organise their workloads for the morning with the court 
clerk. It was anything but the well ordered procedure with which I was familiar and I must admit 
that the change took me by surprise. I had now seen the court in a totally different light than at 
any other time in my courtroom experience. I was even more surprised therefore, when later in 
the morning and in conversation with the court clerk, I was told how subdued people appeared 
to have been that morning each time the bench had retired when compared with other days, a 
change which could only be attributed to my presence in the courtroom. Another small problem 
I encountered was how I should dress in my role as a participant observer. As a magistrate I 
was well aware that I should be formally attired. If I dressed casually would this be frowned 
upon by the court users, who were also expected to dress in a formal manner when in court. If I 
dressed casually would I be seen as being disrespectful to the court? I played safe, I wore a 
suit. Whilst this was ideal for the courtroom it was definitely the wrong type of dress for the 
waiting areas. If I was hoping to sit in the corridors of the court in order to covertly observe the 
behaviour and eavesdrop on the conversations of the defendants, then I was to be 
disappointed, as soon as I appeared in these areas the noisy conversations and the 
rumbustuous forms of behaviour were quickly curtailed. Even on subsequent visits when I 
dressed in a more casual manner, the mood in these outside areas changed almost as soon as 
I walked into the setting, I can only assume that despite my efforts to blend into the scene 
people were still somehow aware that I was a magistrate. For example whether formally or 
casually dressed I noticed that any conversations which were taking place between advocates 
and their clients soon changed from being conducted in normal tones to those of whispered 
conversations immediately my presence was noticed.
However as had been forecast, time was an ally, and my visits to the courtroom were 
eventually accepted with a greater degree of normality, although this was never true of the 
waiting areas where I continued to be viewed with some suspicion by the defendants, their 
family and friends and even by one or two advocates. It appeared that whilst I was in the 
courtroom, the setting with which I was associated, I was accepted. But in the areas where 
magistrates were hardly ever seen, even in my role as a researcher, I was not really welcome. 
Overall I had negotiated the actual entry to the setting fairly well, with the reservations already 
discussed, but I was under no illusion that it had proved quite impossible to follow the advice of 
the literature to remain inconspicuous'. And I was never totally certain all the time I was
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observing how the participants saw my role. Where I was on the magistrate-participant 
observer continuum, I was never sure.
2.9 SIGNIFICANT THEMES.
As I have already indicated, my problem was not the usual one which Is experienced 
by ethnographers entering the setting for the first time. I did not feel overwhelmed by the mass 
of detail which made up the organisation, I already had a great deal of knowledge about its 
structure and its inner workings, I understood most of its specialist language and knew many of 
its people, many as colleagues, some as friends, and I was aware of how the socio-cultural 
system operated. I had no doubts that I was familiar with the setting, I was also very conscious 
that I had a considerable number of pre-conceived ideas. Because of this I was 'blind' to much 
that happened in the courtroom, those things which happened and were taken for granted, 
practices and procedures which were very rarely, if ever, questioned. I was well past the stage 
of asking such questions as 'How is the space organised? How are the people in this space 
organised? How are they attired and is there any relevance in the way that they are? Can you 
see signs of social status and rank? It appeared that because of my long time presence in the 
setting I had become so immersed in the proceedings that I was no longer able to stand back 
'and generate a fruitful perspective of what is of interest' (Jorgensen, 1989, p33). I also 
accepted the argument that neither is it possible to observe every situation that is of interest 
within a setting. It therefore became apparent that there was a real need to force myself to 
stand back and to focus my attention on areas of specific interest.
But how could I bring about this transformation? How could I focus? How after having 
been exposed to the magistrates' courts system for so long could I realistically stand back and 
ask 'What is going on here?' (Rist,1984, p161). My solution to this problem was not to stand 
back and view the situation, but to try and view the situation, not through my eyes, but through 
the eyes of others, and specifically through the eyes of those observers who had been 
particularly critical of the courts and the procedures. On the surface this was a very simple 
technique. In practice I found it to be quite a painful process, it frequently involved me in 
having to make adjustments to my hitherto comfortable outlook. Some of the criticisms would 
have been easy to dismiss as extreme and inapt. But gradually and having read the criticisms 
for the umpteenth time I realised that the 'hair on the back of my neck no longer bristled', I 
began to see how some of the views expressed could have been arrived at, I even started 
questioning some of my own long held views of the organisation, proceedings and the 
objectives of the magistrates' courts.
By asking these questions a number of significant themes emerged. Was, as I had
read, the organisation of the courts designed to degrade and humiliate the defendants? Were
the courts more interested in organisational efficiency than in dispensing justice? Is the
defendant really 'a dummy player* in a courtroom drama which some would liken to a farce, the
theatre of the absurd'? How do the various actors see their roles and how do they view their
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relationships with others? Who really holds the power in the magistrates' courts sytem? How do 
the highly qualified and experienced professional court users really view the part-time, often 
inadequately trained, amateur decision makers, the magistrates? These were questions which 
as a magistrate I had never found the need to ask, these were now the themes on which I 
considered that my research should be focused.
2.10 GATHERING INFORMATION - Observation, documentation and speech.
According to Polsky, 'Successful field research depends on the investigator's trained 
abilities to look at people, listen to them, think and feel with them, talk with them rather than at 
them' (Polsky, 1969, p120). Fielding emphasises the effort that should be made by the 
researcher to think oneself into the perspective of the members, 'the introspective, empathetic 
process Weber called versteheri ( Fielding, 1993, p157). Because of my role, knowledge and 
my existing relationships with the members, I considered that I was already in the fortunate 
position to fulfil many of these desirable, if not essential, requirements.
It has also been argued that the major strength of participant observation is that it is 
not just a single method for gathering information but in reality embraces a number of different 
ways of obtaining data and by employing a variety of techniques it enables inferences and 
leads obtained from one information source to be corroborated or followed up by another. 
Ethnography's customary mix is observation, documentation and speech, the latter usually in 
the form of interviews.
My 'game plan' was based on the use of these basic techniques. From the outset it 
became apparent that interviewing would form a significant part of my research, a factor which 
was gradually reinforced by the concerns which I progressively experienced in my efforts to 
carry out direct observation. As an insider I had a great deal of access to documentation, 
minutes of meetings, training and bench circulars, information issued by both central 
government departments and by other agencies involved in the criminal justice system as well 
as the 'trade journals'. I also had, through the relationships which already existed with the other 
members in the setting, the opportunity to have informal discussions in the relaxed atmosphere 
of the magistrates' assembly room or more formal discussions under the auspices of the many 
meetings which I attended during the period of my research. Initially I also considered using 
questionnaires in conjunction with ranking techniques in order to test out my theories on 'power 
and influence' in the courts, however having covered this topic in depth during the many hours 
of interview which I undertook, I concluded that to use questionnaires would not only be time 
consuming but superfluous. I did use photography as an additional tool in order to portray what 
I considered to be important physical factors of the setting, and because 'several hours of 
verbal description of the setting may be reduced to a few minutes of photography' (Jorgensen, 
1989, p103). Neither of course could I ignore the years of personal experience that I had 
acquired as a result of my direct participation as an insider, the advantages and disadvantages
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of which have already been debated, some of this experience and knowledge must, I was 
convinced, inevitably prove to be a useful source of information.
2.10.1 Seeking different angles and perspectives - The aims of observation.
Through participation the researcher is able to observe the meanings and interactions 
of people from the role of the insider (Jorgensen, 1989, pp13-15). In my particular case I 
considered this advice to be inappropriate, no matter which role I wished to assume I was, and 
had been for a considerable period of time, an insider. I was already familiar with the courtroom 
scene, I had observed the occasion, the procedures, the participants. I had experienced the 
unusual and the mundane, the pleasures and the frustrations, the tears and even some 
laughter, the arrogance and the humility, and the conflicts and the 'deals'. I had witnessed all of 
these, but it had always been through the eyes of the magistrate and from an elevated position 
on the bench. My aim therefore was to observe and seek different angles and perspectives, to 
view the proceedings through the eyes of the social scientist and not only to view the courtroom 
from a different position but also to explore its environs, the waiting areas. I had, for the most 
part, progressed well past observing the overall situation, taking the *wide angle view'. I was 
conscious that I had already reached the stage where I needed to focus my attention on 
matters of specific interest, and yet at the same time I was always mindful not to totally 
overlook the mundane. I did focus, I did seek different angles and perspectives but despite this 
I did not consider that I was necessarily successful in obtaining copious amounts of new 
information from my many hours of observations. In reality, in the actual courtroom, I found 
that relatively little ran counter to expectation.
2.10.2 To elicit rich, detailed material - The informal interview.
I gradually realised that interviews would form an important part of my research. I was
also aware that not all individuals or groups are willing to offer themselves for 'interrogation',
unless there is something in it for them, and in my case there wasn't. I also concluded that
even though I had assumed the role of a researcher, the people whom I wanted to interview
knew me best as a magistrate. This in itself created its own difficulties and effectively
prevented me from interviewing two of the groups of people who were involved in the system.
These were at one extreme the police, and at the other the defendants, although I did in fact
hold informal conversations with members of both of these groups. With the police I was quite
content to maintain the distance, independence and the neutrality which the magistrates' courts
have gone to considerable lengths to demonstrate since the days when these courts were
known as ’the police courts'. In any case apart from their participation in actual trials, there was
only normally one police officer present in the courthouse at any one time, the responsibility for
the custody of defendants having been placed with private contractors. When it came to
interviewing the defendants I envisaged that there could be a number of problems. In the first
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instance, there was the availability of defendants who would be willing to be interviewed. 
Secondly there was a distinct possibility that many of the defendants would not wish to 
cooperate with someone who had possibly fined them, given them a community penalty or 
even sent them to prison at sometime in either the recent or the distant past, or if not, this 
could conceivably happen in the near future. Thirdly, and as a result of this, I had to be mindful 
of my own safety. In restricting the groups to magistrates (lay and professional), court staff, 
advocates (both prosecution and defence), and the Probation Service, I reasoned that the 
views of both the police and the defendants could be explored, albeit indirectly, through these 
participating groups. In practice the role and the concerns of the defendants formed a central 
theme in the interviews.
Having selected the groups I found little or no problem in enlisting their cooperation. I 
personally selected and approached the magistrates whom I wished to interview, magistrates 
whom I saw as representing a cross section of the Bench. I was advised by the Clerk to the 
Justices about whom he considered would be the best members of his staff to approach, I knew 
these people well, and fully endorsed his recommendations. I again selected and personally 
approached the defence advocates. I initially approached the Probation Service through my 
membership of the Probation Liaison Committee, or to be more precise through its Court Team 
sub-committee. Whilst my approach was positively received, I was asked to make a formal 
request in writing, a request which was subsequently granted. Volunteers were asked for and 
the response to this was excellent. Gaining access to the Crown Prosecution Service by 
comparison presented more of a problem in that I had no specific point of contact. This door 
was however opened for me by the Clerk to the Justices. At no time did I meet with any 
opposition, I gave assurances in respect of confidentiality and anonymity, I also gained total 
cooperation for my requests to tape the interviews, and the impression gained throughout was 
that people were very willing to participate.
Informal interviews, so I read, should be user friendly, a mixture of conversation and 
embedded questions (Fetterman,1989, p49), and this was the format which I adopted. The 
interviews were all held at the convenience of the interviewee, sometimes at the workplace, 
sometimes in the home, on one occasion in the foyer of a local leisure centre and on another in 
a car, very early one morning travelling on the motorway to Hull. All but one of the interviews 
were held on a one to one basis. The only departure from this practice, was an interview 
involving two interviewees, and on this occasion both of the participants gave the impression of 
being slightly constrained by the other's presence. All of the interviews were taped using a 
microcassette audio recorder.
But how was I 'to elicit rich, detailed materials that can be used in qualitative analysis'
(Lofland, 1971, p76)? How could I as someone who was already known to all of the
interviewees in a specific role, prevent the respondents from giving the answers which they
might anticipate I would prefer to hear? How could I encourage the respondents to
communicate their underlying attitudes, beliefs and values, rather than presenting the glib easy
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answer (Fielding 1993, p138)? Once again I decided to use a 'third person' approach. I 
formulated many of my questions around the criticisms which had been expressed in the 
literature, some of which I had witnessed during my own observations. Many of the questions 
could be interpreted as contentious, all of them were designed to promote a reaction. (See 
Appendix A). But by presenting them in this way I personally was able to 'hide' behind the 
observations and the criticisms of others, i.e. "the criticisms are nothing to do with me". I 
considered this technique to have been highly successful, the majority of interviews earned on 
apace for periods of one to one and a half hours, and one or two for considerably longer. The 
information gathered during these interviews I considered to be both 'rich and detailed'.
2.10.3 Analysis of Interview Transcripts.
The procedure used in the analysis is based on that described by Giorgi (1985). All of 
the interviews which were conducted during the research were analysed using the method 
detailed below. The aim of the procedure is not only to assist the researcher to make sense of 
the data but also to ensure that the 'world' of the informant, as he or she sees it, is clearly 
understood.
Having conducted and taped the interview, a verbatim transcription of the tape is then 
produced. The next stage involves the researcher combing through the transcript, identifying 
and sequentially numbering specific items of subject matter or blocks of text which express a 
'self contained meaning'. This process whilst being very time consuming certainly focused the 
attention of the researcher not only to what was being said but also the context in which it was 
being said. At this stage any information which was not considered relevant to the research was 
put aside. A crucial consideration in the process is the need for the researcher to make explicit 
and test his or her presuppositions, values, judgements, etc., (to avoid influencing and 
distorting the meaning as intended by the informant), while illuminating the person's own 
meaning by drawing on any knowledge which is available to the researcher.
The next stage is to group the 'meaning' units as themes. In this phase the researcher 
tries to summarise the informant’s main concerns. Where units with a shared meaning occur at 
different points in the text, these are brought together and under a theme which accurately 
describes them both. When a number of meaning units are found to reveal a number of 
different aspects of a similar and more central theme, these are gathered together and 
relabelled under this more general heading.
Finally the researcher looks for any general themes which are common throughout 
the group. At this stage it is important that the researcher safeguards against any over 
generalisation.
2.11 VALIDATION - subjects should be given the right to comment.
In addition to using the different types of data collection which have been described in
the earlier sections of this chapter and the other steps which were taken in order to ensure the
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accuracy and validity of what had been seen and heard, I considered that one further safeguard 
was still necessary. This was to invite the people within the system, both those who had 
knowingly taken part in the research as well as those who had not, to read either parts or the 
whole of the draft thesis. 'Subjects should be given the right to comment on findings by being 
provided with transcripts of interviews and draft publications' (Fielding, 1993, p170). 'The 
success or failure of either report or full blown ethnography depends on the degree to which it 
rings true to natives .. These readers may disagree with the researcher's interpretations and 
conclusions, but they should recognise the details of the description as accurate' 
(Fetterman,1989, p21).
I did ask specific people to read and comment and I was also approached by two 
people who expressed an interest in reading the draft and who also agreed to comment. These 
insiders included magistrates, both lay and professional, the court staff, who were represented 
by both the Justices' Clerk who was in situ when the research commenced and who had made 
an important contribution to the research, and his successor, the current Justices' Clerk. The 
advocates were involved through a defence solicitor, who had also been interviewed as part of 
the study. My approach to a senior member of the Probation Service was not taken up.
The comments which I received were both positive and encouraging. Two of the 
'respondents’ expressed their views in the form of a 'taped discussion', a further two 
communicated their thoughts in writing, while the remainder expressed their views verbally and 
'informally'. Some extracts from the written and taped responses are listed as follows:
The thing that sold it to me was the fact that it contains all points of view from a 
cross-section of court users'. I readily recognised that as our court, my court. The 
ways that different solicitors have, I can pick them out. I don't think it offends anybody 
either, neither do I think it praises any part of the system' (a lay magistrate).
'Most courts I've been in as a clerk or otherwise as part of the Court User Groups .. I 
would say that it is pretty representative, it is the *warts and all' type of scenario'.
'I think the people whom you have interviewed have genuinely tried to answer your 
questions in a way they personally believe in rather than telling you what you want to 
to heari.
You might have found a fairly representative court in this particular one' (a Justices’ 
Clerk).
The balance is extremely fair and does not give the impression of being written by 
someone who as a leaning towards one particular agency. This I feel is the strength 
of the work..'.
'I do not agree with some of the opinions expounded by some of the court users,
although some of their points do find sympathy with me ..'.
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'I was most impressed with the area concerning the question of a 'Professional or 
Amateur Magistracy
'I also feel that the work is easy to read and fairly reflects the views held by the 
various court users' (a defence advocate).
'Reading through the various references I was struck by how outdated most of the 
opinions are which were written more than, say, ten years ago'.
'For reasons which will be obvious to you, I now read it in a different light, or perhaps I 
should say from a different perspective. I look at all of the criticisms of the way 
defendants are treated and their perceptions of the Magistrates and I see how they 
apply to me... I might even suggest that it become compulsory training for all 
magistrates, lay and others' (a Stipendiary Magistrate).
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CHAPTER 3 THE INTERVIEWS - summaries.
3.1 Introduction.
I have already discussed and outlined in the previous chapter the organisation of, and 
the methods used in the interviews which were earned out during the research period. The 
information gained, the opinions expressed, and the openness with which the 'insiders’ 
appeared to approach the interviews, all contributed to this extremely important phase of the 
research. As such it is my intention to report the information obtained in some detail. While this 
chapter only contains a relatively brief summary of the interview information, if the reader 
wishes to study some of the opinions which were expressed in greater detail then I have 
included a more extensive description in the appendices, this includes both the types of 
questions which were used, (see Appendix A), as well as many of the responses which were 
received (see Appendix B). The feedback from the interviews has been organised in order to 
reflect the perceptions of the different groups who are regularly represented in the 
Magistrates' Courts, i.e. the magistrates, the court staff, the advocates and the probation 
officers.
3.2. THE MAGISTRATES' PERCEPTION.
3.2.1 The magistrates' role.
The magistrates are in no doubt that they are the decision makers in their courts and 
that they have the power, not only in the decision making process, but also in the way that the 
courts are controlled. However having the power to control the proceedings is one thing, using 
it effectively is another and the general standard of behaviour in the magistrates' courts 
suggests that this power could be used to greater effect. And not is it only the behaviour of the 
defendants which indicates this, the standard of behaviour exhibited by some court 
professionals is also seen, on occasions, to fall short of that required for both the setting and 
the occasion. Poor behaviour in the courtrooms is a matter which must be addressed by the 
presiding magistrate, whether it be a stipendiary or the chairman of a lay bench.
Whilst it was evident from the responses which I received to my questions, that new 
magistrates with their 'newly trained minds' are welcomed to the Bench, it is also apparent that 
changes, and particularly major changes to the court and its procedures are generally 
unwelcome. As one magistrate said, "Everybody has got a vested interest in keeping things as 
they are". Another was prompted into expressing the opinion that some magistrates may even 
hide behind the familiarity of the procedures in order to disguise their own limited knowledge.
The lay magistrates with whom I spoke conceded that the courts in which the 
stipendiary magistrates preside are more efficient in terms of time and procedural organisation 
than are those which are chaired by the lay magistrates. They are not, however, convinced that 
this greater level of procedural efficiency necessarily results in a better quality of justice. One 
magistrate even suggested that there could be a danger of the professional who is trained in
law and who sits in the courts everyday becoming cut off from everyday people” and 
becoming ”a little bit anaesthetized", a situation in which the dispensing of justice can become 
just another part of a job.
3.2.2 Organisation and degradation.
The magistrates were unanimous in their views that if the courts are going to function 
effectively then the people who are dealt with in the courts must have respect for both the 
institution and the authority with which it has been invested. It was emphasised that this respect 
is not for the magistrates as individuals but for the authority which is invested in them. I was 
again reminded that the magistrates are there to administer the law as the representatives of 
the Queen, and if there is no respect for the authority which they represent, then the system will 
break down. The magistrates were also in general agreement that contrary to certain stated 
opinions that the courts are too strict, they would argue that the courts are often not strict 
enough in enforcing the standards of behaviour which are in keeping with the status of the court 
and the importance of the occasion. Poor behaviour should not be tolerated by the courts. The 
aim of the courts is to get at the truth in order that a correct decision can be arrived at and to ".. 
dispense justice as best it can without being distracted either physically or verbally". If the basic 
common standards of decency are not displayed by those who are attending at court then the 
courts are fully justified in taking the appropriate action. In the words of one magistrate the 
offending parties need "to be jumped on". But it was stressed that the presiding magistrates do 
need to be able to distinguish between those defendants who are being intentionally 
disrespectful from those who are not.
The court has a duty to impress on those people who attend, be they defendants, 
witnesses or the professional court users, the importance of the occasion. It is the symbolism, 
the rules and the procedures which form the structure of the courts which enable these 
objectives to be achieved. In the words of one magistrate it needs to be "very awe inspiring", 
because if it isn't then people fail to recognise the significance of it all. There was also a 
consensus that if the courts are made more informal, this could well have the effect of diluting 
the way in which the authority and the decisions of the court are perceived by those who are 
being dealt with. The claims which have been made by some observers that the intention of the 
courtroom ceremony is 'partly to facilitate the physical control of the defendants and any others 
who step out of place' is partially conceded, but only in so far as it is required to emphasise the 
authority of the court. In any case it is argued that the enforcement of such policies is restricted 
to a relatively few occasions.
Much of the courtroom symbolism and many of the procedures are grounded in the
traditions of the past. They* are not, I was told, just the product of some individual whim but
have evolved overtime and have been shaped by the adversarial system upon which they are
based. The system comprises of an accuser, a defender and a decision maker and, because of
this, there needs to be a structured procedure to ensure that the arguments which are put
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forward are properly marshalled and presented. It is also argued that some of the traditions 
which persist in the courts are associated with the age and the design of the older courthouses, 
some of which were built in the last century or the earlier part of this century and are still in 
regular use. This was a factor which was particularly pertinent to the study area. These 
courthouses were built in an era when defendants and their treatment were viewed somewhat 
differently than they are today, built in an age when it is quite conceivable that the aim of the 
courts was to degrade and humiliate the defendants. The current treatment of defendants is not 
seen to be either as oppressive as some observers have claimed or as frequent as has been 
suggested. One magistrate told me that this was not her perception of what courtroom 
ceremony was about and if this was the aim, "I would not want to be a magistrate". However it 
was admitted by some magistrates that even if the degradation of the defendant is not the 
intention of the procedures, the way in which the procedures are applied by some magistrates, 
and in particular against the more vulnerable types of defendant, then it may well have that 
effect. However, this type of practice was condemned and was said to identify the Wong type 
of magistrates'. But the Fines Enforcement court was singled out as the one area where 
humiliation and embarrassment do intentionally form part of the courtroom procedure. As one 
magistrate told me, "It is the exception which proves the rule In these courts humiliation is 
used in order to communicate to the defendants that not only are they *working the system' but 
the court knows that they are. The general message received from the magistrates whom I 
interviewed was that the humiliation and degradation of the defendants is not only undesirable 
but it can also be counter productive.
The way in which the courts are physically organised and laid out can also have the 
effect of humiliating defendants. Defendants frequently find themselves in situations where 
they are 'beyond the familiar boundaries of face to face communication and where they are 
asked to comment on intimate details of their lives'. This practice whilst strongly condemned by 
one magistrate, was not seen as a major problem by another," ..providing that the reasons for 
this questioning are explained to the respondent". In any case it was argued that the defendants 
should not be too surprised by these requirements. They should either have been prepared as 
to what to expect by their solicitors or in the case of the unrepresented defendant, by the pre- 
hearing literature with which they are issued.
The reaction which I received when I tried to portray the defendant as Carien's 'dummy 
player* was quite forceful. I was told that not only were many of the regular 'clients' not seen as 
being at a disadvantage, but that many of them not only know how the system works, but they 
also know how to manipulate it to their own advantage. I was also told about the way in which 
many unrepresented defendants, rather than being taken advantage of in the courtroom, are 
assisted in presenting their side of the argument, not only by the court clerks whose job it is, but 
even on occasions by the advocates who are prosecuting them.
Neither are embarrassment and humiliation the sole preserves of the defendants.
Even some of the people who attend at court regularly can be subjected to some humiliation.
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One example is the policemen whose evidence in the witness box has been found wanting and 
is then totally discredited by the advocates. One magistrate expressed the view that there is a 
need for the justices to protect witnesses against humiliation by advocates, " ..otherwise 
witnesses may be discouraged from attending court and carrying out their public duty", a 
situation in which justice would be the loser. I was also told about cases where the defendants 
have pleaded guilty, and the absent victims, who have no need to attend at court and may not 
even know that the matter is proceeding, "can have their reputations sullied" with apparent 
impunity by the defence solicitors presenting a very one sided story on behalf of their client. A 
story which is rarely challenged by the prosecution, who in any case are acting for the police 
and more likely than not have little knowledge of the victim.
Once again I was assured that not all courtroom ceremony is for ceremony's 
sake.The hierarchical seating arrangements and the positioning of the defendants and the 
general public are just two examples where the arrangements can be claimed to have practical 
merit. There is a need for security when the courts are dealing with those defendants who are 
charged with the more violent offences or who it is thought may try to abscond. I was also told 
of one occasion when the magistrates were intimidated by the behaviour and actions of the 
general public, intimidation which could possibly affect the decision making process. Whilst 
there was a great deal of agreement among the magistrates that some of the courts could be 
liberalised by the introduction of more informal settings, it was again emphasised that it needs 
to be recognised that there are an assortment of courts, all carrying out different functions, not 
all of which would benefit from a more liberal approach. Whilst it was agreed that some 
changes might well be made, how and what these changes should be was not irpmediately 
apparent. All were insistent however, that whatever changes are made, these must not be 
allowed to diminish either the dignity of the court or respect for the law.
There was a general consensus among the magistrates with whom I spoke that in 
expecting the defendants and the witnesses to show respect for the courts, then there is a need 
for this respect to be reciprocated. In other words, the defendants should also be given the 
opportunity to act with dignity. A starting point for this should be the presumption of innocence', 
a fundamental part of the justice system which it is thought some magistrates appear to forget. 
Other ways in which it was considered that the dignity of the defendants could be preserved 
was by asking them to do things rather than telling them or by prefixing their surnames with the 
appropriate title rather that just referring to them simply as 'Smith'.
3.2.3 Justice and efficiency.
The overall view of the magistrates who were interviewed was that 'justice is not
subjugated to organisational efficiency'. While it was agreed that the court proceedings are
structured, this is seen as being fundamental to the running of the courts. If there weren't rules
and procedures and if people were allowed to make their contributions as and how they liked,
then matters ".. would ramble on for ages". I was told of times past when there had been less
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pressure on the participants to proceed with the business and when magistrates who had been 
sitting for most of the day were expected to continue adjudicating well into the evening to 
prevent cases having to be adjourned, sometimes part heard, in order to prevent defendants 
and witnesses having to return to court on future occasions. But the question asked was, "What 
is the quality of justice dispensed by the magistrates under such conditions"? So while it was 
accepted that there had been a recent tendency to speed up the proceedings, it was not 
considered that this had been done at the expense of achieving the main criteria of the courts, 
that of dispensing justice. One magistrate did express some dissent with this prevailing view 
and did suggest that there are occasions when the courts could operate " ..with a little more 
common sense" in order that the defendants are allowed to say what they want to say, in the 
way they wish to say it without being constrained by the rules of the court.
One magistrate also commented that both the number and the length of 
adjournments had been reduced in recent times as the result of the courts pursuing a definite 
policy. This had been achieved by the combined effects of the Lord Chancellor's review of, and 
amendments to the Legal Aid legislation and the increased probing and questioning by the 
magistrates about why adjournments are being requested and why it needs so long to bring 
matters back to the court. This was a policy in which the magistrates had been prompted by the 
court's 'senior professionals’, the Justices' Clerk and the stipendiary magistrate. In the opinion 
of this particular magistrate this action had been necessary to curtail the practices of certain 
unscrupulous solicitors.
3.2.4. Power and influence.
The power is ultimately with the magistrates, not only do they have the power of 
sentencing, they also have the power, if they so wish, to manipulate events. This 'manipulative 
power1 has a greater relevance to those courts in which the stipendiary magistrates preside, 
"because they know what the advocates are up to”. The magistrates are said to reach their 
decisions in all sorts of 'devious ways'. They listen to what is being said and forget what is 
being inferred, they also use their instinct because that also has a part to play and then they 
make up their own minds.
But who influences the decision makers? It has been argued that advocacy is all 
about the power of persuasion. According to the professional magistrate, the lay bench are 
possibly more willing to be influenced by the advocates than are the professionals. An opinion 
which was not disputed by at least one lay magistrate, who was of the opinion that some 
colleagues take too seriously what the advocates have to say and this is not always because of 
the power of their argument, but often because of the esteem in which these particular 
advocates are held. Whilst the presentations of the Crown Prosecution Service are seen as 
largely factual, even if sometimes not very well prepared, it was felt that the presentations of 
the defence advocates needed to be filtered in order to, "..separate the facts from the 
subjectivity which clouds them".
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There were differing opinions about the influence, or otherwise, of the Probation 
Service and the Pre-Sentence Reports which they prepare at the request of the courts. Whilst a 
stipendiary magistrate saw them as a useful source of background information, he also 
expressed strong reservations about how influential they actually are in sentencing matters. 
One lay magistrate voiced his concern about the wide variations in standards. I was told about 
reports which are of poor construction and bad technique, and these reports tend to be 'pushed 
to one side'. But I was also told that a good report can be a 'clincher1, a report which brings out 
the pertinent points, some of which are not immediately evident to the bench from just looking 
at the defendant, and especially if that report also, contains 'good proposals'. But it was 
emphasised that it always needs to be remembered that these reports are not only susceptible 
to the prejudices of the writer but also to those of the reader. It is a report which is, "Written by 
humans for humans".
The court clerks can without doubt manipulate the benches. The extent to which this 
is done is not only dependent upon their communication skills, but also on their determination 
to influence. I was told of courts, not in the study area, where there are customs and practices 
which could easily be interpreted as encouraging the court clerks to exceed their roles as 
advisers to the magistrates and to involve themselves in the actual decision making process.
3.2.5 The magistrates' perception of the defendant.
The magistrates with whom I spoke reiterated the point that all magistrates need to 
remember that when the defendant comes into the court for the first time, and until such times 
as they are found guilty, or alternatively admit their guilt, then there should be a presumption of 
innocence. Assuming this, then the defendants should be allowed to present both themselves 
and their cases in the best possible light. But whatever the intentions of the magistrates are, in 
reality they are seen to make judgements on the defendants which are often based on the 
appearance and the body language of the defendant and the 'experience' of the magistrate.
As previously stated, when I expressed an opinion to the lay magistrates, that the 
courts in which the stipendiary magistrates presided were generally more efficiently run than 
those in which a lay bench adjudicated, this was not challenged. But what was queried by those 
magistrates was where the defendants' priorities lay, an efficiently run court, or a less well 
organised and less professional presentation, but a feeling that they are more likely to get 
justice by being dealt with by people who are more like themselves The magistrates were also 
conscious of the defendants' lack of understanding of the proceedings and particularly those 
defendants attending at court for the first time. One magistrate had no doubt where the blame 
lay, it is the "legal jargon which is extensively used in the courtrooms" by all of the court 
professionals, including the defendant's own representative. A situation which was described as 
a, "..conspiracy against the defendant".
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3.2.6. The magistrates' perception of themselves and the other court users.
The publics' perception of magistrates is that they are middle aged and definitely 
middle class. This was also the perception which one of the magistrates whom I interviewed 
had prior to her appointment to the Bench. On appointment she said that she was surprised to 
find that this impression is not totally true, although it could not be denied that some of the 
magistrates, "a few of the older ones", did fit the stereotype image. There was also agreement 
that the Bench does not accurately reflect the community which it represents and there is a 
need to broaden the social base from which magistrates are appointed. In the past magistrates 
have been recruited through a restricted network of individuals and organisations and largely by 
the recommendation of people who were already part of the judicial system. In an effort to 
widen the scope of recruitment, new initiatives are being tried, even to adverts being placed in 
the tabloid press. But as one lay magistrate emphasised, even when 'working class' people are 
interested, some of whom would be ideal candidates, their employment status, or quite often 
the lack of it, is often seen as a barrier to them putting themselves forward.
But irrespective of their backgrounds, once the magistrates have been appointed and 
have sat on the bench for some little time, it was suggested that there is a tendency for them to 
adjust their thinking and their values in line with the culture and the ethos of the Bench. As it 
was described, a levelling up or a levelling down which is dependent upon where the magistrate 
starts, a levelling which is, "all to the good of the Bench This, however, was not necessarily 
the universal view. Another magistrate was very much of the opinion that magistrates need to 
be appointed for their independence of thought, because it is only in this way that the 
magisterial system can be continually revitalised. The need for magistrates to have an 
understanding of the community in which they sit in judgement was also seen as an essential 
requirement. The stipendiary magistrate whilst being sympathetic to this view, did outline the 
difficulties of the professional magistrates who live in the areas where they also sit on a daily 
basis and who could, as a result, have some difficulty in living a 'normal life'.
Some advocates are perceived by the magistrates as pompous and arrogant and, at
times, disrespectful to the Bench and in particular to the lay magistrates. It is accepted that
solicitors do study magistrates and learn about their idiosyncrasies, knowledge which they then
use to manipulate the proceedings to the benefit of both themselves and their clients. The
opinion which Parker et al. expressed as a result of their 1989 study, that 'defence solicitors are
seen to inhibit the magistrates' search for the truth of the case', was supported by the
magistrates with whom I spoke. This was seen to apply particularly when the case for the
defence is so weak, and by adopting a smoke screen, they do come between the magistrate,
the defendant and the truth, a ploy which is not always viewed favourably by the magistrates. It
was also said that the adversarial system can be described as a 'bit of a game’, a game where
defendants can sometimes have difficulty in deciding whose side their solicitor is on. Although
it was considered that there was less likelihood of this happening in the magistrates courts than
there was in the higher courts because of the more diversified roles of the advocates. But even
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if it is seen as a game, it is a game which is taken seriously, but sometimes with different rules 
for the prosecution and the defence solicitors. For example it appears that while it is acceptable 
for the defence to take advantage of an inexperienced prosecutor, it is not considered 
acceptable for the prosecution to pursue a similar practice with the defence. It is also seen as 
vitally important for the advocates to retain their credibility with the Bench because "..his bread 
and butter depends on you". But it is also commercially important that, at the same time, the 
solicitors are seen to be representing their clients, and so the advocate has to find a way of 
satisfying both of these requirements. A method favoured by some solicitors is to preface their 
remarks with the words, "I am specifically instructed to say ... ", but in the opinion of the 
professional magistrate this course of action does have its dangers.
There was no doubt in the minds of any of the magistrates whom I interviewed, that 
the Probation Service pursue a 'non-custodial policy', a policy which did not appear to attract 
much support from the magistrates, either lay or professional, a policy which has brought both 
the service and its officers into disrepute. The Probation Service were also criticised for 
presenting an unbalanced view and of not having the publics' interest at heart. The probation 
officers are seen more in the social worker role than as officers of the court and they were 
accused of being motivated by political attitudes. It was considered that these are more the 
trends of recent years which have not necessarilly been to the benefit of the judicial system.
In discussing the advantages or otherwise of inter-group relationships, the subject of 
some parties gaining pecuniary benefits was implied. In this instance there were 
unsubstantiated suspicions that the police tend to direct clients towards the offices of certain 
solicitors but not towards others. The solicitors whom appear to gain are those who are seen as 
being less contentious in their attitudes and those who are considered to be 'spikey' appear to 
miss out.
3.3 THE COURT STAFFS' PERCEPTION.
3.3.1 The roles of the Court Staff.
The court clerks act as the legal advisers to the magistrates, they also fulfil the role as 
administrators in the courtroom, organising and ensuring the continuity of the proceedings and 
the disposal of the day's business. The level of involvement in these particular roles varies and 
is often dependent upon whether the court is presided over by the stipendiary magistrate or a 
lay magistrate. As a legal adviser to the stipendiary magistrate the court clerk's role is virtually, 
but not entirely, non-existent and even as the 'administrator1 of the court their role is somewhat 
curtailed. In the words of one court clerk, working with the stipendiary allows them to have a bit 
of a rest. Alternatively, working with a lay bench can be stressful, the level of stress being 
dependent upon the ability or otherwise of the lay chairman.
The main tasks of the court usher are to keep order and to assist the court clerk in the
smooth running of the courtroom process. By and large, the court ushers are only trained in the
60
basics of the job and they are 'encouraged' to develop their own skills for dealing with people 
and organising the defendants and witnesses for their appearances in the courtrooms. The 
ushers see a large and important part of their job as giving help and assistance to those 
attenders at court who are obviously in need of it, these generally being those defendants who 
are appearing at court for the first time. The ushers are not normally perceived by the 
defendants as being part of the 'establishment', but more as a buffer between the court and 
themselves.
3.3.2 Organisation and degradation.
I was told that many of the rituals and procedures in the magistrates' courts are relics 
of the past and no one has stopped to ask whether or not they still serve a purpose now.The 
main courthouse in use in the study area, which was built in the first third of the century, 
together with the language of the courtroom, were likened by one of the court clerks to an age 
more representative of Charles Dickens. The age and the design of the court buildings were 
seen to have perpetuated many of the traditions and procedures which are still in existence. It 
was also agreed that a great deal of symbolism is still in evidence, although it was considered 
not to be as prevalent in the magistrates' courts as it is in the higher courts. The language of 
the courtroom was considered by both the Justices' Clerk and the court clerks to be archaic. 
The title, 'Your worship' was described as anachronistic: The opinion expressed, was that it is 
still possible to show respect, maintain dignity and recognise authority "without going over the 
top". Neither should the formal language of address be forced upon the defendants. If, in 
addressing certain members of the court, some incorrect and non-formal titles are used, then 
providing that no disrespect is intended, then no disrespect should be assumed by the courts.
It was admitted that in the older buildings there is often a 'stark contrast' between the 
courtrooms and their environs, particularly the waiting areas. Comparisons were made between 
the formality, the ordered presentation and the relative quiet of the courtrooms and the 
'horrible' waiting areas with "wooden benches often awash with tea and coffee", and the 
shortage of interview rooms or segregated waiting areas for the witnesses. But not all of the 
problems can be blamed on the age or the design of the courts, or indeed are necessarily the 
fault of the courts themselves. Vandalism, especially by some of the young offenders who 
attend at court, was also seen as a major contributor to this 'squalor'. People who attend court 
because they are either accused of, or are guilty of, offences involving criminal damage to 
property, do not necessarily show respect for public buildings, even courts of law. Whilst it was 
agreed that it is difficult to defend many of the claims which are made about the conditions of 
the waiting areas in many of the older courthouses, it was considered that it would be difficult 
for the critics to make similar claims about the modem courthouses with their improved 
amenities, interviewing facilities, vandal proof designs and materials and closed circuit 
television monitoring systems.
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Neither should it be assumed that all of the rules which are enforced in the 
magistrates' courts have been designed simply to demonstrate the symbolism and the 
ceremony of the occasion. For example, there are often good reasons why some defendants 
appear in the 'dock'. Some defendants have histories of violent behaviour, others have shown 
a propensity to abscond. If there were no rules to stress the importance of the occasion and the 
need for a certain standard of behaviour, then it is claimed that some people would take 
advantage of the situation. Unfortunately, however, it appears that those who contravene the 
rules inadvertently and those who misbehave intentionally are often treated the same way. The^ 
Justices' Clerk was very definite in the view that the authority invested in the decision makers 
must be safeguarded. But once again it was emphasised that this respect is for the law and for 
the authority invested in the individual, not for the indvidual who has been given that authority.
The court staff considered that, in this day and age, people would find it quite difficult
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to justify claims that the rules and procedures in the magistrates' courts are aimed at 
demeaning the defendant. The degradation of defendants was considered to be the exception 
rather than the rule, although once again it was admitted that in the Fines Enforcement courts, 
the 'fine defaulters' were quite often humiliated in order to ''get the message across" and to 
reinforce the seriousness of the defendant's situation, something which the defendants either 
don't realise or choose to ignore. But as one court clerk commented it is a strange situation 
where on the one hand you are trying to give the defendants a fair hearing, while at the same 
time you are giving them a hard time.
It was recognised that rather than always demanding that the defendants and 
witnesses conform to the rules and procedures, the courts also need to recognise the 
individuality and the shortcomings of many of the people who attend at court. If someone 
genuinely cannot comply with requirements of the court, then allowances should be made 
which still enables that person, wherever possible, to participate effectively in the proceedings. 
If someone is told to do something and unintentionally fails to follow those instructions, then 
they should not be rebuked but reminded and it should be explained to them why it is 
necessary to comply
Within the magistrates' courts system there are a diversity of courts. While they are 
all concerned with justice some mete out punishments whilst others are more concerned with 
matters which are more of an arbitrational nature. Some require a very formal setting, others 
can be dealt with in a more unceremonious environment. It was considered important by the 
court staff with whom I spoke, that the courtrooms reflect these differences. Not only is it the 
defendants who can feel threatened and intimidated by the courtroom arrangements. In a small 
informal courtroom, where the court clerks and the defendants are in close proximity, some of 
the court clerks and particularly the female clerks can also feel threatened and intimidated.
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3.3.3 Justice and efficiency.
There have been large amounts of legislation introduced into the criminal justice 
system as a whole, and into the magistrates' courts in particular, over the last forty years with 
the sole intention of either reducing the workload of the courts or enabling the courts to deal 
with this workload in a more speedy and efficient manner. In the opinion of the Justices' Clerk 
with whom I spoke, the adverse effect of this legislation on the dispensing of justice has been 
minimal. Whilst it was admitted that magistrates are now being encouraged to challenge the 
need for, as well as the length of adjournments, this right to question was defended. The 
argument being that unless the questions are asked then the magistrates will not necessarily 
understand why the adjournments are being requested. If they do not understand, then it is 
unsafe to assume that to adjourn matters is always in the best interests of justice, because, 
"justice’delayed is justice denied”. It was emphasised however that the decision on whether or 
not to adjourn must only be based on the merits of the matter under consideration and not upon 
other peripheral issues such as the workload of the courts or whether it is the 'umpteenth' case 
which has been adjourned during that session. Cash constraints should not be allowed to 
become a major influence in judicial decision making. Neither should the state of the prisons 
and whether they are full or not be allowed to influence the sentencing process.
But cash limiting is seen to be affecting at least one of the agencies. It is claimed that 
the Crown Prosecution Service are adopting a practice which could ber likened to 'plea 
bargaining'. This is a practice where 'charges are being watered down’, and not only when the 
original charges cannot be supported by the evidence but also, in the opinion of some of the 
court staff, when there is "clearly evidence to support a stronger charge". Whilst this policy can 
often be seen as advantageous to the defendant it was not considered to be in the overall 
interest of either the criminal justice system or the public at large. In the opinion of the Justices' 
Clerk, once justice becomes cash limited then "it’s not justice anymore".
There was a general rejection by all of the court staff with whom I spoke that, 'justice 
is subjugated to the interests of organisational efficiency'. Whilst it was agreed that there is a 
policy to fully utilise the time of both the courts and the sentencers, this policy is in place 
"simply to get on with the job". I was assured that there is neither a policy or any instructions 
issued to the court staff to ensure that specifically defined workloads are achieved within a set 
timescale.
The Justices’ Clerk did tell me about some Courts who are currently experimenting by 
running courts during the evenings and at week-ends. This is being done in an effort to meet 
the requirements of those 'clients' who cannot attend at court during the day because of 
business or work commitments. This is being done to try and overcome the current 
unsatisfactory situation, where it is thought that there are a number of people who plead guilty 
to relatively minor offences and ask that they be dealt with in their absence, not because they 
have committed the offence, but because it is seen as a more convenient, and possibly
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cheaper, way of disposing of the matter than having to absent themselves from work in order to 
plead their case. But is it justice?
3.3.4 Power and influence.
The regular professional court users have to accept that the magistrates are the 
decision makers. Whether this fact is accepted willingly or whether it is just tolerated, depends 
on the respect or otherwise that the court users and in particular the advocates have for the 
individual magistrates.
But who influences the magistrates? The degree of influence that the court users can 
exert on the magistrates can very often depend on the reputation or standing that each of these 
individuals have with the magistrates, in other words their credibility. I was told that as advisers 
to the magistrates, the court, clerks need credibility if the advice which they give is to be seen 
as reliable and therefore acceptable to the magistrates. Some advocates see credibility with the 
magistrates as being vital to their role in the courtroom and therefore strive to maintain it, but 
there are a minority of advocates to whom credibility means very little. Credibility and influence 
are seen as variable components in the decision making process and very much personality 
and performance dependent. For example, Who the bench are? How they view the advocates? 
How good the advocate's performance is and how hard the advocates are perceived to be 
trying on behalf of their clients? These are all factors which could affect the outcome.
The advocates are also aware that the magistrates and court users all have their 
differences and idiosyncrasies and they use this knowledge and adapt their strategies 
accordingly in order to benefit their clients. In addition to this manipulation of the courts and the 
magistrates by the defence advocates, it was also argued that the current practice of the Crown 
Prosecution Service to accept pleas to lesser charges than those originally made is now in 
reality taking some of the sentencing initiative away from the magistrates.
The Justices' Clerk admitted that the court clerks have a 'massive potential' for 
influencing judicial decisions and some actually do. The Justices' Clerks themselves, have the 
potential by being able to influence Bench policy decisions and sentencing practices. An ideal 
vehicle for doing this is through their complementary role as the Training Officer, a role which 
incjudes the training of both the magistrates and the court staff. The day to day potential for 
influencing the magistrates is with the court clerks, sometimes in the courtroom, but more often 
in the restricted confines of the Magistrates' Retiring room. The court clerks admitted that the 
influencing of the magistrates was almost inevitable just by the simple act of giving advice. 
Whilst the court clerks claimed that they would never go into the Retiring room with the sole 
intention of persuading the magistrates to a certain course of action, when they do disagree 
with the decision of the magistrates, they admit that this can be transmitted through their, 
reactions and body language and this has sometimes been sufficient to cause the magistrates 
to re-think their decisions.
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In the magistrates’ courts there are two main areas of decision making, the judicial 
which is the province of the magistrates and the administrative which the court clerks see as 
their responsibility. This is a view which is obviously shared by the Lord Chancellor who in 
recent legislation has given the court clerks the power to make administrative decisions in the 
absence of the magistrates, providing that all the relevant parties in the matter are also in 
agreement. The problem in the courts however, is that judicial and administrative decisions are 
not always mutually exclusive and can overlap. I queried if there was a danger, where 
decisions were being seen to be made by people other than the magistrates in open court, then 
this could undermine the authority of the magistrates as the decision makers, particularly in the 
eyes of the defendants? The Justices' Clerk agreed that even if in reality the magistrates are 
not the actual decision makers, it is important that the impression that the final decision has 
been made by the bench should always be conveyed to the onlookers and particularly the 
defendants.
3.3.5 The court staffs' perception of the defendant.
The court ushers do not categorise the defendants by the types of crime with which 
they are associated, only by the degree of familiarity they have with the court and the level or 
amount of assistance which they require. It is also this level of experience which often 
determines a defendant's attitude towards the court. The first-time attenders tend to be fearful, 
the. more experienced attenders don't appear to be bothered. It was definitely the opinion of the 
court staff and particularly the court usher with whom I spoke, that waiting does not affect the 
defendants' thoughts about sentencing. It was considered that those who entered the courtroom 
fearing a custodial sentence, were already in fear of a custodial sentence when they arrived at 
the court building. Although it was agreed that the longer they wait, the more frustrated they 
become, and the more likely they are to commit acts of vandalism within the court's waiting 
areas.
Similarly the defendants react in different ways to the sentences which they receive. 
As already stated, most of the people who receive custodial sentences were 'half expecting' 
them anyway. Others who were expecting to go to prison and are given alternative non­
custodial sentences often show their relief when leaving the courtroom. In the opinion of the 
court usher, there are some young persistent offenders who do give the impression that they 
are laughing at the court and their demeanour in the courtroom is nothing like it is when they go 
back into the waiting areas.
The confusion which is experienced by some defendants in deciding where the loyalty
of their advocates lay was addressed by the Justices' Clerk. Whilst agreeing that the
observations which had been made in the Crown Court could well be substantiated, it was
thought that this confusion is less likely to occur in the magistrate' courts where the roles of the
advocates as prosecutors or defence solicitors very rarely inter-change. While it was agreed
that it must be difficult for defendants to be able to understand why their 'sole prop' in the
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courtroom drama should appear at times to be in friendly conversation with the opposing 
advocate, it was also necessary to understand that neither can the adversaries just be 
"opposing each other day in, day out, because the system wouldn't work".
According to the court usher, when some of the defendants leave the courtroom it is 
evident that they just haven't understood what has happened, "he hasn't a clue". However the 
usher placed the responsibility for this lack of understanding with the defendants themselves. I 
was told that the communication of information is good and that "people bend over backwards 
to explain to the defendants what's happening", but the reason that they don't understand is 
because they haven't listened. This however, was not everyone’s opinion. I was told about the 
courtroom language, the courtroom jargon, which it was admitted is a very efficient way for the 
regular court users to communicate with each other, but a language which should never be 
used in the presence of the defendants or the clients. Because in the final analysis it is these 
clients who need the explanation as to what has happened and what it means and it should be 
conveyed in a language which they can understand.
3.3.6. The court staffs' perception of the magistrates and the other court users.
The quality of a lay bench is often dependent upon the competency of its chairman. In 
terms of quality, some lay benches are considered by the court staff to be equally as good, as 
those courts in which the stipendiary magistrates preside. The main difference is the time 
scales required in the decision making process. Because of the lay magistrate's need to 
consult, then the time required is much longer. On the other hand some lay benches, and 
particularly those who are considered to have a poor chairman, can be, in the words of one 
court clerk, 'stressful'. The business of sentencing and how each individual bench views it is 
dependent on the two or three magistrates who comprise that bench. Some benches are 
considered to be weak and will do anything that is asked of them, often without questioning. 
There are others who just make up their minds and irrespective of any contrary opinion or 
advice stay with their decision. I was also told of occasions where the decision had been 
arrived at because of the persistence and resolve of the magistrate in the minority 'to win the 
argument'. Sentencing is also influenced by Bench Sentencing policies and by the custom and 
practice of the Bench.
Magistrates' courts can be accused of being self-perpetuating, a claim which may well 
have some justification. It is a fact that the majority of new magistrates who are appointed are 
put forward for consideration by existing magistrates. One of the qualities which is considered 
when recommending new magistrates for appointment, not that it will be found on the 'official 
list of judicial qualities', is whether or not that person will fit into the existing Bench.
The court staff see the stipendiary magistrates' courts as being more 'professional'.
The 'stipes' deal with cases at greater speed and so get through the the court's business at a
more efficient rate. There is little doubt that they are better at dealing with those cases which
involve complicated legal argument. The courts in which the stipendiary magistrates preside
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are seen as being much harder in their sentencing practices in so far as they impose more 
custodial sentences. They are seen by the advocates as being more difficult to deal with than 
are the lay benches. There is a perception among many advocates that "they can get a lay 
bench to do what they want". As has been previously stated, the court clerks consider that it is 
much easier to clerk for the stipendiary magistrate than it is for a lay bench, but having said 
that, even the 'stipes' are prone to the occasional mistake in either their decisions or their 
pronouncements.
The different teams involved in the magistrates' courts are motivated by different 
aims and objectives. These can be dictated by the vested interests of the group, the individuals 
in that group or the people whom the group or individuals in the group represent. The main 
teams are the court team which consists of the magistrates, the court clerks and the ushers. 
Then there are the prosecution who may consist of a prosecutor, the police, the victim or 
complainant and any prosecution witnesses. A third team will be the defence and may well 
consist of the solicitor, the defendant and any defence witnesses. The final team will most likely 
be the 'social worker* team, the representatives of the Probation Service. Some of these team 
members, the professionals who attend at court every day may also be members of another 
team, the 'professional court users team'. This means that some of the regular professional 
court users could well see themselves as belonging to more than one team, teams which could 
conceivably have conflicting loyalties.
3.4 THE ADVOCATES' PERCEPTION.
3.4.1 The roles of the advocates.
The advocates see their role as representing the best interests of their clients and not 
just someone who is employed to 'regurgitate' what they have been told. This interpretation, 
however, does not always coincide with the client's understanding of the situation and on 
occasions there can be differences of opinion about the quality of the representation which has 
been provided. From the professionals' point of view, what a client considers to be good 
representation and what in reality is good representation are not always one and the same 
thing. But it was agreed that some advocates do 'play to the gallery' giving the impression that 
they are putting personal publicity and self-interest before the interest of the defendant.
It was also seen to be incumbent on the solicitors to prepare clients for their court
appearances, to brief them on what to expect, to warn them of the possible outcomes and to
explain to the often bemused client what the outcome of the hearing was and what its
consequences actually mean. I was told that this function is not always satisfactorily fulfilled
and quite often depends upon the client's 'court experience' and whether or not, in the opinion
of the solicitor, a briefing is deemed necessary or if indeed the solicitor’s busy schedule even
allows the time to carry it out. Sometimes, however, this decision can be taken out of the hands
of the solicitor and at a late period in the proceedings. I was told of instances where a court
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insists that a case should be heard even though the solicitor in the case is involved elsewhere 
in another court. This type of situation results in defendants being represented, at short notice, 
by a solicitor of the same firm but who is possibly not known to the defendant. Some of the 
defence solicitors did query whether by not spending more time preparing the defendants and 
their witnesses for the courtroom they did in effect prejudice their case? Especially when they 
compare many of their witnesses with those of the prosecution who are either trained in giving 
evidence or else experts in their particular field and familiar with the requirements which are 
demanded in a court of law.
There was total agreement amongst the defence advocates that they do operate in a 
highly competitive commercial market. This market has, in the opinion of at least one of the 
solicitors, created an unfortunate situation where many solicitors have, against their natural 
preference, had to develop a business first, solicitor second mentality, a change of emphasis 
which is seen as being detrimental to the interests of justice.
The prosecutor whom I interviewed summed up his role by describing himself, slightly 
tongue in cheek, as a "minister of justice rather than an avenging angel". The general feeling of 
the Crown Prosecution Service solicitors who practice in the study area, is that the rules tend to 
militate against them. This view is based on the fact that the prosecution have to declare their 
information and intentions beforehand whilst the defence can withhold both, even to the point 
of constructing an 'ambush defence' during the actual hearing. Another area which also 
appeared to cause some concern to one of the prosecutors with whom I spoke, was that nearly 
all of the preparation for the cases is gleaned from documents, statements and information 
submitted on paper, and there can be occasions when the impression gained can be totally 
transformed with the introduction, in the courtroom, of the human element.
3.4.2 Organisation and degradation.
The solicitors were united in the view that there is a need to maintain the dignity of 
the court.There was no desire by any of them to dispense with the old traditions. Even the 
language, considered by many to be archaic, was seen as a means of showing respect, a 
respect which needs to be retained. But it was the view of one solicitor that the language of the 
courtroom can be used, and is indeed used by some, to demonstrate their power over the 
groups who are excluded by its use.
The advocates were also in agreement that there is a requirement to demonstrate the 
seriousness of the occasion. The proceedings "should be strict and should be extremely firm". 
Not only does this fact need to be enforced with the defendants and the witnesses but also with 
the court professionals, who are not always seen to treat the proceedings with due respect.
But in attaining the required standard of behaviour, this should not be achieved at the
expense of humiliating and degrading the defendants. In the opinion of the solicitors with whom
I spoke, when defendants are humiliated they are also put at a disadvantage and this must
ultimately affect the intended impartiality and the fairness of the system. It was also pointed out
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that what the courts sometimes interpret as disrespect is not always intended as such and can 
be brought about either through ignorance on the part of the defendant or more commonly by 
nervousness created by the occasion. In the opinion of one solicitor a demonstration of 
common courtesy by the courts to the defendants tends to add to the dignity of the occasion, 
humiliation of the defendants detracts from it. It was recognised that where people do show 
blatant disrespect to the courts then they could be said to be ".. the authors of their own 
misfortunes and they should be dealt with accordingly".
The claims that courtroom procedures are designed to humiliate and degrade the 
defendant were not wholely accepted by these advocates. But neither was it disputed that these 
procedures are too often applied in an unsympathetic manner or that in some courts some 
people do have a disregard for the feelings of the defendants. The way in which defendants are 
addressed by their surnames only, without them being prefixed with the appropriate title, came 
in for particular criticism. The fact that defendants are often told to do things rather than being 
asked to do things was another area of concern. Within this debate there was one dissenting 
voice, a defence solicitor who considered that many defendants ".. actually lost that quality of 
respect to be called Mister by the reason of the severity of their offending".
Another subject on which there was a high level of agreement was the presumption of 
innocence. It was claimed that this presumption is not always readily apparent in the English 
courts and yet it is a fundamental issue which should always be at the forefront of the 
magistrates’ thinking. When defendants attend at court for the first hearing they are only 
charged with having committed offences and it is important to remember that they are not 
necessarily guilty of those offences.
The age and the design of some courthouses were blamed for many of the shortfalls 
which are experienced in the treatment of the defendants. The old courthouses were described 
by one of the solicitors as 'architectural accidents', which had been designed in an age when 
people had a different view about how people should be treated in the courtroom. Not that 
outdated design was seen as being totally responsible for the hierarchical structure of the court 
and the defendant's place within it. It was recognised that there are also some good practical 
reasons for the courtrooms being designed and arranged in the way that they are. For example 
the magistrates need to be raised and seated at a higher level than the other participants. This 
not only allows them to be seen in their role as sentencers, but it also enables them to see what 
is happening in their court' and to control the proceedings. Neither should the design of the 
courtrooms and the 'artificially stretched distances for face to face communication' necessarily 
be seen as an insurmountable hurdle either, especially for the represented defendant. I was 
told that the skillful advocates have the means to protect their clients from being humiliated. 
One solicitor expressed the opinion that in this day and age when so many people who appear 
in court are either unemployed or in receipt of benefits, the idea that defendants are 
embarrassed or stigmatised by having to divulge their financial status is now outdated.
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All of the advocates who participated in the interviews were agreed that whilst some 
improvements could be made to the courtroom system and to the benefit of the defendants, 
any improvements should not be allowed to detract from the dignity of the court. It was 
generally accepted that there will always be defendants and offences where security and safety 
must be given a high priority but it was also recognised that there are other 'regulatory type 
offences' where a more informal setting would be appropriate. The solution according to one 
solicitor is not necessarily to dilute the present traditions, the respect for other court users or 
the dignity of the court, but simply to upgrade the degree of respect that is shown to the 
defendants.
3.4.3 Justice and efficiency.
One of the criteria now used to assess efficiency in the magistrates' courts is the 
speed with which the workload is moved through the system. The emphasis often appears to be 
on the avoidance of delays and those courts who fail to comply are financially penalised. The 
view expressed by all of the advocates was that the justice system is now largely dictated by 
monetary considerations.
Changes to the Legal Aid system were also criticised, but as was to be expected this 
criticism came almost totally from the defence advocates. One solicitor was particularly 
concerned because in his view the criteria which had to be met in terms of income now 
excluded all but a relatively small proportion of society from being able to obtain the benefits of 
meaningful legal representation. It now appears that effective legal representation is only 
available to either the wealthy who can afford to pay, or to those people who are on state 
benefits, such as Income Support, who can call on the state to finance their defence. It was felt 
that this would leave a large tract of the general public who would either not be represented or 
else would be inadequately represented through the Duty Solicitor system.
All of the solicitors were agreed that there is now a greater emphasis on reducing not 
only the number of delays, but also the length of those delays which are granted. Neither does 
this policy necessarily produce the increase in efficiency which is intended. The solicitor who is 
being pressured may well elect for the 'safe option' and enter a not guilty plea on behalf of the 
client in order to gain the required time to take proper instructions and make a true assessment 
of the situation, an action which can create additional delay rather than save time. The defence 
solicitors with whom I spoke were also incensed by the fact that the majority of delays in the 
courts are perceived to have been caused by them, a perception which they were anxious to 
correct. One solicitor had no hesitation in telling me where he placed the blame. On occasions 
it was caused by the financial constraints which had been placed on the various agencies but 
more often it could be blamed on the attitudes and the inefficiencies of the police and the 
prosecution, or alternatively the inability of the courts to deal with legal aid applications in time 
for the first hearing. The solicitors were very much in agreement that unnecessary delay is not
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only detrimental to the courts, but as a general rule it is not in the defendant's interest either, 
because 'justice delayed can also be justice denied'.
In pressuring the advocate to proceed this can also pressurise the defendant. The 
solicitors find themselves having to take instructions with undue haste and in unsatisfactory 
conditions in the courthouse, sometimes in close proximity with other defendants. Whilst this 
maybe an environment with which the experienced advocate can cope, the same cannot 
always be said of the defendants, some who may find themselves in an unfamiliar and stressful 
situation, now made worse. To force the defendant into making a hasty decision in such 
circumstances is seen as unfair. As I was told, it is important that whatever the outcome, 
whatever the sentence, "The defendant ought to go out of the courtroom, or to the cells and to 
his prison sentence thinking that he's had a fair hearing", and this is not always the case.
Financial constraints and the importance of performance indicators have created a 
situation where in order to save time and consequently money, and where a case can be 
dispensed with at an early stage in the proceedings, the prosecution are frequently willing to 
accept a guilty plea to a lesser offence than that with which the defendant was originally 
charged. This can result in defendants, who originally intended to plead not guilty, being 
tempted, but I was assured not pressured, into pleading guilty to lesser offences. A policy 
somewhat akin to 'plea bargaining'.
3.4.4 Power and influence.
With varying degrees of enthusiasm there is an acceptance that the magistrates are 
the decision makers, a fact which in any case is dictated by the judicial system. When asked 
how influential the advocates are in the decision making process, I was told that this often 
depended on a number of imponderables. The advocate’s power of persuasion, how well the 
advocates know the magistrates or vice versa. How well the facts are presented, knowing what 
to say and what to leave out. It was readily accepted that much of what happens is to do with 
both the personalities involved and the tactics which are adopted and these can vary from 
courtroom to courtroom, from day to day. I was told that the same case put before two different 
benches could produce stark differences. It was admitted that solicitors do use their knowledge 
of the different lay chairmen to the benefit of their clients. Cases are transferred between 
colleagues if it is suspected that a magistrate holds any bias against the solicitor who originally 
intended to present the case .There may be occasions when solicitors will even seek an 
adjournment in order to avoid a particular bench or magistrate, although I was told that this is a 
'ploy' which is generally suggested by the defendants themselves and one which is generally 
discouraged.
Some solicitors see retaining credibility with magistrates as being vital. Credibility is 
not seen as being either automatic or permanent and one way of losing it is to be seen to be 
submitting 'ridiculous' applications before the bench on a regular basis. Once the advocate
does lose this credibility the job can become exceedingly difficult.
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The power of the professional lawyer group as a decision making unit was seen as 
being quite considerable, although I was assured that this power was only invoked to deal with 
the 'really mundane and peripheral points' which were of little interest to the magistrates and 
only used in order to move the workload through the courts. It was agreed though, that to some 
observers in the courtroom this action could quite easily give the impression that the 
professional lawyer group are the actual decision makers and that the magistrates are only 
there to endorse decisions which have been made elsewhere. The group of professional court 
users who are seen to possess a great deal of power within the court system are the court 
clerks and particularly in the 'behind the scenes' area. As I was told by one solicitor who had 
experienced life as a court clerk, this power and influence can be used in one of two ways, the 
direct approach which is to blatantly tell the magistrates what action they should take or a more 
indirect method which is to draw their attention to certain matters and get them to give greater 
thought to the "sub-text of what they've heard".
3.4.5 The advocates' perception of the defendant.
Many defendants are considered by their advocates to be culturally ill equipped to 
participate effectively in the proceedings in the magistrates' courts. Some were described as 
'silly', whilst others were labelled as 'unscrupulous' and 'criminal people'. However not all of the 
defendants could be defined by these categories, there were also some who were deemed to 
be bright and others described as being 'streetwise'. There were those regular attenders at 
court who had enough knowledge of both the court and its proceedings to allow them to 'play 
the system' and to present themselves in such a way as to deceive the sentencers. Rather than 
being the 'objects of the game' as has been claimed by some observers, these regular 
attenders can also be seen in the role of the 'creators of the game'.
The advocates agreed that defendants do experience varying emotions towards the 
courts. This may be apprehension brought about by not knowing what to expect, they may have 
only a limited knowledge about what attending at court entails. Others may experience fear, 
those who have either pleaded guilty, or who intend to plead guilty, may be in fear of what 
sentence will be imposed. Those who are innocent of the offence with which they are charged 
may well feel contempt for the court because of the unnecessary trauma to which they are 
being 'unfairly' subjected. At the end of the hearing the emotions experienced may very well 
depend on the outcome. Magistrates express concern that some defendants leave the 
courtroom and give the impression that they are laughing at the court. This I was assured by 
the advocates did not happen, or if it did only very rarely. Defendants do leave the courtroom 
and they do laugh but this can nearly always be explained away as a release of tension. 
Defendants frequently fear that the worst is going to happen to them. Their solicitors quite often 
prepare them for the worst possible outcome, so when it doesn't happen, when the outcome is 
better than was expected, then they can often be seen to be expressing their relief as they 
leave the courtroom.
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Previously expressed views that the defendants either understand very little or 
nothing at all of what has happened in the courtroom, even though they are central to it, were 
generally accepted by the advocates as having a great deal of foundation. However the view 
was expressed that this description should only apply to unrepresented defendants and if it 
could also be said to apply to represented defendants then there was 'something amiss' with 
the representation being provided. The reasons for this lack of understanding are numerous but 
the main reasons were thought to be, the emotional state of the defendant brought about by the 
occasion, the legal jargon of the court, the complicated pronouncements which are used to 
explain some of the court decisions or just simply poor communication skills. But it was agreed 
that everyone in the court has a role in trying to ensure that the defendant does understand 
what is happening, what has happened and what the consquences are, because that is what 
the whole thing exists to do". As it was explained, if people do not know what has happened, 
how can they have the confidence to know that they have been dealt with fairly? Why should 
they have respect for the institution and the wider thing called law?
It appears, not unnaturally, that the defendants assess the quality of the advocacy 
which they receive, not upon the performance of their advocate, but on the results which are 
achieved. If the solicitors do not follow the instructions given, or fail to say what they were 
asked to say and an unfavourable result is obtained, then inevitably the defendant blames the 
advocate. Whether the instruction was seen as irrelevant either to the defence or as mitigation 
in the case .appears to be immaterial. If the solicitor advises against the making of a futile 
application then the defendant may well question the loyalty of that advocate. If the defendant 
sees his solicitor in 'friendly' conversation with the prosecutor in the courtroom, either between 
cases or during a case and whilst the magistrates have retired to deliberate, then the question 
of loyalty can again come to the fore. Whilst the importance of this demonstration of loyalty to 
the defendant was recognised by the advocates whom I interviewed, it was also argued that 
good inter-personal relationships with the other professional court users are also necessary. I 
was told that in a court the size of that in the study area, a medium sized court, it is in the 
interests of all the court users to have good working relationships. In any case it was 
considered virtually impossible for the adversaries to continually keep up a war of attrition. I 
was also told that because of the heavy time commitments of many solicitors, then the only 
available opportunity to discuss pending cases with the opposition was in the courtrooms and 
when the opportunity presented itself. It was admitted that in any event much of the conflict is 
only a facade, but it was also accepted that in the interest of advocate-client relationships it is a 
facade which needs to be maintained. There was however a general agreement that because 
of the different structures which exist between the two courts and different roles which exist 
between barristers and solicitors, the defendant's confusion about 'whose side his advocate is 
on', is more likely to apply to the Crown Court than it is to the lower courts.
But to gain the impression that the defence representation is a total facade would be
a misrepresentation of the truth. I was told of cases where advocates were affected by the
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outcome. Cases where a judgement has gone against them and where in their opinion, an 
innocent person has been found guilty or a person deserving of bail has been remanded in 
custody, and the solicitors do get "very uptight about it".
3.4.6 The advocates' perception of the magistrates and the other court users.
Defence solicitors must be successful to survive in a highly competitive commercial 
world. The solicitor who cannot get on with people will not enjoy success. It was suggested that 
whilst some of the alliances which are formed can be financially beneficial to one or other of 
the parties involved, most alliances are built on the mutual respect of the people involved. 
Neither do these alliances only benefit the people concerned, it was also claimed that because 
everyone is basically working towards the same end, that is to get cases dealt with 
expeditiously, then justice itself also gains. In the opinion of one solicitor, the best and most 
productive way of dealing with a case is to "work together to resolve the problem rather than 
going into every problem as though it were a fight". Most of the alliances which are formed are 
done so on a reciprocal basis, by "soft pedalling on the facts" or not making as much of 
something as one could in certain circumstances and then when the need arises and a return 
favour is required, it is usually given. It would however be wrong to assume that the court 
scene is one of total unity and compromise. I was told that court professionals are very quick to 
criticize each other, particularly when someone has failed to produce something which was 
promised within the timescale agreed. I was also told that it is not unusual for an experienced 
defence solicitor to take advantage of, and manipulate the inexperience of a new prosecutor, in 
fact it is expected that this will be done. However it is not considered acceptable for an 
experienced prosecutor to take advantage of an inexperienced defence solicitor.
All of the advocates saw the magistrates as being middle aged and middle class but
they did not necessarily share the view of some observers that they are not very 'streetwise'. It
was suggested that one reason why this 'narrow' band of society is over represented is probably
economically determined. They are the only section of society who are financially able and who
are allowed through their employment to meet the time commitments which are demanded of
magistrates. This situation has created a magistracy which is not really representative of
society as a whole and is therefore seen as a weakness in the system. In the opinion of another
solicitor, the reasoning behind the lay magistracy is that they are able to bring the 'common
touch' to the courts' system. In practice it was claimed that the longer that magistrates sit on the
bench, the more they lose their original feelings and beliefs and the more they adapt to the
culture and the ethos of that court. Because of this process of 'standardisation', often influenced
by the more senior and experienced magistrates, the traditions and sentencing practices for a
particular Bench in a particular town are perpetuated. When a magistrate loses this 'original
feeling' and has not acquired either the knowledge or the experience of the professionals then
there is also a danger that the magistrate may 'fall between two stools', having "achieved the
worst of two worlds and lost the best of one". However I was assured that the advocates'
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overriding opinion of the lay magistrates is one of respect. Whilst it was accepted that the lay 
magistracy is something of a lottery, they are seen as bringing qualities and a vision to the 
proceedings which are sometimes absent in the regular court professionals, who can miss 
things through looking at matters in purely legalistic terms.
In expressing their views about stipendiary magistrates there was a consensus that in 
terms of time, their legal knowledge, their ability to ’read between the lines' and their greater 
skills in communicating with the court and the defendants, then the courts which are presided 
over by the 'stipes' are seen as being more efficient. The stipendiary magistrates were also 
perceived as being much harder in their sentencing in so far as they impose more custodial 
sentences than their lay magistrate colleagues.The advocates also find that the stipendiaries 
are often able to indicate their views about a case and the probable means of disposal, 
something that a lay chairman can only do after consultation with colleagues, and this often 
short circuits the procedure in that only the pertinent points then need to be addressed. Where 
the advocates regularly appear before a stipendiary they also get to know what he or she likes 
to be told. But the advocates did admit that they can find appearing in front of the stipendiary 
magistrate quite daunting, they feel that there is a need to be better prepared, they are not 
allowed to get away with as much as they are with a lay bench and this applies particularly to 
trials where some of the defences which are offered would not be entertained by the 'stipe'. But 
a number of criticisms were also made. The stipendiary magistrates were criticised for being 
overly concerned with the speed with which they dispense with their workloads. On occasions, 
they were even accused of prejudging issues before all of the facts had been presented to 
them, and neither did they make much effort to conceal this. They are seen to be more 
selective than the lay magistrates when deciding what they want to hear and what they do not 
want to hear. But despite these criticisms, at least one solicitor expressed a preference for an 
all professional magistracy.
The Probation Service, in the opinion of one of the advocates whom I interviewed, 
comprises of ideologically motivated people who are committed to arriving at a particular 
result, that is to prevent people being sent to prison', a policy which does not necessarily 
provide the best solution in every case. To this advocate this is an area of concern and 
something which needs to be borne in mind by the magistrates when considering the 
'proposals' contained in what is seen as a very influential document, the Pre-Sentence Report.
3.5 THE PROBATION OFFICERS' PERCEPTION.
3.5.1 The probation officer's role in the court.
The role of the probation officer can be split into two main tasks, that of an officer of
the court, a provider of information to assist the magistrates in their decision making role, and
as a 'social worker* whose role is designed to 'advise, assist and befriend the defendant', a role
which has become somewhat modified to include more of an element of punishment as a result
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of recent legislation. In the opinion of the probation officers who participated in the study, the 
courts attach far too much importance to the former and this is to the detriment of the service 
which is provided for the defendants in the courts. It is a situation which urgently needs to be 
reviewed and redressed in order that the officers can direct more of their efforts to the latter 
part of the role, a role which the probation officers would far sooner perform. There is a general 
and largely accurate view that the probation officers tend to play a passive role in the 
courtroom. This has been interpreted by some as a tactic which has been intentionally adopted 
so that by keeping a low profile the officer can give the impression to the onlooking defendants 
of a position of neutrality between them and the courts. However I was told by one probation 
officer that the way that this role is played is not always open to choice but is often dictated by 
the bureaucratic procedure that exists in the courtroom and which discourages many probation 
officers from playing a prominent role in the front stage area, although I was assured that they 
remain very active behind the scenes.
3.5.2 Organisation and degradation.
There was a consensus among those probation officers who participated in the study 
that there is a need for rules in the magistrates' courts to ensure that a complicated set of 
procedures and a number of conflicting interests can be channelled into a workable system. 
The problem as seen by these probation officers is not with the rules themselves but in the 
asymmetrical and dehumanising way in which the rules are applied by some of the regular 
court users, including the magistrates. The layout of the courtrooms and the way in which they 
are organised was also a subject of some concern and a subject of conflicting views. Whilst 
there was a great deal of concern expressed that the defendants need to be protected from 
humiliation by the courts, it was also recognised that there is also a requirement to separate the 
magistrates from the rest of the court in order to demonstrate their impartiality as the decision 
makers, and to achieve this, abnormal distances for face to face communication can become a 
pre-requisite. But a great deal of concern was expressed about the way in which the defendants 
are treated by the regular court users. The way in which the defendants are paraded in the 
courtroom was likened by one probation officer to a 'cattle-market'. Another described their 
treatment as a conspiracy of ego inflation, a method used to ".. heighten the self-importance of 
the ones who conspire together in this It was however conceded that this type of treatment 
is not universal and that there are court personnel who can be observed to be actively working 
against the degrading of the defendants in the courtroom.
There was an overall view among the probation officers that the courtroom
proceedings should and could be liberalised and without the need to forfeit the solemnity, which
it is accepted needs to be retained in order to mark the importance of the occasion. It was the
considered opinion of one officer that the special location, the timing and the status of the
participants involved in the court scene all marked the significance of the occasion without
having to resort to much of the symbolism, the traditions and the procedures. The degradation
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ceremony was certainly not considered to be a necessary part of the court system but more as 
an abuse of power by some of its regular participants.
3.5.3 Justice and efficiency.
The probation officers were also unanimous in their view that all too often the 
magistrates' court is not seen as a place where justice is dispensed but more as a place where 
the defendants are processed. An environment where the probation officers occasionally try to 
resist the flow but generally finish up being carried along with the rest. An environment where 
only now and again do they come across a case which really appeals to their innate qualities 
and their social worker training. The court and its participating agencies all operate in a setting 
which is influenced by such factors as performance indicators and cash limiting and for some 
just the simple fact of trying to survive in what is seen as a highly competitive business 
environment. In this setting the emphasis appears not to be on justice per se, but is more 
concerned on negotiating cost effective deals or ensuring that the maximum number of clients 
are processed through the system as quickly as is possible in order to ensure that a legal 
business survives and that the jobs of those whom it employs are safeguarded. Such, for 
example, are the divided demands which are placed on the defence advocate, not only a duty 
to the client but also a responsibility to a business and the people it employs.
In this pursuit of efficiency I was also told about courts which appear to proceed 
almost in spite of the presence of the defendant, where if a cardboard cut-out was substituted 
for the defendant, it is doubtful if anybody would spot the difference. A situation where even the 
represented defendants are not sure what their representatives are going to say on their behalf. 
A setting in which the magistrates appear to be more interested in the crime and its appropriate 
'sentencing tariff than they are in the person, the individual, who stands before them. Neither 
was this isolation of the defendant necessarily seen as occurring by chance. It was felt by at 
least one officer that the procedures are purposely kept opaque on the assumption that the less 
the defendants understand and the more confused they become, the easier it is to keep control 
of the defendants and hence the proceedings. But it was pointed out that there can be a 
corollary to this type of approach in that it is likely to promote a negative response from the 
defendants, not only to the magistrates' courts and their system of justice but also to the 
sentences which these courts are empowered to impose.
3.5.4 Power and influence.
The probation officers were in no doubt that the power in the courtroom rests with the
magistrates, they were described by one probation officer as 'untouchable'. But they also
identified another powerful and influential group of people, the professional lawyer group, which
consists of the court clerks and the advocates, a decision making network from which both the
non-legally trained probation officers and the amateur lay magistrates are excluded. The power
and influence of the court clerks whilst being acknowledged was also questioned because of
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the covert way in which it often appears to be used. Attention was drawn to the fact that much 
of what the magistrates hear and see is produced in an open court and is therefore subject to 
argument or scrutiny. This openness does not however apply to all of the advice which is given 
to the magistrates by their clerks, a great deal of which is provided, "behind closed doors".
An oft used word when discussing the level of influence which the varying groups are 
able to exert on the justices is 'credibility'. The probation officers were agreed that whether or 
not their reports, and in particular their 'proposals', are accepted by the sentencers very often 
depends on the report writer's credibility with the magistrates on the day. What was of particular 
concern to the officers is how credibility is defined. It was feared that when credibility is granted 
to individuals, the decision is often based on the personality of the individual, not their ability, 
two different elements which can and often seem to be confused by the magistrates. This 
concern was expressed, because it was seen that some advocates attempt, and apparently 
succeed in 'hoodwinking' the magistrates.
The Pre-Sentence Report is the means by which the probation officer can influence 
the sentencers. It was generally agreed that these reports are written with the defendant, the 
underdog, in mind. Other considerations such as matters of public interest are seen as the 
"preserve of the bench". A problem can arise when some probation officers take these 
sometimes conflicting interests to extremes and this can result in the influence of the report 
being devalued. It was, however, considered that a number of relatively recent events had 
resulted in an improved level of report writing and presentation. These were Criminal Justice 
Act 1991, the introduction of National Standards and the appointment of a stipendiary 
magistrate to the Bench. The view expressed by some previous researchers concerned with 
the magistrates' courts had suggested that many magistrates see the Pre-Sentence Report as 
an attempt by the probation officers to usurp their sentencing powers. This is a perception 
which is still seen to exist by the probation officers whom I interviewed. This fact had also been 
more widely recognised and recent guidelines which have been issued to the officers were 
designed to ensure that the sensibilities of the sentencers are not offended. I was assured 
however, that by and large the magistrates within the study area are more receptive to 
'constructive proposals', than had been experienced by the probation officers who had worked 
in other Petty Sessional Divisions.
3.5.5 The probation officers' perception of the defendant.
The defendants in the magistrates' courts are seen as people who are disadvantaged
by the system and who are subjected to rules and procedures which restrict their opportunity to
participate effectively in the occasion. The majority of defendants are often seen as either
having personal shortcomings, or as being in such an emotional state that, at best they only
partially understand what is happening around them in the courtroom and at worst they have no
idea at all. Their treatment by some of the magistrates and the other court users is seen as
being both officious and disrespectful and they were described by one probation officer as
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"cannon fodder for the court system". Although once again I was told that it would be wrong to 
categorise all of the defendants who attend court in this way. Some of the more regular 
attenders at court were described as being both bright and streetwise, knowing not only the 
system but also how to play it.
The probation officers see themselves as having positive relationships with their 
clients. They tend to be non-judgemental and have a degree of empathy with the client's 
situation. They see their relationship with the client as being totally different to that of any of the 
other court users, a relationship which on occasions can result in them becoming a 'privileged 
confidant'. The probation officers with whom I spoke were acutely aware of the need to 
maintain a professional distance between themselves and the client and not to do so was 
considered to be detrimental in two ways. In the first instance it would not be helpful to the 
client and secondly it would fail to demonstrate an expected level of objectivity to the 
sentencers, a balancing act which the probation officers need to achieve if they are going to 
maintain credibility with both the client and the courts. Whether or not the client sees the 
probation officer as 'just another part of the system' often depends on how helpful the officer 
can be to that client and also on how responsive the client is to that assistance at that particular 
time. It can also depend on the client's past experience with the Probation Service or indeed 
any of the agencies which are associated with 'the system' and whether this contact was 
considered to have been beneficial or otherwise. What was also emphasised is that a good 
officer-client relationship needs to be two way. It cannot be based solely on providing for the 
client, there is also a requirement for the officer to make demands on the client. I was told that 
it is quite likely that a probation officer who is perceived as being 'soft' by the magistrates may 
also be seen as a 'waste of time' by the client.
3.5.6 The probation officers' perception of the magistrates and the other court users.
The probation officers see the magistrates as the decision makers whose abilities
vary between the extremes of 'good' and 'abysmal'. They see them as poor communicators
who jealously guard their sentencing powers. They are seen as being mainly middle class,
although this narrow basis for selection is not seen to be as restricted today as it was in times
past. However they are still seen to emanate from a different world than the people with whom
they are dealing. Even those people who are apparently appointed from 'working class'
backgrounds are often seen to assume middle class values after they have served on the
Bench for a period of time. These magistrates were also considered to be more critical of the
defendants from similar backgrounds, seeing them 'as lacking moral stamina' and therefore
subjecting them to harsher sentencing. The magistrates are also considered to be- subject to
personal prejudices and also to making assumptions when dealing with the defendants. But lay
magistrates are also seen as generalists who have a non-vested interest, who can inject the
system with an "invaluable dose of commonsense" and have the potential to question the
existing system. The relationship between the probation officers and the magistrates within the
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study area is considered to be good and much better than that which has been experienced by 
officers in other areas. Despite this, the probation officers still found that they are frequently 
humiliated by the magistrates who make either careless or deliberate comments in the 
courtroom. The probation officers in the study expressed a strong preference for the 
professional magistracy whom they saw as being tougher to convince but more consistent 
because of their greater knowledge and experience. The lay benches were seen as easier to 
convince but also as quite unpredictable. The consensus of these probation officers was that 
they would rather do 'battle' with a stipendiary magistrate than take their chance in a 'lottery' 
with a lay bench.
The probation officers were very outspoken in their criticism of advocates and in 
particular the defence solicitors. The solicitors treatment of, and their attitudes towards their 
clients was described as 'squalid'. It was considered that the advocates major concern was the 
pecuniary benefits which could be obtained and they were seen to be colluding with a system in 
which the welfare of the defendant, their client, is given a low priority. They are still considered 
by some officers to be 'money making plagiarists' who use much of the information that is 
produced in the Pre-Sentence Report. However this view does not appear to be as strongly 
held as it was in the past, it was conceded that solicitors now use the information which is 
produced in the reports rather than depending totally upon it. Even so, solicitors were still 
heavily criticised for their apparent lack of preparation.
The Probation Service's relationship with the police is best summarised by one officer 
who said, "The probation officer who thinks he's got a good relationship with the police is self 
deluding". The only areas of real cooperation appear to be among small groups who have been 
set up to deal with specialist areas and where there are mutual interests. A situation which also 
appertains to their relationships with Crown Prosecution Service.
In talking to the probation officers it became quite apparent that as a group they see 
themselves as separate from the other professional groups who comprise the magistrates' 
courts system. In their own words they are made to feel 'marginalised' by these other groups. 
This does not however appear to be a straightforward exclusion of one group by the others, 
there is a dichotomy. Whilst they are excluded from what they consider to be an arena of power 
and influence, the professional lawyer network, they are also aware that there are pressures on 
them to demonstrate their allegiance and loyalty to the courts. Despite this perceived 
marginalisation, the probation officers do succeed in developing working relationships with the 
other groups in the system, albeit these relationships are normally based on mutual benefit and 
reciprocal arrangements. In short, whether they are seen as part of the court by the other court 
users is said to be dependent upon whether they are seen to be useful to some other agency or 
individual at that particular time.
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CHAPTER 4. ANALYSING INTERACTION - OBSERVATION AND DOCUMENTATION.
4.1 An Introduction.
As I have already indicated, the information gathering phase of my research design 
was based on ethnography's customary mix of observation, documentation and speech.
The interview phase has already been described and recorded in the previous
chapters.
I had been exposed to the general courtroom scene for an extensive period of time 
prior to my decision to carry out a programme of research. During that time I had become very 
familiar with the courtroom and its procedures, it was very difficult therefore to get away from 
the view that a courtroom, is a courtroom, is a courtroom. There was no doubt that my 
awareness of the criticisms of both the courts and their procedures did enable me to approach 
the court scene from a number of new and different perspectives. In reality however, I did find 
that my observations in the courtroom became somewhat restricted and inevitably focused. I 
found myself looking for the unusual rather than the ordinary, the specific rather than the 
general. As a result of this I did not consider the direct observations in the courtroom to be the 
most productive of my research activities.
As a magistrate, as a member of the Magistrates’ Courts Committee, the Lord 
Chancellor's Advisory Committee and the Probation Liaison Committee, I received a profusion 
of documents. These documents were extremely varied and consisted of Government 
circulars, predominantly from either the Home Office or the Lord Chancellor's Department, 
white papers, green papers, discussion documents and directives. Then there were the trade 
journals, 'The Magistrate', or the 'Justice of the Peace'. There were circulars and minutes from 
the Central Council of the Magistrates' Courts Committees. At the local level I received minutes 
from those meetings which I attended and also from many I didn't. In addition there were 
circulars, training information and newsletters, not only those produced by the courts but also 
by the other agencies involved in the criminal justice system. During the period of my research 
I also found that both the national and the local press were extremely interested in the 
happenings and the 'crises' in the criminal justice system.
My final source of information was the views and opinions which were expressed by 
the various participants. These were expressed in a number of forms, as well as the interviews, 
there were meetings, training sessions, seminars or just simply in informal discussions.
4.2 ORGANISATION AND DEGRADATION.
4.2.1 Quality of service - the human interaction aspects.
In an article in The Magistrate in early 1991, Raine expressed concern that
traditionally the standards for quality had generally focused on the quality of judicial decisions
rather than on the process as a whole. He was of the opinion, an opinion which was shared by
many court users, that there was considerable scope for improving many aspects of judicial
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administration, improvements which would better fulfil the expectations and needs of those who 
experience the court systems. High on the list of priorities should be 'the dimension of personal 
treatment'. The quality of service might well be improved markedly so far as users were 
concerned 'by careful attention to human interaction aspects'. Indeed, the conclusion drawn 
was that many of the 'shortcomings of, and limitations to, the service provision that at first light 
seemed inevitable in old cramped and ill suited court buildings, could be mitigated to a 
considerable extent by visible, knowledgeable and helpful staff in waiting areas and by 
courteous and sensitive behaviour of personnel in the courtroom' (Raine, February, 1991, p6). 
This theme was also taken up by the Lord Chancellor. In his address to the Magistrates' 
Association in 1991 he emphasised the importance of the courts having effective reception, 
arrangements for non-professional court users 'so that they can be informed as to where they 
should go or where they should wait. The importance of having capable ushers cannot be 
overstated' (The Magistrate, Dec. 1991/ Jan. 1992, p199). A year later he was committing the 
Magistrates' Courts' Service to the development of the Citizens' Charter initiative. Whilst 
conceding that many courts were hampered by old and often cramped buildings, a situation 
which was particularly relevant to the study area at that time, he did not consider this to be 
wholely restrictive. 'The human contact between staff and users is most important .. I would 
urge you to see us as the public do' (The Magistrate, Dec. 1992/ Jan. 1993, p197).
There was obviously a need for change, a need for greater emphasis on the 'human 
interaction' aspects. So how did the magistrates' courts respond? The Magistrates' Courts' 
Service Inspectorate commenced its three yearly inspections of magistrates' courts early in 
1994 and ranking high on their agenda was the quality of service which these courts provide. 
Having inspected a number of courts, they found '.. recently there has been a deliberate shift in 
emphasis which gives the needs of users a higher priority .. A working group has been 
established to focus on a Courts' Charter initiative .. a Quality Forum has been set up. .. a 
Magistrates’ Courts' Charter has been produced .. '(HM Magistrates' Courts' Service 
Inspectorate, executive summaries, April 1994-April 1995).
But how did the study area perform in respect of the 'personal treatment' of non- 
professional court users. A 'Quality of Service' survey which was undertaken in 1992, and 
whilst the court was still located in its old and inadequate buildings, found the reactions to be 
mixed. When asked the question about the 'availability of staff to deal with queries', 28 per cent 
considered it to be very good and a further 54 per cent rated staff availability as satisfactory. In 
assessing 'the helpfulness and friendliness of court staff, 46 per cent considered the standard 
to be very good while a further 44 per cent placed it in the 'satisfactory' category. In an identical 
survey carried out in 1995, a year after the courts had moved into a purpose built, ultra-modern 
courthouse with a permanently manned reception desk, 30 per cent rated the availability of 
court staff as very good but only 46 per cent considered it to be satisfactory. The answers to 
'the friendliness and helpfulness of staff question were identical in both of the surveys. Over 
the same period however, it was considered that 'the quality of information provided by ushers
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or other court officials on arrival at the courthouse' had improved considerably. In 1992 only 
half of those surveyed considered the quality of information worthy of being placed in either the 
'satisfactory' or 'very good' categories, by 1995 this had improved to 76 per cent.
My own experience of visits to foreign courts is that they all resemble 'bureaucratic 
rabbit warrens', and particularly in the non-public areas. To date I have the dubious record of 
having been temporarily lost in the city courts of Manchester, Liverpool and Sheffield, even 
though at two of these courts I was there on official business and had been given directions by 
a 'helpful receptionist'. In the study area, many of the magistrates breathed a sigh of relief 
when direction signs were erected in the new courthouse which identified the routes from the 
magistrates' assembly room to the ten courtrooms which are located on three different levels.
4.2.2 A caring, responsive and fair service, or a system which is fundamentally 
disrespectful.
Addressing the Bishop of Lincoln's conference on 'Respect in Prison', July 1991, 
Howard Zehr described the criminal justice system as 'fundamentally disrespectful', as a 
'technical process of establishing blame and handing out pain'. He argued that, 'At present our 
system robs victims and offenders of autonomy, it depersonalises them. It is based on the 
requirements of the most bizarre cases, but uses the the same procedures for petty ones'. 
According to Zehr, 'We learn respect from being respected, not by being disrespected’ (The 
Magistrate, April 1992, p53).
From my observations and experience within the magistrates' court at that time, I 
doubt whether Dr. Zehr would have received universal support for these claims. In fact a view 
occasionally expressed by some magistrates was that by committing certain types of offences, 
especially those which involved violence and theft, then these offenders risked forfeiting their 
right to be treated with respect. But despite this there were moves afoot within the courts to 
improve the levels of courtesy afforded to court users, both professional and non-professional. 
In 1990 at a training seminar for bench chairmen within the study area, the attenders were told 
that, 'Patience and courtesy should be shown to defendants, advocates, witnesses and 
prosecution alike'. They were also urged, 'To address defendants as Mr, Mrs or Miss, or by first 
name and surname'. In 1992 the Judicial Studies Board were producing a list of suggested 
competences against which bench chairmen could be appraised, these competences were 
subsequently adopted by the Bench in the study area. One of the major categories was 
'Dealing With People', a category which included such competences as, 'Ensuring courtesy to 
all court users', 'Addressing defendants in an appropriate manner*, 'Avoiding a patronising tone' 
and 'Showing appropriate concern for distressed parties and witnesses'.
It was conceded that until relatively recent times there had been little or no training in 
magistrates' courts on the subject of human awareness, 'but now dealing fairly with people, 
including race issues, had become an integral part of training’ (Black People in Magistrates' 
Courts, Justices' Clerks' Society, 1995). A review earned out by the Justices' Clerks had also
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found that the majority of their members and the magistrates who they advised were convinced 
that 'equality of treatment is provided in their courts to all court users'.
In the course of their inspections, carried out in a twelve month period between 1994 
and 1995, the Magistrates' Courts' Service Inspectorate once again found wide variations in the 
way that court users were treated, and particularly in the way that defendants were dealt with. 
In some courts the staff were observed to be '.. courteous and helpful'. Inspectors observed 
staff dealing with users '.. sensitively and professionally'. In other areas the staff were seen to 
be'.. courteous and responsive to the needs of users'. In another area they observed instances 
where'.. staff went out of their way to assist in matters outside the normal responsibility of their 
post'. The '.. calm efficiency and helpfulness of the court ushers' was singled out for special 
mention. Unfortunately these observations were not universal. In another area it was reported 
that while the professional court users were happy with the service they received, it appeared 
that'.. the needs of defendants and witnesses did not seem to be a high priority'. In one specific 
courthouse it was observed that prisoners were sometimes chained to tables, radiators, window 
bars and even a piano while waiting for their cases to be called. Handcuffed prisoners were 
walked through public areas for access to toilets and courtrooms (Magistrates' Courts' Service 
Inspectorate, executive summaries, April 1994-April 1995).
As I have already indicated, in my own court only 10 per cent of those surveyed were 
dissatisfied with the helpfulness and friendliness of the court staff. The Magistrates' Courts 
Committee is still awaiting its first visit from the Inspectorate. Unlike the larger city courts which 
I visited during the research period, my own court only uses the dock for those people who are 
produced into the courtroom from the cells, that is those prisoners who are either produced 
from custody or who have been arrested on warrants. Neither are all of the prisoners who are 
escorted into the dock always handcuffed, a decision which seems to be left to the custody 
officer. As one police custody officer informed me, "You know those you can trust and can't 
trust, the ones who are likely to jump over the dock. You check with the CPS and identify those 
who aren't going anywhere, [those who it is anticipated will be remanded in custody]. We 
identify the ones who have caused trouble in the cells or when they were arrested. We don't 
'cuff non-payers, [fines defaulters]". Not that this system was necessarily a guarantee of a 
defendant's behaviour in the courtroom. During the period of my survey one young male 
prisoner leaped over the dock rails and escaped from the courthouse to enjoy a few days of 
unexpected freedom. However, the practice of not putting all of the defendants into a secure 
area within the courtroom for their hearing, and especially those alleged to have committed 
violent crimes, was a matter of concern to a number of the lady magistrates who experienced 
some anxiety for their personal safety.
4.2.3 A demonstration of courtesy is now an integral part of courtroom procedure.
Accepting that dealing fairly and courteously with people is now said to be an integral 
part of the system in magistrates' courts. How does this show itself within the confines of the
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actual courtroom? From my own observations I found the way that defendants and other non- 
professional court users are treated is almost as diverse as are the individuals who participate 
in the courtroom interactions. Like the Magistrates' Courts' Service Inspectorate, I also 
observed a great deal of courtesy, helpfulness and even concern from both the magistrates 
and the court professionals. But I also witnessed instances of defendants being given a 'rough 
ride', although on the majority of occasions when this occurred it could have been argued that 
the recipients had brought it upon themselves because of the disrespect they had shown for the 
court, however on other occasions this argument would have been difficult to substantiate.
I have been repeatedly impressed by the courtesy which the court ushers display 
towards, not only the regular court users, but also towards witnesses, defendants, the 
defendants' families and friends as well as members of the general public. Their general 
helpfulness and politeness appears to be one of the constants in the courtroom and I have 
regularly been surprised to hear them address people, some whose alleged crimes they must 
find most offensive, as 'Sir* as they have escorted them into the courtroom and told them where 
to stand. An overall impression of courtesy is generally maintained throughout the court 
hearings, although some of the politeness comes over as being part of the courtroom 
procedure and somewhat superficial, but some of the concerns which are demonstrated for 
some of the non-professional court users do appear to be very genuine. Defendants in court 
normally have their surnames pre-fixed with the appropriate title when being addressed in court 
or by their first and surnames when the decisions of the court are being announced. There are 
occasional lapses by some stipendiary magistrates who have traditionally referred to 
defendants by only using their surnames. Defendants are no longer told to stand or to sit as and 
when required, they are now asked to do so, although when asked to stand they have very little 
choice in the matter. I have also seen magistrates apologise to defendants for any 
inconvenience caused when administrative errors have resulted in their unnecessary 
attendance at court. Witnesses are frequently thanked for attending at court and giving their 
evidence, and considering the stressful situation that many witnesses experience, they are 
entitled to this type of acknowledgement.
During the course of my research I have also seen examples where the magistrates 
and the court professionals have shown a genuine concern for the plight of some of the people 
who appear in the courts. I have seen people with severe financial difficulties have their fines 
remitted or else be sentenced to one day's detention in default, a sentence which in practice 
means that they are 'detained in the courtroom' until the end of the afternoon's court business. 
On one occasion I observed the considerable lengths to which a prosecutor went to in order to 
obtain a placement in a secure psychiatric unit for a mentally ill defendant because he felt that 
a remand to prison, the only other realistic and a much easier alternative, would have been 
totally inappropriate for this defendant. I witnessed an occasion when the husband of a very 
distraught defendant was permitted to sit next to her throughout the hearing in order to offer his 
support and act as a calming influence. I observed a case where because of the emotional
85
state of the defendant, a condition which was also a cause for medical concern, the bench 
demanded a 'stand down' pre-sentence assessment in order that the matter could be dealt with 
on the day rather than subjecting the defendant to further weeks of uncertainty and emotional 
strain. Defendants with disabilities are regularly allowed to sit throughout the proceedings once 
they have taken the oath. I was, on one occasion, party to a defendant, a homeless and regular 
petty offender, being given a short custodial sentence so that he could spend the Christmas 
and New Year period in the 'comfort' of a prison cell. He had 'burgled' his solicitor's office in the 
hope of being arrested and sent to prison. We could and possibly should have sentenced this 
defendant to a non-custodial alternative. Defendants who are charged with relatively serious 
offences and who arrive at court unrepresented are routinely asked if they wish to seek legal 
advice, either by consulting the duty solicitor or by seeking an adjournment of their case so that 
this advice can be obtained.
Whilst assisting unrepresented defendants in trials is a recognised part of the court 
clerks' duties, it is a duty which my observations suggest is taken very seriously. Not only are 
their rights and the procedures to which they must conform explained very clearly and in some 
detail, but I have also witnessed occasions where the court clerk has appeared to almost take 
on the role of the defendant's advocate in their dealings with the prosecution and the problems 
which many unrepresented defendants experience in the cross-examination of witnesses. Not 
that this should be taken as an indication that the prosecution take advantage of the 
unrepresented defendant. To the contrary, I have also observed these defendants, not only 
being supplied with writing materials by the prosecutors in order that they could make notes, 
but also with good practical and legal advice.
4.2.4 Non-professional court users can be disadvantaged by courtroom practice and
procedures.
Imagine a typical early morning scene in the magistrates' court. The first case of the 
morning is being heard, the defendant has pleaded guilty but there is a great deal of mitigation 
and the defence solicitor is addressing the magistrates on his client's behalf. For the defendant 
this is an extremely important day. The court is crowded there are numerous solicitors sat 
around waiting for the cases in which they are involved to be called, some are making notes 
others are involved in conversations with associates and colleagues. The court clerk is busy 
organising the morning's schedule, most of the defence solicitors are keen to have their cases 
dealt with early so that they can deal with their business in other courtrooms or else get back to 
a busy office. There are comings and goings, files and fresh information are being fed to the 
various professional court users. Probation officers keep moving in and out of court. Solicitors 
use the courtroom as a convenient route to see their clients who are being held on remand in 
the cells. Solicitors, unlike bam'sters in the Crown Court who tend to creep in and out of the 
courtroom, appear to 'breeze' in and out of court. Family and friends of the defendants, 
defendants waiting for their own cases to be called or just general members of the public who
86
wish to gain access to the public area at the rear of the courtroom all add to this general 
situation . The observer is left with the impression of an almost incessant background noise, a 
hub-hub of conversation, the rustling of papers, comings and goings and the opening and 
closing of doors. What impression is the defendant left with on this, an important day in his life? 
Unfortunately for some, this is not an imagined scene but a scene based on observation and 
reality. Some court chairmen do attempt to keep this level of disturbance within reasonable 
levels. The stipendiary magistrates certainly demand that a greater level of courtesy and 
respect be shown to the court. The later in the court lists that.a defendant's case is called, the 
fewer are the people present, the less are the peripheral distractions and the more the 
defendant becomes the centre of attention for all those who are present in the courtroom rather 
than just those who are directly involved in the case. Fortunately trials are not subjected to this 
type of situation because of the way in which they are scheduled and allocated to specific 
courts rather than being included in a general court list.
But of course trials do contain some pitfalls, and particularly for the non-professional 
witness and the majority of defendants. The problems can start from the very outset when they 
are asked to take the oath. "Take the book in your right hand and read the words on the card". 
A very simple statement unless you are either a poor reader or else you cannot read at all. This 
situation is not as infrequent as some people may think and it can be a source of considerable 
embarrassment and humiliation, and definitely not designed to put the witness or defendant at 
their ease. Then they are instructed on how they should deliver their evidence, normally by 
their solicitor. "I will ask you the questions but please address your answers to the magistrates, 
[this often involves the witness turning through an angle of 120 degrees if he or she wishes to 
face the advocate and then the magistrates]. Please keep your voice up because the 
magistrates need to hear your replies. At the same time will you please watch the pen of the 
court clerk, the gentleman sat there, because he will be taking notes of what you say. Please 
answer at a speed which will enable him to take accurate notes. I know it is difficult but please 
try". Having successfully negotiated these hurdles and having presented their evidence, they 
are then cross-examined by the 'opposition'. During this period it may be courteously suggested 
to them that they are mistaken', or that they are being economical with the truth', [and some 
are], or else 'the evidence you have given is a load of lies' [and occasionally it is difficult to 
draw any other conclusion].
From my observations it appears that the professional witness is better equipped to 
handle this situation. They give the impression of being more in control, they know the rules of 
evidence and also the speed at which to present it. If they have any anxieties they do not 
openly display them. Unless they are referring to their notes or handling exhibits, they stand 
with their hands clasped either in front of their bodies or behind their backs, unlike the amateur 
who tugs at his collar, plays with his tie, [obviously borrowed for the occasion], drums his 
fingers on the edge of the witness box and shuffles uneasily from one foot to the other. As one 
prosecutor told me, "I was trained to watch how people give their evidence, whether they move
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from one foot to another and such things as that. Unfortunately with these witness boxes you 
can't always see". The professional is also more adept at handling the awkward question, they 
refuse to speculate, if it is not recorded in their notebook then it was either not said or it did not 
happen. If they do not understand a question then they ask for clarification before even 
attempting to give an answer. But even professionalism can be subjected to criticism on 
occasions, I saw an attempt to discredit a witness because his testimony from the witness box 
was almost word perfect with his statement which had been made some ten months earlier. I 
also heard a solicitor, who was experiencing a great deal of difficulty in getting a police officer 
to agree with his version of events, accuse the officer of being flippant in the replies to his 
questions. The court chairman did intervene on this occasion and expressed an opinion that 
some of the questions being asked,".. were tending to invite this type of reply".
Then there is the unrepresented defendant. I formed the impression during my period 
of research that the trial procedure, in which the prosecution presents its case and then in turn 
the defence present their case, with witnesses being challenged as and when they have given 
their evidence, sometimes appeared to act as a constraint on the unrepresented defendant. 
Although the rules and the procedure were always clearly explained, all that the defendants 
wanted to do was to tell the magistrates their side of the story. They listened to the prosecution 
evidence, but when they were asked if they had any questions for the witness, all they wanted 
to do was to give their version of events. When they were stopped and told it was not their turn 
to give evidence, they simply looked confused and sat down. Only rarely was the evidence of 
the prosecution witnesses challenged. Another common failing, is that in presenting their own 
evidence, the unrepresented have a tendency to introduce hearsay evidence, [evidence given 
by one witness about what some third party is supposed to have said]. On being stopped and 
told that this is inadmissable this just appears to cause further confusion and further frustration.
There is also further disadvantage caused by the language of the courtroom. 
'Ignorance of the law is no excuse, yet no one can pretend that the law is easy to understand. , 
Courts pride themselves on 'open justice' but the terminology can be inaccessible to ordinary 
people' (Gibson, 1991, p57). Once again moves are afoot to try and improve this perceived 
shortfall. Among the list of competences for court chairman, as suggested by the Judicial 
Studies Board, are such proposals as 'ensuring defendants and all in court understand what is 
going on', 'using simple language without jargon', and 'speaking clearly and concisely'. The 
principle appears sound, but it is not only 'ordinary people' who can be confused by the 
language. At a training seminar for magistrates with approximately one year’s experience, a 
request was made on behalf of the group for a 'Glossary of Terms' which would help them 
better understand the legal jargon of the courtroom. Advanced disclosure, Section 9 
statements, prima facie case, old style committals were just a few of the terms which were 
creating confusion amongst the decision makers.
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4.2.5 Some non-professional court users may be intentionally given a 'rough ride' in
the courtroom, and some 'regulars' might consider it well deserved.
But it is not only the systems and procedures which can disadvantage the attenders at 
court, it can also be the way that they are dealt with as individuals by individuals. While it is the 
stated intention in the magistrates’ courts to treat all court users with courtesy, it cannot be 
denied that some defendants, in certain situations, are accorded anything but respect. In some 
instances it might be difficult to even describe the treatment they receive as fair and in some 
situations the courts might even be accused of setting out to embarrass or even humiliate the 
people involved. Having observed and even participated in some of these types of situations, I 
know that magistrates and court professionals would argue that this sort of treatment is only 
meted out in situations where the recipients have either shown disrespect to the court or a 
disregard for its orders.
It appears that the art is in balancing the human approach to the non-professional 
court users with the dignity of the court. I have frequently seen defendants and witnesses enter 
the courtroom with their hands in their pockets, wearing hats and chewing. Usually a quiet word 
or indication from the court usher is enough to redress the situation. Sometimes it requires the 
intervention of the chairman or the court clerk. This type of incident is an almost daily 
occurrence and normally accepted as unintentional. But what happens when there is a blatant 
refusal to comply with the request? On one such occasion the defendant refused to take his 
hands from his pockets and informed the bench chairman that his hands were cold. The 
chairman said in that case he would stand the case down until later in the list thereby giving the 
defendant the opportunity to leave the courtroom and warm his hands. The defendant suddenly 
realising that there could be a long wait ahead, took his hands out of his pockets, apologised to 
the court for his 'unreasonable behaviour1, and the hearing proceeded. Of course I have also 
seen advocates addressing the bench, hand in pocket and leaning against the bkcks of their 
seats, I have yet to see the proceedings halted and a solicitor told to take his hand out of his 
pocket and to stand up straight. On another occasion a defendant was produced from the cells 
area wearing a hat which he adamantly refused to remove, also refusing to give any 
explanation. This defendant was quickly removed back to the cells and remanded in custody in 
his absence. Then there are those defendants who have attended at court, they intend to plead 
guilty but want 'to have their say' generally about what they see as the unfairness of it all, a say 
which is often delivered in an aggressive and sometimes abusive manner. From my 
observations these defendants are normally granted a reasonable degree of lattitude but if they 
persist, my own method of dealing with the situation is to stand the case down, ask the 
defendant to wait outside of the courtroom and to inform him or her that we will proceed with 
the case as and when they feel able to apologise to the court. A strategy which normally 
produces the desired outcome, at least for the court.
When discussing this subject with a stipendiary magistrate, I was told, "My own view, 
supported by many other 'stipes', is that we tend to show greater courtesy to the unrepresented
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defendants than to some advocates. My own stance is quite simple. I expect an advocate to 
know certain things and to conduct himself according to certain standards. I expect the non­
professional user to know considerably less and behave according to the ordinary standard of 
any citizen in a court. This means for me to get cross with a non-professional, they have to 
misbehave and probably more than once. For me to get cross with an advocate, as you have 
observed, requires little more than the advocates appearing not to be properly prepared
Not only is it the defendants who are on the receiving end of the courts' rebukes. I 
have seen members of the public reprimanded for behaving in the courtroom in the same way 
as they would in the 'taproom of their local public house’. I also witnessed an occasion when a 
young couple in the public seating decided to pass the time 'kissing and cuddling' while the 
young man was waiting for his case to be called. The chairman gave them the choice of 
staying in the courtroom or going into the waiting area. Having elected to stay, the couple were 
then somewhat embarrassed when the chairman insisted that they sit with an empty seat 
between them. On another occasion when observing 'covertly' from the public seating in one of 
the city courts, I nearly found myself ejected as part of a group who found the antics of their 
friend, a defendant, quite amusing. Although not part of this group, I found myself in the middle 
of them and as a result we were all subjected to severe rebuke from the chairman with a 
warning that any repetition would see us removed from the courtroom. Fortunately 'my new 
found friends' heeded the chairman's words. Was this taking my research too far I wondered?
But the defendants who appear to be at the forefront of the displeasure which is 
demonstrated in the magistrates’ courts are the fines defaulters. These are the people who at 
some earlier hearing, when they had either pleaded or were found guilty of an offence, were 
ordered to pay a fine, compensation or costs and in some instances all three. Many of them 
had requested time to pay at so much each week and some would even have had some say in 
the rate at which repayments could be paid. They have been brought back to court because 
they have failed to pay as ordered. Where the true circumstances of the defendant's means 
were not known at the time the sentence was imposed and where the initial fine was set too 
high, or alternatively, where there has been a marked change in the defendant's circumstances 
then, as I have already indicated, the courts can demonstrate a great deal of common sense 
and understanding. It is where the failure to comply is construed as being wilful or where the 
defaulter is considered culpable that the attitude shown by the court is anything but courteous. 
From both my observations and personal experience, the questioning in these courts is quite 
often aggressive, the answers given are often deemed as unacceptable. The defaulter's 
means, down to the smallest detail are declared and scrutinised in open court. He or she is left 
in no doubt that in the court's opinion the debts to the court should be given an extremely high 
priority in their list of financial outgoings. Finally the defendant is often given the impression 
that there is a high probability that he or she could receive an immediate prison sentence, 
whether in reality this is likely or not.
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Below are extracts from an actual case In which a fines defaulter was dealt with in a 
court In the study area. The defendant had been arrested and brought to court for non payment 
of a fine which had been imposed for a television license offence. The woman was in her 
thirties, her husband was unemployed, they had eight children:
Court clerk: Why haven't you paid your fines?
Defendant: It's only a television license, thousands get done for that.
Court clerk: So you don't take it seriously then?
Defendant: Yes, but I must pay it weekly.
Court clerk: But why haven't you paid these fines?
Defendant: My 'washer1 broke and I had to get a new one.
Court clerk: So you bought a 'washer1 but you can't pay your fines.
[ By this time the body language of both the participants suggested that a degree of hostility 
had entered the proceedings]
Defendant: I've got eight kids to look after. What would you do?
Court clerk: You are not here to ask me questions, you are here to answer mine.
Chairman: Your priority must be to pay your fines to the court.
The defaulter was found to be culpable and the alternative of five days imprisonment 
was imposed but then suspended. From my experience of these courts, while the questioning 
routine was very familiar, imposing the custodial alternative on a mother, especially one with a 
number of young children, was unusual. My impression was that this was due to the hostile 
atmosphere which had been created between the court clerk and the defendant, and this in turn 
had influenced the bench in their decision making. I have during the course of my research 
discussed the problem of the non payment of fines with both magistrates and court staff and 
there is a strong feeling that many people will try to get away with not paying their fines for as 
long as they can, and in some instances it is only when the final sanction has either been 
threatened or made that they pay as ordered.
Also during the course of my research, although it must be emphasised only on rare 
occasions, I have seen courts treat defendants, not only disrespectfully, but also unfairly and in 
a way which suggested to me, as an observer, that justice is not always seen to be done, [even 
if in reality it might well have been]. In one of the courts which I visited I observed a case in 
which a male defendant who had been arrested and charged with burglary was opposing the 
prosecution's application that he should be remanded in custody. Part way through the address 
which his solicitor was making on his behalf, an address with which the defendant was 
obviously unhappy and which he had unsuccessfully tried to interrupt on a number of occasions 
but he had been instructed by the chairman to keep quiet, the defendant then tried to dismiss 
his solicitor. He shouted, "[Name of solicitor] ..I'm sacking you". He was again told to be quiet 
and again he objected, "There's no way he'll get me bail". Again he was instructed by the 
chairman to be quiet, and once again he tried to dismiss his solicitor. Finally the defendant 
became very abusive and he was then forcibly removed, still struggling and swearing, back to
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the cell area. The dignity of the court was restored, the advocate continued to address the 
bench on 'his client's behalf, the prosecution claimed that the defendant's behaviour supported 
their application and the defendant was duly remanded in custody. After the decision had been 
announced the court appeared to treat the matter as if it had been nothing more than an 
amusing interlude, the only concern seemed to be for the unfortunate defence solicitor who had 
had the misfortune to have to contend with an unreasonable client. As an observer, I was left 
wondering why defendants are not allowed to dismiss their solicitors if they are not satisfied 
with the representation which they are receiving, even if this is during the actual hearing? In a 
different court and very late in the day, a well meaning chairman hearing an application for a 
remand in custody, made an unfortunate comment which was seized upon by the defence, a 
comment which effectively barred himself and his colleagues from making a decision on the 
application. A statement was then made to the effect that because there were no other 
magistrates available in the building to hear the case, a statement which I had strong reasons 
to suspect was incorrect, then the defendant would be remanded in custody overnight for the 
application to be heard before a different bench the next day. As an observer I had no way of 
knowing whether or not the application would have been granted or refused. But I did leave the 
courtroom feeling that the defendant could have been penalised for an error inadvertently 
made by the court chairman. Having witnessed these events it is easy to see why some critics 
of the magistrates' courts' system have claimed that irrespective of who makes the mistakes it 
appears that the court and its regulars, the magistrates and the court professionals cannot lose, 
while at the same time it is very difficult for the defendants, even with rights, to win.
4.2.6 The defendant's friend - the defence advocate.
Some defendants are fortunate enough to attend court with legal representation, a 
defence advocate whose role is to look after the defendant's interests and provide a measure 
of protection against some of the pitfalls which have been outlined in previous chapters. As one 
solicitor explained to me, a major part of a defence advocate's role is to put forward the client's 
case in the best possible light and to obtain the best possible outcome for the client, in the 
majority of cases this equates to the lightest possible sentence. I have no doubt that in 
countless cases this is done. I have witnessed advocates making very impassioned pleas on 
behalf of their clients, I have seen the look of satisfaction on their faces and their obvious 
delight for their clients when the decision has gone in their favour. I have also occasionally 
experienced their thinly disguised expressions of annoyance when it hasn't. I have seen 
advocates and clients chatting happily away to each other and on first name terms, especially 
with their regular clients, in the back of the courtroom. I have also seen them sharing a period 
of apprehension while they have been waiting for the magistrates to return to the courtroom 
with their decision.
During the same period I have also seen clients left in total isolation in the courtroom 
to await their fate, not knowing whether they should continue to obey the last instruction they
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heard, which was to stand as the magistrates left the courtroom to consider their verdict, or 
whether they should follow everyone else's example and sit down. Their solicitor doesn't offer 
much guidance either, often he is already in conversation with some of the other court 
professionals, perhaps about some social event, or it is quite possible that he is already 
discussing somebody else's case with the prosecution. What I have also found intriguing is the 
way in which advocates sometimes portray their clients to the magistrates. I have frequently 
heard solicitors describe their clients as 'not the brightest of people’ or 'not a very literate man'. 
On one occasion I heard a defendant described by his representative as 'one sandwich short of 
a picnic'. On another occasion and in an attempt to prevent his client being sent to prison, an 
outcome which appeared to me to be almost inevitable, a solicitor described his client as ' 
..having low esteem, of being semi-literate, of having the inability to find a job, having scant 
regard for either the criminal justice system or discipline. "He is not helping himself and he has 
a bad record". Not surprisingly the magistrates were not impressed by what the advocate had 
said about his client, the defendant was sent to prison for four months. I don't know in any of 
these examples what the clients thought about it all. I was left with the question, 'If these are 
your friends, who needs enemies'?
4.2.7 Do defendants always display their real emotions?
How are defendants really affected by the courtroom situation, its procedures and the 
way that they are dealt with by the various people with whom they come into contact? As 
Carien observed, 'Defendants come into court in all shapes and sizes. They are of all 
occupational classes, [although from my own observations, by far the vast majority were from 
the working classes, or to be more precise, the unemployed class], they are of all nationalities 
..' (Carien , 1976, p33), but my own conclusion is that they react in many different ways. As I 
have already made reference, I have seen defendants who were extremely distraught because 
of the circumstances in which they have found themselves. I saw one defendant who was so 
nervous that when he was asked by the court usher to stand by a chair he, to his subsequent 
embarrassment, stood on the chair. I have also seen defendants give expression to their 
feelings in particularly aggressive ways, arguing with the court staff and magistrates, swearing 
at magistrates, throwing doubt on the parentage of magistrates and on one occasion even 
spitting at the magistrates. Admittedly the actions identified in these latter examples normally 
occurred as the defendant was being led out of the dock and on his or her way to prison. I have 
also witnessed occasions when the defendants expressed what appeared to be genuine 
gratitude to the court clerks, probation officers, advocates and even the magistrates for the way 
in which they had been dealt with or assisted in the courtroom.
I have also, on many occasions, been quite amazed by the apparent calm and 
relaxed demeanours of many defendants, some of who were, in my opinion, in rather perilous 
situations, situations where their future freedom was at considerable risk, an opinion which 
often proved to be true. My observation notes described one defendant as,' Showing a lack of
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interest in the proceedings, lolling back, gazing at the ceiling, apparently not concerned even 
though a custodial sentence is a distinct possibility'. On another occasion I was prompted to 
write, 'Some defendants don't listen and give the impression of not being interested. They 
gesticulate to family and friends at the back of the court and appear to find the whole 
proceedings amusing'. I have also seen, while the magistrates were out of the courtroom 
considering their verdicts, defendants in the dock happily chatting away and even sharing a 
laugh and a joke with their police or security escorts. After a number of months of observing I 
made a note, 'Defendants generally appear to be in control of their emotions. In all but a few 
exceptions, I have not seen many outward signs of stress, even from those who were in danger 
of being remanded in, or sentenced to periods in, custody'.
But do the outward signs tell the whole story? In conversation with a young man 
whom I was sitting next to in the public seating of a court in the study area, I asked,
Q. Have you been to court before?
A. Yes, on motoring offences.
Q. What do you think of it, did you realise what was happening?
A. Not the first couple of times, but then its okay, then you know what's happened.
Q. On those first occasions, when did you realise what had actually happened?
A. When I was laid in bed the next day.
4.2.8 The battle of the Poll Tax courts.
Of course it would also be wrong to assume that all defendants enter the arena of the 
courtroom totally unprepared for what is awaiting them. In fact during the course of my 
research there was a brief period, admittedly in a specific type of court, where the defendants 
appeared to gain the upper hand, albeit only temporarily. The courts were those set up to deal 
with people who had not payed their Poll Taxes. The story is best told through extracts from 
two documents. The first document is a set of guidelines which were issued in some areas of 
Lancashire to the defendants in Poll Tax proceedings when they attended at court. The second 
is a letter written by the treasurer of the Wye Borough Council and circulated to assist other 
local authorities and magistrates' courts in their dealings in this type of court.
The first document suggested that defendants should adopt the following tactics 
during the hearing. ' Key aim, drag out the entire procedure, put pressure on the magistrates, 
prevent the magistrates reaching the cases of people not present, (otherwise they will just 
'rubber stamp' thousands of liability orders in one session) .. Be prepared to make lengthy 
speeches about circumstances, denounce the Poll Tax .. this drags out the procedure and puts 
pressure on the magistrate .. Do this even if you plan to ask for an adjournment at the end of 
your entire hearing. .. Ask to be represented if you lack confidence .. You can quote the case 
'MacKenzie friend', this does not prevent you speaking in your own defence as well. .. Do not 
demand an adjournment until you have dragged them through the whole argument... Do not be 
intimidated by the language of the court. At every opportunity ask them to explain in laymens
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terms. Pretend you didn't hear, get them to repeat things etc. .. With 'MacKenzie friend', you 
are abie to suspend proceedings for a few minutes while you examine the evidence ..' (A 
document obtained by the Bury MBC, July 1991).
The second document indicates some of the disruption which was experienced during 
these courts. ' .. I have just returned from a 'post mortem' with the Magistrates, their Clerk, 
Court staff and Police at which the Magistrates' Clerk confirmed that he had totally 
underestimated the opposition and in 31 years had never failed to be able to control the Court. 
He resolved that this would never happen again... The general concensus was that the rule of 
law must prevail and that close cooperation between the Court officials and the Police to 
exercise firm discipline inside and outside the court was absolutely necessary. I was also 
promised that next time the proceedings would concentrate on allowed evidence and defence 
only. No extraneous issues would be allowed nor would more than one Mackenzie's Friend per 
defendant. It was further agreed that attempts would be made to arrange courts on the same 
day as other areas so as to dilute the protest groups...'(Letter from the treasurer of the Wye 
Borough Council, July 1990).
The courts did eventually gain the. upperhand. I was told that at the Leeds 
Magistrates' Courts the first Poll Tax case which they heard took a total of three hours, the 
second, two and a half hours. By a series of procedural restrictions such as not allowing 
Mackenzie Friends to address the court, by imposing sanctions on them if they provided the 
wrong advice to the defendant, and by specifying a limited number of defences which the court 
would accept to these charges, the average time in the Leeds courts for each Poll Tax case 
was reduced to just three minutes.
My own experience of adjudicating in a 'Poll Tax' court did not involve me in any high 
drama. In total, applications were made for 1,241 liability orders to be issued. There were four 
defendants present who wished to appear in the courtroom. All four admitted liability, it was 
apparent that they had only attended at court in order to express their dissatisfaction with the 
local authority. This they were allowed to do, although it did not affect the outcome of the 
hearings, perhaps it made the attenders feel better for having been heard. The whole 
proceedings took one and a half hours and for most of this period the magistrates were 
'unemployed'in their Retiring room.
As I said earlier in this section, it appears that the art is in balancing the human 
approach to the non-professional court users with the dignity of the court. In the opinion of the 
Lord Chancellor, 'A human approach does not threaten the dignity of the court. Rather it 
enhances it. An austere and self important air merely distances the court from the public and 
puts at risk the sense of ownership of local justice which is so important to us all' (The 
Magistrate, Dec. 1992/Jan. 1993, p197).
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4.3 JUSTICE AND EFFICIENCY.
4.3.1 Excessive and spiralling costs - Expenditure in the Criminal Justice System.
In 1991 the estimates for expenditure for the various criminal justice agencies totaljed 
£7,636 million. The main costs of the system were incurred by the Police and Forensic Science 
Service and the Prison Service, which between them accounted for just over 80 per cent of the 
total. Of the remainder, the Crown Courts accounted for £125 million, the Magistrates' Courts 
£294 million, the Crown Prosecution Service £198 million, the Probation Service £320 million 
and the cost to the nation of Criminal Legal aid was an estimated £372 million. During the 
preceding five years the costs had grown considerably. In real terms, expenditure in the 
Magistrates' Courts had increased by 37 per cent, the costs of the Probation Service by 32 per 
cent and the Criminal Legal aid bill by a massive 76 per cent. Since its inception in the financial 
year 1987/1988, the cost of the Crown Prosecution Service had risen by 32 per cent. (Costs of 
the Criminal Justice System, Home Office,1992, p11). It was also recognised that the further 
that suspects or offenders were taken into the system, the greater were the resource costs 
employed. That is, the Crown Court costs were greater than those in the magistrates' courts 
and custodial sentences were more expensive than the non-custodial options. Figures 
produced in 1987/88 showed that the average costs of a guilty plea to an 'either way' offence, 
that is an offence which can be dealt with to its conclusion by either the magistrates or the 
Crown Court, was £122 in the lower courts and £300 in the Crown Court. Similarly a not-guilty 
plea cost £295 and £3100 respectively. The costs to the participating agencies also varied 
considerably dependent upon where a case was being heard. For example in the case of the 
Crown Prosecution Service, the average cost per defendant in the magistrates' courts was £45, 
the comparable cost in the Crown Court was £390. These figures adequately demonstrate that 
the earlier that cases can be disposed of in the criminal justice system, the more cost effective 
it is. 'Not that the criminal justice systerri should only be considered in terms of resource costs'. 
(Sir Clive Whitmore, Permanent Undersecretary, Home Office, 1990, p4).
Despite this view, and not surprisingly when one takes into consideration the 
Government's policies on public spending, resource costs did become an important factor in 
the administration of the criminal justice system during the period of my research. Pressures 
were exerted on the magistrates' courts and the other agencies in the system, pressures which 
were also to affect some of the inter-group relationships within the system.
4.3.2 'Magistrates' Courts' Committees may feel that the Home Office is obsessed
with cash and efficiency'.
This quote was part of a statement made by an Assistant Under Secretary of State for 
the Home Office when addressing the Central Council of the Magistrates' Courts' Committees 
in November 1991 and it did appear to correctly assess the feelings of the magistrates' court 
with which I was involved at that time, particularly their concerns about the impending
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introduction of performance related funding allocations. The formula which was introduced in 
April 1992, made financial allocations to the magistrates' courts according to that court's 
performance in four criteria. Sixty per cent of the funding was based on the completed case 
load; 25 per cent was based on fines enforcement and efficiency; 10 per cent on the time taken 
to complete 'indictable' or 'either way' offences and the remaining 5 per cent on quality of 
service measures. The whole was to be phased in over a period of five years. The fact that the 
performance indicators were weighted in this way not only placed new pressures on the 
magistrates' courts as a whole but on the lay magistrates in particular.
The local reaction to this was very predictable. In a circular to the Bench early in 
1992, the Justices' Clerk wrote, 'No matter how the arrangements are wrapped up in officialese, 
the fact remains from now on, the Home Office was to tell each of us how much we could 
spend and what we had to do to get the money. .. There is no getting away from the basic 
principle of control from the centre. .. From the Bench's point of view, the money you get (and 
consequently the staff, the training, the building and everything that goes with it) depends now 
entirely on how efficiently you deal with the workload and how quickly you enforce fines. Every 
adjournment costs money .. The administration of justice never was particularly easy and the 
new financial constraints are just another factor to be taken into account in each case. .. The 
following year’s budget depends entirely on what you are doing now. I would not like to think 
that we would have to join those courts who have been left with no option but to close down 
courtrooms and make staff redundant' (Court Newsletter, February, 1992). So here were the lay 
magistrates, the 'great unpaid', suddenly saddled with the responsibility for the future of the 
court and its staff. Not that this created any apparent changes, to the observer in the courtroom 
it appeared to be very much business as usual.
A review of the funding arrangements in 1994 recommended that the emphasis 
should be shifted from the performance of the court to its workload and proposed that the 
funding criteria should be revised. Forty-five per cent of the allocation should be based on the 
out-turn, i.e. actual expenditure, averaged over a five year period; 10 per cent on the standing 
population of the area; 35 per cent based on the completed case load (averaged over three 
years, rising to five years as statistics became available); 5 per cent on fines enforcement and 
efficiency and 5 per cent on the time taken to complete 'indictable' and 'either way' offences.
4.3.3 The 'Battle of the Magistrates' Courts' - The granting and control of 
adjournments.
Not only was pressure being exerted on the lay magistrates locally to improve their 
levels of efficiency in the control of the courts, there were also periods between 1990 and 1993 
when the magistrates were being subjected to national pressure, and in particular from their 
own organisation, The Magistrates' Association, to exercise firmer controls in this area.
In 1990, magistrates were informed that in the previous four years the average length 
of adjournments had increased from between 22 and 24 days to 26 days. They were also told
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that 'As the increase is clearly identified as being within the court system, maybe the time has 
come for more courts to take command' (The Magistrate, Sept. 1990, p139). Later the same 
year they were told by Eric Crowther, an advocate and former Stipendiary Magistrate, that they 
were ' .. often too tolerant of requests by defendants, solicitors and the CPS. These have 
become so easy to gain that magistrates no longer ask what is reasonable. .. the remedy is in 
the magistrates' hands' (The Magistrate, Nov. 1990, p198). The Chairman of the Bristol 
Magistrates informed her colleagues how the 'battle' with the professional court users should be 
fought. 'Delay can be reduced and the quality of justice enhanced by the strict application of 
common sense criteria. .. During the early months of our battle for control, there was much 
blood on the floor, that we survived is due in some measure to the resilience of the troops, but 
largely to the single minded general, our Magistrates' Clerk, who led, encouraged and 
supported us' (The Magistrate, July/Aug. 1990, p134).
Despite these efforts the number and length of adjournments continued to increase. 
The emphasis appeared to change and became more concerned with the non-fiscal aspects of 
adjournments. The Clerk to the Batley and Dewsbury Magistrates wrote, 'There will be an 
emotional cost to many defendants, to their families and sometimes to victims and witnesses. 
There is also the potential for justice itself to be adversely affected ..' (The Magistrate, May 
1991, p70). The campaign to reduce the number of adjournments was still live in 1993 when 
the Legal Committee of the Magistrates' Association issued a report in which it said, 'The bench 
must never forget that the granting of adjournments is a judicial decision. .. When a bench 
goes into court it expects some progress to be made in every case in its list and will only grant 
adjournments when both appropriate and fa ir .. the growing tendency of both the CPS and 
defence solicitors to believe they have an automatic right to an adjournment will be terminated' 
(The Magistrate, May, 1993, p69).
A particular matter of disquiet in the study area was the ineffective way in which the 
administration of trials proceed in the magistrates' courts system. Despite the introduction of 
pre-trial reviews, a device which among other things was designed to prevent trials from 
collapsing at the last minute thereby enabling the courts to make more effective use of their 
time, only one trial in every five trials listed after being the subject of a pre-trial review, 
proceeded as planned. This despite some cases having been adjourned up to eight times in 
order to allow the pre-trial review to take place. The reasons for trials not proceeding as 
planned are varied. Surveys carried out in the study area found that 25 per cent proceeded 
either as 'guilty pleas' or else the defendants agreed to be 'bound over to keep the peace'. 
[Probably as a result of the prosecution and the defence having reached 'an agreement']. 
Eleven per cent did proceed but took less time than that which had been allocated by the 
courts, 5 per cent were discontinued at the request of the Crown Prosecution Service, in 7 per 
cent of the cases the defendants did not attend at court on the day of their trials and warrants 
were issued for their arrests and 32 per cent, almost one third, of the cas^s were further
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adjourned for numerous and different reasons (Discussion paper, The [ ] Magistrates AGM, 
1995).
This was not only a local problem, indeed it had been the subject of research by 
Raine and Willson in 1993. They had concluded that, 'Local culture appears to be a crucial 
variable so far as scheduling performance is concerned, particularly with regard to the level of 
delay and collapsed trials. Courts which placed emphasis on the strategic negotiation with 
professional users appear to be more efficient in their use of court time, hear more trials in full 
and dispose of more trial cases on the day they are listed. .. In the research it was found that 
the clerkships which performed best were those where investment in strategic policy making 
had been made and where the courts exercised clear control over its work and the actions of 
users. In contrast those clerkships where the prevailing culture on the Bench and among court 
clerks was more one of resignation to the apparent inevitability of delay, inefficiency and 
inconvenience, and where the responsibility for scheduling was under valued or shared with 
other agencies, were the ones who performed least well1 (Raine and Willson, 1993, p11). From 
my own observations in the courtroom and the fact that locally only one in five of trials proceed 
as planned , it would be difficult to argue with these conclusions. In suggesting a reason why 
the local figures were so worrying, a local solicitor said, 'It was difficult for the defendants to 
decide what their plea would be until the day of the trial' (Court User Group, March,1995).
This indicates that concern was still being expressed locally well into 1995. The 
recently installed Justices' Clerk said that in his opinion adjournments were both too frequent 
and relatively easy to obtain, and if these were to be reduced then '..a stronger lead from the 
court would be necessary' (The Bench Meeting, Spring,1995). Later in the year, plans were also 
announced for a one day training session to be held involving magistrates and representatives 
of other criminal justice agencies. The topic would be, 'Delays in the Criminal Justice Process 
and the granting of unnecessary adjournments’ (MCC Training sub-Commitee, August, 1995).
So why does there appear to be a reluctance on the part of lay magistrates to comply 
with the many requests and to deal with the problems and costs which are associated with 
many adjournments? From my observations and experience of the magistrates' courts there is 
little doubt that in dealing with applications for adjournments there are many magistrates who 
take the least line of resistance, some because it is the easy way out, particularly if a case is 
difficult or complicated. Others don't have the confidence 'to do battle' with the professional 
court users, and especially when it is a 'dual application' from both the prosecution and the 
defence, a ploy which is often used. Very few lay magistrates feel so Strongly about 
adjournments that they are willing to see, 'blood on the floor*. There were also what I 
understood to be unwritten 'local agreements' about what was an acceptable length of 
adjournment for certain types of applications, for evidence to be served, for committal papers 
to be prepared, for print-outsof driving records to be obtained, to allow for personal service or 
warrants to be executed, or for Pre-Sentence Reports to be prepared. The length of these 
adjournments are very rarely challenged. (What I was not aware of, either as a practioner or an
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observer, and I doubt if many of my lay magistrate colleagues were either, was that during the 
early nineteen-nineties courtroom adjournments had been the subject of a national working 
group, a group set up by the Home Office, and their recommendations, which covered many of 
the types of adjournments which I have mentioned, had been set out and supposedly 
implemented as part of a document known as the Inter-Agency Agreement on Pre-trial Issues). 
Another reason why the magistrates fail to challenge 'the system' is that when they do attempt 
to apply pressure to the proceedings, the responses they receive often indicate that this matter 
can only be brought forward to the detriment of other cases in the lists. I have also observed 
occasions where the magistrates have been insistent on the adjournment period being less 
than that requested only to be told that there was no available time in the court listings. 
However I am convinced that the biggest single reason for lay magistrates granting 
adjournments as requested, and especially where these are requested by either the defendants 
or their representatives, is their concern that in refusing an adjournment and insisting that the 
matter should proceed on that day, this action might be interpreted as legislating against the 
interests of the defendant, and their concern is that justice must not only be done, it must also 
be seen to be done. On many occasions I have heard benches agree, 'to give the defendant 
one last opportunity to get his defence together and present it to court', or 'a further opportunity 
to seek the advice of a solicitor’.
4.3.4 The problem of rising crime rates in the community and falling workloads in the 
magistrates' courts - The police's cautioning policy.
Not only was it the number and the lengths of adjournments which were causing 
concern to the court managers and administrators. They had also seen a worrying decline in 
the number of criminal cases being dealt with by the magistrates' courts, a matter of concern 
because the size of the workload was now a key indicator in deciding what funding the court 
would receive in the coming years. Throughout the early years of the research programme the 
number of criminal cases dealt with by the court in the study area fell year by year, and this fall 
was particularly pronounced in 1992, when the decrease was 17.5 per cent. As the Justices' 
Clerk said, "I would be very pleased with the figures of people coming before the courts if the 
crime rate was going down". But the crime rates were not going down, to the contrary the 
town's crime rates were on the increase, by 13.5 per cent in 1990, 21 per cent in 1991, 12 per 
cent in 1992,16 per cent in 1993 and 13 per cent in 1994 (Source: South Yorkshire Police). So 
why were the number of criminal matters being dealt with by the courts on the decrease? A 
number of reasons were put forward, these included falling detection rates, a reluctance by the 
CPS to proceed unless they were confident that they had a greater than 50 per cent chance of 
success. But by far the major single factor was the increase in the number of cases where the 
police cautioned the defendants rather than charging them. Statistics for the number of 
cautions administered by the South Yorkshire Police in 1992 showed an increase of 37 per cent 
over the previous year (The Star, February 5,1993).
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The police initially defended this policy by claiming that it was a highly effective 
weapon in combating crime and that 80 per cent of young first time offenders were dissuaded 
from committing further crimes. In 1990 the Home Office urged the police to extend its use 
from minor offences involving young people to more serious matters, a policy which was not 
universally welcomed. For example, Paul Firth, the Clerk to the Rotherham Magistrates 
interpreted it as a part of "..more and more moves to save expenditure by not bringing people 
to court". What concerned him and others was the way that this policy could be interpreted by 
offenders, and that the use of cautions for such offences as burglary and robbery could give the 
impression that these offences were no longer seen as serious. Offenders often believed that 
they 'had got away with it', while ordinary people felt let down by a system which was seen as 
'failing to crack down on criminals'. Whilst accepting that a reduction in expenditure for the 
criminal justice system would inevitably be high on the Government's agenda, Firth did not 
consider that it could be dealt with in isolation. In his words, "You can’t just cheapen the cost of 
the criminal justice system without looking at the quality of it" (Yorkshire Post, 1992). And it 
was not only the economic aspects of the police cautioning policy which were causing these 
concerns. It was the fact that these cautions were administered within the privacy of the police 
station, away from the public gaze and as part of a system which is rarely publicised. Unlike a 
court hearing, cautions are not subjected to public scrutiny.
In February 1993, the South Yorkshire Police announced that it had set up a working 
group to examine the force's policy on the cautioning of offenders because of 
'misunderstanding and inconsistency in the way it is implemented across the county' (The Star, 
February 5,1993).
4.3.5 The problem of rising crime rates in the community and falling workloads in the 
magistrates' courts - Crown Prosecution Service policies.
In April 1990, a report by the House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee reported 
that 'guilty defendants may be going free because of incompetences by Crown Prosecution 
lawyers... There were too many examples of ineffective prosecutions' (Daily Telegraph, April 
27,1990). Some three and a half years later the same paper reported that, '.. the Crown 
Prosecution Service is conducting an internal investigation into why some cases submitted to it 
by the police have to be abandoned'. In 1992 the CPS dropped 193,000 out of 1.5 million cases 
received, many of which the police expected to win. 'Yesterday's announcement follows 
criticisms from the police and criminal lawyers that the CPS were too willing to drop cases 
before they had completed the route through the courts' (Daily Telegraph, November 6,1993).
It was not only the number of cases being dropped which was being criticised. In 
South Yorkshire there was criticism of the CPS by both the police and the magistrates' courts 
for 'watering down' some of the charges which were brought before the courts. Some police 
officers accused the CPS of deliberately reducing or axing charges in order to avoid costly 
hearings. The Head of the Rotherham CID said, "We are unhappy because this has a terrible
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effect on police morale, especially with officers on the ground whom the public blame when a 
charge is dropped or substituted for a lesser offence". (This problem of discrepancies in the 
charging policy between the police and the CPS involving offences of violence was 
subsequently addressed at national level and once again it resulted in a set of guidelines being 
produced in an attempt to produce a more consistent and less contentious system of deciding 
the types of charges which should be proceeded with). The Clerk to the Rotherham Magistrates 
was also claiming during this same period that' ..the CPS is running a secret policy aimed at 
avoiding costly court work. He said prosecutors routinely reduce charges of 'causing actual 
bodily harm' to 'common assault', the reduction means that the case cannot be sent to the 
Crown Court' (The Star, March 5,1993). He said, "In Rotherham we had never heard of a case 
of common assault until the end of last year, since then we have been flooded with them". In 
reply Neill Franklin, the Branch Prosecutor for Sheffield and Rotherham maintained that the 
CPS 'were providing a good quality service .. and upholding the criminal justice system well'. 
"Our policy on assault cases is not something dreamed up by me in Sheffield, but is based on 
Government guidelines and judicial precedent" (The Advertiser, March 12,1993).
Despite all of the debate it was reported at the 1994 AGM of the [ ] magistrates that, 
'In spite of the rise in crime in the community, work in the courts was reducing. As funding is 
particularly dependent on the workload this could have serious consequences for the Bench' 
(The [ ] Magistrates AGM, October,1994).
4.3.6 A wav to reduce the number of adjournments? Fixed rate Criminal Legal aid.
An article in the Daily Telegraph in 1991 reported that lawyers in the Southampton 
area were quitting the Duty Solicitor Scheme in a direct challenge to the Lord Chancellor over 
proposals to slash fees for legal aid work. The Southampton Criminal Court Solicitors' 
Association said that their members wanted a minimum of £59 an hour for legal aid work in the 
magistrates' courts. The Lord Chancellor's proposals when introduced in April 1993 would give 
solicitors on criminal legal aid work £162 for each guilty plea, £226 for a not guilty plea and 
other standard rates for committal proceedings to the Crown Court. The fees were said to be 
roughly half of the averages paid under the current scheme (Daily Telegraph, November 30, 
1991). Two years later the conflict was still running and legal action against the Lord Chancellor 
was being taken by the Law Society. In announcing the decision to proceed with the action the 
society's president said that the case was ''..about ensuring that proper legal representation 
remains available to those who need criminal legal aid. This is not a dispute in which we are 
seeking more pay for solicitors" (Daily Telegraph, September 9,1993).
In Rotherham, the local firms involved with criminal law practices petitioned their 
local Member of Parliament. They claimed that the proposed changes '.. have nothing to do 
with justice and everything to do with a Treasury inspired cost cutting exercise'. It was claimed 
that not only were solicitors deserting the legal aid system but those clients who were still 
entitled to legal aid would get less and many more would be denied it altogether, because of
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guidelines issued to magistrates that it should only be granted in cases where there is a 
likelihood of the defendant receiving a custodial sentence, a requirement which would rule out 
the majority of cases tried or heard in the magistrates' courts. It was stated that, 'Solicitors will 
be penalised for doing their job properly and will be encouraged to cut corners, because they 
will receive the same payment no matter how much time they spend on each case. .. We are 
concerned that these proposals will hit some of the poorest and most vulnerable people in 
Rotherham .. only those on income support or equivalent low wages will be eligible for free 
legal aid' (The Advertiser, January 8,1993).
Legal aid is not a subject which is discussed a great deal outside of the administrative 
areas of the magistrates' courts. The only time it is raised in the courtroom is either where 
Legal Aid has been requested and it has been refused by a member of the court staff and 
occasionally the advocate may decide to make a direct application to the sitting bench, or else 
where it is used as the reason for an application for an adjournment, and this is generally when 
a case is in court for the first time. The reaction around the Magistrates' Retiring and Assembly 
rooms to the principle of fixed rates for legal aid was not unwelcoming. Magistrates are 
sometimes suspicious that the reason some adjournments are requested is that there may be 
some financial benefit for the advocate who is making the application. The hope among certain 
magistrates was that fixed fees could be a way of assisting the courts to reduce the number of 
applications for matters to be adjourned.
4.4 POWER AND INFLUENCE.
4.4.1 Control of the court and its proceedings.
Who controls the proceedings in the magistrates' courts? Is it the court chairman, 
could it be the court clerk, some may even think that it is the court usher who organises the 
proceedings, or is it a combination of all these? Others may well ask, "Does it really matter who 
controls the courts providing that they operate within the rules, that fairness and justice are 
achieved and the dignity of the court is preserved"? It is obvious that to many people within the 
system it is an important consideration. In the opinion of the Judicial Studies Board (JSB), one 
of the primary skills required by a court chairman is the ability to demonstrate his or her control 
of the court. The JSB suggest that this 'competence' can be sub-divided into two main 
components, these being 'exercising authority' and 'maintaining the dignity of the court'. The 
Lord Chancellor has also made his views on this matter known. Addressing the Magistrates' 
Association in 1991 he said, 'In one survey a defendant indicated that he thought the Crown 
Prosecutor was running the court .. To avoid such impressions the chairman of the bench must 
ensure that he or she is seen to be in control ..' (The Magistrate, Dec. 1991/ Jan. 1992, p199). 
While I must admit that I have never left the courtroom with the same impression as this 
defendant, but then I am familiar with the system, I have on a number of occasions left the 
courtroom with the feeling that the court clerk, not the bench chairman, had been in charge of
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the court, and especially where the court clerk was either very experienced or a senior member 
of the court staff. I also gained the impression that some court chairmen, despite the prominent 
position which they occupied in the court setting, appeared quite content to play a secondary 
role in the proceedings. Typical of the comments which I made during the course of my 
observations were, The clerk appeared to dominate the proceedings' and 'Throughout the 
morning the court appeared to be controlled by the court clerk'. I also saw numerous instances 
where it appeared to the onlooker that it was not only in controlling the court where the 
magistrates played a secondary role. I also witnessed many instances where procedural and 
adjournment decisions were in reality made by the other principle actors in the courtroom, the 
court clerks and the advocates. Quite often the magistrates did not appear to be consulted, 
their agreement to the decision appeared to be a formality and the major role of the court 
chairman in the process was to announce the decision. But of course this picture is not all 
embracing, it does not apply to all lay magistrate chairmen and from what I have observed it 
definitely does not apply to stipendiary magistrates. I even heard one lay chairman severely 
criticised by some of his colleagues for the 'over zealous and autocratic way with which he 
chaired the courts in which he presided'. This chairman had, in discussions with me, 
emphasised the importance of court chairmen being seen to be in complete control of the 
courtroom proceedings. Neither was there any doubt that the chairman who threatened to eject 
me and my 'friends' from the city court was in charge of the proceedings. Even one of my 
'young friends' was heard to grudgingly admit, "She might be an old bitch, but she certainly 
knows her job". Praise indeed.
4.4.2 The decision makers and the decision making process.
From the outset of my research I have asked the question, 'Who are the real decision 
makers? I know who announces the decisions, but who actually makes the decision?' From all 
of the groups within the magistrates' courts I have received replies which have left me in no 
doubt that in judicial matters, it is the magistrates who make the decisions. In trials they 
consider the facts which are presented to them and they then decide on the innocence or guilt 
of the accused. Where the offender has been found guilty, or in the vast majority of cases 
heard by magistrates, where the offender has pleaded guilty to the offence or offences, the job 
of the magistrates is to decide the appropriate sentence. This sentence should not only reflect 
the seriousness of the crime, it also needs to take into consideration the circumstances of the 
offender, these might well include personal, family and financial factors, plus any relevant 
criminal antecedents. The sentencers are also required to decide on the objectives and aims of 
the sentence. Is it intended to punish the offender? To deter the offender and others from 
committing this type of offence? Is there a need to protect the public or to demonstrate the 
public's concern about this type of offending? Or is the aim of the sentence one of 
rehabilitation? The disposals which are available to the sentencers are numerous, but of course 
not all of the disposals can be used for all types of offences. The disposals available and
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mainly used for offences at the lower end of the scale of seriousness are the discharges. Next, 
and the most common means of disposal used by the magistrates, is the financial penalty, the 
fine. Moving up the scale of seriousness there are the community sentences, the most common 
of these are probation, community service and combination orders, (the latter being a hybrid of 
the other two). At the top of the sentencing tariff is the custodial sentence. In addition to these 
sentences, and sometimes used as a sentence in its own right, the magistrates can, where 
appropriate, order the offender to pay compensation to his or her victim.
4.4.2.1 Magistrates - 'free agents' or severely constrained by statute?
Having been granted these very considerable sentencing powers, are the magistrates 
really 'free agents' in the way that they are allowed to use them? One magistrate writing about 
his colleagues claimed that, 'More than 30,000 people in England and Wales have the power to 
send you to prison. They do not need any legal qualifications .. and once appointed they have a 
job until they are 70 ..'. But is this a totally accurate statement or does it only tell part of the 
story? For a start and in terms of disposal, the very serious offences such as murder, 
manslaughter and rape, are not even within the jurisdiction of the magistrates' courts. Of those 
offences which can be dealt with by the magistrates to their conclusion, it is only those matters 
which are considered by society, or their representatives, to be high on the Scale of seriousness 
which can be disposed of by means of custody, or even a community sentence. These include 
such offences as burglary, theft and associated crimes, drug related offences, crimes of 
violence, the more serious public order and criminal damage matters and the very serious 
motoring offences. It is therefore a fact that the offences where the magistrates can impose 
custodial and some community penalties are restricted by statute. Even on those offences 
where they are able to impose custodial sentences there are still important criteria which need 
to be met. As a result of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act, an Act which was implemented with a 
great deal of publicity and acrimony during the period of my research, the magistrates once 
again saw their sentencing powers being eroded by the need to satisfy specific requirements. 
As a result of this Act, the magistrates were instructed that they should only use their powers of 
imprisonment if one of two criteria were met. The first requirement was '.. if the offence or a 
combination of that offence and another associated with it is so serious that only such a 
sentence can be justified'. The second condition was ' .. in the case of a violent or a sexual 
offence, that only such a sentence is adequate to protect the public from serious harm from the 
offender1. Even when the sentencing magistrates were satisfied that these requirement had 
been met, they were still not allowed to proceed to an immediate sentence. They were then 
reminded that,' A pre-sentence report must be obtained and considered before such a decision 
is made'. (Pronouncements in Court, The Magistrates' Association, 1992). One effect of this 
requirement was that the magistrates could not proceed to sentence on the day of the hearing. 
Matters had to be adjourned for a pre-sentence report to be produced, a report which is 
prepared by a probation officer and will rarely, if ever, contain a proposal which will support the
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case for a custodial sentence. The adjournment of some three to four weeks almost inevitably 
meant that the lay bench who would make the Final decision would be a different bench to the 
one who had presided at the original hearing. If after all this the magistrates still considered that 
only a custodial sentence was appropriate, then The court must explain how the statutory 
criteria for a custodial sentence are satisfied and in ordinary language why it is passing a 
custodial sentence' (Judicial Studies Board, 1992).
So what was the effect of this and other constraints, for example the introduction of 
Unit Fines, on the sentencers? According to the MP for Wentworth, Mr Peter Hardy, an 
increasing number of magistrates resigned from the bench between 1988 and 1992 as a direct 
result of new restraints in their sentencing powers. This situation had then been compounded 
by the new sentencing legislation which had been introduced as part of the 1991 Criminal 
Justice Act in October, 1992. Commenting on these aspects, the Rotherham Clerk to the 
Justices agreed that the new Criminal Justice Act had curbed some of the traditional powers 
exercised by magistrates. He confirmed that, "Magistrates are becoming more and more 
constrained and feel they are applying the law first and justice second" (The Advertiser, March 
12,1993).
The Criminal Justice Acts of 1993 and 1994 made changes to 1991 Act, particularly in 
that they abolished the system of Unit Fines and relaxed the requirements which had been 
placed on the courts to obtain pre-sentence reports in all cases where a custodial or a 
community sentence was being considered. In practice it is now possible, in the most 
exceptional circumstances, to send someone to prison without first obtaining a pre-sentence 
report, however the sentencers in the study area are still 'strongly encouraged' to obtain a 
report in all cases where custodial or community sentences are being considered. 'The Court 
ought normally to be in possession of a pre-sentence report in relation to custody and most 
forms of community penalty. Custody can only be used when the offence is 'so serious' that no 
other sentence is justified. Community penalties can only be used where the offence is 'serious 
enough' (Bench Handbook, Sentencing Guidelines, 1995).
4.4.2.2 Sentencing Guidelines - an aid for sentencers or a sentencing tariff?
The Magistrates' Association Sentencing Guidelines, whilst not a mandatory element 
of the magistrates' decision making process, are arguably an extremely influential factor in the 
magistrates' considerations. These guidelines, while not designed to replace the independent 
reasoning and common sense which magistrates undoubtedly bring to the system, they are 
designed to achieve a more consistent system of sentencing for both the individual magistrates 
and the different Benches to which they belong. The objective of the guidelines is to assist the 
magistrates in 'assessing the relative seriousness of each case' by prompting them to consider 
the aggravating or mitigating factors of the offence and 'enabling them to arrive at the 
commensurate penalties'. The guidelines recommend an 'Entry point, for the various types of 
offences, the entry point being aligned to 'an offence of average seriousness'. The 'Entry point'
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can be custody, a community penalty or a fine. Where a fine is the proposed entry point, the 
level of the fine is also normally specified. The guidelines emphasise that the entry points are 
only recommendations and they need to be considered together with the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances which surround the offence. The responsibility for the sentence is that 
of the justices and it is they who must assess each case judicially having regard to (a) the 
circumstances of the particular offence and (b) the circumstances of the particular offender1 
(The Magistrates' Association, 1993). Despite these clear instructions on how the guidelines 
should be used, my observations and experience have left me with the distinct impression that 
when imposing financial penalties, many magistrates use the 'Entry points' at their face value, 
and the entry point automatically becomes the penalty imposed. On countless occasions I have 
heard the entry point announced as the penalty, or the 'entry point minus one third' if a discount 
has been allowed for an early guilty plea.
A further constraint which prevents the magistrates from imposing a level of financial 
penalty which they consider would reflect the seriousness of the offence, is the offender's 
inability to pay a substantial financial penalty. This factor is a matter of considerable frustration 
among the sentencers in the study area, an area of high unemployment. The higher courts 
have stipulated that any financial penalty imposed on the non-wage earner should be capable 
of being completely paid within one year of the sentence having been imposed. In practice this 
means that magistrates can often only fine an offender who is drawing either unemployment or 
social security benefits a maximum of £150 - £200 irrespective of the seriousness of the 
offence committed or indeed the number of offences being dealt with at any one time.
4.4.2.3 The Bench ethos can be an important influence on sentencing policy.
Another key element which can often dictate the magistrates' sentencing decisions is 
the ethos of the Bench. The Bench on which my research was centred had a reputation for its 
low use of custodial sentences when compared to other Benches in the country. In 1986 the 
use of custody by magistrates' courts sentencing adult males ranged from 8 per cent in the 
study area to 39 per cent in Tower Bridge, London (Supervision in the Community, 
NAP0.1988). However in the early nineteen-nineties and whilst the Bench still had a reputation 
of 'being soft on custody’, a number of Bench resolutions were passed. It could be argued, 
although there is no direct evidence to support it, that someone was trying to instill some 
'toughness' into the Bench's sentencing policies. At the Spring Bench meeting in 1991 it was 
resolved that, 'Offences of violence against people providing a public service, offences of 
violence against the very young, very old and otherwise frail victims, and offences of violence 
involving the use of weapons should normally attract a custodial sentence'. It may be 
coincidental that this resolution was adopted following an assault in which the offender received 
an 'embarrassingly' lenient sentence, having committed an unpleasant and violent attack upon 
a nurse while she was on duty at a local hospital. At the same meeting the Bench also adopted 
the policy, 'Where a defendant appeared before a Court charged with an offence alleged to
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have been committed whilst on bail to the Court and where the second offence in time was of 
similar seriousness, then as a starting point the Court should give serious consideration to 
refusing bail to defendants' (May 1991). This resolution appears to have been a response to the 
concern which was being expressed by some Senior Police Officers that more than a third of 
crimes were being committed by people who were already on bail to the courts. Some two and 
a half years later it was further resolved that, 'Unless there are genuinely exceptional 
circumstances, this Bench will operate a sentencing practice of custody for the burglary 
(dwelling) offences in the future, and any mitigation should only be about the length of 
sentence' (AGM, October 1993). In effect this resolution implied that there was very little 
mitigation that could be put forward to allow the offender to escape a custodial sentence, it 
should have made custody an automatic disposal for this type of offence.
4.4.2.4 The effect on sentencing of the 'human factor'.
Despite these strongly worded resolutions my subsequent observations within the 
study area indicated that there was still a strong reluctance on the part of many of the justices 
to invoke the ultimate sanction of custody. The reason for this could well be the previously 
discussed statutory constraints which are placed on the sentencers, alternatively it could be 
what I would describe as the 'human factor*. I have reached this conclusion having attended a 
number of magistrates' training sessions, and especially those which included 'sentencing 
exercises'. At these sessions I have been regularly surprised at the severity of the penalties 
which have been suggested and which, on average, are far harsher than the penalties which 
are imposed in the real situation. This applies particularly in the liberal use that is made of 
custody in the 'unreal' situation. Neither do the magistrates appear to have much difficulty in 
justifying their reasons for these sentences. But of course what is missing in these artificial 
situations is the human factor. It appears that it is much easier to impose a harsh sentence 
when all the facts and background information are extracted from a piece of paper than it is to 
deal with a defendant who is present in the courtroom along with all the social factors which 
surround that person. This I often feel is the crucial factor when dealing with offenders. In the 
final analysis it appears that the personal and social factors of the defendant are frequently the 
considerations which take preference over the 'seriousness of the offence' and thereby temper 
the sentencers’ decision.
4.4.2.5 'Each member of the bench has an equal voice'.
But of course decision making as far as the lay magistrates are concerned is not the 
domain of a single individual. It is a decision which is reached only after discussion and 
consideration by the three, (on some occasions, but not usually by design, two), members who 
are adjudicating. Members who in theory have an equal say in the decision making process, 
but do they? Whilst observing from the well of the court, I have occasionally been prompted to 
record the apparent domination of the bench discussions by either one or two of the justices, or
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conversely the very limited input of others. Neither, it would appear, is this lack of involvement 
necessarily one of choice. During the period of my research I was told of two occasions where 
specific magistrates had been so incensed by their exclusion from the decision making process 
that they had taken the extreme step of withdrawing from that bench and had refused to 
continue sitting with those specific colleages who had taken little or no account of their 
presence. While the JSB strongly emphasises that chairmen should 'Ensure the full 
participation of wingers', it appears that this fundamental requirement cannot necessarily be 
taken for granted. Apart from the two instances quoted, the consultation with and participation 
of 'wingers' was an issue which was never far below the surface and was always likely to 
reappear. Writing to the members of the Bench in 1991, the Justices' Clerk stated, 'During 
recent training sessions it has often come to my attention that there is a misunderstanding of 
the relationship between the chairman of any court and the other magistrates sitting, .. the 
chairman has no casting vote, .. each member of the bench has an equal voice. .. The need to 
consult all members of the court cannot be over emphasised. I appreciate that much pressure 
is placed on the magistrates to despatch the work expeditiously. However speed should not be 
achieved at the cost of full consultation' (May, 1991). Again in 1993 and because of the 
concern expressed by some, 'less senior members of the Bench who do not feel that they are 
being consulted by some chairmen', the Chairman of the Bench felt the need to remind the 
magistrates that the chairmen should make full use of their wingers "because it is important 
that all three magistrates play a full part and that the newer magistrates, who are not asked an 
opinion, should volunteer an opinion" (AGM, October 1993).
4.4.3 If the magistrates have the power in the decision making process, who exerts
the influence?
Having been convinced that the magistrates are the judicial decision makers, even if 
they do appear on occasions, to be severely constrained by either statutory or social factors, 
the next question to which I required an answer was, 'Which of the groups within the 
magistrates' courts have the ability to influence the decision makers and to what extent?' Is it 
their official advisers, the Justices' Clerks and their legal teams? Could it be the 
representatives of the Crown Prosecution Service or the other prosecuting agencies, the people 
who bring the cases to the courts and who decide what charges should be answered? 
Conversely might it be the defence advocates, the solicitors who argue the case on behalf of 
the defendants, who argue the facts in a trial and who put forward pleas of mitigation where the 
offence or offences have been admitted? Or is it the probation officer, the officer of the court, 
part of whose role has been described as 'assisting, advising and befriending the defendant'? 
As we have already seen the sentencers are instructed to consider the information which is 
submitted to the courts by these officers in the form of pre-sentence reports whenever they are 
considering the imposition of either custody or community sentences. Then of course there are
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the unrepresented defendants. Do they influence the sentencers? Are the magistrates 
influenced by the defendant's attitude, appearance, dress or even background?
4.4.4 The Clerks to the Justices, their legal teams, and the narrow line between
advice and influence.
'The Justices' Clerk should be able to provide, (and ensure that their legal teams 
provide), a high standard of professional and legal advice and support for magistrates, .. 
ensure that the advice to the magistrates is accurate, concise and clear. They should practice, 
and encourage court clerks to apply a positive and active approach' (Extract from a Job 
Description for a Justices' Clerk). These basic responsibilities were expanded upon by one 
Justices' Clerk in a letter to the Editor of The Magistrate, 'The Practice Direction of 1981, states 
that the clerk is responsible also for advising justices in mixed law and fact, practice and 
procedure .. justices frequently require assistance, not only in relation to legal matters but also 
in relation to other crucial considerations such as consistency, conformity to guidelines and the 
service of the overall interests of justice rather than the interests of any one party. A decision 
while being perfectly legal, may offend against one or more of these considerations without the 
steadying hand of the legal adviser..' (The Magistrate, Oct. 1993, p159). All of which suggests 
that the Justices' Clerk and the court clerks have a considerable input in the decision making 
process.
From my many years of experience, I have no doubts that, in the main, the advice 
given by the clerks to 'their magistrates' is very professional and of the highest standard. I 
would also totally agree with the Justices' Clerk's opinion that the magistrates do frequently 
need assistance and advice not only on legal matters but on the other 'crucial considerations' 
which he has specified. Also from my experience and particularly during the period of my 
observations in the courtroom, I have also concluded that this advice can be used as a means 
for influencing the magistrates, and that it can be introduced in a number of different forms. It 
can be direct or indirect, it can be employed in the courtroom or the retiring room, or it may be 
introduced in a number of guises which are actually peripheral to the actual decision making 
process. Two examples of the peripheral activities are the magistrates' training programmes 
and court communications such as court circulars or newsletters. The Clerk has the opportunity 
to influence the magistrates without them realising it through their training. It is the Clerk who 
has the responsibly for training the magistrates and who decides the content of their training 
programmes, including the previously mentioned sentencing exercises, although in the study 
area it is true to say that this particular aspect of training has lately been undertaken by the 
stipendiary magistrate. With regards to influencing the Bench by means of court circulars, I 
quote three examples which occurred during the period of my research. The first two are 
extracts from the Court Newsletters, a circular written by the Justices' Clerk, 'In [the study area] 
court, a custodial sentence is four times as likely for burglary than it is for violence..' or even 
more pointedly, 'I find it impossible to reconcile a fine of £125 for using a car without insurance
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with a fine of £50 for wounding with a glass'. It would appear to be too much of a coincidence 
that these two expressions of concern by the Clerk were soon followed by the Bench resolution 
calling for a tougher sentencing policy for certain types of violent crime. Although it has to be 
admitted that this resolution was also influenced by another factor which was referred to in a 
previous section. Another method of influencing sentencing could be put under the heading of 
The Dissemination of Information' or more specifically the distribution of the local crime 
statistics. As the Justices' Clerk observed, 'I believe that Magistrates should be kept informed, 
not at least for the purposes of ensuring that where there are significant increases in certain 
types of criminal activities, offenders appearing before the court charged with such offences 
should be dealt with accordingly' (April 1992).
While it is accepted that the court clerks by the very nature of their role cannot avoid 
being influential through the advice that they give, I have occasionally been drawn to the 
conclusion that the way in which they seek to influence can sometimes exceed their official 
mandate. Sometimes it is what is said, and that may not necessarily be a piece of advice, it 
could well be a rhetorical question. On other occasions it is not what is said but a poorly 
disguised expression of disapproval or the failure to disguise some element of body language, 
and all these are signals which can, and do, cause the decision makers to think again. 
Sometimes the influence can be direct. In its simplest form it is when the court clerk says to the 
magistrates," With your agreement Sir..'', and then goes on to announce some decision that he 
and possibly others have arrived at. Then there is the example of the court clerk who informed 
the magistrates without any prior consultation, "There is no way that a sentence can be made in 
this case without the aid of a report". That clerk had obviously decided that the offence should 
be dealt with by either a community or a custodial penalty. The magistrates on this occasion 
went along with the 'recommendation', perhaps they agreed, or perhaps they did not wish to 
embarrass their clerk in open court. On another occasion a bench were considering an 
application for a remand in custody for a very serious drugs related offence. It was obvious that 
the magistrates were undecided but were favouring 'conditional bail' providing that a place 
could be obtained for the defendant in a Bail Hostel. On asking this question of the clerk, they 
were informed that "If a place had been available in a Bail Hostel, you would have been told 
about it by the defendant's solicitor". The clerk also volunteered an opinion that if the defendant 
was convicted for these offences at the Crown Court, then "..he would be the subject of a long 
custodial sentence". It was quite obvious that the clerk was not in favour of the defendant being 
allowed bail. The magistrates arrived at their decision and remanded the defendant in custody. 
Possibly this was the correct decision. The point at issue is, who actually made the decision 
and did the advice which the magistrates received meet the criteria of being a 'high standard of 
professional and legal advice'?
Neither is the way in which the magistrates are influenced always as obvious and as 
direct as the examples quoted above. While observing in a Fines Enforcement court, it 
appeared to me that the questions being put to the defendants by the court clerk and the way in
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which the questions were phrased was tending to channel the magistrates into a certain course 
of action. For example, "If the magistrates allow you your freedom this afternoon, what offer do 
you make to the court in order to pay off these fines"? I would suggest that once this question 
has been asked and an offer has been made, it leaves the magistrates with very little 
alternative but to accept the offer, unless of course the fines defaulter is silly enough to make 
some totally unacceptable or derisory offer to the court. Once the question has been asked and 
once an offer has been made, it is doubtful if the court are then in a position where they could 
find, if they wanted to, either 'culpable neglect' or 'wilful refusal'. I did ponder in my notes of the 
occasion, 'Whether the clerk's knowledge of that particular chairman actually enabled him to 
anticipate the bench's policy and thus allowed him to push through the afternoon's business at 
pace. Or whether the clerk was dictating the role of the decision makers and the bench were 
just content to acquiesce'. I have previously made reference to the situation where I was 
convinced that the aggressive attitude of the court clerk, which in turn evoked an aggressive 
response from the defendant, was the most influential factor in a mother of eight young 
children receiving a suspended committal to prison for the non-payment of a fine.
In some of my discussions with the court clerks, while it was always claimed that they 
never set out with the intention of influencing the magistrates in their decision making, it was 
conceded that on occasions this outcome would be inevitable, in fact it was expected. I also 
gained the impression that this was a situation accepted not only by the court clerks, but also 
by some of the other participants in the courtroom. As I heard one court clerk confiding to the 
chairman after a hearing, "They were saying earlier that I was in a bad mood and then after you 
had consulted me, you announced that you were imposing a custodial sentence. I don't know 
what they thought I had been telling you". I was reliably informed by that chairman that this 
particular decision had been made prior to the clerk having been consulted. But it might well be 
interpreted from what the clerk said, that some court users automatically assume that it is the 
court clerks' input which is the deciding factor in the decision making process. I also came to 
the conclusion having talked to the court clerks that they considered that the decisions made by 
the magistrates whom they were advising often reflects on them. After one defendant had been 
given a custodial sentence, a sentence which was obviously not considered appropriate by the 
court clerk, that same clerk confided that he welcomed the appeal against sentence which had 
been lodged on behalf of the defendant.
4.4.5 The prosecutors - presentation and manipulation.
According to Parker et al, the prosecutors occupy a somewhat different position from 
the other professional groups in the courtroom, in that they do not have any direct influence on 
sentencing, '..the prosecution was not mentioned by magistrates as an influential source of 
information’. Although in one court they did identify one chief prosecutor who 'was very adept at 
playing cases up and down ..' (Parker et al, 1989, p99). From my own observations and 
experience I found little reason to disagree with these observations, until one day ....
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I had been aware for a long time that some prosecutors either emphasised or 
minimised certain aspects of the cases they were presenting, this being dependent upon their 
ultimate objective. I was particularly aware of the way that prosecutors often emphasised the 
aggravating factors when making applications for defendants to be remanded in custody. What 
I had not realised was that this tactic of playing things either up or down was not only used in 
individual offences, but these opposites could also be applied in their different forms to the 
same offence at different stages in the proceedings. To demonstrate the way in which this 
technique can be applied, I will use an example of a case in which I was personally involved, 
initially as a participant and then as an observer. The case involved the 'serious' charge of 
burglary. On the first occasion the prosecutor made a strong application for the defendant to be 
remanded in custody. The bases of the application were the seriousness of the offence, the 
considerable criminal antecedents of the defendant and a history of the defendant's failure to 
surrender to the courts on previous occasions when he had been granted bail. The magistrates 
were told that whilst the building was a public house, and therefore commercial premises, a 
part of the building did contain residential quarters and the building had been entered in the 
early hours of morning whilst the residents were asleep. All factors which were introduced to 
demonstrate the seriousness of the offence. The bench were also told that less than two weeks 
previously the defendant had attended at a neighbouring court charged with offences of 
dishonesty. It was also revealed that he had a considerable record of previous convictions, 
some of which had resulted in custodial sentences being imposed. The prosecutor even went 
as far as expressing an opinion that if convicted of this offence, the defendant might well be 
facing another custodial sentence. The defendant was remanded in custody, a decision which 
was repeated by another bench approximately one week later, although the defendant was later 
granted bail by a judge with the condition that he resided at a Bail Hostel. The second time I 
was involved in this matter was when, as an 'observer*, I viewed the proceedings from the well 
of the court. On this occasion the hearing was before a totally different bench and the facts 
were presented by a different prosecutor, but I assume from the same prosecution file. The 
magistrates on this occasion were being asked to decide venue. Where should the case be 
heard? Was the offence so serious that it should proceed to the Crown Court or did the 
magistrates consider that it was a matter which could be dealt with to its conclusion in the 
magistrates' court and within their limited powers? To my surprise both the prosecution and the 
defence advocates indicated to the magistrates that in their opinions this offence did not figure 
very high on the scale of seriousness and it was therefore 'eminently suitable' to be dealt with 
summarily. The prosecutor then proceeded to present a case which was designed to both 
minimise the serious aspects of the offence and to justify the application which was being 
made. Neither at this stage of the proceedings can the defendant's previous record be 
produced to the court. In line with the facts which had been presented to them and the joint 
application made, the magistrates agreed that the matter was quite suitable to be dealt with in 
their courts. Having been in the courtroom on both occasions, admittedly in different roles, I did
leave the court on the second occasion wondering whether it was indeed the same offence that 
had been dealt with on both occasions. What is more I did not just feel that the magistrates had 
been influenced, I would have used the word manipulated. Neither am I certain whether on the 
first occasion the defendant was unnecessarily remanded in custody or whether on the second 
occasion he was treated leniently. However on both of these occasions 'justice' appeared to 
have been called into question. It did appear as though a game was being played.
In debating the role of the Crown Prosecution Service, the Justices' Clerk in the study 
area implied that it is not necessarily what the prosecutors say in the courtroom which 
influences the issues as much as the decisions which are taken outside of the actual hearings. 
"They decide what charges are eventually put. In most cases the evidence gathered by the 
police determines this, but not always, .. in most cases the CPS can bring what charge they 
want even if the effect, or even intention, of bringing a lesser charge is to deprive the 
defendant of any right to jury trial and/or to reduce the sentencing options of the court" (April 
1993).
4.4.6 The defence advocates - guiding the magistrates in the 'right direction'.
Addressing a group of relatively inexperienced magistrates in the study area, a. 
defence advocate told them, "You have a difficult job, we have a lot of respect for you, we try 
to guide you in the way we think you should go". My own impressions, gained both from my 
years as a magistrate and during the period of my research, have led me to believe that, by 
and large, the defence advocates do show respect for the magistrates, both lay and stipendiary. 
One might even argue that this demonstration of respect is an essential part of the advocates' 
strategy if indeed they wish to influence the magistrates in their decision making. It has 
certainly been argued that to show discourtesy to the bench could well be both foolish and 
counterproductive. As one stipendiary magistrate observed, 'Open impertinence in the face of 
the court is happily very unusual.. Impertinent advocates are generally also incompetent ones.
.. My own policy is to point out that the last way to obtain a good result for a client is to irritate 
the court. . '(Bartle, 1995, p150).
So how does the defence advocate attempt to influence the magistrates, guide them 
in the way they think they should go and obtain the best result for the client? I am certain that if 
I put this question to my colleagues in the lay magistracy, they would say that advocates talk, 
talk and then talk some more. I am equally certain that the advocates would counter this claim 
by maintaining that it is important to address a lay bench on all of the possible options 
concerning a case because it is only very rarely that they receive any indication about what the 
lay bench may be thinking. This is hardly surprising, because it is doubtful if even the 
magistrates are aware of the consensus view until after they have deliberated on their decision. 
Observation has convinced me that some chairman do, either intentionally or even 
subconsciously, give indications of approval or disapproval to certain suggestions or proposals 
which are put to the bench. This indication may be as obvious as a nod of the head or just a
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poorly concealed facial expression. But it is a practice that should be guarded against. It is a 
brave, or foolhardy, chairman who gives any indication to an advocate before he knows 
whether his colleagues will allow him to deliver.
But of course defence advocates do try to influence the magistrates into adopting the 
best achievable sentencing option for their client. A regular ploy which I have seen employed 
by defence solicitors is to pre-empt the magistrates' decision by telling them that, "My client is 
able to pay any fine imposed by the court at £'x' per week". This statement could be said to 
serve a dual purpose. Initially it indicates that the advocate considers that this offence is only 
serious enough to be deserving of a financial penalty. And secondly by making an offer of what 
the client can realistically be expected to pay each week, and the fact that it is expected that all 
fines should be capable of being paid off within the year, the advocate is also attempting to set 
the parameters for the level of any financial penalty imposed. Of course the level suggested 
does depend on the seriousness of the offence and the means of the defendant. While this 
technique is rarely challenged by a lay bench in the open court, I did observe an occasion 
where a stipendiary magistrate responded to such a suggestion with the comment, "A fine, I 
was thinking more of a custodial sentence for this offence". A comment which persuaded the 
advocate to quickly reassess his approach. Another method which I have occasionally 
witnessed, is the situation where the advocate is not only trying to convince the sentencers that 
the offence is not so serious but also that he or she has already taken the client to task in an 
attempt to prevent any repetition, and has therefore reduced the need of action by the court. An 
observed example of this technique is the comment, "I have told her, [the defendant] brutally 
and frankly, that if she continues behaving in this way, she will end up in serious trouble".
Of course not all offences are, or can be, mitigated into the lower levels of 
seriousness and advocates realise this as much as anyone. Neither are they interested in 
chasing lost causes just for the sake of it, wasting court time and thereby risking losing the 
credibility which they have with the magistrates. In such cases it is not unusual for advocates to 
concede that the offences are of a more serious nature with the type of comment, "I would 
suggest a pre-sentence report, I can't see you wanting to fine or discharge on these particular 
matters". Neither is it my experience that defence advocates generally challenge the proposals 
which are contained in these reports, unless they feel that there are practical reasons which 
could prevent their clients complying if such an order were made. Although 1 did witness one 
occasion where the advocate obviously considered that he had gauged the mood of the bench 
who were sitting rather better than had the probation officer who had prepared the report. The 
pre-sentence report obviously contained a proposal for a short probation order, a proposal 
which the advocate apparently felt would not find favour with the sentencers. In his address to 
the bench and in an obvious effort to keep his client out of prison, he said, "I am not in favour 
of short probation orders, I would suggest that a two year order should be imposed This 
could be interpreted as a high risk strategy. It did not influence the bench on this occasion and 
it is also to be hoped for the sake of the advocate, and any future clients, that the next time this
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advocate is in court arguing for a short probation order that he is fortunate enough to have a 
bench of different magistrates or a set of magistrates who have very short memory retention.
So how do the advocates retain their credibility with the magistrates while at the same 
time being seen to be doing their best for the clients, even if sometimes this might not be the 
case. I have observed and made notes of the way that defence advocates address the 
magistrates and I have concluded that they signal their level of, or lack of, commitment to the 
matter in hand within the first few words of their address. I will demonstrate this technique by 
using a few actual opening statements for bail applications which were made during the course 
of my research. Demonstrating a great deal of commitment the advocate stated that, "This is a 
strenuous application for bail". A less committed approach was introduced with the words, "If 
you are kind enough to grant the defendant bail ..". Finally there was the 'this is wasting my 
time and your time' approach, in which one advocate actually said, "I can see that my friend's 
application [the prosecution] has much merit. However I am instructed by my client to make an 
application for bail this morning". The advocate then sat down, his job done. Another method is 
to indicate to the magistrates that this is the story that has been communicated to them by their 
client, whether the bench believe it or not is very much up to them. "This is what really 
happened, this is what they have told me ...".
4.4.7 The probation officer - an influential agent or the 'peddler of the soft option'.
In the opinion of a number of people the role of the probation officer in the courtroom 
is epitomised by a perceived lack of involvement in the proceedings of the court. Some 
observers have also commented on the probation officer's apparent preoccupation with 
maintaining a low profile whenever they are inside the courtroom itself. Parker et al, observed 
that verbal contributions from the probation officers in the adult courts are relatively infrequent 
(Parker et al, 1989, p161). From my own observations, I certainly formed the impression that 
the probation officers in the courtroom only address the court when they are invited to do so, 
and this is not very often. This impression was confirmed to me when reading the minutes of a 
meeting held in the research area by the Probation Liaison, Court Team sub-committee, a 
committee which comprises of both magistrates and probation staff. During the meeting a 
question was asked about the probation officer's role in the courtroom. The minute read,' [The 
stipendiary magistrate] ..was quite forthright in his response. He outlined that generally the role 
should be doing what he asks, answering questions etc., something he finds we, [the Probation 
Service], already do very well. The point was made that it is not always possible for them, [the 
probation officers], to be proactive in their role. Following a general discussion it was felt that 
the probation officer’s role in court was of an appropriate level and that on any occasion that 
the officers felt the need to raise an issue then they could' (March 1991).
It could be assumed therefore that the probation officers exert very little influence on 
the decision makers, however my experience of the court system suggests that anyone who 
makes that assumption could very well misinterpret the reality of the situation. As I have
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previously demonstrated, magistrates, when considering imposing sentences for the more 
serious offences which fall within their jurisdiction, and where they are considering disposals 
which fall within the community sentence or custodial sentence categories, are advised, or in 
some instances instructed that, 'A pre-sentence report must be obtained and considered before 
such a decision is made'. So what is a pre-sentence report and how influential is it in the 
sentencing process?
According to national standards, a pre-sentence report should, amongst other things, 
be impartial, balanced and factually accurate, drawing fairly on both the aggravating and 
mitigating factors in the case. It should assist the court in reaching a view of the seriousness of 
the offence. It should present to the court relevant information about the offender, including the 
offender's propensity to re-offend. Finally the report should have a conclusion with, \vhenever 
relevant, a proposal for the most suitable community sentence, under which, were the court to 
choose that course, the report writer considers the offender could most appropriately be 
supervised and the risk of future offending be reduced' (National Standards for the Supervision 
of Offenders in the Community, 1992). The pre-sentence report is a document which, whether 
by choice or statute, is requested with regular frequency by the magistrates in the study area. In 
1994, some 9 per cent of cases were adjourned so that magistrates could 'have the benefit' of 
the additional information which the reports provide them with before they proceed to sentence. 
This resulted in a total of 835 requests for pre-sentence reports, an average of 16 per week, 
from either the magistrates or for those cases which had been committed to the Crown Court 
(The PSR, August 1994).
But how do the magistrates react to these reports? As Parker found out, ' Many 
magistrates were critical of recommendations .. and quite resentful of what they saw as a 
usurping of their power1 (Parker et al, 1989, p91). I have not met many magistrates who have 
openly accused the probation officers of usurping their power. I would say that the feelings of 
many of the magistrates on my own Bench are possibly summarised by one colleague who told 
me, "I object to the Probation Service trying to channel us into the preferred recommendation 
rather than giving us a set of options, and the pros and cons of all the alternatives”. Despite this 
during the period October 1993 to March 1994, the sentencers concordance rate with the 
proposals made in the reports was 64 per cent (The PSR, August 1994). I would suggest that 
this figure indicates a relatively high level of consensus, particularly when one considers that 
for certain offences and certain offenders the magistrates will be looking specifically at a 
custodial sentence, and this is a proposal which after twenty years as a magistrate I am still 
waiting to see contained in a pre-sentence report (or its predecessor the social inquiry report). 
At the other end of the scale there might be a proposal for either a discharge or a fine. In this 
case it also needs to be remembered that before requesting the report, the magistrates should 
already have considered both of these options and discounted them as being inappropriate for 
the matters with which they were dealing.
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Of course there are also those magistrates who see the probation officers as the 
'peddlars of the soft option', the 'do gooders', the 'social workers'. This was really brought home 
to me at a training session where the speaker was a visiting stipendiary magistrate, who has 
since been made a judge. I asked him for his opinion of.the Parker quote, 'Whilst magistrates’ 
justice is arguably cheap to administer, the end result is expensive .. The end product of local 
discretion when all the secure vans have delivered all the local custody decisions to the prison 
gates, is a penal crisis' (Parker et al, 1989, p173). His immediate response was, "Who wrote 
that a probation officer?". He then described the statement as 'bunkum and hooey'. The social 
worker aspect of the probation officer’s role has once again been brought to the fore with the 
Home Secretary's proposal to review the current requirement for probation officers to have a 
social work qualification. A comment in The Magistrate, which apparently supports the Home 
Secretary's view, reads, 'It must be recognised that the social work qualification which is 
currently required compounds the image of the probation service as a branch of the social 
services, rather than a key agency in the criminal justice system. This in turn does nothing to 
counteract the public perception of community sentences as a soft option, leading to a 
disturbing level of dissatisfaction with the magistrates who sentence offenders to community 
penalties' (The Magistrate, July/Aug. 1995, p127).
4.4.8 The appearance and demeanour of the defendant.
Are the magistrates influenced by the people, the defendants, who appear in front of 
them? I think that it has already been adequately demonstrated from the observations which 
were dealt with in previous chapters that the answer can be in the affirmative. I have already 
referred to the effect that the presence of the offender in the courtroom has in reducing the 
severity of some sentences. On the other hand, I have also detailed one matter in particular, 
although this was not an isolated instance, where the aggressive attitude of the defendant 
resulted in an unexpectedly harsh decision by the bench. What I am not certain about is 
whether these actions by the magistrates result from a cool and calculated look at the facts of 
the case or whether they are dictated more because of some other subconscious or emotional 
considerations. My experience of observing, talking to and working with magistrates, has led 
me to the opinion that the decision while determined by the former is often, and sometimes 
considerably, modified by the latter. Neither is this reaction necessarily the sole province of the 
magistrates. One example of this concerned a prosecutor who was giving the defendant a 
really 'rough time' during cross-examination. During the course of this questioning, it emerged 
that the defendant was about to enter the same University and college from which the 
prosecutor had graduated some years before. The tenor of the cross-examination changed 
dramatically, the prosecutor adopted a much softer approach and at the end of the case, he 
even wished the defendant well in his studies.
How is the magistrate influenced by the appearance of defendants in the courtroom? 
On the one hand there could be the well dressed or neatly attired defendant who appears to be
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contrite and full of remorse, sometimes in tears. On the other it might be the young 'skin head', 
liberally tattooed, wearing an offensive T  shirt and attired in denim, who doesn't appear to be 
concerned about either the court or its proceedings. My belief is that magistrates leam to avoid 
making assumptions which can be created by the defendant’s appearance and demeanour. It is 
surprising how often an 'illusion' can be shattered once the decision has been announced and 
the defendant is on his or her way out of the courtroom. It is also something which magistrates 
are warned against in the early part of their training. As one solicitor told a group of 
magistrates, "We lump groups of people together and class them as bad, for example gypsies. 
I might be able to get away with it, but you as a magistrate cannot".
But how much care do defendants take with their appearance when they are attending 
at court? My overall impression is that the vast majority do not take much care at all. It could 
be that many of those who attend at court in the study area are unemployed and therefore do 
not have a great deal of choice in the matter, particularly in respect of their dress. But of 
course some do try. There is for example the young defendant who attends at court in an ill 
fitting suit, which must have been borrowed, and in a collar and tie which is a constant source 
of irritation and something he obviously isn't in the habit of wearing. Neither do the efforts of 
the defendants always have the desired effect on the sentencers. I am certain that magistrates 
are not overly impressed by those Fine defaulters who arrive at court wearing apparently 
expensive clothing, displaying their 'gold' rings, chains and medallions, and then on being 
asked why they haven't paid their fines plead hard times and a lack of finance. I would also 
question the wisdom of the two defendants who appeared at court charged with the theft of a 
considerable amount of leisure wear from a local sports retailer. Both appeared in court 
wearing identical and 'new looking shell suits'. While accepting that it was highly unlikely that 
these were anything to do with the matter which was being dealt with, it did elicit some behind 
the scenes comments from the magistrates involved.
4.5 INTER-GROUP INTERACTION.
4.5.1 A sense of common purpose.
'For the system [criminal justice], to achieve its objectives efficiently, it is important 
that all the criminal justice services share a sense of common purpose ..' (Home Office Annual 
Report, 1991). This statement echoes the views which Sir Clive Whitmore, the then Permanent 
Under Secretary of State at the Home Office, made in The Magistrate approximately one year 
earlier, 'System implies a number of inter-related organisations contributing to a common 
purpose. Their common objectives should be expressed as preventing crime, protecting the 
public, maintaining the Queen's peace, punishing and (if possible) reforming the guilty, 
providing support for the victim and ensuring fairness and justice for all. For the most part each 
service pursues these objectives individually rather than collectively or with a sense of 
common strategy' (Whitmore, 1990, p4). Another member of the Home Office, David
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Faulkner, reported that the 'search for a sense of common purpose' had been one of the major 
themes in the administration throughout the previous decade, and possibly even before that, 
but it had to be admitted that '..Effective cooperation is not easy to achieve' (Faulkner, 1991, 
p73). Reflecting on her earlier days in the Magistracy, Rosemary Thompson, the Chairman of 
the Magistrates' Association, recalls that many magistrates didn't even think of their courts as 
being part of the criminal justice system and accepts that there was a general ignorance among 
magistrates about how the other agencies worked, ' .. the importance of magisterial 
independence was emphasised as a basic element in the judicial approach. But too often 
proper independence tipped over into unhelpful isolation' (CJCC Newsletter, November 1995). 
The gap which existed between the agencies was again brought to the forefront of public 
attention by the findings of the Woolf Enquiry, the report of which was published in 1991. This 
enquiry which had been set up primarily to investigate the prison disturbances of the time, 
identified ' ..a 'geological fault' between the agencies that should have been involved with 
prisoners. ..Even those who were included in the 'criminal justice system' were seen not to work 
well with each other* (Raine and Willson, 1993a, p217). Commenting on the Woolf Report, His 
Honour Judge Tumim, Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Prisons, wrote, 'At present I believe this 
country to be unique in Europe in the lack of understanding one part of the system has of the 
others. The sentencers tend to be ignorant of what lurks behind the walls of the prisons. The 
prison govemers rarely sit in court. The probation service is often criticised but not much 
studied ..'. Emerging from this enquiry was a proposal for the setting up of a national forum 
'..where the most senior policy makers in criminal justice, other than Ministers, can meet at 
regular intervals and offer guidance'. This forum could also be replicated at a more local level 
where it was proposed that '..the judge, the probation chief, the prison govemer, the police and 
CPS leaders, a representative magistrate, to meet at regular intervals to discuss common 
issues' (Tumim, 1991, p135). These proposals resulted in the setting up of the Criminal Justice 
Consultative Council (CJCC), along with a further 24 Area Liaison Committees throughout 
England and Wales, the latter being designed to build upon the work which was already being 
carried out at local level by the Court User Groups. The vehicle identified as the means of 
creating a greater understanding between the probation service and the magistrates was the 
Probation Liaison Committee. These were said to have a crucial role in the quest for better 
communication and understanding and 'should seek to promote a high level of awareness 
amongst the whole bench' about the fullest range of probation related matters. (The Magistrate, 
March 1990, p43).
4.5.2 Four years after Woolf.
The initial impression when looking at inter-agency relationships four years after the .. 
Woolf Report was published is that little, if any, headway has been achieved, and this applies 
in particular to the developments at national level. Lord Justice Rose, the Chairman of the 
CJCC, writing in the latter half of 1995 admitted that, ' The Criminal Justice Consultative
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Council which I chair is 4 years old. .. Our 24 Area Liaison Committees..are only a little 
younger. But our existence and the work we do are not widely known At the same time a 
newly appointed member of the Council wrote, 'We have no criminal justice system. Instead a 
number of different agencies work to their own systems for their own ends..' (CJCC Newsletter, 
November 1995). A comment which sounded vaguely familiar. But what was the situation at 
the 'workface', at the local level? Inter-agency relationships were one of the areas which were 
being scrutinised by the newly formed Magistrates' Courts' Service Inspectorate. The early 
feedback from the inspectors was a little more encouraging. 'Inter-agency liaison is highly 
developed .. Inter-agency liaison on the whole were developed and working relationships are 
reported to be constructive and helpful.. Relationships were found to be generally good', were 
typical of the comments made. When commenting specifically about the Court User Groups 
their remarks were considerably more variable, '.. views on them were mixed, on the whole 
they are useful for information sharing, at a local level most professional users spoke positively 
about liaison both formal and informal .. Court User Groups were not all seen by staff or 
professional users to be effective for inter-agency communications or practical problem solving' 
(HM Magistrates’ Courts' Service Inspectorate, executive summaries, April 1994 - April 1995). 
These comments were fairly representative of the comments which I received when making 
enquiries about the effectiveness of the Court User Groups, while some positive comments 
were received from one of the group's members in the study area, they were however, seen as 
being quite ineffective by one respondent who was a member of a group in one of the city 
areas.
4.5.3 A more harmonious, more efficient and a more just local system.
'Inter-agency work has the potential for improving mutual understanding between 
various personnel engaged in a local criminal justice system and thereby contributing to the 
development of a more harmonious, more efficient and indeed hopefully more just local 
system'(Cavadino and Wiles, 1994, p32).
It may already have been noted from some of the observations made in the earlier 
sections that relationships between the different agencies in the study area have not always 
been totally harmonious, and in the view of some, considering the adversarial nature of the 
courts and the criminal justice system, this should not have come as any surprise. Writing to 
the members of the Bench in 1992, the Justices' Clerk expressed an opinion that, 'We in [ ] 
have good working relationships between the various parties involved in the criminal justice 
system .. All of us I hope are concerned to make the system more just .. Working together 
should allow us all to come nearer to meeting our individual expectations most of the time. 
Conflict is unavoidable in an adversarial system. But if we all know what is expected of us and 
accept the underlying philosophy then the conflict can be greatly reduced' ( A Bench circular, 
May 1992). And of course conflict there was, I have already made reference to the well 
publicised clash between the court's 'chief administrator1 and the Crown Prosecution Service
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over the Service's alleged policy of downgrading certain charges which involved offences of 
violence. Concern was also expressed by the courts about the police's policy of cautioning 
more and more offenders rather than bringing them before the courts. Both policies, it was 
alleged had more to do with financial considerations than with the efficient and effective 
administration of justice. Neither were these areas of conflict confined to the courts. Even some 
of the agencies who might be perceived as being on the 'same side' found themselves in 
conflict, even though it was not always openly admitted. A report in the local press quoted the 
local Head of the CID as saying,' Up to the end of last year we had an excellent relationship 
with the CPS, as far as two independent organisations could have, but suddenly their 
prosecution policy changed. Since then a number of decisions have been made that we don't 
agree with. We are unhappy ...' .These claims were however refuted by the Branch Prosecutor 
for Sheffield and Rotherham who insisted, 'We are hiding nothing and our relationships are first 
class'. (The Advertiser, March 12 1995). But efforts continue in an attempt to develop good and 
efficient working relationships within the local justice system. Even as I write, a one day 
training conference is being arranged in the study area, a conference designed to bring 
together the police, Crown Prosecution Service, the Probation Service, defence solicitors along 
with the magistrates and their clerks. Among a number of aims identified for the conference is 
one which is designed, 'To seek to identify ways in which the key organisations can better work 
together in order .. to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal proceedings 
process' (Bench circular, January 1996).
One specific area of cooperation which appears to have developed over a period of 
years within the study area, has been the relationship between the sentencers and the 
Probation Service, a relationship which it could be argued has had a considerable influence on 
the sentencing philosophy of the Bench and its relatively low use, over quite a long period, of 
the custodial option. In 1989, the South Yorkshire Probation Service was developing an action 
plan which was designed to target the various participants in the magistrates' courts. 'The 
importance of a regular constructive dialogue with sentencers about the contribution of the 
service ..cannot be under-estimated ..an actual dialogue between the sentencers and the 
Service is crucial'. The court clerks were also identified because 'they advise magistrates and 
carry current local policies'. Solicitors and barristers were also considered to be 'key members 
of the system'. (Tackling Offending, June 1989). The importance of these relationships was still 
at the forefront of Probation Office thinking in 1993, 'Courts and Probation Service need to 
liaise. They may not always see eye to eye, but an understanding of one another and mutual 
respect is essential if working relationships are to be effective' (PSR newsletter, Autumn 1993). 
A year later in a policy document which had been jointly produced by the Magistrates' Court 
and the Probation Service it was agreed that, 'The courts and the Probation Service each face 
budget restraints, it is in the interests of both to work cooperatively together to ensure that best 
use is made of the resources of both. Performance standards set for criminal justice 
organisations can often only be met by mutual cooperation between those organisations'. One
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area identified as being particularly suitable for this joint approach is training. The document 
suggests that, Training together offers the opportunity for making the best use of training 
resources and for fostering a mutual understanding and an appreciation of the perspectives of 
each organisation .. Joint approaches to training at all levels and for all personnel, create 
opportunities for developing understanding and coordinated working relationships' (Working 
Together for Justice in Rotherham, a draft document, September 1995). These strategies 
designed to develop a greater level of inter-agency cooperation and awareness must be 
welcomed in the interests of a 'more just local system', and as the previously mentioned joint 
document states, both of the parties concerned, '..support the principles of cooperation and 
coordination central to the recommendations of the Woolf Report'. But while accepting this, it 
can sometimes be difficult to ignore some of the phrases which are contained in the proposals, 
phrases which suggest that a number of the proposals which are put forward are really finance 
and resource driven. A not untypical example is the extract from the proposal which is quoted 
above and makes refererence to 'budget constraints' and the need to work together 'to ensure 
that the best use is made of the resources of both organisations'. Another example which I 
noted from a Bench circular stated, 'Many of us have a strictly limited amount of public money 
entrusted to us to provide a service within the system. Others have a share of public money 
alongside the task of running a commercial business..', and once again it is this concern with 
the financial aspects of running the system which suggests to me that quite often it is these 
monetary considerations which are the real inducements for the various local agencies 
developing a 'sense of common strategy'.
4.6 BUILDINGS AND FACILITIES.
4.6.1 The old courthouse - traditional splendour and modern squalor.
The main court building, in which the bulk of my period of observation was spent, had 
been built in the late nineteen-twenties and appeared to be typical of the architecture of that 
period. From the outside it was a large and imposing structure and its very appearance 
indicated that it must be a building of some public importance. Inside, the two original 
courtrooms, whilst suffering from the wear and tear of some sixty five years, still provided hints 
of their past splendour. With their high ornate ceilings, arched windows, oak seating and 
furniture and the brass railing. (See appendix C). My first impression on entering these 
courtrooms was how much their design reminded me of the Methodist chapels which I had 
attended in my youth. The windows on the outside walls of the courtroom, whilst being fairly 
large, were set at such a height that not only did this prevent people on the outside looking in, it 
also discouraged people who were on the inside from looking out, or if they did all they could 
see were the rooftops of the nearby buildings or else the sky beyond. This design was possibly 
seen as a way of ensuring that the participants' minds were concentrared on the important 
matters which were before them. Much of the seating comprised of wooden benches, although
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some of the major participants, the advocates, probation officers and the police sat on rows of 
leather upholstered tip-up seats. The magistrates were provided with quite ornate mahogany 
chairs with generously upholstered leather seats. There was even a difference between the 
chair used by the chairman of the bench and those used by the 'wingers', the difference being 
that the chairman's chair was slightly larger and also had arms. These chairs were replaced 
towards the end of my study period with modem fabric upholstered swivel type chairs, possibly 
another tangible sign that the courts were entering a different era, an era which may have been 
heralded by the building of the new courthouse. Not only was it the design and the standard of 
the seating which differed, but also the way that it was incorporated into the court layout, with 
the various participants all being arranged at differing heights and at various distances from the 
bench. Neither were people allowed to encroach into other people's territory. On one occasion 
while observing from the well of the court I was politely informed that the seat I was occupying 
was normally reserved for the use of the court custody sergeant. I did not sit there again. At 
floor level and nearest to the magistrates and their clerk were the advocates, the row behind 
and at a slightly higher level was occupied by representatives of the Probation Service, on the 
third row and higher still were the seats reserved for the police. The front row of the seats 
located down one side of the room were normally occupied by the press and the court usher, 
and the row behind was generally reserved for those visitors who were attending at court by 
prior arrangement, for example parties of students. These were the seats which I preferred to 
occupy when observing from the well of the court. The height of the seating described, varied 
between floor level and 30 centimetres. The bench was set 46 centimetres above the floor 
level which enabled the magistrates both to see and be seen. For some reason the chairman's 
chair was set on a plinth 10 centimetres higher than those of his or her colleagues and this did 
tend to suggest to me that these arrangements had not totally evolved through practical 
requirements and that there were also some hierarchical and symbolic considerations 
incorporated into the layout. This thinking also extended to the setting of the dock and the way 
in which it was symbolically embellished with its brass rails. The floor of the dock was set 35 
centimetres above the floor level of the courtroom, this meant that when the defendants were 
in the sitting ppsition they were in a prominent position but not as prominently positioned as 
were the magistrates, but when they stood for sentencing they were elevated to the most 
prominent position in the courtroom. However as I have already indicated, unlike some of the 
city courts which I attended, the practice of requiring all defendants to appear in the dock had 
been discontinued. The majority of defendants were directed to use the seats which were 
located in front of the dock, these seats were set at floor level and situated adjacent to the 
seats occupied by the defence advocates. This whole scene was overlooked by a large public 
gallery, and while no longer in use because of safety reasons, it did serve as a reminder of the 
days when the courtroom was obviously a greater public spectacle than it is today. It was 
interesting to note that the seating which was subsequently allocated to the general public, 
rather than being the 'best seats in the house', were the seats located at the very rear of the
courtroom and with a very restricted view of the proceedings. Whether by accident or design, 
these seats proved to be less popular with the spectator population and there was a marked 
decrease in the attendance of those people who, having 'signed on' at the nearby Employment 
Exchange, then came into the courtroom either to get out of the cold or else to occupy their 
time in what otherwise could well be a very boring day. The poor behaviour of these people 
was often a cause of concern and many is the time that the proceedings had to be halted and 
the miscreants rebuked by the bench chairmen. The public seating is now generally occupied 
by the family or friends of the defendants, and particularly those defendants who are being 
produced after a period of remand in prison, or else by other defendants who are filling in time 
while they wait for their own cases to be called into the court. This revised situation did appear 
to the observer to be representative of the demise of the general public's involvement in the 
proceedings of the magistrates’ courts.
The third courtroom in this building had a much more informal atmosphere. Only the 
bench and the witness box were raised above floor level. This court had no dock and was only 
rarely used for those defendants who were produced from the cells. The advocates sat at a 
table facing both the bench and the court clerk. The seating for the defendants was located in 
front of the witness box and adjacent to that of the defence advocates. The seating in this court 
varied from the 'ornate' leather upholstered chairs used by the magistrates, to the more 
modest, but still leather upholstered, chairs of the other regular court users, including the 
defendants, and the more common everyday fabric upholstered seats which were provided for 
the general public. This courtroom, unlike those previously described, did overlook a very busy 
and very noisy thoroughfare. Secondary glazing had been installed in an attempt to reduce the 
noise levels which impinged on the proceedings. This courtroom was also subject to the 
extremes of temperature but in the periods when the temperatures were high the opening of 
these windows to allow for more air was not a practical option because of the noise levels. 
Therefore the two key areas of listening and concentration were occasionally put severely to 
the test by this particular courtroom. One thing which I also noted whilst studying the layout of 
this courtroom was the different ways in which the bench itself could be perceived. Viewed 
from the main body of the courtroom one observed a highly polished wood panelled frontage to 
the bench with its three 'antique' arched back chairs which were set in front of a wall adorned 
with a splendid and classically patterned wallpaper and overlooked by the royal crest, quite 
impressive and very appropriate for a court of law. However viewing the bench from the 
opposite direction, a view which the public never saw, the bench took on the form of a simple 
timber and hardboard structure, a very ordinary and functional 'work table'. To me this 
comparison seemed to exemplify the two parts of the courtroom proceedings, the traditions and 
the symbolism on the one hand and a practical hearing of the facts of the matters before the 
courts, deciding on those facts and hopefully dispensing justice on the other.
The waiting area in this building consisted of two long corridors which formed a T  
shape. The seating comprised of a number of wooden benches set down the walls of the
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corridors and some of these benches were positioned so that they were facing each other. 
Despite being cleaned on a daily basis the waiting area was a cause for continuing concern. 
More often than not by mid-moming the area was smoke filled, there was generally an 
.assortment of litter on the floor and the wooden benches were awash with spilled tea and 
coffee. The daily scene therefore comprised of a whole variety of people, defendants, victims, 
prosecution witnesses, defence witnesses, families (including babes in arms and other young 
children) and friends of the various factions, herded together into a restricted, polluted and 
occasionally hostile environment. It must be conceded, however, that much of this pollution, in 
fact some would argue all of it, was created by those people who used the facility. Neither were 
the interview facilities seen as being much better. One thing on which the advocates and the 
probation officers seemed to be in complete agreement was that there were neither enough 
interview facilities and those that did exist were barely adequate.
In contrast to the squalor of the public waiting area was the Magistrates' Assembly 
and Retiring Room. This room had its fitted carpet, large mahogany boardroom table, a set of 
thirteen 'Chippendale style mahogany dining chairs', a 'glazed mahogany bookcase' and a 
'reproduction mahogany drinks cabinet', although it must be admitted that during my many 
years of involvement I was not aware of any occasion when this latter piece of furniture was 
actually used for the purpose for which it was designed.
The second courthouse which was in use at this time has already been referred to in 
the introduction to this research. This building was only ever envisaged as an interim measure 
to be used between the demolition of an old town centre courthouse, an extremely ancient, 
decayed and inadequate building which had been demolished to accommodate a development 
of retail outlets, and the building of the new courthouse. This courthouse was created by 
converting part of an old comprehensive school into a court building with three courtrooms. As I 
have already related, the courtrooms had a relatively uncomplicated layout, everything with the 
exception of the bench and the witness box being on a single level. The courtrooms were 
carpeted and the furniture was both modem and functional. None of these courts had a dock, 
neither did the building contain the facilities to provide anything but the most rudimentary levels 
of security. And what facilities there were proved to be no match for the wrecking powers of 
some of the young defendants, those being produced from or waiting to be transported to youth 
custody establishments, who were sometimes locked in them. The waiting areas in this 
courthouse were, in the initial stages, far superior to those in the main court building, but these, 
and particularly the upholstered seating which they contained started to show both the ravages 
of time and the destruction inflicted by the knives and razors of some of the attenders at these 
courts. It may therefore come as no surprise to the reader to be told that these courts did not 
generally deal with the more serious types of criminal offences. This building contained the 
Youth courts, the Family proceedings, local authority matters and the lesser criminal matters 
such as motoring and TV license offences.
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4.6.2 A courthouse built for the 21st Century?
The new courthouse was commissioned in 1987, the building was started in 1991 and 
completed in 1994. The first case was heard on the 3rd of May of that year, a date which was 
very near to the end of the period of my actual observations within the courtrooms. The new 
courthouse is a red brick building and accommodates ten courtrooms. One of its most 
impressive external features is the royal crest which is located above the main entrance, the 
crest is incorporated into the brickwork and comprises of 2,500 separate coloured bricks. The 
courthouse which was built at a cost of £6.5 million is designed to have a life span of 60 years.
The local press described it as an 'impressive building' which 'had a strong green 
theme'. A report continued, 'Inside, large towering windows have been designed to bring 
sunlight into the courtrooms, which have their own silent ventilation system drawing in fresh air 
to keep them at a constant temperature... There are five courtrooms designed to be informal. 
Each has its own distinctive colour scheme and furniture which can be moved round to suit 
different purposes. Even the witness box is on wheels'. All of the witness boxes are now 
equipped with seats and a practice has been adopted to allow witnesses the choice of 
presenting their evidence either sitting or standing. 'The remaining five "formal" courts all have 
separate docks which all feature the latest Home Office approved "dry moat" system along with 
security glass and alarm buttons to minimise the risk of prisoners escaping. Court Four.. has 
special facilities to allow children to give evidence at trials via a live video link from side rooms 
away from the pressures of the courtroom'. In all the courts the benches are raised, but only in 
the main courtroom, Court Ten, is there raised seating, and this is restricted to a single row of 
seats in front of the dock, seating which is normally reserved for use by the defendants, and in 
the public seating area where there are three rows of tiered seats.(See Appendix C)
Moving on to the other areas of the court building the report continues, '.. large open 
public waiting areas, all have glazed roofs and walls and are built around a central courtyard 
whose windows are designed to admit as much natural sunlight as possible... For the general 
public, staff and solicitors the new airy design will come as a welcome relief from the crowded 
and smoky corridors which characterised the old courthouse. .. The cramped corridors are 
replaced in the new courthouse with spacious waiting areas and all the necessary facilities 
including toilets, telephones and a modem canteen .. special attention has beeen paid to the 
needs of witnesses, children and the disabled. .."One of the biggest complaints we got at. the 
old courthouse was that prosecution witnesses had to sit facing defendants whilst waiting 
outside. That will not happen here, because the trial courts have separate waiting rooms for 
witnesses only".. The complex is linked to the Main Street police station by a tunnel 90 metres 
long .. the court itself has its own cells for forty prisoners, with additional holding rooms 
between the courts themselves' (The Advertiser, May 6,1994).
It is apparent that a lot of lessons had been learnt over the years, and whilst the 
courts are no longer required to provide the setting for the degradation ceremony, neither, 
because the courts have to deal with a number of very violent and potentially dangerous
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people, can they afford to ignore the safety and security aspects which are also an important 
part of daily life. An interesting aspect of the new courthouse is the way in which the public 
have responded to it. Although a high degree of anti-vandal elements were designed into the 
building and a no smoking policy enforced from the outset, the initial impression is that the 
building and its contents are being shown a great deal of respect by its users. The only 
exception to this being the cell area. Whether or not it has also resulted in a better standard of 
justice being dispensed, it is impossible to judge. That is still dependent on the human element. 
As one senior court official commented when we were discussing the benefits of the new 
courthouse, "But that only gives you a better construction and better facilities, it doesn't 
necessarily improve the justice. It should assist, but it isn't an end in itself'.
4.6.3 Substitute 'requires paintings' for 'needs painting' - 'the punters' move up 
market.
What do the non-professional court users, the defendants, 'the punters', think to the 
changes which have taken place? Surveys carried out in the old courthouse indicated that two 
thirds of those asked, considered the comfort of the waiting areas to be 'poor*. When asked 
about the standard of privacy in these areas the level of dissatisfaction rose even further and 
four out of five were unhappy with the situation which existed and described the level of privacy 
as 'poor*. The availability of public telephones was another area which was also severely 
criticised by those who took part in the survey. The question about the standard of toilet 
facilities received a very mixed response, 45 per cent considered them to be 'satisfactory', in 
fact some 5 per cent of those who responded even described them as 'very good', while at the 
same time 42 per cent described them as 'poor1. The refreshment facilities, the 'snack bar* 
provided in the main courthouse by the WRVS, were considered to be 'very good' by 18 per 
cent, 'satisfactory' by 42 per cent and 'poor1 by 19 per cent.
So what were the responses when an identical type of survey was taken some twelve 
months after the opening the new courthouse? Responding to the question on the comfort of 
the waiting areas, three out of five of the respondents now described this facility as 
'satisfactory', and one in five as Very good'. While the response to the privacy aspect also 
received a more positive response with more than half now describing the situation as 
'satisfactory', there were still 40 per cent who indicated that they were less than happy with 
level of privacy which was available to them. Criticisms about the provision of telephones 
made by almost two thirds of the respondents in the first survey had reduced to one in five in 
the new courthouse. The responses to the provision of refreshment facilities were somewhat 
surprising. The new canteen 'with its panoramic view of the town centre' and operated by a 
professional catering company, was viewed as being only slightly better than the very basic 
facilities which had been provided in the old courthouse.
Also of interest were the comments and suggestions made by some of the 
respondents and particularly the way in which user expectations appeared to increase in line
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with the improvements which were introduced in the building of the new courts. In the old 
courthouse most of the comments were concerned with the squalor which prevailed and 
suggested that there was a need for painting and decorating, for more comfortable seating as 
well as improvements to the waiting areas in general. One respondent did ask "Why bother it 
will only get vandalised?", and another possibly more prophetic respondent even suggested 
that the only solution to the problems was simply to "Demolish the building". It was therefore 
interesting to note that the suggestions which were forthcoming from the survey which was 
carried out in the new courts, and recognising that many of the original concerns had now been 
satisfied, took on a new meaning. The suggestions for the waiting rooms were no longer 
concerned only with the basic comforts. The call for painting and decorating had been 
overtaken by a request for paintings to be displayed, and neither did the suggestions stop 
there, the provision of more plants, newspapers and magazines, and music were all proposed. 
One optimist even suggested that a licensed bar should be provided. A baby changing room 
having been provided, the demand was then made for creche facilities. Proposals for better 
refreshment facilities were overtaken by suggestions for cheaper refreshments and vending 
machines. In the old courthouse one of the main 'bones of contention' was the lack of non­
smoking areas, with the introduction in the new court building of a no-smoking policy it was 
perhaps not too surprising to see this emphasis change and by far the most contentious issue 
became the lack of 'smoking rooms'. Of course the longer that people have to spend in the 
courts the more important these issues become, a fact which is recognised not only by the 
court administrators but also by those who are summoned to attend at the courts. In the 
surveys the importance of reduced waiting times and even the introduction of an appointment 
system were matters that came more and more to the fore. As indicated, neither was this 
important issue ignored by those who were running the courts. In practice the number of people 
seen within one hour of their scheduled arrival time, or their actual arrival time if they were late, 
had improved from 40 per cent in 1993, to 67 per cent in 1994 and 87 per cent in 1995 
(Source; Quality of Service Surveys - User Reaction (Non-professional court users), 1992, 
1993, 1994, 1995). Much of the evidence obtained from these surveys suggests that many of 
the problems which were being experienced in the study area were overcome with the building 
of the new courthouse. At the same time it also appears that as the basic problems are 
overcome then the non-professional court users become more 'sophisticated' in their demands, 
and expect to be treated in a dignified and professional manner when they attend at court.
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CHAPTER 5 THE CONCLUSION.
5.1 POWER. INFLUENCE AND STATE INTERVENTION.
5.1.1 The criminal justice system and state intervention.
One of the recurring themes throughout my research has been the high level of state 
intervention within the criminal justice system. While it is neither my intention to debate in 
detail the 'conflict' or 'consensus' theories of law and order, or to discuss the merits or otherwise 
of the conservative, liberal or radical views of sentencing and punishment, I do consider that it 
would be remiss of me if I did not record some of my observations and concerns about the ever 
increasing involvement of both government ministers and their departments in the criminal 
courts and the associated agencies. Neither am I on my own in expressing these concerns, this 
'interference' has certainly not been universally welcomed. It has variously been described as 
inconsistent, contradictory and ill-thought out. In the words of no less a person than the Lord 
Chief Justice, Lord Taylor of Gosforth, "We have had more Criminal Justice Acts in the past six 
years than in the preceding sixty. Indeed major legislation on criminal justice is threatening to 
become an annual event in our constitution. Like the budget, we are no longer surprised by its 
happening, we are merely curious to know what is going to be changed this year... Sentencing 
policy has in four years swung from one extreme to the other...'' (An address to King's College, 
London, March 16 1996 reported in Justice of the Peace).
5.1.2 The state has an obligation to protect the public.
It should be accepted that law is an essential part of politics. 'It is the existence of law 
which distinguishes a stable state from a situation of anarchy’ (Drewery 1981, p1). But to 
prevent a concentration of power into any one centralised function of the state there needs to 
be safeguards, and ' ..a key principle of the English 'constitution', enshrined in official 
discourse, demands the separation of the legislative and executive, the political and the judicial 
processes'(Parker et al 1989, p2).
While there are a number of theories concerning the need for and effect of law in 
society, the two main and most commonly expressed views emanate from either the 'conflict' or v 
the "consensus' theorists. The views of many of the conflict theorists often reflect the writings 
of Pashukanis and express the opinion that, 'Criminal law is like all law, an instrument of class 
domination and occasionally 'class terror*. Pashukanis saw the criminal court as 'a weapon in 
the immediate class struggle' (Pashukanis cited in Garland 1990, p113). Perhaps not 
surprisingly, this is not a view which was generally shared by those people whom I observed, 
interviewed, had informal discussions with or interacted with in my role as a magistrate. Neither 
would those colleagues with whom I sit on the Bench necessarily agree with Carien that one of 
the prime tasks of the magistrate is to protect 'the institution of private property and the 
prevailing modes of capitalist production' (Carien 1976, p12). Although there must have been 
some who questioned their role in those courts which dealt with the poll tax defaulters in the 
early nineties and particularly in their treatment of the striking miners in the mid-nineteen
eighties, treatment which it is claimed 'tore away the veneer of impartiality from the 
magistrates' courts' (Mansfield, 1994, p210). Although it is true to say that in the study area, an 
area which had a large involvement in the coal mining industry, the lay magistrates were 
protected from this controversy, the majority of cases involving the striking miners were dealt 
with by visiting stipendiary magistrates. To the contrary, I am strongly of the opinion that most 
magistrates would readily subscribe to the consensus theories, in which the law is seen as an 
institution for the furtherance and protection of the welfare of everyone, a system of rules 
which, by and large, expresses the popular will and protects the rights and liberties of the 
citizen, a system which also contains a contractual obligation by the state to punish those who 
transgress the rules.
It is this requirement to safeguard the rights and liberties of the citizen, that is to
'protect the public', coupled with the fact that the state was seen to be failing in its law and
order obligations, which was seized upon by the Conservatives in the late nineteen-seventies
and placed high on their political agenda. Throughout the seventies there had been growing
public concern with increasing levels of crime and an apparent decline in law and order. ' The
mugger on the street became symbolic of the general moral and economic decline of the
nation' (Brake and Hale, eds Brown and Sparks 1989, p137). In the words of Margaret
Thatcher, "We will not make law and order an election issue, the British people will". And there
it has remained on the government's agenda ever since, always high on rhetoric and allegedly
targeted at the serious offender, but its direction and effectiveness often appears, in reality, to
have been more influenced by the size of the prison population and the cost of keeping people
there. During the course of my research there appeared to be a continuing and hardening
campaign against the serious and persistent offender. In 1993, Prime Minister Major, was
asking the public to 'change their attitude from being forgiving on crime to being considerate to
the victim' ( The Mail on Sunday, Feb. 21 1993). Later that year at the Conservative Party
Conference, the Home Secretary, Michael'Howard, was telling the party faithful, "In the last
thirty years the balance in the criminal justice system has been tilted too far in favour of the
criminal and against the protection of the public. The time has come to put that right. .. It is
time that the criminals are frightened, not law abiding members of the public .." (CPC,October
6 1993). Over two years later the rhetoric was still the same. When introducing the government
White Paper entitled 'Protecting the Public', in the House of Commons, a paper which
contained a number of proposals for not only increasing the lengths of certain specific custodial
sentences, but also proposing mandatory minimum sentences for certain categories of
persistent offending, as well as the discontinuation of the automatic right to parole after part of
a custodial sentence has been served, the Home Secretary stated, "The first duty of
government is to maintain law and order, to protect peoples' freedom to walk safely on the
streets and sleep safely in their houses... These proposals are tough and they should be. They
are needed to protect the public and build a safer Britain" (House of Commons, April 3 1996).
Although these policies were not aggressively opposed by the other political parties, in fact
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certain aspects were welcomed, they were seen by many within the judiciary as both 'short­
sighted and irresponsible' and as a further unwarranted intrusion by the politicians into the 
judicial process, 'a fettering of the judge's discretion'. Others see them as a further step down 
the road from the policies of the sixties based on rehabilitation to policies where, on the 
surface, the emphasis is concerned solely with the punishment of the offender.
5.1.3 Rehabilitation or 'just deserts'.
Cohen wrote in 1985, 'There have recently been some startling changes of tactics, 
alliances and battlefields, but the basic conflicts in the politics of crime control are still 
expressed in traditional terms, soft versus hard, liberal versus conservative, treatment versus 
punishment or more recently, 'doing good' versus 'doing justice'. (Cohen, 1985, p245).
The strategy of rehabilitation, that is fitting the treatment to the offender, reached its
peak in the 'liberal age' of the nineteen sixties and then went into a rapid decline during the
nineteen seventies. This decline was promoted by a whole range of disparate groups who were
all critical of rehabilitation policies even if quite often for different reasons. But among these
groups there was a growing consensus 'that the state's role in the punishment of offenders
should be more concerned with doing justice rather than doing good' (Carien and Cook, 1989,
p15). The critics from the right, the conservatives, felt that rehabilitation, with its emphasis on
reform rather than punishment, simply let the offender off. They saw the rising crime rates and
the potential collapse of law and order as tangible signs that the liberal soft options had failed.
They called for a return to the justice model, to a system of just deserts where the emphasis
was on 'deterrence, incapacitation and retribution', a situation which could best be achieved by
inflicting harsher punishments on the offenders. Even the liberals, the proponents of the
rehabilitation policies, were now having second thoughts. Not only were they beginning to
question the state's right to impose 'treatment' on its citizens, they were also questioning a
system which in practice appeared to punish offenders for who they were rather than for the
crimes which they had committed. Those on the left also saw a system which, because of its
individualised style of sentencing, discriminated against those groups who were already
marginalised by being either socially or econmically disadvantaged. The sentencers
themselves were also expressing concern. By dealing with those people with limited incomes
and in recognising this, imposing fines at the lower end of the 'financial sentencing tariff, fines
being the magistrates' most common form of punishment, they feared that they were
unwittingly implying that poverty was a license to commit crimes. Lawyers were also critical of
individualised sentencing, [as were many academics], because they saw it as a system which
resulted in a lack of sentencing consistency which ultimately brought the courts into disrepute.
The pragmatists attacked a system which they saw as ineffective, inefficient, subject to
unnecessary delays, clogged up with minor offences, a system which demonstrated
bureaucracy at its worst. As for the practitioners in the system, they were either prevented or
incapable of using discretion in any way. These failings according to some critics had resulted
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in justice and the very legitimacy of government itself becoming discredited. As far as these 
critics were concerned the solution lay in bifurcation, the soft cases which were responsible for 
jamming the system should be filtered away into forms of control outside of the main 
apparatus. Valuable resources could then be targeted 'on the real business of crime control' 
(Cohen, 1985, pp 128-140; Carien and Cook, 1989, pp13-15).
So by the time of the 1979 General Election, the scene was set for the return of a 
government who had set law and order high on its agenda, a government who had promised to 
be 'hard on crime'. This was an era which demanded a return to the justice model, an end to 
individualised sentencing and for constraints to be placed on local discretion. Politically there 
were no benefits to be gained by a government committed to the humanitarian aspects of 
punishment. Those who had mistrusted the state to administer rehabilitation policies were now 
placing total faith in the state to punish justly. But if people were looking for minimal state 
involvement and a policy which allowed the agencies within the system to implement and carry 
out the policies as they saw them, then they were to be disappointed. What the transition to the 
justice model actually did was to create a system where the whims of the administrators were 
exchanged ' for an enormously powerful, simple and centralised system of state control' 
(Christie,1981, p52; Cohen,1985, p137).
But of course it might be argued that all can be forgiven if the end justifies the means. 
But has it? According to Cohen, The whole onslaught on rehabilitation and its supposed 
replacement by the justice model has turned out to be a terrible mistake. .. In practice the 
justice model has turned out to be a masterpiece of unintended consequences. It has been 
totally coopted into right wing law and order politics and its visible success in changing the 
sentencing systems, (making them fixed, mandatory, flat, presumptive etc.), has only led to 
sentences which are longer, harsher and more unjust. In the process, prisons have become 
even more overcrowded and brutal than they were before ..' (Cohen 1985, p246). Cullen and 
Gilbert criticised the attack on discretionary decision making because, '..this was precisely the 
way in which citizens could be protected from the hard edge of the state. When discretion goes, 
so does fairness, compassion and individuation, and in its place comes an abstract machine­
like dispensation of fixed amounts of punishment' (Cullen and Gilbert, 1982 cited in Cohen 
1985, p246).
As a sentencer of long standing, adjudicating on what is generally accepted as being 
a 'soft' Bench, a Bench which, when compared to many others, sends relatively few of its even 
more serious offenders to prison, and a Bench which makes a great deal of use of the 
community penalties which are available to it, and also as a student of the magistrates' courts 
for much of the first half of the nineteen nineties, I find very little in these statements by Cohen 
and Cullen and Gilbert with which to disagree, in fact I would suggest that they are even more 
pertinent today than they were when they were written a decade or more ago.
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5.1.4 The dilemma of funding a punitive justice system while at the same time
trying to reduce the overall costs of the criminal justice system.
When the Conservatives returned to power in 1979 the prison population already 
exceeded 42,000 inmates, and this was a level which would continue to rise. In fact within a 
year it had peaked at just under 45,000 and in the years between 1983 and 1987 would 
continue to increase at an average annual level of 8 per cent. This rise occurred despite 
attempts in the 1982 Criminal Justice Act to restrict the imposition of custodial sentences to 
those offences which were considered to be either very serious, or where there was a need to 
protect the public, or where the offender had failed to respond to previous non-custodial 
sentences. By 1986 it had become obvious that the transition to the justice model, that is 
making the punishment fit the crime, had not only resulted in vastly overcrowded prisons, so 
overcrowded that local police stations and courts were having to use their cells to 
accommodate the overspill of prisoners, but the crime rates were also increasing at an 
alarming rate and the inequalities which had been identified by some as a weakness of the 
rehabilitation model were still very much in evidence. Not only were the government concerned 
about these trends but also by the spiralling costs of keeping these people in prison and the 
financial burden of an ever expanding prison building programme, which by 1988 and with a 
prison population in excess of 50,000, had already cost around £1 billion. It was no 
coincidence, therefore, that in that same year the government put forward proposals which 
would 'stiffen* the community penalties and therefore enable the aims of punishment to be 
achieved by dealing with offenders within the community. Punishments which would allow the 
government to maintain a punitive law and order rhetoric while cutting a costly prison 
population' (Carien and Cook, 1989, p15). But the proposals to make community penalties 
more onerous were not welcomed by all, and among these opponents were the probation 
officers who rejected the notion that punishments should necessarily be designed 'to make the 
offenders life, gratuitously difficult and unpleasant' (NAPO News, October 1988). It might be 
claimed that in the short term the probation officers won their argument, but it might also be 
said that in the longer term they didn't. It is quite possible, that as a result of this type of stand, 
today's government has and is making proposals which if successfully implemented will change 
this 'social worker attitude' of the Probation Service.
This need to reduce the prison population also appeared to be a key theme in the
government's White Paper, 'Crime, Justice and Protecting the Public', which was published in
1990 and which formed the basis for the ill-fated 1991 Criminal Justice Act, although the
government were at pains to stress that a reduction in the prison population was not the central
objective of the Bill. The White Paper explained that the criminal courts in England and Wales
imprison more offenders, and a greater proportion per head of population, than any other
European country. The paper also emphasised that the use of custody should be confined to
serious cases only, and which in any case' ..was in line with declared government policy, which
has been to stress 'bifurcation', dealing with less serious offences within the community
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wherever possible, while imposing custodial sentences on those convicted of more serious 
crimes (Wasik and Taylor 1991, pp 2-3). This was the White Paper which also proposed the 
introduction of Unit Fines into the lower courts, a system whereby offenders were ordered to 
pay a certain proportion of their disposable income rather than a flat rate tariff amount which is 
decided at the discretion of the magistrates. A greater fairness in sentencing was said to be the 
guiding principle behind this move to Unit Fines. These changes when they were implemented 
in the 1991 CJA, while undoubtedly being successful in reducing the prison population, were 
not well received by the members of the judiciary. As Rozenberg observed, 'It was not 
surprising that judges and magistrates resented the loss of their discretion. They would hardly 
welcome artificial restrictions on their ability to send offenders to prison, just as magistrates did 
not want to lose their power to decide how much an offender should be fined’ (Rozenberg 1994, 
p298). The judiciary did rebel, some lay magistrates did resign because of what they saw as an 
erosion of their judicial powers. Such was the scale of the opposition that the government was 
forced to concede and amended certain sections of the Act. The restriction on the number of 
offences which could be considered when deciding sentence was removed, as was the part of 
the Act which prevented the offender's antecedents being taken into consideration when 
arriving at the type and the length of sentence to be imposed. The system of Unit Fines, whilst 
in principle being accepted by many as an important step forward, but in need of some 
adjustment was, quite surprisingly, completely withdrawn from the legislation. These major 
amendments to the Act were made within 9 months of its implementation. Whilst this about 
face may have satisfied the judiciary, it had a devastating effect on the government's prisons 
policy, the prison population increased from 41,000 in the early months of 1993 to more than 
47,000 in the November of that year. It appeared therefore, that the government's attempt at a 
compromise, that is to reduce the excessive use of imprisonment by the judiciary whilst still 
enabling them to be seen to be maintaining their judicial independence had failed. Or had it?
While accepting that the government's aim to reduce the prison population and
therefore the costs within the prison service has been a dismal failure, I would suggest that
there are certain other of their targets within the criminal justice system which have
undoubtedly been achieved. They have succeeded in introducing a system of bifurcation,
designed to keep the lesser offences either out of the 'due process' system altogether,
confining these cases to the lower courts, or else restricting the amount of time that these
courts spend dealing with the 'soft cases' and thereby enabling them to concentrate their
valuable financial resources 'on the real business of crime control’. I would also suggest that
during the years since this government came to power there has been considerable movement
made, admittedly with only partial success, to restrict the powers of the judiciary. As Garland
observed, 'Increasingly, in the 1980's, correctional executives are using sophisticated modelling
procedures which depict the penal process as an input-output system with limited resources ..
Their conclusions about the capacity of the system and resource implications of particular
levels of sentencing, or of specific legislative reforms, are then fed back to the judiciaries and
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state legislatures in an attempt to 'rationalise' judicial or political actions in accordance with 
good systems of management..' (Garland, 1990, p188). The next two sections demonstrate 
how these policies have impinged on the procedures within the study area.
5.1.5 An erosion of the due process?
Not all detected or admitted crimes are dealt with by the magistrates, and when they 
are, the sentencing or decision making powers of the justices can be restricted by the type and 
nature of the offence with which the defendant is charged, charges which even people within 
the criminal justice system would say do not always reflect the gravity of the offences.
Some of the offences which I regularly dealt with when I was first appointed to the 
Bench, and specifically the lesser motoring offences, can now be dealt with on the spot by the 
use of financial and endorsement penalties, the Fixed Penalty system. This is a system which 
was enacted in 1982 and which first came into force in England and Wales in 1986. It was 
extended to speeding and traffic light offences in 1992, and there is still considerable scope for 
its expansion into other areas, for example the continuing and apparently growing problem of 
television license evasion. The police's discretion on whether or not to prosecute on matters 
concerning defective motor vehicles has also been officially endorsed with the introduction of 
the Vehicle Rectification scheme. This scheme has been operational in South Yorkshire since 
1988, and allows the offender a period of time in which to rectify the defect, and providing that 
the offender complies within a specified time scale, then no further action is taken. In more 
recent times it has also been observed by those people who participate in the criminal justice 
system that there has been a significant growth in the police's cautioning policy. This has not 
only been reflected by an increase in the number of cautions, a rise of 37per cent in South 
Yorkshire in 1992, but also in the range of offences to which it is now applied. At the instigation 
of the Home Office, the cautioning policy is no longer reserved for those 'minor offences 
involving young people'.
During the course of my research, the Crown Prosecution Service also came under a 
great deal of criticism for the way in which it applied, or indeed didn't apply, some of its 
charging policies. Initially they were criticised for the large number of cases which they dropped 
before they had completed or even started their route through the courts. In many of these 
instances it was claimed that these were cases 'which the police expected to win'. The second 
criticism aimed at the CPS accused them of 'watering down' some of the charges which they 
brought before the magistrates. They were accused of accepting pleas of guilty to lesser 
offences because it was seen as more cost effective than allowing the matter to proceed to trial 
with all the increased costs which that entails. A further allegation was that, on occasions, they 
tailored the charges in order to prevent the magistrates from sending the cases to the more 
expensive Crown Court. This they achieved by ensuring that the charges laid were of the less 
serious categories and could therefore only be tried summarily in the magistrates' court.
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These were all policies which I have no doubt placed the decision making process for 
these offences firmly with the enforcement agencies and which either avoided completely, or 
else restricted the power of those involved in the judicial decision making process. I would 
further suggest that it explodes the myth that 'Plea bargaining has no place in the English 
criminal justice system'. Some observers of, and participants in, the criminal justice system 
may well argue that these policies are fully justified on the grounds of increased efficiency and 
cost effectiveness. Others with whom I spoke argued that whilst on the majority of occasions 
these decisions do favour the defendant, they quite often have little to do with the dispensing of 
justice. In the opinion of one Justices' Clerk they not only disadvantage the criminal justice 
system they can also succeed in disadvantaging the 'general public'. I have little doubt that 
even the 'notion of due process' is being gradually eroded in the interests of cost effectiveness, 
or to be more precise the imposition on the various criminal justice agencies of performance 
indicators and cash limiting.
5.1.6 The tightening of the leash on local discretion.
It is almost twenty years since Baldwin and Bottomley called for the powers of the 
magistrates to be subjected to a greater level of scrutiny and suggested that they should be 
made to explain their powers and the extent of their discretion at all stages of the process. 
Three years ago we were being told that an increasing number of magistrates were resigning 
from the magistracy because of restraints which were being placed on their traditional 
sentencing powers, restrictions which they saw as obstacles to carrying out their duties, that is 
the dispensing of justice. So to what extent have the demands of Baldwin and Bottomley been 
met?
When I was appointed to the magistracy in the mid nineteen seventies, all that the
magistrates needed on entering the courtroom was the court list for that day. This list contained
all the basic information which they needed to carry out their magisterial duties. It told them
who the defendants were, what the offence(s) was that each defendant was charged with and
what the maximum penalties were for each of the offences. Any other information concerning
the offence or the offender would be revealed during the course of the hearings. I would claim
that it is not an over simplification to say that the sentencing powers of the magistrates were
only restricted by the maximum sentences which were stipulated by statute, the sentencing
practices developed within each particular local Bench, and the combined views and discretion
of the three magistrates who were adjudicating. The sentencing options, in retrospect, seemed
to be somewhat restricted, for example, community service was only in its infancy and
probation was seen not so much as a punishment but more as a way of providing support and
assistance to the offender. So if the magistrates wanted to send the defendant to prison and if
that offence carried a custodial sentence then they did, on the spot, and without the need for
explanation. They did not consider that there was a requirement to consult with any other
agency when arriving at that decision. If they decided a fine was appropriate then they fined,
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the level of the fine being set primarily to reflect the seriousness of the offence, the defendants 
means always appeared to me as being of secondary importance.
Attempts to achieve a greater consistency of sentencing started in the early nineteen 
eighties. In 1981 the South Yorkshire Sentencing Liaison Committee, which had been set up at 
the expressed desire of The Magistrates' Association, issued a set of sentencing guidelines. In 
1989 The Magistrates' Association published its first set of national sentencing guidelines. 
During this period a greater emphasis was also put on the fact that when imposing financial 
penalties the court must consider the means of the individual offender, and local conditions'. 
As I have already stated legislation, and particularly the 1982 and 1991 Criminal Justice Acts, 
contained sections which had been specifically designed to severely restrict the 'discretionary 
powers' of the sentencers. The 1982 Act laid the ground rules which needed to be satisfied 
before a custodial sentence could be imposed. The 1991 Act not only placed further constraints 
on sentencers who were considering custodial sentences, including the obligatory requirement 
for a pre-sentence report to be obtained before a custodial sentence could be imposed, but also 
introduced the system of Unit Fines, which was to be used when imposing financial penalties. 
However the major constraints imposed by the 1991 Act were removed either in part or in full 
by the Criminal Justice Acts of 1993 and 1994.
When the lay magistrates in the study area walk into the courtroom today, they take 
with them their own personal copy of the Bench Handbook, and it is essential that they do 
because without it they would find life in the courtroom very difficult, in fact the bench chairmen 
might even find it impossible to fulfil the requirements of their role. The handbook contains 
detailed information, including flowcharts, explaining the various 'steps' which need to be taken 
as part of the sentencing process. Having decided the type of sentence that is appropriate, the 
magistrates are then supplied with the 'suggested entry points' for some forty two non-motoring 
offences, which range from such offences as grievous bodily harm to depositing litter, and fifty 
three motoring offences which include offences as diverse as driving whilst disqualified, 
overloading a vehicle and walking on the motorway. These entry points indicate the penalties 
which are considered appropriate for an offence of 'average seriousness'. A number of 
features which might aggravate or mitigate the offence are then listed for the sentencers 
consideration. The sentencers are then told that it is normal practice to allow a reduction in the 
sentence for an early guilty plea. If the sentencers have decided that a financial penalty is 
appropriate, they are then instructed that they must take the offender’s means into 
consideration and if these are 'below average means’, the fine imposed should be reduced to a 
level *which the offender can realistically be expected to pay'. If they are considering either a 
community or a custodial sentence they are then reminded that they 'ought normally to be in 
possession of a pre-sentence report' before actually proceeding to sentence. They are left in no 
doubt that they can only impose a custodial sentence if the offence is 'so serious that no other 
sentence is justified' and that community sentences should be used only for those offences 
which are considered 'serious enough'.
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Having finally arrived at their decision, the bench chairman is then asked to explain 
that decision and the reasons for it in open court. The Bench Handbook also contains a list of 
thirty three different pronouncements which are appropriate to the Adult courts and cover the 
whole range of decision making and sentencing options. The information includes the 
requirements upon which the pronouncement is constructed and a 'sample form of words' which 
should be used when announcing it. In a preface written by The Magistrates' Association, the 
sentencers are told, 'Skill in making pronouncements is a competence court chairman are 
expected to achieve'. At the same time they are warned that, 'Some pronouncements are 
complex to construct and deliver and not without legal pitfalls'. I have little doubt that many of 
these elements have been introduced into the system in order to assist the magistrates to 
arrive at 'more just' decisions and to achieve greater levels of consistency in their sentencing. 
But my observations and experience also tell me that the end result is not always that which 
was intended. Certain elements, i.e., 'structured decision making', tend to be used very 
sparingly by magistrates, while others, for example, the sentencing guidelines' and particularly 
the entry points for financial penalties, often appear to be applied slavishly and without much 
consideration to other related parameters. While this method does provide a fair level of 
consistency and similar sentences for similar types of offences, I am of the opinion that this 
type of 'consistency in sentencing’ does not necessarily equate to justice for the individual.
In 1978, the year before the Conservative party were voted back into power, Baldwin 
and Bottomley called for the magistrates' power and discretion to be subjected to a greater 
measure of control. In the intervening years I have no doubt that some important steps have 
been taken in this direction, and rightly so. As a practitioner I cannot say that I yearn for the 
'good old days'. However I am also certain that there are also occasions when the sentencers, 
in complying with all the do's and don't's, the musts and the maybes, the cans and the can'ts, 
become a little confused as to whether they are dispensing justice or trying to build a 'self- 
assembly wardrobe', and sometimes with the same frustrating results. But whatever actions 
have been taken, in the opinion of some, they still fall well short of what is actually required. 
Speaking in the House of Commons, the Shadow Home Secretary, Jack Straw said, "Lack of 
consistency and progression in sentencing plays far too great a role at present .. How can 
anyone explain to the public that the chance of receiving a custodial sentence can vary from 
one case in six in [one specified area] to one in sixty six in [another specified area] .. The 
current sentencing system makes a farce and mockery of the courts (House of Commons, 
April 3 1996).
5.1.7 The power of the decision makers - The view from the inside.
Despite the introduction of these constraints, there still appeared to be little doubt in
the minds of the people who participated in my research project that the decision makers in the
magistrates' courts system are the magistrates themselves. They are seen to wield a great deal
of power, power which is not necessarily restricted just to the decision making process. They
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are also seen by many of the court users as possessing considerable inter-personal power. As 
we saw in the earlier chapters one of the professional practitioners saw them as being 
'untouchable', a description which I would describe as somewhat exaggerated, but one which 
does tend to demonstrate the power which the magistrates are seen to hold at the local level. It 
is obviously a power which the professionals, especially the advocates and the probation 
officers, hesitate to challenge and which makes retaining credibility with the Bench such an 
important part of everyday court life. It is a power which the defendant would also be foolhardy 
to challenge.
But it is in the judicial decision making process where the magistrates are really seen 
as the people with the power. As one of the participants spelled it out, probation officers make 
proposals, advocates present the facts and put forward mitigation, the court clerks give advice, 
but at the end of all this it is the magistrates who make the decisions, the other people are only 
there to provide information. Whilst I would suggest that this is something of an 
oversimplification of what happens in reality, it is a fact that it is the magistrates 'who get the 
last word' whatever anybody says to them. There is no doubt that they have the power because 
they have the power to impose a sentence on the defendant, and ultimately they do have the 
power to send someone to prison.
5.1.8 Magistrates may have the power but influence also plavs a major part in the 
decision making process.
But if the magistrates have the power there is also little doubt that there are other 
participants within the local court structure who exert a great deal of influence on them, and this 
applies in particular to the lay justices. From my research I concluded that the people at the top 
of this list were the court clerks and in particular the Justices' Clerk. No one tried to conceal the 
fact that the clerks have a 'massive potential' to influence the magistrates in the decision 
making process. In the words of one very senior clerk, "I know clerks who have and probably 
still do”. But what appears to be a matter for concern among some of the court users with 
whom I spoke, is the ulterior way in which this influence is used. Whilst much of what happens 
can be seen, although not always heard, taking place in the front stage area of the courtroom, 
some disquiet, even suspicion was expressed about that part of the process which involves the 
magistrates and their clerks and takes place in the 'behind the scenes area', the Magistrates' 
Retiring room, or as it was described in an earlier chapter, 'behind closed doors'.
The court clerks themselves agreed that it is almost inevitable that they will influence
the lay benches, and on occasions even the 'stipes', through the simple act of carrying out their
basic role, that of giving advice to the magistrates. But they also conceded that their influence
can sometimes extend beyond this, lay benches are on occasions, directly challenged by their
clerks about the factors which they have considered in reaching a decision. Neither is it only
the questions which are asked which can bring about a rethink, it is often the way in which
some of the questions are phrased. As we have already seen a court clerk's disapproval can
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also be conveyed by either a poorly disguised facial expression or by some other form of body 
language. The clerks with whom I spoke claimed that the failure to conceal their disapproval in 
this way was unintentional, however, observation and experience did not necessarily convince 
me that this was always the case. What I am convinced of is that the clerks do exert a 
considerable influence on the magistrates in the decision making process and, whether the 
clerk's contribution is verbal or non-verbal, intentional or otherwise, many are the times that the 
sentencers have felt the need to either reassess the direction of their deliberations or on 
occasions to totally rethink their original decision because of the input of the clerk.
Next we consider the influence of the advocates. I was informed by one solicitor of 
considerable experience that "Advocacy is all about the power of persuasion". But it still begs 
the question, 'How persuasive are the advocates in the decision making process in the 
magistrates' courts'? A great deal has been written in the earlier chapters about 'the importance 
of credibility', a tool by which some advocates may seek favour with the magistrates or 
alternatively a method which can be used 'to pull the wool over the eyes' of the lay magistrate. I 
was even told how essential it is commercially for the advocate to obtain and retain the 
confidence of the magistrates. The greater the success an advocate achieves in the courtroom, 
the greater the number of clients who seek his or her representation and the more 
commercially successful that business is.
From my own observations I have concluded that the greatest influence which the 
advocate exerts is not necessarily contained in what is obvious to the sentencers, or even what 
happens in the courtroom, there are more covert ways in which influence can be imposed on 
the court and without the bench necessarily being aware that it is being influenced. I agree with 
the view of Carson, that the advocate as the questioner can also act in the role of the censor 
and can, in many instances, be the determining factor in what the court hears, or more 
importantly what it doesn't hear. We have also seen how the prosecutor, sometimes in alliance 
with the defence advocate, determines the actual charges which are brought before the court 
and thereby determines the types of sentence which can be imposed. Additionally they can also 
restrict the options of where a case can be heard, in some instances effectively depriving the 
defendant of his or her right to jury trial. My own experience as a practitioner and an observer 
has also convinced me that the advocates have not only the means to influence the 
magistrates, but they also have the means and the skills, which they use, to manipulate the 
magistrates.
The probation officers with whom I spoke, saw themselves as the 'least powerful' of
the professional court users in the magistrates' courts system. They consider that they are
marginalised by the other professional groups, treated with suspicion and even ignored on
occasions. They claim that they are excluded from the 'arena of power and influence' which
they see as being generally dominated by the 'professional lawyer network', that is the
advocates and the court clerks. After talking to the other groups within the courts, I could well
understand why the probation officers had arrived at the conclusions they had. Magistrates
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were concerned because they saw an emphasis within the Probation Service which they 
associated more with the 'social worker* role of the officers, a role which was sometimes seen 
to be in conflict with their responsibilities as officers of the court, a concern which has also 
found its way on to the Home Office agenda with the recent questioning about the need for 
probation officers to hold a social work qualification, the DipSW. The Probation Service's 
undisguised opposition to the custodial sentence is also seen as part of their propensity for the 
'soft option'. Other groups within the criminal justice system described the probation officers as 
being 'ideologically motivated, 'well meaning', 'do gooders', 'naive' or just plain 'gullible'.
However I would suggest that if we accept this perception of the probation officer as 
being accurate, then we could well be deluding ourselves. It also has to be remembered that 
the probation officer is the author of the pre-sentence report, and that the PSR, or the social 
inquiry report as it used to be called, was the document which Parker found to be the most 
frequently mentioned influence on sentencing in all of the courts included in the study (Parker 
et al, 1989, p 87). In my study area the pre-sentence report was viewed in a number of ways. 
Some considered that it was an important aid to sentencing, others saw it as an attempt by the 
Probation Service to usurp the bench's prerogative on sentencing. As we have seen some saw 
the document as being influential while others expressed strong reservations about how much 
notice is really taken by magistrates of the recommendations which are contained in these 
reports. Others criticised the reports because they lacked balance, or else there was a need to 
disentangle the reports for 'political attitudes and correctness'. Despite all these reservations, 
statistics for the study court show that there is a high level of concordance by magistrates with 
the recommendations which are put forward for their consideration, in fact almost two out of 
every three of the recommendations contained in pre-sentence reports are accepted and 
imposed by the sentencers. Considering that pre-sentence reports are only requested for those 
offences which are towards the top end of the magistrates' sentencing tariff, I would suggest 
that through the PSR the probation officer exerts a great deal of influence on the decision 
making process and particularly on the sentencing decisions for the more serious offences 
which are dealt with to their conclusion in the magistrates'courts.
5.1.9 Do lav magistrates have 'the capacity to deliver justice in the modern age*?
It now appears that the judicial process has become so complex and riddled with
'legal pitfalls' that the lay magistrates need a 'guide book to lead them through each step of the
decision making process, 'guidelines’ to enable them to achieve a reasonable level of
consistency in their sentencing, 'prompt cards' to ensure that they do not mess up their lines
when addressing the court and the defendants and a legal adviser to prevent them from 'getting
it wrong in public'. Coupled with this are the claims of certain of the court professionals,
particularly some advocates and court clerks, that the lay magistracy is getting out of its depth
and no longer has the capacity to deliver justice in the modem age (Raine and Willson, 1993a,
p46). If this is the case, is there not a very strong argument for having a total review of the
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'ancient and honourable' office of the lay magistrate, a system of justice which has been in 
existence for about 700 years? There are those who would argue that now is the time, not only 
to supplement the magistrates' court system with full time, legally qualified and trained, 
professional magistrates, but to completely replace the lay magistracy with professional 
magistrates. 'If we were starting again from scratch there is little chance that anybody would 
design a system in which nine out of ten cases were tried by unpaid, unqualified people’ 
(Rozenberg 1994, p275).
At the local level, as we have already seen, the lay magistrates were seen by the 
professional court users as possessing various levels of ability, their decision making was 
described as 'unpredictable'. When comparing the courts in which the professional magistrate 
presided with those in which the lay magistrates adjudicated I also found that there were 
considerable areas of agreement among those with whom I spoke. Generally the stipendiary 
magistrates were seen as being more professional, more efficient with their use of court time 
and in the way that they disposed of their workloads. They are seen, not surprisingly, as being 
better at dealing with those cases which involve complicated legal argument. The courts over 
which the 'stipes' presided were described as being much 'sharper1, they were even described 
by one advocate as 'daunting'. There is no doubt that the professional magistrates demand a 
higher level of preparation by the court professionals and the 'stipes' were also considered to 
be better communicators than are the majority of their lay magistrate colleagues. Their 
sentencing policies were considered to be generally harsher. This professionalism which the 
stipendiaries display had also evidently impressed a young man with whom I had a short 
discussion, having previously appeared at court on two occasions before the lay magistrates, 
he then told me that on the third occasion he appeared before a 'real judge', the stipendiary 
magistrate.
It would therefore appear that on the surface there is a prima facie case for supporting
a change to a fully professional magistracy. But could it prove to be too expensive to finance?
Some argue that it would, while others argue that it might also be difficult to find enough
lawyers to do the work. I have not carried out a detailed study of the relative costs of the two
systems, but I would suggest that many of the increased costs of a fully professional
magistracy could well be off-set by the savings which could also be made. I submit the
following thoughts for consideration in the debate. The first point is that 30,000 lay magistrates
sitting in benches of three and attending at court for approximately 35 sittings each year could
conceivably be replaced by approximately 1000 stipendiary magistrates sitting as individuals in
up to ten courts each week, (a sitting being seen as a half-day). There appears to be little doubt
that with the improved throughput of workload which would be achieved by a move to an ail
professional magistracy, the number of court sittings would be quite considerably reduced from
what is now seen as the current norm. One might not unreasonably expect that these improved
efficiencies would result in cost reductions, these could come from a rationalisation of
resources and even from the possible closure and sale of some of those courthouses in areas
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where even now they are not fully utilised. It might also be argued that the increases in the 
salary bill could be largely offset by a number of different factors, initially there are the 
magistrates' subsistence allowances and other expenses. There would be a massive reduction 
in the costs which are currently incurred in the training of magistrates, an expense which 
continues to increase in order to enable the lay magistrates to cope with the frequent and often 
complex changes to the legislation. In addition there are also all of the administrative costs 
which are required to support and keep informed the current 'large army' of lay magistrates. I 
would also suggest that the change to a fully professional and legally qualified magistracy 
would make obsolete the need for the legally qualified and trained 'legal advisers', the court 
clerks. This role could arguably be 'de-skilled' to that of an 'administrative clerk', and with the 
relevant reduction in the salary bill. I have no doubt that many of these suggestions will pose a 
great many logistical, organisational and administrative problems, but I would still submit that 
they are worthy of further study and consideration. And neither does everyone accept that even 
in its present format that magistrates' justice is necessarily cheap. Parker expressed the 
opinion that, ' While magistrates’ justice is arguably cheap to administer, the end result is 
expensive. Nor is the price inflation-proofed. It is rising continuously and, in our opinion 
unnecessarily' (Parker et al, 1989, p172). Of course what Parker was specifically referring to 
was the fact that local discretion is too often used in a punitive way, a policy which can and 
does result in penal crises. However my own research suggests that in the study area at least, 
the change to a professional magistracy is not necessarily a guaranteed way of reducing the 
prison population.
But of course every debate must have two sides, and the lay magistrate - stipendiary 
magistrate debate is no exception. During the course of my research I also heard the lay 
magistrate described as 'a positive good', as the 'generalist with a non-invested interest' who 
introduces 'a whole dose of common sense' to the judicial system as it operates in the 
magistrates' courts. It is also said that they can bring an additional perception to the 
proceedings which is sometimes lacking in those professionals who attend at court daily and 
see their role very much as just a job and who 'can become cut off from everyday people'. 
There are others who argue that verdicts depend on facts as well as law and there are many 
who still believe that magistrates are more accurate fact diviners than are lawyers (Jackson, 
1993 pp148-149). Others criticised the stipendiaries for being too preoccupied with the speed 
with which they deal with their workloads, even to the extent of giving the impression on 
occasions, that they have reached their decisions before all the facts or mitigation have 
actually been placed before them. I also heard other comments which gave me cause for 
concern such as, "You know what a stipendiary likes to hear, what he likes to be told". This type 
of comment can so easily be interpreted as suggesting that if there was a totally professional 
magistracy, then the submissions and reports might well be tailored to reflect the requirements 
of the tribunal rather than addressing all of the aspects which may need to be considered 
during the hearing.
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I have no doubts at all that an all professional magistracy would be more efficient. But 
of course no decision can be made without first considering the underpinning principle of the 
whole system, the 'right to judgement by one's peers', although I would suggest that even this 
basic concept has been blurred by the mists of time. But despite this, what is still important at 
the end of the day is how the defendant sees it. As one lay magistrate explained it, "I think from 
the defendant's point of view, they don't necessarily want to see a professional and efficient 
court as long as they feel they're getting justice .. the person in the chair might not be as 
articulate, but he's talking the same language as the people who are standing in front of him". 
One could argue that this sentiment alone, expressed in the support of local justice, is sufficient 
reason for retaining the current system of lay magistrates. But of course in preserving the lay 
magistracy and their application of 'common sense and local knowledge', there is also a very 
real danger that you must also retain 'local discretion’ in decision making and a 'lack of 
consistency in sentencing'. Is this an acceptable price to pay?
5.2 JUSTICE AND EFFICIENCY.
5.2.1 In the age of high efficiency and low costs? It appears that due process is 
considered to be both inefficient and too expensive.
On combining my duties as a magistrate with my role as a manager in industry, I 
found that one of my first and enduring impressions of the magistrates' courts was the apparent 
level of inefficiency which pervaded these courts. This was demonstrated in particular by the 
the under-utilisation of both resources and time and the failure to regularly achieve what I 
would have considered to be a reasonable level of progress. I overcame my frustrations about 
these matters by regularly reminding myself that this was a court of law, it was not a production 
line, we were not manufacturing 'widgets', neither were we concerned with operating at a profit. 
What we were dealing with was people, we were concerned with making decisions, some of 
which could seriously affect the lives of those people, we were there to dispense justice, and 
justice, so I had been told, 'should not only be done, but should manifestly be seen to be done'. 
Therefore the prime aim of my role as a magistrate, as I saw it, was to arrive at a just decision, 
the time taken to arrive at that decision, I argued, was of secondary importance.
Therefore as a researcher, i was somewhat taken aback, and even a little
disappointed, when I read some of the criticisms of my 'predecessors’ who, in the late nineteen-
seventies and early eighties, had described the system in the magistrates' courts as more to do
with economic than with legal considerations and that the system too often sacrificed individual
needs to those of bureaucratic efficiency (Baldwin and McConville, 1977; McBamet, 1981). My
research among the regular court users in the study area also indicated that my own 'cosy' view
of the situation was not widely shared, especially among the the probation officers and the
defence advocates whom I interviewed. Despite my view to the contrary, some of the people
whom I interviewed did compare the procedures in the courtroom with a 'factory production
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line'. I was told of the increasing pressures to restrict the number and the lengths of 
adjournments, pressure to proceed on the day irrespective of whether the relevant persons had 
been presented with the appropriate information to which they were entitled or indeed whether 
they had been allowed the time to be adequately prepared. There was often an impression that, 
on occasions, the court appeared to proceed almost in spite of the defendant and that this 
preoccupation with speed and efficiency is often satisfied at the expense of appropriate and 
meaningful communication. A number of my respondents had little doubt that this drive for 
improved efficiency in the courts had far more to do with reducing costs than it had with 
dispensing justice, a policy which was firmly placed at the door of central government.
My views about the inefficiencies within the magistrates’ courts were, however, 
shared by other members of the judiciary and in particular by the Magistrates' Association, but 
my reasoning that a degree of inefficiency was acceptable in the interests of justice did not 
appear to be so readily accepted. Through the pages of the Association's journal, The 
Magistrate, they and their contributors, criticised both the procedures and particularly those 
magistrates who contributed to the delays. As we have already seen in some detail, certain 
aspects of the administration in the courts were described as 'little short of scandalous', many 
delays were said to be unacceptable, the costs incurred were seen as being excessive and in 
order to gain control of the situation the magistrates were urged to take command. They were 
told that rather than safeguarding justice by always conceding to requests for adjournments 
they could in fact be creating a situation where justice could actually be adversely affected. The 
maxim often used in these arguments being that 'Justice delayed is justice denied'. I do not 
know how successful! this campaign has been country wide, my view is that within the study 
area little has changed, and the problem of the number and length of adjournments remains 
high on the court administrators' agenda. But now there has been a change of emphasis, 
instead of appealing to the decision makers to control the granting of adjournments, the 
strategy is now to obtain inter-agency agreement on what constitutes an acceptable length of 
adjournment for each specific type of application. If successful, and the signs are that it will be, 
this strategy will in reality take the decision away from the magistrates, who will simply be 
presented with a fait accompli by the parties who will in effect be presenting an 'agreed' 
application, an application in which the time scales will also have been approved in principle by 
the court administrators.
Another recent initiative in the study area has been to change the format of the Pre­
trial Review courts. These, as a general rule, will no longer be conducted before a bench of 
magistrates t)ut tjefore a ^senior >GGurt clerk who will have been delegated the appropriate 
administrative powers. While these court clerks are not empowered to usurp the judicial 
functions of the magistrates, they will ' conduct PTR hearings, question and challenge 
advocates in a way that is not possible in the presence of members of the judiciary’. This move 
has been welcomed by the local magistrates who 'perceived themselves and are perceived by
others as being 'rubber stamps' in the PTR courts' (Briefing Paper No 3, September, 1995). But
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one is bound to ask whether this is a further erosion of the due process and if it is indeed in the 
interests of justice and the defendant? Commenting on the PTR system, Saunders and Young 
expressed the view that it is a system which encourages plea bargaining and while, 'From a 
crime control perspective, it is possible to argue that prosecution and defence lawyers are 
simply acting in a realistic and pragmatic fashion and doing the public a service in helping to 
maintain a high rate of conviction at relatively low cost .. From a due process point of view, 
however, one might argue that it is incumbent on defence lawyers to take seriously such ideals 
as the presumption of innocence and the right of silence. These are important protections .. 
against the entrenchment of practices that encourage the state to exercise prosecutional power 
in an unconstrained manner. Any form of pre-trial bargaining aimed at short circuiting the court 
process results in an undermining of these protections' (Saunders and Young.1994, p280).
What was not in doubt in the minds of almost all of the people with whom I spoke is 
the fact that the administrators, not only in the magistrates' courts, but also in the other criminal 
justice agencies are under considerable pressure to manage the funds and resources which 
they are allocated more efficiently. Some would even claim that cost effectiveness and the 
saving of money has now taken precedence over all other matters. Even the Lord Chief Justice 
was moved to comment that, "If you walk into a Crown Court, you are as likely to meet a 
management consultant as a Judge" (The Lord Chief Justice, Lord Taylor of Gosforth, March 6 
1996). Others claim that there has been '.. constant pressure to move legal cases down the 
system, to have them heard in the cheapest available way and with as few lawyers involved as 
possible’ (Rozenberg 1994, p123). Claims which the findings of my own research would largely 
support, particularly in respect of the first part of the statement. I have also little doubt that 
some court procedures have been streamlined and in many instances have resulted in the 
greater level of administrative efficiency which they were implemented to achieve. But the 
important question is whether in achieving this level of efficiency, some of the safeguards 
which were designed into the due process model to protect the rights of the individual are being 
eroded and will continue to be while ever the due process is considered by the policy makers to 
be 'too expensive, too inefficient and too ineffective' (Jones,1993, p200).
I have no doubts that the magistrates' courts, along with the other agencies in the 
criminal justice system, are being increasingly subjected to performance indicators and to cash 
limiting. I also agree that when justice does become cash limited then there is a great danger 
that it will not be justice anymore. As one of my respondents said, "You can't just cheapen the 
cost of the criminal justice system without looking at the quality of it".
5.3 ORGANISATION AND DEGRADATION.
5.3.1 The criminal trial, a 'barbarous ceremony*.
'Courtroom ceremony is characteristically organised to degrade and humiliate the
delinquent involved. Such personal degradation is not some accidental or peripheral quality of
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the courtroom scene, but often an inevitable consequence of the court event' (Emerson, 1969, 
p174). Emerson, and other researchers who have studied interaction in the courtroom, have 
widely cited the theories of En/ing Goffman in support of some of their conclusions that the 
organisation and many of the procedures which are employed within the courtrooms are in fact 
the basic elements of a degradation ceremony.
Goffman portrays people in a 'natural setting' as being very much in control of their 
behaviour, and acting, within limits, under their own direction. Whilst there is a requirement to 
recognise the 'definition of the situation', they are in a position where they can, to a large 
degree, control and influence the impression which others gain about them. An important factor 
in the way in which people present the 'self to others, is the control of information, both verbal 
and non-verbal, which is transmitted by the sender. This control enables the individual to 
ensure that the audience do not 'acquire destructive information about the situation which is 
being defined for them’ (Goffman, 1959, p141). Interaction in these settings also allows for the 
employment of 'corrective practices', both defensive and protective, which when invoked can 
protect the participants from embarrassment and humiliation. This is achieved by the 
participants cooperating to protect both the encounter and the claims advanced by the other, 
and therefore compensating for any discrediting occurrences that have not been successfully 
avoided (Goffman, 1959, p24).
But the courtroom was not seen by Goffman as a 'natural setting', to the contrary he 
describes the criminal trial as a 'barbarous ceremony' which is expressly designed to prevent 
the mark, [the defendant], from saving his face' (Goffman, 1952, cited in Rose (ed) 1962, 
p503). The defendant in the courtroom is not allowed to control the way that the 'self is 
presented. The ceremonial rules of the court demand that the defendant adopts a 'deferential 
and remorseful attitude', a state which emphasizes the defendant's subordinate position 
(Goffman, 1967, p497). In his opinion the court ceremony generally attempts to 'shake up' the 
delinquent, denying access to those face saving and role distancing devices which can often be 
utilised to stave off degradation (Goffman 1952, cited in Emerson1969, p210). Rather than 
employing those 'corrective practices' which protect the individual from embarrassment, the 
courtroom procedures, and particularly its powers of interrogation, can be claimed to encourage 
those inquiring into the facts and circumstances of the case to breach the 'nomal rules' of 
interaction by allowing them, in open court, to probe into intimate, embarrassing and 
humiliating areas of the defendant’s life (Emerson, 1969, p202). Court hearings are therefore 
conducted on the basis of transformation rules', which allow officials to act in ways that 
constitute clear violations of the appropriate rules of behaviour (Goffman,1961, cited in 
Emerson1969, p202).
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5.3.2 Courtroom procedures are fundamentally disrespectful. Or are they?
As we have already seen, the major criticisms which have been directed at the 
criminal courts by a number of eminent researchers focus on the way they are organised and 
the way in which the defendants are treated. For example, we are told that criminal trials are 
intrinsically structured to isolate and degrade accused criminals' (Emerson, 1969, p215), or 
that the process is no more than 'the ceremonial stripping of a man of his dignity' (Garfinkel, 
1956, pp 420-4). Carien argues that the strategy of magistrates' justice in itself infuses the 
proceedings with a surreality 'which atrophies the defendant's ability to participate in them'. She 
compares the proceedings in the courtroom with a game, a game in which the defendant 
stands as the 'dummy player1, powerless to do anything other than absorb the gains and losses 
of all the other players in the game (Carien, 1976, pp18-42). Researchers have variously 
described the defendant as baffled, bullied, thwarted, misunderstood, coerced, oppressed and 
manipulated (Atkinson and Drew, 1979, p11). Even in more recent times we find that the 
criminal justice system is still under attack as being 'fundamentally disrespectful' (Zehr, The 
Magistrate, April 1992, p53). If these criticisms are accepted as a true reflection of actuality, 
then it is also true to say that what happens in the courtroom has little to do with either the 
propriety of legal procedures or with the abstract ideals of justice.
That problems do exist is also readily accepted by those who operate within the
system. How these problems can be overcome appears to be more difficult to determine. I
have already written in some detail about the efforts which are being made in order to improve
the quality of service to those who use the courts by those who administer them. Court
Charters, Quality of Service surveys, monitoring and inspections by the Magistrates' Courts'
Service Inspectorate being just a few examples. Neither have I any doubts that in many areas
a great deal of effort is also ongoing to improve the physical environment. The new courthouse
in the study area itself is an outstanding example of replacing a traditional, outdated and totally
inadequate and squalid building with a new, ’state-of-the-art’ building, with its excellent
facilities, a building which was obviously designed with all of the users in mind, the non-
professional occasional attenders as well as the regular professional court users. But as one
senior court official conceded, "Whether or not it has resulted in a better standard of justice
being dispensed it is impossible to judge". And when all is said and done, the final acts in the
judicial process do not take place in the reception and waiting areas in the presence of the
court's administrative staff, but in the courtroom in front of the magistrates, court clerks,
advocates and the representatives of other agencies involved in the criminal justice system.
But neither has this area been neglected. Both the magistrates and their clerks have been
urged in their more recent training to demonstrate both 'patience and courtesy' to all court
users. Magistrates, and specifically the court chairmen, have been reminded that every person
whatever he or she has done 'deserves to be treated with the dignity that is due to him [or her]
as a person' (Young and Clark, 1980, p22). As has already been stated, the competences,
which are now an essential part of the training and appraisal of the court chairmen, lay great
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emphasis on the skills of dealing with people. Showing courtesy, demonstrating an unbiased 
approach, addressing the defendant in the appropriate manner, showing an appropriate 
concern for distressed parties and witnesses, and ensuring that all who are in the courtroom 
understand what is happening, all form part of this new competence based approach. Of course 
there are those who would argue that all of this is superficial and does very little to address the 
real inequalities within the system. Yet again there are those who claim that the changes which 
have already occurred have gone too far.
One criticism which has been made is that the 'obsession with fairness to the 
accused' has been at the expense of either the victim or the witness (Ronald Hatfield, Chief 
Constable of West Midlands; Daily Telegraph, Feb.19 1993), others claim that it is even at the 
expense of society as a whole. Others, and particularly those magistrates who felt the need to 
resign in protest and frustration after the introduction of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act, 
considered that the liberalisation of the courts and the erosion of the justices' sentencing 
powers were detrimental to the process of justice. One expressed the view that".. the law has 
become too soft and lenient.. they, [the defendants!, are laughing at the legal system” (Daily 
Telegraph, Feb. 24 1993). Another was of the opinion that, "They, [the defendants], see the 
whole court with its army of officials, probation officers, lawyers and voluntary staff as being 
there to help and guide them. They feel heroes in that situation". This magistrate even posed 
the question whether the prime concern of the courts is now to punish or whether it is to 
"..understand the offender and remove any stigma or blame for his behaviour" (Daily 
Telegraph, Feb. 15 1993).
When delivering the annual Lord Denning lecture, the Attorney General, Sir Nicholas 
Lyall Q.C., called for reforms to the criminal justice system in order to achieve a fairer and 
more effective balance between the interests of society and those of the defendants. He 
stressed that the goal of the system should be truth and justice, but somehow, "It had become 
an over-formalised game in which frustrated players were often tempted to break the rules. We 
should try to achieve a system which is rather less of a game and more a search for the truth" 
(Daily Telegraph, March 24,1994).
5.3.3 Is there a better wav? The need to review procedures. The local view.
The people in the study area with whom I discussed some of the criticisms, were in 
general agreement on quite a large number of the issues. But it should be remembered that 
these are all people who work within the criminal justice system and in the magistrates' courts. 
There was from the outset a total consensus on the need for rules. There were strong views 
that rules are required to emphasise the solemnity and the seriousness of the occasion and to 
uphold the dignity of the court. Rules are also required in order to safeguard both the authority 
of the law and the authority of those who have been invested with the task of administering it. If 
there were no rules it was generally agreed that certain people would quickly take advantage of
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the situation and the courts would find it difficult, if not impossible, to carry out their task of 
getting to the truth of the matters which they were being asked to consider.
Contrary to the views of many researchers, there was also a fair level of agreement 
that the courtroom procedures in themselves are not designed to degrade and humiliate the 
defendants, although one probation officer did compare the occasion with the parading of the 
beast at a cattle-market. However it was accepted that too often the procedures are applied in 
an unsympathetic manner which can result in the embarrassment and the humiliation of the 
defendants, and indeed other people who attend at the courts. This act of demeaning was 
condemned on a number of grounds. It was seen as a relic of past traditions which no longer 
had a place in the justice system, it was considered to be an abuse of power by those who had 
been invested with authority, and it was also seen as being counter productive to the aims and 
ideals of justice as well as a practice which may well breed resentment against the courts and 
the rule of law in society as a whole.
It was agreed by the majority with whom I spoke that there is a need for the courts to
review some of their practices in an attempt to liberalise the procedures and to bring them
more in line with the requirements of the modem age. The language, for example, was a
source of constant confusion for many and the forms of address used by the court
professionals came in for particular criticism, it was considered by some to be archaic and to be
totally inappropriate for today's requirements, although this was not a view which was
necessarily shared by the advocates in the study. It was, however, agreed by all that any
changes should not be allowed to diminish the respect and recognition of authority which is
currently demonstrated in the courts. A number of the suggestions which were put forward did
appear to reflect the perspectives and the involvement of those making the suggestion. For
example, some of the probation officers were in favour of more informal courts with all of the
participants seated round a table and the defendants being addressed by their first names, but
others were less certain. The court clerks and some magistrates felt that an informal court left
them vulnerable to possibility of physical abuse. Others considered that the use of first names
when addressing defendants only succeeded in detracting from the seriousness of the
occasion, although almost everyone agreed that all defendants should be addressed using their
appropriate titles. Other areas of agreement included the fact that all defendants, without
exception, should be accorded the presumption of innocence, until it has been determined
otherwise. This may seem like stating the obvious, but in the opinion of some it is not always
applied. It was also suggested that there is a need for the courts to recognise that there is no
such thing as a stereotype defendant, and there is sometimes a need for the court to identify
any difficulties which the defendant may have, for example, social problems, educational
difficulties, physical disabilities, and where possible adapt the needs of the court to that
defendant rather than expecting the defendant to adapt to the procedures of the court, which he
or she may find very difficult. Magistrates also need to be able to differentiate between those
defendants who are being intentionally disrespectful to the courts from those who aren't. Again
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there was total agreement that whatever changes were made the authority and the dignity of 
the court and the seriousness of the occasion must be maintained and in no way should a ’visit' 
to the court be allowed to be viewed by a defendant in the same context as a trip to the 'local 
supermarket'. If the defendant does show intentional disrespect to the court or to its authority, 
then the court has the right, and should impose the appropriate sanctions upon the transgressor 
even if this does result in the humiliation of the wrongdoer.
But while ever we have an adversarial system very little will change. Questions will 
still be asked, embarrassing areas of the defendants' and the witnesses' lives will still be 
probed, their word will still be doubted and efforts may well be made to discredit both the 
witness and their evidence, and all in open court. Even where efforts have been made to 
reduce the level of humiliation, for example, where the defendants can give written information 
about their finances to the court by way of a 'Means Enquiry' form, for whatever reasons the 
vast majority, at least in the study area, choose not to take advantage of this facility. The courts 
frequently need to know this type of information in order to arrive at a realistic and appropriate 
financial penalty. The questioning starts. Are you working? What is your job? What is your take 
home pay? Are you unemployed? How much benefit do you get? Are you married? Do you live 
alone? Do you live with your partner? Is your partner working? Does your partner claim benefit? 
How many children are there? How much child benefit do you receive? How much do you 
spend each week? How much on gas, electric, rent, mortgage, council tax, water rates? Have 
you any loans? Do you pay to any clubs? How much is still owed? Are there any other 
outgoings or debts you would like to tell the court about? The questions often appear endless 
even to those who are listening, the embarrassment is often very apparent for those being 
questioned. And yet much of this major source of humiliation in the courtroom could so easily 
be avoided, if the defendant chose to provide the information, as requested, and in advance. 
But as one of my respondents told me, having to reveal this type of information is no longer a 
cause of humiliation to the large majority of people who attend at court in the study area. Being 
either unemployed or receiving social security benefits, in an area where unemployment is 
high, is no longer considered a cause of acute embarrassment. Many of these people are used 
to their means being regularly assessed by various organisations. It could even be argued that 
the greater they are able to present their financial plight to the courts, the less they are likely to 
be asked to pay in either fines, costs or compensation when being dealt with for the offences 
which they have committed. But to many, and in particular to those who are not 'regular 
attenders', the appearance in court must still be a very daunting, even an awsome and often 
confusing experience filled with a large degree of uncertainty and apprehension.
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5.4 THE MAGISTRATES' COURT - A SUMMING UP.
5.4.1 The arena for a bureaucratic degradation ceremony, or a venue where the 
ordinary person can see the law being administerd bv people like 
themselves.
So in conclusion how does, in the opinion of the researcher, the reality of the 
courtroom interaction in the magistrates' courts conform to the abstract ideals of justice? Are 
the courts really organised as part of of the degradation ceremony, designed to humiliate the 
defendant, to emphasise the wrong doing and to inflict public retribution on the individuals who 
have violated the rules of society? Are the courtroom procedures more concerned with 
achieving the requirements of bureaucratic efficiency than they are in dealing with the needs of 
the individual or their basic task of dispensing justice? How effective in this day and age is the 
lay justice system and does it really satisfy the age old ideals for which it was implemented, 
that is trial by one's peers, a system by which the ordinary citizens can see the law as the law of 
the people being administered by men and women like themselves? And finally how are these 
amateur justices, the stipulated decision makers, viewed by the professional court users who 
operate and control much of what goes on within the environment of the courtroom? These 
were the questions which dominated my thinking as I embarked upon my research and 
particularly after I had read much of the pertinent literature.
5.4.2 A need to liberalise the courts without sacrificing the importance and dignity 
of the occasion.
Very few of the people whom I met during the course of my research shared the 
views which had been expressed in some of the literature that the procedures in the 
magistrates' courts were designed in order to degrade the defendant. However a number of 
people were willing to concede that many of the procedures which were employed in the 
courtroom were relics of the past and representative of an age when defendants were required 
to demonstrate a public penance for their misdeeds. It was also conceded that although the 
procedures were not designed to humiliate and embarrass, the way that they .were sometimes 
applied by both the court professionals and the magistrates did have this unfortunate affect.
I found, having researched the situation, that I could not necessarily agree totally with
this view, but neither did I contribute to the theory that a trial in the magistrates' court could be
accurately described as a 'barbarous ceremony'. However during my research I was often
reminded of a view which was expressed by Zher, that is, that while the system appears to
have been based on the most bizarre and serious cases, it then appears to adapt these same
procedures for the more mundane and petty ones. I have been to city courts where the majority
of defendants were made to appear in the dock even though quite often their misdemeanour
was of a relatively minor nature. I have regularly seen defendants, and particularly
unrepresented defendants, trying to grapple with very complicated procedures and an equally
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confusing legalistic language which left them totally confused about what had happened during 
the proceedings and just about able to grasp the basics of the penalty which had been imposed 
on them. I have even seen represented defendants obeying the instructions of their advocates, 
and pleading guilty, when the confusion in their eyes and the look on their faces, indicated their 
obvious belief in their innocence. I have, as I have previously described, also witnessed, and 
even participated in, events where defendants have been treated with anything but the respect 
which allowed them to retain the dignity to which they were entiltled as human beings. All of 
these things I would claim could well be interpreted as examples of where the position of the 
defendant had been unfairly undermined and with the attendant emotional consequences. But I 
have also, as I have demonstrated, witnessed many occasions when the courts have gone out 
of their way to show understanding and consideration towards the non-regular court user.
During the period of my research I have been aware that some very positive 
initiatives have been implemented, initiatives designed to improve the way in which defendants 
and witnesses are treated. However I do feel that to date, most of these initiatives have been 
more concerned with how the non-professional court users are treated outside of the courtroom 
and only with matters of basic courtesy within. The problems of complicated procedures 
remain, as does the often archaic and legalistic elements of the language. What efforts have 
been made to 'simplify' the magistrates pronouncements which are still in, my opinion, both 
complicated and overlong. The forms of address which Carien described as being used by the 
regular court users to produce 'verbally embellished images of each other1 are still in use and 
continue to project an image of an institution steeped in the past and of a time when humiliation 
and embarrassment were an integral part of the judicial process. I agree with one of my 
magistrate colleagues who expressed an opinion that there are many instances when the courts 
could operate with a little more 'common sense' so that the defendants are allowed to say what 
they want to say and in the way they wish to say it without being too constrained by the rules of 
the court.
However before the wrong impression is gained, and whilst I fully support the need to
liberalise some of the courts, and particularly those dealing with the more regulatory type of
offences, I also agree totally with those who emphasise that whatever changes are made, there
is a need to retain the dignity of the court, the importance of the occasion and respect for both
the law and the authority of the courts. I also accept that not all courtroom procedures and
layouts are necessarily just symbolic and that much has evolved over time and for good
practical reasons, factors which continue to be incorporated into the designs of modem
courthouses. For example, I accept that there are good reasons for the magistrates to be
separated from the rest of the court in order that they are able to both apply and demonstrate
their impartiality as the decision makers. I also see the wisdom of setting them at an elevated
level so that they can see and be seen. I still see the need for people to take the oath, even
though I suspect that to many people it does not preclude them from telling lies. I also see the
need for the dock, albeit without the symbolism of the brass rails or the spikes, but as
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previously inferred, only in those courts and for those defendants where there is either a safety 
or a security risk.
While I agree that courtesy must be shown to all court users, I also accept that 
courtesy is a two way matter. As such I also support the view that those who intentionally step 
out of line and show disrespect to the court are the 'authors of their own misfortune' and must 
be dealt with in an appropriate manner, if this involves a degree of humiliation or 
embarrassment for the miscreant then so be it.
5.4.3 A judicial system which is dominated bv monetary considerations.
In the earliest stage of my research, I read an article in which Carien expressed the 
view that the organisation of the courtroom system had more to do with maximising the 
processing of people than it had with dispensing real justice. While I was somewhat surprised 
by this observation, I did record at the time that while I would like to reject this view out of 
hand, I did consider that there were a number of factors which might make this difficult to do. I 
was aware of a number of aspects which were present in the court procedures which could well 
leave an onlooker with this impression. The rapid processing of those cases where the non- 
attenders had pleaded guilty by letter. The way in which hundreds of liability orders can be 
issued in the space of a few minutes in respect of council tax offences once the magistrates 
have been satisfied that the necessary procedures have been carried out. The rapidity with 
which those charged with television license offences are dealt with once that 'tariff for the 
afternoon has been agreed by the three sitting magistrates, tariffs which are applied often 
irrespective of the personal circumstances of the offenders. This is a practice which is also 
extended by some benches to a much greater range of offences, and it soon becomes obvious 
to the observer that the penalties for each offence are being dictated, and with relatively little 
modification, by the entry points as specified in the Sentencing Guidelines. Neither have I any 
doubts that many non-judicial and even some decisions which could be described as 'quasi- 
judicial' are made or agreed by the court professionals in order that the business of the court 
can proceed with a minimum of disruption and delay. I have also observed that there are 
occasions when some lay benches appear only too willing in agreeing to cases being adjourned 
to other courts, and especially if this course of action has enabled them to avoid having to 
make extremely difficult, complicated and possible lengthy judicial decisions. But this latter 
example is very much the exception and I have not generally observed or been aware of 
magistrates trying to dispose of their workload at the expense of what they see as dispensing 
justice.
But what has come very much to the fore during the period of my research has been
the increasing preoccupation with costs. Performance indicators, cash limiting, cost
effectiveness, amendments to the legal aid legislation and increasing commercial pressures,
are all factors which have greatly occupied the time and the thinking of many of the
administrators and participants within the criminal justice system. One thing on which there is
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unanimity of thought is that the system is now largely dictated by monetary considerations. 
Pressure to reduce delays are encouraged, in fact those courts and magistrates who do not 
challenge requests for adjournments are openly criticised. But what I find to be matter of even 
greater concern is the pressure which appears to be aimed at restricting the proceedings to the 
most cost effective end of the criminal justice system. As I have already discussed at length 
these pressures have resulted in an increase in the process of cautioning by the police, of 
cases either not being proceeded with by the Crown Prosecution Service or alternatively being 
'watered down' so as to ensure that they are dealt with at the low cost end of the judicial 
process, i.e. the magistrates' courts. My concern is that these ploys are taking many of the 
decisions away from the judiciary, the 'due process', and public accountability and transferring 
them to the enforcement agencies and the 'criminal' and 'bureaucratic' process machinery. 
While it is accepted that these policies can quite often be seen as benefiting the offender, it can 
also be argued that justice is not only about the defendants, it is also about victims and society 
as a whole, and in short circuiting the system, it can also be claimed to be 'selling these people 
short'.
And not only is it in these areas where the government is becoming involved. There is 
now growing evidence that they are becoming more and more involved in the sentencing 
process and even threatening judicial independence. As I have already discussed at some 
length the government is continually attempting, and in many cases succeeding, in eroding the 
power and discretion of the local decision makers. What is more I am also of the opinion that 
this policy is not only being aided and abetted by the main opposition party but also in a 
number of instances by the magistrates' own Association.
5.4.4 Trial bv one's peers is priceless*.
In my conversations with the professional court users I gained a definite impression
that the lay magistrates were, by and large, seen as a 'positive good' within the judicial system.
They were variously described as a 'good dose of common sense', and as bringing certain
qualities to the bench which are sometimes lacking in the court professionals and in particular
they were valued for their local knowledge. Their performances on the bench were described as
being anything between very good and appalling, and there were also some criticisms of their
sentencing which was described by one advocate as 'a lottery'. The literature was also quite
variable in the assessment of the lay magistrate. On the one hand they were seen as
progressively getting out of their depth as they struggled with the complexities of the
continually changing law. Lord Denning argued that 'a good laymen was better at trying fact
than a middling lawyer. We must keep them' (The Magistrate, October 1991, p168). Badge, a
stipendiary magistrate, argued that the retention of the lay magistracy was essential 'because a
trial before a lay bench is a trial by one's peers' and as such is priceless (The Magistrate,
November 1989, p196). But is a trial in front of the lay magistrates really a trial by one's peers
or has this principle really become blurred by the mists of time? I expect on the one hand it can
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be argued that it is possibly truer today than it was a century ago when the magistrate was also 
likely to be the local squire. But neither do I accept that the magistracy is truly representative of 
the society from which it is drawn. Nor do I have any doubts that an extremely large majority of 
magistrates emanate from a totally different world to the bulk of the defendants on whom they 
sit in judgement.
A few comparisons show that the majority of defendants in the study area who appear 
in the adult crime courts are young males aged between eighteen and twenty five, they are 
normally unemployed, socially deprived, of below average intelligence and live in the worst 
housing areas of the borough. Conversely the majority of magistrates are seen as being middle 
aged, middle class, or alternatively possessing middle class values, and even though the 
majority of magistrates possess a great deal of local knowledge they do not generally inhabit 
the same neighbourhoods or frequent the same areas as do their 'clients'. The appointment of 
magistrates is seen as being restricted to a relatively narrow band of society. While attempts 
have been made to widen this band, this has only met with very limited success in the area in 
which I earned out my research. This I consider is due to a number of factors. The qualities 
which are specified as being required by a magistrate tend to target the more mature, 
reasonably well educated and well balanced individual. The ability of magistrates to fulfil both 
the sitting and training commitments which are demanded on appointment, especially in an 
area of high unemployment, restricts the choice to those individuals who either have the 
flexibility of employment or who are in occupational positions where they can negotiate the 
necessary time away from their work. This often restricts the choice to those who are in either 
the professional and managerial grades or to those who are self-employed. It is also a fact that 
many of the candidates who are seen to possess the necessary qualities required by a 
magistrate are put forward by existing magistrates, a practice which can result in the Bench 
becoming self-perpetuating, a situation which is often re-inforced by an 'unwritten requirement' 
that the successful candidate must also be seen as-being able to fit in with the present culture 
and ethos of the Bench. Therefore in comparing the quite often marked differences between 
the magistrates and those whom they judge, I would suggest that the retention of the lay 
magistracy on the grounds of trial by one's peers' is now totally outmoded and no longer 
appropriate. So on what grounds should the lay magistracy be retained? I have discussed the 
advantages and disadvantages of an all professional magistracy at some length in a previous 
section. While I have no doubts that in terms of absolute efficiency, an all professional 
magistracy could be totally justified. I am also convinced that the combined knowledge, both 
general and local, of a lay magistracy sitting in benches of three and supported by the legal 
knowledge of their clerks does bring an additional and essential dimension to the criminal 
justice system which would be sorely missed if a change was made to a totally professional 
magistracy.
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Appendix A.
THE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS.
Listed below are some of the questions which were asked, or some of the statements 
which participants were invited to comment upon and which formed the basis of the interview 
phase. Some of these statements may appear to certain observers as being somewhat 
contentious. However, because most of the statements were based on the literature review, I 
was able to place these opinions at someone else's door and this did enable me, as an insider, 
to explore vital issues of the research without necessarily being associated with the views 
expressed and to retain my desired position of impartiality and objectivity and yet not to be 
seen by the interviewees as just an 'investigating magistrate'.
Many of the statements were of a 'general' nature and were used extensively 
throughout the interviews, others were more specific to a particular group or role and were 
therefore only employed where appropriate.
General.
'Justice is subjugated to organisational efficiency'. Are the magistrates' courts more 
interested in organisation than they are in dispensing justice?
Courtroom ceremony is maintained partly to facilitate the physical control of 
defendants and others who may step out of line, it is organised to degrade and humiliate the 
defendants. 'Bewilderment and embarrassment are openly fostered and aggravated, 
uncertainty is callously observed and manipulated'.
Defendants are escorted into the courtroom, told when to stand up, when to sit down, 
when to speak, when to be quiet. During the hearing he can be told to take his hands out of his 
pockets, chewing gum out of his mouth, the hat off his head and the smile off his face. 'Once 
he, the defendant, is in a distraught state where he just wants to get it over, judicial fears that 
the defendant might slow down the proceedings by being awkward are diminished'.
Defendants are set up in a guarded dock at a distance artificially stretched beyond the 
familiar boundaries of face to face communication and are asked to describe or comment on 
intimate details of their lives.
'Once the defendant challenges the absolutism of the legal rules on the grounds of an 
overt appeal to common sense, the defendant's challenge can be portrayed as either out of 
place, out of time, out of mind or out of order*. It has been suggested that justice is often 
dispensed in spite of the defendant's presence.
Some defendants, admittedly in the Crown Court, had difficulty in deciding whose 
side their advocates were on.
Defendants feel an acute sense of frustration and alienation. In relation to the due 
process the defendant stands as the 'dummy playeri absorbing both the gains and losses of all 
the contestants. What is your view of the defendant as the 'dummy playeri?
1
In contrast to their unceremonious and coercive presentation of the defendant, 
magistrates, police and other court users all project visual images of themselves and verbally 
embellished images of each other, Your worship', 'the learned clerk', etc.
Do you feel that the defendant is disadvantaged?
Is there a hidden agenda. A language or a signalling code by which all the regulars 
can communicate with each other but which excludes the defendant and on occasions even the 
magistrates?
Carien asked thirty probation officers, When a defendant has appeared in court for 
the first time. What impression did they get of quality of the defendants' understanding of what 
had happened? 57 per cent of those asked didn’t think that there had been any understanding 
whatsoever, 37 per cent thought they'd understood very little. From your own experience, what 
do you think?
Magistrates and clerks can go to elaborate lengths to explain the meaning of legal 
phraseology to defendants who either do not hear them or who nod in a dazed blank way.
How good are court chairmen at communicating?
To quote one researcher,'There is a stark contrast between the courtroom and the 
squalor of its environs'. What do you feel about that contrast in our own courts?
The court experience is said to be characterised by waiting. Defendants becoming 
more and more nervous, increasingly harbouring fears that they will be sent to prison. How 
many people come to court these days thinking that they will go to prison?
If the magistrates do hold the power and they do make the decisions. Who or what in 
the courtroom has the greatest influence on these decisions?
The most frequently mentioned influence in all courts was the PSR. How influential do 
you think the Pre-Sentence Reports are?
Most of the courtworkers are said to be concerned with maintaining credibility with the 
magistrates. How important is credibility?
Magistrates are mainly middle-aged, middle-class, not very streetwise and often 
lacking insight into the social world of those they judge.
You can appoint 'working-class' people to the Bench but after a period of time they 
begin to display middle class values.
Is justice in the magistrates' courts a lottery?
The courts run by the stipendiary magistrates are said to be more professional and 
more efficient. Have you any views on that?
Is there a better way of organising and arranging the courts, a better way of doing it?
Magistrates.
Do you feel that as a stipendiary magistrate, you not only direct the court, but if you 
want, you can also manipulate the court?
2
Some lay benches will do anything that is asked of them and often without 
questioning. Would you agree with that view?
Do you feel that magistrates are manipulated without knowing that they are?
Non-magistrates.
Everyone in the courtroom are professionals with the exception of the three people 
who are sat on the bench and who make the decisions. How do you view that as professionals.
There are so many vested interests in court, police, magistrates, probation officers, it 
is a matter of them all fighting over one carcase. The pervading mode of interaction between 
the different legal teams is said to be one of uneasy compromise.
There is a feeling among magistrates that defendants quite often leave the courtroom 
laughing at them.
Court staff.
Objectivity is traditionally the requirement of the clerk who is there to provide legal 
advice but not to influence. The dividing line between offering advice and having an influence 
on sentencing is rather a thin and unclear one. Do you feel that you influence when giving 
'advice'?
The daily parade through the courts of recidivist drunks, alcoholics and kindred spirits 
is seen as a degradation ceremony which provides the audience, including the magistrates, 
with a series of spurious comedy turns. Do you reduce the diversity of defendants into 
manageable proportions by categorising them into 'types'?
Magistrates and court staff.
For new magistrates, the message of the other court users is clear, the system works 
very well thank you, please leave it alone. Did you receive this type of message?
Advocates.
Technically, *the solicitor is supposed to represent the interests of the client. This 
supposition is mythical. Many defendants who are directed to apply for legal aid find that they 
are subjected to an outside court training on what they have to do inside, such training often 
being in the last ten minutes before the case is heard and often by a young solicitor whom they 
have never seen before.
The solicitor who works regularly in one court is often more prepared to accept the 
police version of events rather than their clients and the best the solicitor is prepared to do in 
court, is not to represent the client's views, but instead to present them as characters worthy of 
clemency, treatment or a second chance.
3
While it is the job of the defence advocate to try everything within the rules to get his 
client off, it is not necessarily the job of the prosecutor to get a person convicted. If that is true, 
does this not put the prosecution at a disadvantage?
Magistrates and advocates.
Defence lawyers were generally perceived as inhibiting the magistrates' search for the 
truth of the case. At least they distort it by presenting the defendant's side, or by their mere 
presence they obstruct the possibility of direct communication with defendant.
Probation officers.
Is there a conflict between being an officer of the court and a person who is there to 
'assist, advise and befriend' the defendant?
A quote from a magistrate, "I don't know what side the probation officers are on, oufs 
or the defendant's. They are supposed to be objective but I think they are on the side of 
leniency".
The role of the probation officer in the courtroom has been described as passive, 
apart from actually providing the PSRs they keep a low profile. Would you agree with that 
perception?
Many magistrates were quite critical of the recommendations in the PSRs and quite 
resentful of what they saw as a usurping of their power. I'd like your views on this.
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THE INTERVIEWS - a detailed account.
Appendix B.
B1. THE MAGISTRATES' PERCEPTION.
B1.1 The role of the magistrate'
"But the power does ultimately reside with 
the magistrates, because they can 'pot' somebody, 
they can send somebody away. They have 
the power to do just that".
(a stipendiary magistrate)
B1.1.1 The magistrates are the decision makers and as such they must set 
themselves apart from the rest of the court.
There was no doubt in the minds of the magistrates whom I interviewed, both 
amateur and professional, that ultimately the power and the decision making in the magistrates’ 
courts rests with the magistrates. As I was told by the stipendiary magistrate, "..you've got to be 
at arms length,.. you're deciding in the end.. you cant enjoy the privilege of the jokes and the 
nonesense". The stipendiary also described the considerable power which is vested in and can 
be wielded by the magistrates, "I think from my point of view, yes I have the power to send 
somebody to prison for twelve months, I suppose technically for longer if they are on a 
suspended sentence. I also have the power from knowing what the advocates are up to, .. not 
only that but they know that I know, so that gives me an edge". This latter point demonstrates 
the magistrates’ power and influence not only in sentencing terms but also in the control of the 
court and their potential to manipulate the proceedings, a matter in which the professional 
magistrate may well have the advantage over the lay magistrate. This latter issue will be dealt 
with in a later section.
B1.1.2 There is a need to improve the overall standard of behaviour in the 
courtrooms, this is the responsibility of the court chairman.
The standard of behaviour in the court rooms was often considered by the 
magistrates whom I interviewed as being of an unacceptable level. Neither was this problem 
seen as only appertaining to the defendant's behaviour. As I was told by one lay magistrate, "I 
sometimes feel a bit annoyed when solicitors are chatting to each other when the clerk is 
presenting the case.. ". Another lay magistrate was of the o p in io n , if any improvement could 
be made in court, it is general courtroom behaviour,.. this is where the magistrates have to grip 
the court and to my mind there is all the difference between a weak chairman and a strong one 
in this case,.. and I've certainly stopped the court on half a dozen occasions when solicitors are 
having chats among themselves".
B1.1.2.1 - the court chairman has much in common with a circus ringmaster.
One lay magistrate used the analogy to compare the court chairman's role with that of 
a circus ringmaster, ”.. and while he is the kingpin, you’ve certainly got professionals all the way
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round all wanting to do their act, sometimes at the same time". But I asked, "Has the magistrate 
not only the power to control the proceedings but also the potential to manipulate the court"? It 
was agreed that the court chairmen or the stipendiary magistrates do have the capability to do 
this on occasions, but I was also reminded by one magistrate that it is also possible to, lose 
control very rapidly, .. and I've seen it nearly go". I was told that part of being a successful 
chairman is not only knowing the right time to interject but also when it is the right time, ".. to 
bite his tongue". The job of the court is to get at the truth and it is the job of the chairman in the 
courtroom to ensure that this aim is achieved, or as near as it is possible to do so. In order to 
attain this end it was admitted that it may fall to the court chairman to impose some control on 
the defendants, but the consensus view amongst the magistrates with whom I spoke was that in 
doing this, . it is also part of the chairman's skill to see that the defendant is not embarrassed".
B1.1.3 New magistrates are welcomed to the bench and so is the knowledge which 
they bring with them, providing it does not herald change.
'Certainly for new magistrates and those becoming senior magistrates, the message 
from other court workers is clear, the system works very well thank you, please leave it alone', 
(Parker, Casbum and Turnbull, 1981). I asked a relatively newly appointed magistrate for her 
views on this particular observation. She told me, "No, not from most of the people I have 
worked with. In fact Mrs [ ]  said to me on one of my first occasions sitting on the bench with her, 
'Oh good, I was really pleased when I saw your name on the list, (The Allocation of Magistrates 
to Courts), I thought good, I'm going to learn something today'. What she was saying was, ' You 
are fresh from training, I might leam something from you'. I'm not saying they all have that 
attitude, but thankfully I do not think I've met up with many, although there are exceptions, who 
felt, 'Here's a newcomer, who thinks she knows it all', and in a way that's very encouraging 
Whilst the personal experience of this particular magistrate indicates that new magistrates, 
their experience and newly acquired knowledge are welcomed by the majority, it should not be 
taken as an indication that change is necessarily welcomed. A second magistrate informed me, 
"I think everybody has got a vested interest in keeping things as they are. Solicitors on both 
sides, the usher, the clerk, his or her assistants and ourselves. We know the rules and 
everybody is by nature a conservative, they don't want change". Another magistrate suggested 
that some magistrates might even have an ulterior motive for retaining the familiar rules and 
procedures,"People who are not very good at being magistrates might hide behind procedures 
as a way of preserving their own dignity because they are not certain what is happening either".
B1.1.4 The professional magistrate is qualified, trained and experienced, but how 
streetwise?
It has been argued in the main text by many of the regular court users that,the courts 
in which the stipendiary magistrates adjudicate are generally seen as being more efficient in 
terms of time and procedural organisation, although it was queried whether or not these are the 
criteria by which defendants actually assess their appearances at, and their treatment by the
courts. The stipendiary magistrates do see their knowledge, training and experience as giving 
them certain advantages when compared with the lay justices. As one professional magistrate 
told me, "I also have the power from knowing what the advocates are up to, rather more, and I 
don’t say I've got exclusive knowledge of that, than the lay magistrates have, having been one 
for twenty three, twenty four years. So I know what’s involved out there, not only that but they 
know I know, so that gives me the edge. So they are going to treat me more with ’kid gloves' 
than they would a lay bench. So I have the edge there". Because of this superior knowledge 
and experience and also because of his professional standing within the magistracy, the 
stipendiary also considers that he has special responsibilities to fulfil. I was told, "I'm conscious 
that I’m a 'pro' and I feel that I have to set certain standards and encourage the lay bench,.. to 
maintain good standards and get into good habits". This stipendiary also considered that 
because the 'stipes' send more people into custody than the lay benches do, then they are seen 
as being much harder in sentencing terms. This is, in the main, due to the simple fact of, ".. 
sitting everyday, and the law of averages". Whilst not disputing the stipendiary's superior 
knowledge of the law, court procedures and a more detailed knowledge of many of the major 
players, one lay magistrate did query whether this necessarily made for a better quality of 
justice? This magistrate argued, ".. if you are trained in law and if you are there everyday, then 
you can become cut-off from everyday people and cut-off from how they feel and their way of 
life and it tends to become a job to you and that happens in any profession". This particular 
magistrate also went on to say, "So I'm very wary of anyone who thinks that this should be a 
profession, that people should do it everyday, that therefore they can do it better than we can. 
I'm sure that the stipendiary does a good job, but nevertheless I think he can possibly become a 
little bit'un-streetwise', for the want of a better term, because it is his job and he's doing it and 
he might become a little bit anaesthetized". This magistrate conceded that a system which uses 
lay magistrates could be, a lottery, and that's what the lay magistracy is and that's what we 
get". But what, I asked this magistrate, is the alternative? "The only alternative is to have 
professional stipendiary magistrates and I dont think that would be as, not effective, but as fair 
in the long run".
B1.2 Justice and organisational efficiency.
"Now I dont feel that I've ever been hurried.
In spite of all that has been said, I still feel 
that no one, whether it be the clerk, the usher, 
the CPS, has ever attempted unduly to influence 
us to get on with it and get things out of the way".
(a lay magistrate)
B1.2.1 Is justice subjugated to organisational efficiency?
When I put this question to the magistrates whom I interviewed the replies which were 
given appeared on the surface to be somewhat guarded. As one magistrate told me it was 
possibly truer when the claims were made than it is now. I was told about times past when the 
courts used to sit until seven or eight o' clock in the evening in order to prevent part heard 
cases having to be adjourned and defendant^, witnesses and everybody else having to be
brought back to court on future occasions. But at what price? What quality of justice is 
dispensed by magistrates who have been sitting all day, or since the early hours of the 
afternoon, and are then asked to make important decisions so late in the day? Now I was told, 
very very seldom do we sit after half past three, four o' clock". The stipendiary magistrate 
insisted that both organisation and efficiency are fundamental to the running of the courts, 
"Yes, I think you have to make sure that the business is despatched with a measure of 
efficiency because if there was no formalisation and everybody threw in their two-pennyworth in 
any order.. it would ramble on for ages. The structure of it, I suppose has to meet certain 
criteria in terms of efficiency, but I don't think that's why it's designed that way, I think that is 
purely a product of it". However one magistrate did express a concern that perhaps the 
procedures which are in place are too rigid. "Perhaps if the procedures were relaxed so that we 
didn't all have to remember what comes next and we could operate a little more common sense 
and we could let the defendants say what they want to say. Because you can sometimes see 
that they are bursting at the seams to speak out, because they feel, ’ .. this is not fair, this is 
what is being said about m e ' It was accepted by some that there has been a tendency in 
recent times to quicken up the proceedings but it was maintained that this policy has not been 
to the detriment of the defendant. This point was emphasised by one of the magistrates who 
told me, "I've seen a tendency in recent months to quicken things up, but again if you think of 
the main criteria as justice with the defendant, that has not been subjugated at all. What 
changes have been made, I think are all to the good from everybody's point of view..".
B1.2.2 The combined efforts of the Legal Aid system and the magistrates have
succeeded in minimizing both the number and the lengths of adjournments.
7 still feel the system could be improved and I often feel that they don't get justice 
because they have to wait too long.. and have to come back time and time again to court". This 
view was expressed by one magistrate and was concerned with the problems of adjourned 
cases and the concept of 'justice delayed is justice denied', a concern which was shared by 
other colleagues. Another magistrate, however, did feel that recent amendments to the Legal 
Aid system, the changes to the payment rates, could possibly result in restricting both the 
number and lengths of these adjournments. As I was told, "There were some solicitors who 
were unscrupulous, no question about that, and on occasions I've had to say 'No , with 
colleagues of course on this, ’ ..that we see no reason why an adjournment should be made'. 
When they argue very strongly then the adjournments we used to think of in terms of six weeks, 
eight weeks, they are now a fortnight and we say, 'Can you manage a week Mister So and So'. 
So the message is there". This action to reduce the number and lengths of adjournments whilst 
not adopted as a specific Bench policy was, I am told, instigated and encouraged by the two 
senior professionals of the 'court team', ".. it's only the hints that have been given to us by [the 
Clerk to the Justices] and also [the stipendiary magistrate], just in the little hints and tips over 
the Retiring Room table".
B1.3 Courtroom organisation and the degradation ceremony.
"I hate that when they're asked to give 
details of their finances. ..They're stripped 
of their dignity aren't they and they stand there 
and talk about how much they owe the rent man 
and the milkman..".
(a lay magistrate)
B1.3.1 If the courts are to function efficiently then the people who appear before them 
must have respect for their authority.
All of the magistrates with whom I spoke were unanimous in their views that the 
people who appear in the courts should show respect for those courts and for the authority 
which the magistrates represent. On the other hand it was also felt that the courts should 
demonstrate the qualities which were deserving of this respect. In the opinion of one lay 
magistrate, "I think that if someone is having to come to court to be judged by their peers then 
they have to have a certain respect". This magistrate was also of the opinion that if the courts 
are to demand respect, then the structure of the court and the dignity of the proceedings has to 
be such that the respect of the participants is both earned and retained. I was told, "I think the 
structure of the court and the way the defendant views the bench and what these magistrates 
are representing is important, I think we have to keep a sense of status and dignity so that it is 
respected". This magistrate even went as far as saying,".. and I think that if people dont have 
that certain amount of respect for the Bench and the authority it represents then the system 
would collapse". Another magistrate emphasised the fact that, "We are there to represent the 
law, the Queen .. ". This point was expanded upon by the first magistrate who told me, ” We 
are representing a position and that is the important part of being a magistrate, that you are 
representing a position of authority. Why are we there? Why are we sitting up there and why do 
we have to go through all the business of swearing in and everything if our position is not given 
respect"? This magistrate was keen to spell out to me the extent to which this authority should 
be interpreted by the magistrates themselves, " We are the guardians of that position and we 
ought to be very much aware of that ourselves. I never feel when I'm sitting up there on the 
bench, ... that I'm personally being given that respect. I dont expect to be respected as a 
person but I do expect that the position I represent is respected”. The magistrates with whom I 
spoke were also in agreement that quite often the courts are not strict enough in ensuring that 
the general standard of courtroom behaviour which recognises the status of the court is 
demonstrated, neither was this criticism only directed at the behaviour of the defendants. It was 
also considered that the behaviour of some of the advocates could be improved. As one 
magistrate told me, "I sometimes feel a bit annoyed when solicitors are chatting to each other.. 
when the court clerk is presenting the case".
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B1.3.2 There is a need for symbolism because it identifies the authority of the court.
The court has a duty to emphasise to the participants the importance of the occasion 
and it is considered that the rules and procedures which form a major part of the ceremony of 
the court fulfil this requirement. As I was told by one of the lay magistrates when I suggested 
that the reasoning behind the ceremony was 'partly to facilitate physical control of defendants 
and any others who step out of place', (Carien, 1976, p25). "Yes ceremony, not for ceremony's 
sake, but to establish the setting and the rules and the procedure". In saying this, the 
magistrate did concede that there were occasions when certain procedures were invoked in 
order to control and constrain the defendants, but his view was, "The need for constraint, yes, 
on what are we talking about, one in a hundred, one in two hundred who need to be 
constrained". The view of another magistrate was, "I feel it should be very strict, very awe 
inspiring. I really feel that, because then people recognise that this is the law and this is what 
will happen to us... I think it has to be like that. If the courtroom wasn't given some symbol of 
authority then how much would they take notice of coming to court... So what is the alternative, 
surely if you're going to court you have to be slightly in awe of that". The stipendiary magistrate 
was also convinced of the requirement for the courts to be conducted in an orderly way. He told 
me, "Well you have to have order in these matters. I mean you cant just have somebody 
shuffle in and please yourself who talks to the court and please yourself what sort of questions 
are asked". If the courts were made more informal then it was suggested that this could have 
the effect of diluting the way in which the authority of the court was perceived by those on 
whom it sits in judgement. As one magistrate explained, "It depends how we want people to to 
view the Bench doesnt it. If they are thinking of it as something that is on a higher level to 
them, these are my peers but they have been given the right to sit in judgement on me', then 
dont we have to symbolise that in some way, isnt that how it's structured. It's structured in 
order to be symbolic of the higher authority".
B1.3.3 Much of the courtroom ritual and symbolism is based on tradition.
"What I do see is a certain amount of ritual. I like to see that because I think it adds 
dignity, not to put the defendant at a disadvantage, but basically because in the courtroom we 
are playing by the old rules of the game, .. there is courtesy and firmness, a tradition of a 
prosecution, summary, witness, defence opening, the summary, cross examination and so on". 
This view, that much of what happens in the magistrates' courts is based on its traditions and 
on the adversarial system which underpins it, was also shared by the stipendiary magistrate. He 
told me, "There is a structure and a way of doing things which has evolved, it isn't something 
that I or anyone else has made up. But there has to be, in the way that our criminal justice 
system has developed, somebody to point the finger, somebody to represent the defendant and 
somebody to make the decision, and so you can't just have a general free for all. In my view 
that would be unedifying to say the least. So to marshall the arguments and to get the facts 
before the decision makers, whether it be one or three, there are rules which have been laid
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down and which are followed and that is to give the tribunal the information on which they can 
make a decision. Now I’m sorry that's formalised but I don't know any other way of doing it”. 
Referring to the layout of the courts the stipendiary magistrate did agree that in part much of 
this was symbolic, "I suppose the set up or layout of the criminal court is to symbolise that the 
justices, or the magistrates, or the judge is above the rest, well the fact is they are. They have 
been set up to make decisions and I suppose it is symbolic that they are ranged a little higher”.
B1.3.4 Poor behaviour bv the defendants can inhibit the court's function of getting at 
the truth.
The main aim of the magistrates' courts is to get at the truth in order that a correct 
decision can be arrived at and the appropriate justice dispensed. It was considered that there 
are some occasions when the poor standard of behaviour displayed by defendants can frustrate 
this ideal. The stipendiary magistrate explained that, "The business of the court is to get on with 
it and to dispense justice as best it can without being distracted either physically or verbally”. He 
then went on to say, "Certain basic common standards of decency are required and if you 
expect a defendant to shamble in and not to talk to you and not to stand up when he is talking 
to you or just to behave as he would in a pub or anywhere else, I honestly don't think that is 
appropriate. One doesn't behave that way in other public arenas, why should we put up with 
tap room1 behaviour in court.. ". It was considered that where this type of behaviour is inflicted 
on the courts then corrective action by the courts is justified. In the words of one lay magistrate, 
"If they behave badly they have to be told. If someone comes in wearing the slogan, 'KILL THE 
MAGISTRATES', or 'KILL THE PIGS', and they are chewing gum and they've got their hands in 
their pockets and they're deliberately showing that they've got no respect whatsoever for this 
court of law, then something has to be done about it". The responsibilty for taking this action 
lays, in the opinion of the magistrates whom I interviewed, with the magistrates and where a lay 
bench is involved, specifically with the court chairman. "This is where the chairman has to take 
command, ..There are things which are done deliberately which are showing contempt for the 
court. ..They should be jumped on".
B1.3.4.1 - the magistrates need to be able to distinguish those defendants who are 
being intentionally disrespectful from those who are not.
'But is there not a danger that those who are being disrespectful to the court in an 
unintentional manner, either through nervousness or just because they do not know any better, 
may be treated in the same way as those defendants who are being intentionally disrespectful?' 
The magistrate with whom I discussed this possibility agreed that these differences did exist 
and that there was a need to identify which was which and treat them in different ways. As he 
told me, "If someone came into court and was not showing respect for the court it would soon 
become pretty obvious and that has to be checked immediately, ..obviously some people are 
really nervous when they come in and they dont know what to do with their hands and we have
to recognise peoples body language and make allowances for it". It was also recognised that in 
contrast to those people who are intent on being disrespectful to the court there are the first 
time attenders, and surely we get to recognise if this is someone's first appearance in court 
.. They dont know where to go, they dont know where to stand and you know if we're sensitive 
to that we ought to be able to appreciate that this is that person's first time in court and just help 
them through it". But in the instances where the defendant is showing disrespect, how does the 
magistrate deal with the situation? A lay magistrate who is experienced in taking the chair in 
the Adult Crime courts told me that there would be, ".. a word of advice given by the chairman 
to the defendant and if that doesn't bring results then I feel that it's got to be pointed out more 
strongly, and then the final warning". On occasions the assistance of the defendant's solicitor 
may have to be sought, "... I've put a case back and sent the defendant out of court with his 
solicitor for a word of advice although I haven’t told his solicitor what to tell him". The 
stipendiary magistrate told me that on occasions he has threatened to exclude wayward 
defendants from the proceedings. He told me, "I've said to people when they have misbehaved, 
'Look we have a certain way of behaving in this court and if you do you are welcome to stay, 
but if you dont, you know, keep quiet when people are talking, then I'll order you out”. But it 
was emphasised by all the magistrates with whom I spoke that it is important to recognise the 
behaviour which is intentional and that which is not. In the words of one magistrate, "Again this 
is where the experience of the chairman and the two wingers comes in, to see and spot the 
behaviour which is unintentional as against the defendant who is putting two fingers up' at the 
court".
B1.3.5 The degradation of the defendants is both a relic of the past and counter
productive to the aims of justice.
In commenting upon the claim that the treatment of the defendant in court is often 
designed to put them in a 'distraught state of mind where he just wants to get it over1, (Carlen, 
1976, p29), one lay-magistrate admitted, "Oh there's so much in there that is true, but that 
again I would put in the minority of cases". Also commenting on the Carlen quote the 
stipendiary magistrate maintained that in his opinion the situation had not been accurately 
interpreted and that the actual treatment of the defendants was, ".. not all as oppressive as the 
quotations you are saying are made out... I think that is an overstatement, very much so". The 
stipendiary magistrate continued, "I'm sure it is not intended in this day and age to degrade, I 
think at one stage the courtroom was certainly there designed, particularly in the Victorian 
period and we have a bit of an hangover of t h a t The reason for this 'hangover* was blamed, 
in part, on the age and the design of the courtrooms of that era, some of which are still in 
regular use today, a factor which was relevant to the study area during the main period of the 
research. As the stipendiary magistrate admitted, "Some of the grandiose courtrooms may 
have that effect but there's very much a move away from that style of courtroom in the new 
buildings. So I think there might be a 'rizzum' of truth, injecting a measure of awe into the thing.
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But I think to degrade, that's far overstated". In fact I found all of the magistrates whom I 
interviewed to be very much of one mind on this topic, they all viewed the degradation of the 
defendant as not only undesirable but also counter-productive. In the words of one magistrate," 
.. if we embarrass a defendant or a witness, .. we are not going to get at the truth". Another 
magistrate discussing the problems of demeaning the defendants felt very strongly that there 
was no place for it on the courtroom agenda and told me, "That is not my perception of 
courtroom ceremony, if I thought it was what we were there for, I wouid not want to be a 
magistrate". But even though there appears to be this general rejection of the degradation 
ceremony as such, it was admitted that where the defendant is seen to be intentionally 
disrespectful to the court then some sanctions will be invoked. As one magistrate put it, "if 
you've got a 'bolshie' defendant he must be made to realise that he's doing himself the biggest 
disservice of all". But this magistrate concluded, "But humiliation and embarrassment dont sit 
easy".
B1.3.6 Magistrates who humiliate defendants should not be magistrates.
Whilst it was generally agreed by the magistrates that the procedures in the 
magistrates' courts were not specifically designed to humiliate and embarrass the defendants, 
unless, as has been stated, they step out of line, it does appear that in certain situations and 
with certain groups the application of the courtroom procedures by some magistrates is 
intended to do precisely that. As one magistrate said, "I object very strongly to magistrates 
picking on certain types of people because they feel they can get away with it,.. I would object 
really strongly if I saw someone being treated like that and people do do it, magistrates do do it, 
particularly if they feel they can pick on someone because they're younger, a young lad, a youth 
who might have longer hair than he should have". This magistrate expressed the view that this 
sort of behaviour from magistrates identifies, * ..the wrong type of magistrate". But even these 
strongly worded views were somewhat tempered by a rider about defendant behaviour, " .. 
sometimes they dont deserve it, but an awful lot of the time they do". This magistrate was also 
of the opinion that the attitude of individual courts towards the defendants is quite often 
governed by the approach of one or two of its principal actors, "... the person who is sitting in 
the chair and the court clerk".
B1.3.6.1 - in the Fines Enforcement courts humiliation and embarrassment can be 
tools of the trade.
During my interviews with the magistrates, I again mentioned both my observations 
of, and my own experience in the Fines Enforcement courts where it appeared that the 
demeaning of the defendants was a tactic which was regularly employed by the magistrates. 
This point was conceded by at least one magistrate who told me, 'You've picked there the 
exception that proves the rule. That is, we are trying to embarrass them in a Fines court, in 
general that is a fact". In an attempt to justify this procedure, I was told, 'Yes, are you trying to
13
humiliate them? Are you you trying to embarrass them..? I think that those two are by-products 
of what you want and that is to try and get money out of them. You want to tell them effectively, 
you're not believing what they've said, .. they're working the system, you know that and what 
you want to do is to get over to them .. that you know that they're doing that". But whilst 
admitting that embarrassment and humiliation are a part of the procedure in the Fines 
Enforcement courts, this magistrate was also keen to assure me that, "... Fines courts are the 
exception. I cant think of any other where you really want to come down on the defendant, 
unless they are misbehaving".
B1.3.7 Respect needs to be a two wav street.
There was also a consensus amongst the magistrates to whom I spoke that in 
expecting the defendants and the witnesses to demonstrate their respect for the courts then 
there was also a requirement for the courts to extend some courtesies in return. As one of the 
lay magistrates said, "I think we ought to be giving them a little bit more dignity when they come 
into court. ..I think that everybody has to be given their own dignity, so I think magistrates 
should conduct themselves with dignity and they should allow the defendants to be able to 
conduct themselves with dignity". This magistrate felt that there was also a need for the regular 
court professionals to appreciate the situation in which many defendants, "..ordinary people", 
find themselves and to realise that they can, feel very threatened by the professionals and 
the law and by authority". This magistrate was critical of some regular court users who seemed 
to have lost sight of the presumption of innocence on which the English justice system is 
based. I was told, "When we walk into court we might not be guilty. ..a lot of the time we have 
people coming in and really they just come to court to make a protest, because they've had this 
letter, '.. it arrived on my birthday and I have paid my tax and I have paid my insurance', and 
they've come to court to make some type of protest and we have to be careful with peoples' 
dignity". Another lay magistrate maintained that one of the simplest ways in which the courts 
can assist people to retain their dignity is to ask people to do things rather than telling them. By 
saying pi ease, "..Please, it's a request with a'please'
B1.3.7.1 - the non-use of titles, a means of humiliating the defendant or a harmless 
tradition used bv the legal professionals.
The two areas which seemed to attract most comment in the 'dignity discussion' which 
I had with the magistrates, were the insistence that the defendants must always stand when 
they are either being addressed by the court or when they are addressing the court, and the 
fact that some magistrates address the defendants by their surnames only and do not prefix it 
with the title Mr., Mrs., Miss or whatever. Concerning the former, one magistrate told me, "I 
hate this business of telling people to sit down and stand up and sit down and stand up. If I 
were a defendant I'd rather stand up until it is over with and then go out, and it's ridiculous this 
business of, 'May he sit down Sir?', 'Right sit down', and then ten seconds later ‘stand up
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again', 'Right, now sit down again. There's no point to it, why have we got them jumping up and 
down like that"? With regard to this latter area of contention I was told, " And these people 
should also be addressed as 'Mr.' or whatever they want to be addressed". This was seen as 
another way in which people could be allowed to retain their dignity whilst appearing at court. 
Another magistrate assured me, "I would never call the defendant by his surname only", but 
admitted, "I've seen it done". It was however interesting to see that this was seen to be more of 
a problem by the lay magistrates than it was by the stipendiary, who saw the addressing of 
defendants by their surnames only as no more than a part of courtroom tradition, a practice 
which is very common between the members of the Bar. The stipendiary magistrate assured 
me that, in his opinion, this practice was definitely not designed to demean the defendant. He 
told me, “It's very much a Bar thing, in that members of the Bar will address each other by their 
surnames.. until they get to know each other and then they will address you by your first name 
or call you Mr So and So. But it is a strange habit that the Bar have and which has caught on in 
a sense... But I dont think there's any side to it, I mean I vary enormously, I call some people 
Smith, I call some people Mr Smith, it just depends how it comes out and I dont think anything 
about it. So I think it's a load of nonesense, I dont think there's anything in that at all". This 
magistrate did disapprove of the practice which had been outlined to me by another court user 
whereby the defendant was referred to by using their title before conviction but by surname 
only after either being convicted or an admission of guilt. As he told me,"Oh, no, no, no, that is 
demeaning somebody, it is really"
B1.3.8 Organisation and procedure can have the effect of humiliating the
defendants, b u t..
During my interviews with the magistrates, I asked them to express their views on the 
statement, 'Defendants are set up in a guarded dock .. at a distance artificially stretched 
beyond the familiar boundaries of face to face communication and are asked to comment on 
intimate details of their life', (Carlen, 1976, p23). Whilst it was acknowledged that the dock in 
the study area was only used for those defendants who are produced from the cells, it was also 
agreed that much of the statement had a familiar ring. As one magistrate told me, "Yes and 
that's really humiliating, I hate that, when they are asked to give details of their finances and 
they do.. They're stripped of their dignity arent they, and they stand there and talk about how 
much they owe the rent man and the milkman and how much insurance and how much tax. It’s 
really wrong that they should do that to people, I really dislike that side of it. I do hate that side 
of it, it's something that’s been worrying me for a long time actually. I mean someone might 
come in for a really trivial offence, something that's been overlooked... But it's the clerks who 
do this ..I,often want to lean over and say to the clerk, 'Why did you make him go through all 
that. Why cant they simply say, 'How much could you afford to pay' and then if there's a 
problem let's go through it. But there again they are able to hand in their finances on a form 
now arent they"? A second magistrate did not view this inquiry into the defendants’ means with
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quite the same degree of dismay. While admitting that some defendants do occasionally query 
why they need to divulge their finances to the court, once the reason is explained to them, that 
the information is required because, ".. 'it would help us to come to a fine which we hope will 
be in accordance with the severity of the offence and your means to pay any fine', I’ve never 
had anything but cooperation from a defendant". Another view expressed by both the 
professional and the lay magistrates was that there is enough information contained in the 
correspondence which is sent to the defendants prior to their court hearings to give them a 
strong indication of the type of information which they will be asked to give to the court. Where 
the defendant is represented by an advocate then it is the job of that advocate to prepare the 
defendant for what to expect.
B1.3.9 Not all of the courtroom ceremony is for ceremony's sake, there are some 
practical reasons.
While much of the ceremony and ritual which plays a part in the courtroom drama is 
claimed to have evolved over time, not all of the symbolism which is witnessed in the 
magistrates' courts should be viewed as ceremony for ceremony's sake. As has already been 
stated, some of the symbolism is seen by magistrates and others as demonstrating both the 
status of the magistrates as well as their impartiality in their role as the decision makers. In 
addition to this, the tiered seating arrangement and the distancing of the magistrates from the 
other court users and in particular the defendants and the general public also has, according to 
the stipendiary magistrate, considerable justification. He related to me a specific instance 
where he saw magistrates actually put in fear by the behaviour of some attenders in the public 
areas of the courts. In his words, "I've known magistrates to feel intimidated by the presence of 
numbers in court. I can remember once being in a court where there was a demonstration, it 
was an industrial dispute and the court was packed with people and every point they cheered. 
The magistrates, I could see they were trembling, they were extremely concerned as to how, or 
whether, they would get out of the courtroom safe". This magistrate also put forward his views 
as to why the docks need to be retained in the courtrooms where dangerous defendants are 
dealt with, "Well there are purposes in having a dock and having somebody a measure of a 
distance away from you. It wouldn’t do ..to be as close as I am to you, across a desk, dealing 
with someone who has been indicted for murder, or rape, or violence. One has to observe 
some security".
B1.3.91 - in liberalising the courtroom proceedings, care must be taken to preserve 
the authority and the dignity of the courts.
While there was a fair degree of consensus among the magistrates with whom I 
spoke that some of the courts could be conducted in a more liberalised atmosphere and a more 
informal setting, they were eager to point out that there are a number of different types of 
courts which are designed and organised to fulfil totally different fuctions. The Family courts,
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which have been previously mentioned, being a prime example of a court which can be held in 
a quite informal setting. But some Crime courts have also been held in a more informal setting, 
albeit due to unusual circumstances, the courts being additional to the normal courts and 
located in the Magistrates' Retiring room. One magistrate related his experiences of this type of 
court. "i've sat round a table in the Retiring room and used that as a court, .. and I dont think 
we suffered any lack of dignity. We were at the end of a very big table and the clerk on one side 
and the defendant on the other. The answer is Yes, we could all sit round a table, apart from 
dangerous defendants". The main area of concern expressed to me by the magistrates centred 
on the problem of being able to create a less formal courtroom environment whilst at the same 
time ensuring that the authority and the dignity of the courts are preserved. One magistrate 
spoke to me quite extensively on this topic and the dilemma which it generated. Tm not 
altogether sure whether we should change the structure or how we should change it. But yes 
certain procedures should be changed and certain language and attitudes. .. I think some of 
the language could be changed, it's archaic and I would hate to be referred to as Your worship' 
or even 'Ma'm'. Language in court can be very pompous, ... the language is stupid. But I still 
think we should have a certain structure .. I think the structure of the court and the way the 
defendants view the Bench and what these magistrates are representing is important. I think we 
have to keep that sense of status and dignity so that it is respected... But I think the procedure 
of the court could be changed and the language could be changed as long as we are all aware 
that we are there to guard our own rights and everybody else's rights". This magistrate also 
warned against de-formalising the proceedings too far, "I just feel that if it was structured 
differently so that everyone was at the same level, .. Would we still have the same respect? .. 
If we haven't got something to look up to, don't we construct something that we can look up to 
and respect and surely we ought to be looking up to law and order, surely that ought to be part 
of the system. If going to court meant going and sitting in a nice cosy office and just having a 
chat with someone across a desk and being handed a cup of coffee while it was sorted out, 
nobody's going to pay a great deal of attention to that kind of procedure”.
B1.3.10 In being concerned for the dignity of the defendants, the problems
experienced bv the other court users, and the victims in particular, should not 
be ignored.
My approach to the interviews with the magistrates was in some areas focused on the 
plight and the treatment of the defendants. I was reminded by some of the magistrates with 
whom I spoke that there are also a number of other people who may feel that they have 
received adverse treatment from the justice system as practised in the magistrates' courts. As 
one magistrate told me, ".. and not all people with authority in court come off all that well, I 
often see policemen and women embarrassed and humiliated, you know the solicitors can 
sometimes tear them to shreads if they haven't got their evidence together. So I think we are all 
there, potentially we can all make fools of ourselves or be made fools of cant we". Another
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magistrate expressed his concern for the dignity and respect of the witnesses. As he explained,
"I think one of the greatest sins that a solicitor can impose on the court.. is that he abuses the 
witness,.. So I think in the terms of the attitude of the court, solicitors must be brought up so 
that there is no intentional embarrassment, if there is embarrassment then it should be 
redressed as quickly as possible". The reasoning behind this particular magistrate's thinking is 
that,".. we've got witnesses coming to court now in spite of, in many cases, great provocation, 
nobbling, they still come, they're doing a service. Is it right they should be abused, verbally 
lashed, told they are lying, told what they are saying is a pack of lies?". This magistrate was 
concerned that unless witnesses are treated with due respect by the courts and protected 
against humiliation and abuse, Will they consider ever coming to court as a witness again, 
and the answer is no. Who suffers there? It's justice". This magistrate not only saw it as the 
court chaiman's job to offer some protection against the abuse of witnesses, but he also had a 
'golden rule', "That any witness, whether you feel he's told a pack of lies or not, is to be thanked 
for coming to court and for his evidence". Another magistrate expressed concern for the victim, 
especially in the cases where the defendant has pleaded guilty. In this magistrate's own words,
7 mean most of us, I'm sure, recognise the fact that the solicitor is there, on behalf of his client, 
to tell a very one sided story and there are problems inherent with that, because for example, 
and this is something that really bothers me, the victim, in a lot of cases where the defendant 
pleads guilty, can have their reputations sullied because there is no one to speak for them. The 
solicitor is able to give his or her side of the story, [the defendant's], and tear to pieces the 
victim because the victim is not there. They don't even know that that person is in court on that 
day, because nobody bothers to tell them. We also have to recognise that the CPS is being 
very objective, .... he's there to represent the case for the police, he doesn't particularly care 
about the victim, because he's probably never seen the victim".
B1.3.11 Some of the regular defendants at court can be more experienced than the
magistrates.
During my interviews with the magistrates. I asked them for their views on Carlen's, 
description of the defendant as the 'dummy player1, (Carlen, 1976, p42). The reaction from one 
of the lay magistrates was spontaneous and drew a very strong response. Prior to this, this 
particular magistrate had expressed considerable concern for the defendant's plight. "But come 
on Gordon, a lot of the defendants that we see in court have been there before many times. 
Some of them know exactly how to play the system, ..an awful lot of our clients have been 
before many times, they know the system better than we do. I bet there are some people who 
go to the magistrates' courts who've been there more times than I have Once again though 
all of the magistrates were concerned that the members of the Bench are able to , recognise 
if this is someone's first appearance in court and .. just help them through it". Another ~ 
magistrate was of the opinion, ".. that if the defendant needs help then it should be given, 
especially an unrepresented one, and here I can pay tribute to the clerks and to the majority of
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the prosecution in that they dont seem to take advantage of the unrepresented client, ..they in 
turn seem to help out". The stipendiary magistrate was somewhat critical of Carien's analogy of 
comparing the courtroom procedure with a game. He told me, "It can be that, I've seen it 
degenerate to that on occasions, But I think she's overstating the situation to make a point. The 
one thing you cant do is generalise with these things, you know it's alright making these 
sweeping assertions but you can never generalise in relation to these situations".
B1.4 Power and influence.
".. unfortunately there are some magistrates 
who do take too seriously what the solicitors 
say and that’s the older ones really.. "
(a lay-magistrate)
B1.4.1 The magistrates have the power, but how they arrive at their decisions is by all 
sorts of devious methods.
"But the power does ultimately reside with the magistrate .. because they can send 
somebody away. They have the power to do just that. .. I have the power to send somebody 
away for twelve months... So I have the power”. There is no doubt from this example quoted 
by the stipendiary magistrate that the magistrates have been given quite considerable 
sentencing powers. I also asked the question whether or not the magistrates also have wider 
powers, for example, the power not only to direct the court but also the power, if they so wish, 
to manipulate it? The stipendiary magistrate replied, "Yes I would say that I have the power to 
do it, or I can do it up to a point". He also told me that because of his experience both as a 
solicitor and as a magistrate, experience which is not common to the majority of lay 
magistrates, "I also have the power from knowing what the advocates are up to, not only that, 
but they know that I know, so that gives me the edge". But what I was interested in was how, 
having been given the power, the magistrates actually arrived at their decisions. On this 
particular point I found the stipendiary magistrate both vague and definitely noncommittal. He 
told me "How they arrive at that decision? To do it might be all sorts of devious ways and I don't 
know". A lay magistrate told me, "You have to listen to what's being said and forget what's 
being inferred and forget what's between the lines and you just have to make your own mind 
up. That's what we are here for anyway, isn't it?" I asked this magistrate whether or not being 
amateurs, the lay magistrates are manipulated by the professionals without realising it? I was 
told, "It sometimes works against them, [the professionals], Because sometimes you get into 
the Retiring Room and you've listened to what's been said and you just know what is right and 
you've got the power at the end of the day to override what they are saying. At the end of it you 
can just say, 'Right, weli this is our decision. This is what we feel about it', and you can 
sometimes let your instincts come in, because instinct has got a part to play in this, otherwise 
why bother having us, why not just train professionals”.
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B1.4.2 Some magistrates are too easily influenced bv solicitors.
But if the magistrates are the decision makers, who are the people who have the 
greatest influence on their decisions? In the words of the stipendiary magistrate, "It is said that, 
'A trial in England is to decide who's got the best lawyer'..". But in practice, how influential are 
the advocates in actually persuading the magistrates? The stipendiary continued, "I dont know, 
it depends on the day doesnt it, how it stn'kes you, as to how much you listen and how much 
you take in. I've sometimes thought, 'Yes, he's got a good point', I've had my mind changed, not 
very often, but occasionally by a good advocate". That was one professional's view of other 
professionals, but what about the advocate's ability to influence the lay bench? The stipendiary 
told me that in his opinion, magistrates appeared to be influenced too easily. "I think some 
magistrates appear, it would be wrong to say they do, but appear not necessarily to think about 
what they are actually asked to decide... ". This happens particularly on those occasions when 
the prosecution and the defence are in agreement as to some course of action, and the 
magistrates appear too eager to concur rather than standing away from it and asking 
themselves, 'What are we being asked to do'?. One of the lay magistrates was even more 
critical of the way that some colleagues allow themselves to be influenced by certain 
advocates, this is not always by the power of their arguments either, but sometimes because of 
the esteem in which those advocates are held. I was told, " .. unfortunately there are some 
magistrates who do take too senously what the solicitors say and that's the older ones mainly, 
... They sit there and are very impressed by solicitors because they are very rich peopie".
'  B1.4.2.1 - the CPS presentations are mainly factual whilst many of the defence
advocates' presentations are clouded bv subjectivity.
"The CPS presentations are very factual, so I listen to what they say, but you 
sometimes get an impression that they are not telling you as much as they ought to be telling 
you, or that they dont know the case very well". I found this opinion as voiced by one lay 
magistrate to be quite representative of the views of a number of magistrates. Conversely this 
same magistrate’s perception of the defence advocates was, "The defence solicitor, I filter what 
he is saying, I try to filter the facts from the subjectivity that clouds them. / switch off when they 
start telling me what a wonderful person this is and how they have lived an unblemished life. 
Besides I'm not absolutely sure a lot of the time whether that is relevant to what is being said to 
us". This magistrate continued, "You learn to read certain solicitors as well, because if the 
solicitor is very effusive about his clients, like certain of our solicitors are, then you learn to read 
when he is not being effusive, so you get certain clues from that". I did ask how important the 
performance of the advocate was in the court room and I was told by the professional 
magistrate, 7 wouldn't take it out of a defendant because he had got a bad solicitor. .. In terms 
of his own career, well the better he is the more customers he'll get, it's as simple as that". 
From this comment therefore it would appear that the advocate's performance is more relevant 
to commercial success than it is to whether or not a person obtains or is denied justice.
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B1.4.3 The probation report, the professional and the amateur interpretations - a
conflict of opinion.
In the opinion of one stipendiary magistrate, the Probation Service are useful as a 
source of background information pertaining to a particular defendant but he had very serious 
doubts about their ability to influence the magistrates in their decision making role. As he 
explained, "I dont think the Probation Service have a great deal of influence. I have to say, I 
think they have minimal input in relation to matters. .. / think they're very good at doing the 
solicitor's job and providing you with background information but in respect of the force of 
recommendations, I have strong reservations about how much notice is taken of these". He 
went on to explain the reasoning behind his statement, 7 accept that they, [the Probation 
Service], are not there to recommend custody, they are there to recommend anything but and 
that's the basis on which I look at a probation report.. they provide a range of options, some 
which I may accept, some of which I dont But they are not there to send anybody down and 
you have to weed through and say well this -is'serious I developed this professional 
magistrate's view of probation reports, (Pre-Sentence Reports), in my discussions with the lay 
magistrates whom I interviewed. I was told that in a number of areas there are reports which 
are seen to achieve an acceptable standard and there are those which are considered to be 
very poor. In expressing a personal view one lay magistrate told me, "I'm certainly worried 
about the wide variety of standards. On the one hand they are poorly constructed and 
presented. Reports where the verbage that is used, the bad construction, the poor techniques 
used, tend to say, '.. what on earth have we got here', and you go ahead and sentence and 
you tend to push it on to one side". But on other occasions, "You have a report and it's a 
clincher because you feel it summarises so well, so accurately all that has been said by the 
prosecution and the defence and the defendants and really the options that are stated for 
sentencing are good". It was also claimed that a good report can bring out the really important 
matters which are not immediately evident even to an experienced bench who may see the 
defendant in the courtroom for no more than a few minutes, "..family problems, ..educational 
problems, ..mental illness, ..mental disabilities.." So in general this lay magistrate did see the 
probation report as, important, certainly on sentencing,.. it gives you the relevant features". 
But the Pre-Sentence Reports are also seen by magistrates to be susceptible not only to the 
prejudices of the writer but also to those of the readers. As one magistrate commented, "It is 
written by humans for humans, so take it for what it is. Look at it, look through it. ..Now in that 
respect, we're putting them on trust, we're trusting their judgement, because they are giving us 
a filtered version through their eyes". This magistrate did conclude on a cautionary note, "Now 
what degree of trust can you place in every report? It varies".
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B1.4.4 The clerks can manipulate benches, unquestionably.
"/ think clerks can manipulate benches, unquestionably, and it depends on the 
communication skills of the clerk and how determined that clerk is to influence, and they can 
make a significant difference".Th\s was the view of one very experienced magistrate. Another 
magistrate told me, "If I'm not absolutely sure then I would take into consideration what the 
clerk has to say". But again it appears that this could well depend upon who the clerk is and 
what level of credibility he or she has with those particular magistrates. This magistrate 
continued, "There are some clerks who might come in and have certain attitudes and I might 
not take much notice of that". The practice in the study area when the magistrates retire to 
consider either their verdict or their sentence, is that they will send for the clerk only when they 
feel the need to consult and seek advice on either the legal aspects of the case or on 
sentencing practice. This, I was told, is not always the practice which is necessarily adopted by 
all of the English courts. I was told of a court where, the chairman stood and said, 'The 
bench will retire and we will ask our clerk to accompany us'. We were under instruction that this 
would happen. .. Sometimes we asked guidance on our powers of sentencing whilst the clerks 
were in,.. Some left us to get on with it .. One or two clerks.. would stay in whilst we discussed 
innocence and guilt and indeed sentencing. Some stayed with us all the time and some older 
and not necessarily highly qualified clerks, they would tend to be very forthright in their views 
and they would, if not tell us what to do, certainly point us very much into the direction of what 
they felt the penalty should be and indeed guilt and innocence, although that was quite rare". In 
answer to my question on whether or not magistrates are influenced by the 'hard to conceal' 
non-verbal reactions which the court clerks sometimes exhibit when they are informed about 
decisions with which they do not agree. I was told by one magistrate, "I'm concerned, yes, I 
don't know whether it influences me, it concerns me, and then I feel, perhaps we should spend 
a little bit more time and have a little bit more discussion in the light of what the clerk had to 
say".
B1.5 The magistrates' perception of the defendant.
"So I think from the defendant's 
point of view, they dont necessarily 
want to see a professional and efficient 
court as long as they feel they're getting 
justice"
(a lay magistrate)
B1.5.1 There should be a presumption of innocence, unless there are telltale signs.
I was told by one lay magistrate that, "We have to remember that when they, [the 
defendants], walk through the door, these people have been accused of something but we dont 
know whether it is true or not". The presumption of innocence was seen by this magistrate to be 
the basic requirement that must be acknowledged by the courts and because of this the 
defendants should be given every opportunity to put their cases to the court in the best possible 
light. As this magistrate put it, we cant expect someone to walk into a court and stand there
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and have to defend themselves. They might be inarticulate, they might be frightened, they might 
be nervous, they might have some sort of problem. We couldn't possibly inflict that on them". If 
this magistrate demonstrated one view of how defendants are perceived by magistrates, during 
the course of my interviews I also became aware that not all magistrates necessarily start off 
from this presumption all of the time. Another magistrate, during our conversation, did give an 
indication that magistrates may also have some pre-conceptions about certain types of 
defendants who appear before them. I was told how there are clues which can give an 
indication as to a defendant's background. An example quoted was, " .. where you see 
somebody come into court, either in the dock or in front of the dock, and stand withr their hands 
behind them”. I was told that this shows, ".. straightaway to an observant magistrate that is the 
product of a Young Offenders Institution. I mean we don't have to have a cnminal record, we 
know that it is there and we know that he's already been through a caution, fine.....
B1.S.2 An efficiently run court or justice, a matter of priorities.
During my observations from the well of the court I did gain the impression that those 
courts in which the stipendiary magistrates adjudicated were, by and large, conducted in a 
more efficient manner than those courts chaired by a lay magistrate. I expressed this view to 
the lay magistrates whom I interviewed. This did cause one lay magistrate to query how 
important being dealt with by an efficient court really mattered to the defendant. From this 
magistrate's point of view, "I don't know whether if I were a defendant, and I wasn't very 
articulate and I wasn't very intelligent, or if I was a little bit frightened of authority. Then I might 
feel better if I went to court and saw people like me sitting up there. I might not feel that I'm 
going to get away with what I've done, but at least I will be feeling that I'm being judged by my 
peers... So in a way the court might not be running as smoothly as a stipendiary might run it. 
The person in the chair might not be as articulate, but he's talking the same language, or she is 
talking the same language as the people who are standing in front of him. .. Because 
sometimes people are very frightened when they come into court and they're frightened very 
often because of that kind of professional middle class accent that sometimes sits up there. .. 
So I think from the defendants point of view, they don't necessarily want to see a professional 
and efficient court as long as they feel they're getting justice".
B1.5.3 The language of the courtroom, a conspiracy against the defendant.
Claims have been made that many of the defendants who attend at court fail to 
understand either the proceedings to which they have been a party or even the decisions that 
have been reached and how it effects them, (Carlen, 1976, p22). This claim was not strongly 
disputed by any of the magistrates whom I interviewed, although as has been previously 
discussed it is not always considered prudent to generalise on this matter. But it was admitted 
that among the less experienced attenders at the courts then these claims were not without 
some justification. In conversation some suggestions were even proffered as to the reasons for
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these failings. According to one magistrate there were a number of contributing factors, *.. the 
strange surroundings. They're anxious, the majority must be anxious if it's their first 
appearance. .. They know where to go, they appear, they dont know what to expect, they've 
got certain ideas, they may appear to be streetwise but really they dont know what's going on.". 
Another confusing factor was claimed to be the legal jargon which is extensively used in the 
courtrooms. In the words of one of the lay magistrates, "..and the language. I mean the 
prosecutor, you need a law degree, he speaks in a 'pseudo-legalised dialect'. The defending 
solicitor is his only friend, but he speaks the other-language as well... In that respect there is a 
conspiracy against the defendant". This magistrate maintained that the onus is on the 
magistrates, not only to meet the legal requirements when making the pronouncements to the 
court, but also to ensure that the defendant understands by translating the meaning of that 
pronouncement into a language that the defendant cannot fail but understand.
B1.6 The magistrates' perception of themselves and other court users.
"We are there to look at people who are 
there from ordinary backgrounds, or whatever 
backgrounds, and we are there to make 
judgements on them,.. If we are going to 
do that we have to understand what their life 
is like and if we dont do that, if we are cut off 
from that, then we shouldnt be doing the job".
(a lay magistrate).
B1.6.1 The public perception is that magistrates are middle aged, middle class and 
not very streetwise.
In their study of the magistrates' courts, Parker, Sumner and Jarvis asked, 'Quite how 
streetwise a largely middle aged, middle class magistracy is remains a matter for some 
speculation', (Parker et al, 1989, p60). During the course of my interviews with the lay 
magistrates I asked for their reaction to this statement. The first magistrate I interviewed told 
me, "I'd agree with that", but then went on to qualify the response by telling me that the 
statement is not as true as it would have been some fifteen years or so ago. This was in part 
due to the efforts of recent Lord Chancellors to attract and appoint people from both a wider 
social base as well as from younger age groups. A second magistrate told me that the 
statement was also an accurate reflection of the general public's perception of the magistracy. 
When first approached to see if she would be interested in putting her name forward for 
consideration for the magistracy, this magistrate had been rather reluctant, because I 
thought, 'Oh no, I dont want to join that brigade of be-hatted and be-spectacled people', and so 
I have to say that I was pleasantly surprised because they are not all middle aged, middle class 
.. and not very streetwise, although I think a few of the older ones are like that". But it was the 
view of both lay magistrates whom I interviewed that the Benches do remain predominantly 
middle aged and middle class and that there is a need to broaden the social strata from that 
which the majority of magistrates are currently appointed.
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B1.6.1.1-the Daily Mirror, the gateway to the magistracy for the working classes ?
Traditionally the majority of magistrates appear to have been recruited through a 
restricted network, either from organisations mainly of political, trade or business affiliation, or 
more commonly by the personal recommendation of someone who was already part of the 
magisterial system. As one magistrate recalled, "How did we get appointed? Who were our 
points of contact? Very, very few indeed had sought appointment, it had all been done by 
recommendations, the network. Middle aged, yes. Middle class, yes, but I see a change, a 
broadening of the net without question”. This broadening of the net to which this particular 
magistrate referred was the policy of , ".. various Lord Chancellors .. in trying to extend the 
base, even to the extent of advertising in the Daily Mirror". In the opinion of this particular 
magistrate, now if that doesn't catch one end of the spectrum, then I dont know what will". 
But is getting the required message to the *working classes' all that is required in order to 
ensure that the magistracy becomes more representative of the society from which it is drawn? 
According to another magistrate this is a problem which has got much wider implications 
because, *.. people from the working class, if they are lucky enough to have a job, cant get the 
time off to be magistrates, cant afford to be a magistrate and.. if they've got a job it might work 
against them if they're on the Bench and they are asking for time off, or they might work for a 
particular company, or whatever, who wont give them time off”. This magistrate expressed 
concern about the barriers which prevent these people from putting themselves forward for 
selection. Their non-availability was seen to be very much to the detriment of the magistracy as 
a whole because, "There's an awful lot of bright people out there".
B1.6.1.2 - magistrates, of whatever background, are rust one part of the magistrates' 
courts system and as such are expected to conform to it's culture.
During the course of these interviews, I did express an opinion that after magistrates 
have spent a period of time as members of the Bench, it is often difficult to tell those 
magistrates who had been appointed from working class backgrounds from those who had not.
I asked whether over time it was thought that magistrates do adopt 'middle class values'? One 
of the magistrates interviewed agreed with my assessment, "Yes very often they do, they start 
talking differently and become very pretentious. I’m being very general because not every one is 
like this, but I've noticed an awful lot of people who talk with peculiar accents from the ‘working 
class' who are on the Bench". A second magistrate saw it more as an overall levelling process 
which takes place within the Bench. I was told, "I think they mostly modify through contact and it 
is very much a levelling up or a levelling down, depends where you start".This magistrate saw 
this levelling process as being, all to the good of the Bench I think". I then queried, if this 
theory was correct, was there not a danger that magistrates, both as individuals and as a 
Bench, could become stereotyped? This magistrate did concede that there was a danger that 
some of the individuality and common sense for which the magistrates are appointed may be 
stifled but insisted that there was also a requirement for magistrates to, "..fall into the ethos of
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the court, its traditions of centuries. We are just one part of the court". This point of view was 
not however necessarily shared by all the members of the Bench. In the opinion of another 
magistrate, the whole essence of the lay magistracy is that people should be selected for their 
independence of thought and the ability to express their views. In support of this argument I 
was told, " Surely the whole concept of the magistracy is that we bring in people who are not 
doing the job everyday, who bring their everyday experience to the Bench, ..and they're 
hopefully revitalising the system by bringing everyday life, because that's what we're there for 
really".
B1.6.1.3 - the need for local knowledge, the amateur and the professional views.
The Lord Chancellor will not normally appoint any lay magistrate, ' ..who does not 
reside in the area of the commission or within 15 miles of it's boundaries'. One magistrate was 
in total agreement with this instruction which is part of the guidelines issued for the Lord 
Chancellor's Local Advisory Committees. The thinking behind this instruction is to try and 
ensure that the magistrates who are appointed have,".. a feel for what the local area is feeling". 
This theme was also taken up by a second magistrate who told me, "We are there to look at 
people who are from ordinary backgrounds, or from whatever backgrounds, and we are there to 
make judgements on them and if we are going to do that, we have to understand what their life 
is like and if we dont do that, if we are cut off from that, then we should not be doing the job". 
The stipendiary magistrate, whilst not disputing the benefits which local knowledge brings to the 
Bench, did highlight the difficulties of living locally for the professional magistrate who is sitting 
everyday and is well known to a certain 'clientele'. He told me, "I dont live in the area and that 
is a good thing and a bad thing. I think it is a good thing on the basis that I can live a normal life. 
I dont think I would if I lived in the middle of [], I think I'd be looking over my shoulder all the 
time. But by the same token, when you dont live somewhere you're not quite as 'au fait' with 
local demands and needs".
B1.6.2 Advocates are seen as pompous, arrogant and disrespectful.
In the words of one lay magistrate, ". and the solicitors are so laid back and some 
solicitors are so pompous and arrogant a lot of the time and alright they are there for the 
defendants' rights but I think there's an awful lot of those solicitors I wouldnt choose to 
represent me". One of the professional magistrates also expressed an opinion about the 
behaviour and attitudes of certain solicitors towards the Bench. I was told, "I'm not happy in the 
way that some advocates treat magistrates at all. They dont behave like that with me, they 
know they wouldnt get away with it if they did". He then went on to elaborate on this point, ". .a 
number of them are fairly disrespectful to the lay justices, which I dont like at all. They wouldnt 
say it to the lay justices, but I've heard advocates refer to the Bench as, '.. those wooden tops' 
and things like that, and at times there is a measure of disrespect bordering on .. a little dumb 
insolence which I think is deplorable". During the course of my interviews with these
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magistrates, I was also told about the the way that advocates brief colleagues on the qualities 
and traits of individual justices, ".. avoid that one, adjourn if you get in front of so and so .. 
There seems little doubt therefore that advocates do attempt and quite often succeed in 
manipulating the system to the benefit of both themselves and their clients. Neither are these 
ploys reserved solely for use in the courts adjudicated by the lay magistrates. This stipendiary 
magistrate admitted, "I can see peopie manipulating cases out of my clutches now when they 
see there is any risk..
B1.6.2.1 - advocates are seen to come between the magistrates and the truth.
During my interviews I also broached the subject raised as a result of the Parker 
study of the late nineteen-eighties that, 'Defence lawyers were therefore perceived as inhibiting 
magistrates' search for the truth of the case', (Parker et al, 1989, p98). One magistrate told me, 
"I agree in every r e s p e c tand in particular when, "..the defence is so weak and by adopting 
a smoke screen they do come between the truth, us and the defendant". This particular 
magistrate did not see this particular tactic as presenting too much of a problem to the more 
experienced magistrates. As he said, "This is where I think the skill of perception which is 
gradually enhanced over the years is useful, .. you can soon pick out the smoke screen". But 
neither did this magistrate look upon this type of ploy favourably. In his opinion, "They're really 
doing nothing for their client at all.. you know the one I mean, who almost brings tears to your 
eyes. Does he do his client a service? If his case is so weak, it will be shown and he will regret 
i t Despite these reservations, a second lay magistrate insisted that the defence advocate is 
an essential part of the adversarial system in the magistrates' courts and especially in respect 
of trials. This magistrate recognised that the defence advocate is there to do a specific job and 
it is up to the magistrates to be aware of what these aims and objectives are. 7 mean most of 
us, I'm sure, recognise the fact that the solicitor is there on behalf of his client to tell a very one 
sided story... So yes, I feel that the solicitor has to be there and I feel that the magistrates have 
to be properly trained to be aware of the fact that what they are telling us is very subjective".
B1.6.2.2 - defence advocates, but whose side are they on?
I put to some of the magistrates whom I interviewed the claims made by some of the 
defendants in the Baldwin and McConville study that, '..they had found it difficult to decide 
whose side their barrister was on so closely involved did he appear to be with the prosecutor*, 
(Baldwin and McConville, 1977, p85). One of the lay magistrates agreed that it is not difficult to 
see why defendants could get that impression and that defence solicitors need to take care that 
their clients are not sent messages which are capable of being misinterpreted. I was told, "I 
think solicitors ought to remember when they are in court and they are defending somebody, 
that person may feel offended if they see him chatting to the CPS. I mean I would be offended.. 
if the CPS was presenting the case in an unfavourable way and making me out as bad and 
foolish or evil, or whatever, and then I saw my solicitor having a chat or a coffee with him
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afterwards". The stipendiary magistrate was also aware of these dangers but was very much of 
the opinion that it was more likely to occur in the Crown court than it was in the magistrates' 
courts. The reason that this situation was more likely to occur amongst barristers was, " .. 
simply because they may be in the same chambers, they may share a room,.. the people who 
are on opposite sides, .. may be very good friends. But that doesn't stop them being beastly to 
each other in court". This magistrate conceded that it could all be criticised as, ".. a bit of a 
game". A game or not, I was also told of instances where advantage is gained by some 
experienced advocates at the expense of new and inexperienced prosecutors. In the words of 
the stipendiary, "Some very weak prosecutors who come in very young, 'wet behind the ears 
prosecutors', and I've seen them manipulated by very experienced defence advocates into 
taking lines that somebody far more experienced in prosecuting would never take, I've seen 
them leaned on quite substantially".
B1.6.2.3 - credibility is important if  only for the commercial benefits it brings.
I discussed at some length with one of the magistrates the importance that the 
advocate attaches to maintaining credibility with the Bench. In the course of this discussion it 
became apparant that in the opinion of this magistrate, credibility with the Bench is vital 
because, he's appearing daily in front of you, his bread and butter depends on you and how 
much and how reasonably you appreciate him and his credibility". But I was told that credibility 
is not only important to the solicitor-magistrate relationship, it also applies to the solicitor-client 
relationship. The solicitors have also to be seen by the clients to be representing their interests. 
This only becomes a problem when the client instructs the advocate to present the case in a 
way which either conflicts with the advice of the advocate, or alternatively might be seen to 
insult the intelligence of the court. This situation can create something of a dilemma for the 
solicitor, " ..because the client says, 'Look you tell them this is the situation or I'll clear off and 
see somebody else'. So he's got to get round the problem, .. He has to maintain certain 
standards otherwise he would lose everything and therefore he'd start losing clients on that 
basis. So he's got to signal to you in some ways, '.. that these are not my ideas but I'm asked 
to put forward the argument on behalf of my client, take it for what it is'. Where a solicitor says, 
'I'm specifically instructed to say such and such', he clearly is representing his client by putting 
forward the argument, ..but he's trying to preserve at least something of a relationship with the 
bench But in the opinion of this magistrate it is not an easy course of action to take, "It's 
dangerous, it's dangerous".
B1.6.3 A non-custodial policy, an edifice built by the Probation Service?
"So I suppose it must be very difficult for a probation officer to actually say, 7 cant 
help this person, this person should be locked away'. I think it is a difficulty, .. So they're 
treading a thin line between us and them arent they". This was an opinion expressed by one 
magistrate during a discussion which centred on the role of the probation officer as an 'officer
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of the court’ or a 'friend of the defendant'. A second magistrate was more forceful in his views 
on the probation officer role. In expressing his opinion on the subject he said, "I think the first 
thing that ought to be uppermost in their minds and it never is, ..a  probation officer is an officer 
of the court, one of the functions of the court is to protect the public and to have the public's 
interests at heart. That, I see is conspicuously absent in each and every probation report and in 
that respect they are never balanced". I did venture to suggest to this magistrate that perhaps 
the probation officer’s job these days is to keep people out of prison. In reply to this suggestion 
I was told, 7 would pose the question, who has said it is their job? Their Association gives these 
guidelines out. By whom are they approved? Are they agreed by other court users or not? This 
is an edifice that is built by the Probation Service and it is one of the factors that's bringing the 
Probation Service into disrepute". Both of the lay magistrates whom I interviewed queried the 
objectivity of the probation officers and both agreed that the officers could be accused of 
having leanings towards leniency in sentencing terms. One of the magistrates very , much 
resented what he described as,".. the misuse, the abuse of terms like 'society' which litter some 
reports .. ". On hearing this comment, I was prompted to ask this particular magistrate if he 
considered the probation officer to be more a social worker than an officer of the court? I was 
told, "Yes very much so, I'm very strongly of that opinion. .. The pendulum has swung very 
much the wrong way. ..A very significant minority of the probation officers that I came across 
first in my career as a magistrate, they had ex-service backgrounds, either as regulars or as 
National Servicemen and they had an entirely different attitude to what we see now". But it was 
emphasised by this magistrate that, "Their job is not to sentence, it is their job to advise upon 
the options that are available to us with the client's suitability". But this magistrate concluded, 
"But it really is a job for us to disentangle the contents of the reports for political attitudes and 
correctness".
B1.6.3.1- probation officers cannot anticipate who the sentencers are going to be.
I did pose the question during my discusions with the magistrates whether or not it 
was considered feasible that the probation officers could 'tailor make' their probation reports, 
(PSRs), for specific magistrates or benches? In answering my question, the stipendiary 
magistrate first dealt with the lay bench, "Well no, they have National Standards now. I mean 
they don't know who they are going to come in front of, they have no idea, no idea". But what 
about the stipendiary magistrate I asked. I was told, "Well you might have some idea who might 
deal with it. But no, ..they haven't a clue who's sitting and I get switched so frequently anyway 
that I could be anywhere, so they couldn't
B1.6.4 Some inter-group relationships can produce pecuniary benefits?
In discussing inter-group relationships, the topic of certain individuals gaining financial 
advantage was again raised. I was once again told of certain suspicions, but suspicions that 
could not be substantiated. I was told, "That I think is curious and it was something that bugged
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me.. was that the people, (the advocates), who got the most work were the people who got on 
best with the police and I could never understand that But there it was, they were playing the 
system somewhere along the line, the advocates obviously, or the police, who seemed to feel
that these advocates would go so far but perhaps no further  But it's an area that has
existed, let's say no more than that, and the individual solicitor who was 'spikey' wouldn't 
necessarily get recommendations because he was known to be an awkward devil
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B2 THE COURT STAFFS' PERCEPTION.
B2.1 The roles of the court clerk and the court usher.
B2.1.1 The role of the court clerk.
The role of the court clerks in the magistrates' court is multi-faceted in that they are 
the legal advisers to the magistrates, they are the administrators with the task of ensuring the 
continuity of business through the courts and they are also frequently called upon to be the 
arbiters and decision makers in the inter-personal and inter-group conflicts which occur within 
the day to day operation of the magistrates' courts. The extent to which any of these duties is 
carried out depends on a number of factors. For example, whether the court in which they are 
working is presided over by a stipendiary magistrate or a bench of lay magistrates? If it is a lay 
bench, whether or not the chairman of that specific bench is seen as competent or otherwise? 
Finally, whether the prosecution and defence advocates are well enough prepared when they 
come into court on the day so that the business can proceed and the court's workload dealt with 
in an efficient and judicious manner? I was told by the Justices' Clerk, that whilst the court 
clerk's role as the legal advisor to the lay magistrates is a vital function, "..if you're looking at 
the clerk as a legal advisor, you could almost always say that the 'stipe' will not want him, but 
not always even then". Again, as an administrator, the court clerk has a much greater role to 
play in the court where a lay bench is sitting than when the court is being controlled by the 
stipendiary magistrate, "..and much of that is to do with the 'stipes' experience, ..because he 
sits every day and as a practitioner knowing his way round the ins and outs of the support 
systems, ..which a lay bench really have no hope of picking up". These views of the Justices' 
Clerk were also endorsed by one of the court clerks who participated in the interviews. I was 
told, "As far as we're concerned sitting with a stipendiary magistrate is having a bit of a rest to 
be quite honest”. The same court clerk told me that when working in the court with a lay bench, 
"The job is stressful". It was explained that the level of this stress depends very much on the 
competence of the chairman of the lay bench. "The chairman influences a lot of things, if you've 
got a good chairman you know it's going to be alright". As far as keeping the courts busy and 
ensuring that the business of the courts was carried through in an effective way, the court 
clerks, to whom I spoke, did not feel that they could exert too much influence in this matter 
because this rested very much in the hands of the other court users and in particular the 
advocates. As one court clerk stated, "Whatever we do, whatever we say, however we try to 
get things moving, if they are not in a position to do anything, what can we do, we cant do 
anything".
B2.1.2 I asked. *What are vour basic instructions, as ushers, in respect of running 
the court ?'
This was one of the questions which I asked one of the court ushers in the course of
an interview. I also asked the supplementary question, ' What is your training and your31
function'? I found that the court usher was quite eager to give me his reply. He told me "I half 
anticipated this question because it’s my 'pet hobby-horse',. You are not basically trained. You 
are just given to somebody and they say, 'Just follow him and do what he does .. So nobody 
ever at any time said to me these are your duties, other than are written down on my job 
description. .. You know where to stand people to take the oath". So how do the court ushers 
develop their 'skills'? 'You just follow somebody and adopt their style for a bit. Then you notice 
that the ushers have different ways of running a court. .. So everybody develops their own 
style. But nobody actually ever said, ' This is how we run a court, this is why we do it this way, 
other than your job description. Keep order in court, assist the the court clerk in the smooth 
running of the process'.. ". I then asked, 'If part of the court ushers' role was to ensure that 
deference is granted to the magistrates by the other court users'? I had observed in court that 
not only do the ushers instruct every one to stand each time the magistrates enter or leave the 
courtroom, but they were also seen to intercept whenever the defendants or witnesses tried to 
pass any items to the bench. The usher told me that these actions signified nothing other than 
efforts to uphold the dignity of the court. He did agree that these acts do take place, "Well that 
happens yes, but there again I would have thought that is only done, .. to uphold the dignity of 
the process of the court, not simply because, well I cant imagine a situation where you'd have a 
witness saying, Tve got this bit of paper, here you are mate'. You cant have it because this 
then brings it down to a level which is not right". The court usher sees a part of his job as giving 
help and assistance to those people in the court waiting areas who are in need of it. These are 
mainly the first time attenders at court, "Well he's never been here before, he doesnt know the 
ropes and you do tend to look after them differently". While the ushers are seen as an important 
part of the court staff they are not necessarily viewed by the defendants as a part of the 
establishment. As I was told by one court usher, "You're sort of the buffer between the court 
and them".
B2.2 Justice and organisational efficiency.
"I think it is right to say that we are 
putting pressure on them, [the defence 
solicitors], I'm sure that is right, but it's 
a matter of again, the extent of the pressure 
and whether it's done, to use the phrase, 
judiciously".
(the Justices' Clerk)
B2.2.1 Justice has the capability of being subjugated to organisational efficiency.
In answer to the claim that 'Justice is subjugated to organisational efficiency', (Carfen, 
1976, p20), the Justices' Clerk whom I interviewed conceded that, ". it has that capability, I 
think the longest standing version of that has been the need to get on with cases at a certain 
pace". He told me about specific areas of legislation which bad been implemented over the last 
forty years where the main intention had been to improve the organisational efficiency of the 
courts. "The 1957 Magistrates' Court Act which ..allowed guilty pleas by post. Prior to that
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defendants had to turn up at court and plead guilty in person. ..The 1967 Criminal Justice Act 
which allowed for committals without, [the magistrates], considering the evidence..". But this 
Justices' Clerk said that in his opinion, " ..the impact of legislation like that on justice is minimal 
in the sense that those who are going to plead guilty will plead guilty whether they do it by post 
or in person. Those who concede that there is a case to answer at committal would have liked 
to have conceded it before the 'paper' committal was invented by and large".
B2.2.1.1 - the pressure to proceed and not to adjourn is not always detrimental to 
justice.
The question was asked, 'Does the cash limiting of the courts and the challenging by 
the magistrates of the need to adjourn cases, put pressure on people in the magistrates' court 
system and in particular those who have the responsibility for preparing and presenting the 
accused person's defence, pressure which could adversely affect that preparation and 
presentation? The Justices' Clerk admitted that there was always a danger that this could 
happen, but in conceding that, he emphasised that this should not be the case. He told me "I 
think it’s right to say we are putting pressure on them, I'm sure that's right, but it's a matter 
again, the extent of the pressure and whether or not it's done, to use the phrase, judiciously". 
He defended the right of the magistrate to question the need for an adjournment, "I think that 
not to question the reason for an adjournment is not to do justice, because you don't know then 
whether you are doing justice or not. You, [the magistrates], by questioning can at least be 
confident in your own minds whether you are doing justice". He then expanded on this point by 
explaining that just to adjourn cases at every request could very well be argued to be unjust, " 
..because justice delayed is justice denied. You can end up with a situation where one side or 
the other, or both in a criminal case, can prolong the case to such a length that justice is 
inevitably not done. Because witnesses forget or don't turn up, perhaps they come to court on 
some occasions and are sent home unused, don't come back a second time". However what 
the Justices' Clerk was at pains to stress was that the decision whether or not to proceed, 
should be taken on the merits of the case in hand, " .. and not whether this is the tenth, 
eleventh or twelth adjournment you have granted this morning".
B2.2.1.2 - not all of the people who plead guilty, even by letter, are necessarily 
guilty.
Not all of the people who claim that they are not guilty of the offences with which they 
are charged, or feel that there is considerable mitigation which could be put forward in their 
defence, necessarily attend court to present their case or put their defence before the 
magistrates. A specific example of this type of person is, "..the businessman who says, Tm not 
guilty of speeding really, but I can't afford a day off work and call the witnesses and all the rest, 
in the chance that I might get aquitted or I might be convicted. So I'd rather just get it over and 
done with and plead guilty by p o s t ' The Justices' Clerk did question whether or not in an
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attempt to avoid this type of situation, this failure in the justice system, the magistrates' courts 
should arrange their hours of business so that this type of customer is catered for. He told me, 
"Now you could argue that if we are really interested in doing justice, that we wouldn't even run 
the risk of denying somebody justice by compelling them to take a day off work. We would 
organise our courts to suit our clients and our clients are the general public, defendants 
included. .. We should run week-end courts, we should run evening courts". He went on to 
inform me that some areas are currently running evening courts on an experimental basis, but 
these are only dealing with those cases where guilty pleas have been entered or where matters 
just require to be adjourned.
B2.2.2 Cash constraints should not be a deciding factor in the judicial decision 
making process.
The Justices' Clerk emphasised the point that cash constraints should never be 
treated as major influential factor in the decision making process, ".. anymore than when the 
Home Office say the prisons are full. The question is not whether the prisons are so full, can 
they accommodate this defendant ? The question is, has this defendant committed such a 
serious crime that he has to go to prison"? The Clerk continued, 7 think you can't totally ignore 
cash restraints, but I would like to think, and I'm not entirely convinced about this, that cash 
restraints are modelled on the overall considerations of justice, in other words that they allow for 
adjournments, for some delay for the appropriate length of time necessary to prepare a case 
properly".
B2.2.2.1 - cash limiting certainly appears to have altered the policy of one of the 
agencies in the Criminal Justice system and to the detriment of justice.
"There's one that I'm particularly concerned with at the moment, which is not so much 
the cash limits on the courts, but the cash limits on the CPS”. This statement was made by the 
Justices' Clerk. The reason given for this concern was because of its, "..serious potential, 
because there is nobody to counter balance". The policy to which he was referring and which is 
now regularly adopted, is a policy which could be likened to plea bargaining. He continued by 
expressing the view that the effect of cash limiting on the CPS has been, "..to push them into 
accepting deals, pleas to lesser charges rather than run trials, because it's cheaper for them". 
The views of the Justices' Clerk were totally supported by both of the court clerks interviewed. 
One told me, "The CPS are now watering down. At the first indication of a 'not guilty' plea they 
ask, What will he plead to ?'. Charges are being watered down left, right and centre and I think 
as a result of that, yes justice is suffering". While it was acknowledged by the clerks that in 
some of these cases the prosecution evidence, "might not be very strong", there were other 
cases, "..where there is clearly evidence to support a stronger charge, but because of policy 
decisions being made from on high this charge will be reduced whether you like it or not". The 
general feeling amongst the clerks, with whom I spoke, was that where this policy is applied,
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this has now weighted justice very much in the favour of the defendants. This perception of the 
situation was also shared by the Justices' Clerk. When I asked whether the CPS policies were 
now to the advantage or disadvantage of the general public? He replied, "It would usually be to 
the advantage of the defendant but to the disadvantage of the Criminal Justice system and in 
particular to the disadvantage of the general public". He also considered that the policies now 
imposed, and particularly that of calculating the funding of the various agencies upon their 
performance indicators, is bringing matters, ".nearer to justice being cash limited and once 
that's the case it's not justice anymore".
B2.2.3 There is neither a policy or instructions for the court staff to ensure that 
throughput targets are achieved within a set timescale.
There was a general rejection by the court staff, the court clerks and the usher, with 
whom I spoke that a policy existed in the courts which sacrificed the ideals of justice on the 
altar of organisational efficiency. As I was told by a rather indignant usher, "No I would strongly 
disagree with that. ..Nobody has ever said to me, 'Right we're going to do this, do this, do this', 
simply because we've got twenty-four cases today and we've got to get through them. We don't 
want anyone asking awkward questions, we want to get them in and out as quickly as we can'. 
It's never been said that and I never imagine it would be the case". The court clerks also saw 
their ability to keep things moving through the courts efficiently as being very much dependant 
upon the other court users. As they explained, "Whatever we do, whatever we say, however we 
try to get things moving, if they, [the prosecution and the defence], are not in a position to do 
anything, what can we do ? We cant do anything. What happens in court is dependant on both 
the defence and the prosecution having everything organised and ready to go". The Justices' 
Clerk also tried to dispel the theory put forward by some critics that the main concern in the 
courtroom is to keep the courts running and to avoid delays in order not to upset the judge or 
the magistrate, "..because they are the most important people in the set up". He did admit that 
the aim of the courts was to keep the decision makers working at all t im e s , because if they're 
not working, nobody's working, we're not hearing any cases and that adds to the frustration and 
it adds to the delays. That's the only reason I would say you've got to keep the courts sitting all 
the time, ..simply to get on with the job".
B2.3 Courtroom organisation and the degradation ceremony.
"I think the courtroom is no different to real 
life as it were, in that some people earn the 
respect of the defendant, but some defendants 
are not going to respect you and then you have 
to use the authority to maintain some sort of 
order, some sort of dignity".
(the Justices' Clerk).
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B2.3.1 Many of the rituals and procedures which are enshrined in the magistrates'
courts are relics of the past, but are they really redundant in a more modern 
era ?
"It's all steeped in tradition, 'Your worships', 'My learned friend', and all that sort of 
stuff". This was one opinion which was expressed by one of the court clerks whom I interviewed 
as part of the study. "It makes you think of Dickens" ventured another, who continued, "just 
think about the whole thing, just look at the building for example, it's very old fashioned isnt it? 
You can see these things just get carried along". The view of these two court clerks was also 
endorsed by the Justices' Clerk. In answer to the claims which I put to him, claims made by 
some observers that the ritual and symbolism in the courts is used as a means to humiliate and 
degrade the defendants, (Emerson, 1969 p174: Carlen, 1976, p23), he did concede that 
symbolism is still very much in evidence in the magistrates' courts, although not in his opinion, 
as evident as it is in some of the higher courts. He told me, "The first thing I would say is that 
I'm quite sure that the symbolism is there. The majority of magistrates' courts buildings were 
built in an age when much more of that was there than there is now, but because the buildings 
were built then, they are still like it, our own courthouse .. being a case in point". He then went 
on to differentiate between the higher and the lower courts, "I would then immediately draw a 
distinction between the magistrates' courts and the Crown courts, where I think more of what 
you have just read is true in the Crown court. There are more archaic rules, many more 
concerns that the defendant should not interrupt, should not slow down the proceedings". He 
was also quite clear that the time had come to re-assess the situation and to determine which 
of the rules and procedures are still relevant to the modem day. In his words, "I think 
sometimes though we've brought our rules, our procedures, our rituals into place because they 
served a purpose then, but we’ve never stopped to ask ourselves in the last twenty, even fifty 
years, whether they still serve a purpose".
B2.3.1.1 - some of the language is anachronistic, you can show respect without 
going over the top.
One of the questions I asked was whether or not the use of language, and in 
particular the methods of address which are used in the magistrates' courts, are a means 
employed by the regular court users to manufacture there own brand of authority? The Justices' 
Clerk was very critical about the styles of address which are in regular use. "I think this is 
archaic and to think that somebody might actually be worshipped these days seems completely 
anachronistic to me. I don't actually, personally, use that phrase at all, I always refer to the 
magistrate as 'Sir1. I mean 'Sir1 is a bit different, it still shows a modicum of respect, I hope it 
shows some authority, a bit like going back to school, but I think it's more akin to real life. We 
do have these phrases, these rituals that are based on history that we have never overcome". 
These sentiments were also echoed by one of the court clerks during the interview, 7 cant say 
that, (Your worships), .. because I find it difficult to say. I mean quite often you get people
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saying, 'May it please your worships’, that is how they start their address. Sometimes 111 say, 
'As you please Sir' or something like that. ... You can still show respect for people without 
going over the top". In the opinion of the Justices’ Clerk, "There is an awful lot of scope for 
bringing those sorts of practices into the ... Twenty-first Century.. but ensuring that there is still 
some retention of respect, authority, dignity, call it what you like". Neither should the formality 
of the language be necessarily forced on to the defendants. The Justices' Clerk stated, "I don't 
see anything wrong in telling the defendants that magistrates are magistrates. I don't think they 
need to be told that they call them 'Your worships’, and in fact I've seen the defendants, 
witnesses, who have talked to the magistrates in terms of 'luv' and 'duck' and 'dearie' and it 
seems to me that if that's their normal everyday way of speaking and if they don’t intend any 
disrespect then it is inappropriate to assume any disrespect and pull them up for it". He 
admitted that in a more liberalised atmosphere there could be people who might try to take 
advantage of the situation and it is not always easy to pick out those who are genuine from 
those who intend disrespect, "... but I think there ought to be an assumption that he’s not and 
what he is doing is being himself and if he is not necessarily being disrespectful, then why stop 
him".
B2.3.1.2 - the aae of the buildings can often be the cause of the stark contrast
between the coutroom and it's environs, but not totally.
Once again the age of some of the courthouses and particularly those which formed 
the basis for the study area, were blamed for what is admittedly a stark contrast between the 
courtrooms and their environs, and in particular the public waiting areas. As one of the court 
clerks admitted, "it is a real contrast isn’t it, going from the court where you're completely cut off 
and unaware of what's happening outside, ..you dont hear anything, you cant hear if anything 
is going on. Everybody in court is very smart and quiet and formal and you go out there and it’s 
all smokey, ..cups of tea and cigarettes ail over the floor, the benches and everything". This 
view was reiterated by a second court clerk, who described the scene in the waiting areas as, * 
.. pretty horrible out there, ..the conditions for waiting around are pretty stark, ..sitting on those 
wooden benches quite often awash with tea and coffee". Not only was it the waiting areas that 
came in for criticism, previous observers had also found that many defendants had found 
themselves waiting to go into the courtroom, 'unable to get either refreshments or the privacy in 
which to talk to their solicitors or probation officers', (Carien, 1976, p27). The court usher did 
express some concern about the shortage of rooms which allowed for discussions between the 
defendants and their solicitors to be held in private, these did exist, but he agreed that these 
were limited and, "..not good enough, it really isnt". What really concerned the usher was a 
lack of segregated areas in which the witnesses in a case and the defendants in the same case, 
but on different sides, could wait for their cases to be called . As he told me, "The other thing 
about privacy that always disturbs me out there is where you've got a trial and you've got 
defendants and you've got witnesses for the prosecution in the corridor and sometimes they're 
sat almost side by side and it's very embarrassing for people on both sides, especially if it's an
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assault or something". Whilst it is accepted that the criticisms are well founded, again I was 
told, "..again I think it comes back to the court design and the age of the building".
B2.3.1.3 - the human element does lend a helping hand.
Vandalism is seen as a major problem by those trying to maintain a reasonable 
standard of conditions in the public waiting areas and in particular those areas which are 
situated adjacent to the Youth courts. In the words of one court clerk, "Well I think that's a 
problem, particularly with the Youth court, the waiting around just leads to them committing 
offences against the building, wrecking seats, daubing their names on the walls". In an attempt 
to explain why this vandalism occurs in the magistrates' courts, the Justices' Clerk told me, "We 
are not dealing with people who come of their own free will. Most of the people we are talking 
about who contribute to the squalor, at least those who do it deliberately or recklessly, are there 
because they are allegedly thought to have been doing something of the same order. They are 
the sort of people who are perhaps there for criminal damage, for daubing up the toilet walls in 
the town centre, or breaking into somebody's house and wreaking havoc. It has to be said that 
no matter how innocent until proven guilty these people are, we still have to say, we are dealing 
with people charged with criminal offences, the vast majority of whom will be convicted of those 
charges or plead guilty to those charges".
B2.3.1.4 - this contrast is not so prevalent in the more modern courthouses.
When comparing the magistrates' courts buildings built in the first third of this century, 
with those which are being designed and built to cater for todays' needs, I was told that there 
are a number of major differences. For example, "The more modem buildings have almost 
without exception refreshment facilities, ..all have more numerous and more private interview 
facilities". Although it was emphasised that in respect of the word 'private', what was actually 
mean't possibly needed some clarification, the word I was told means, "..inaudibility, because 
most solicitors will tell you that they do not really want to go into a solid door room with some of 
their clients, problems might arise. But they want to be inaudible". In the opinion of the court 
clerks, the new buildings, "..have a much more informal feel about them", the old court buildings 
with their oak panelling and brass rails were felt to be intimidating. This point was also taken up 
by the Justices' Clerk, who told me that in his experience, "The more modem buildings are less 
majestic in the courtrooms, less oak panelling and less 'brass railly' and at the same time more 
comfortable in the waiting areas". He had also found that, "..if the buildings were better 
constructed so that it is somewhat vandal resistant in the first place and if it actually is easily 
cleaned overnight then it tends to suffer less vandalism the following day".
B2.3.2 Not all of the rules are just symbolic, some have a practical application.
Whatever rules are adopted and implemented as part of the system in the 
magistrates' courts, this should only be done after the need for these rules has been fully
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evaluated. This was the view put forward by the Justices' Clerk, ’Whatever level of control you 
adopt, whether it be the level of putting everyone in the dock, or telling people that nobody 
keeps their hands in their pockets,.. or whether it be right down to the level of saying, 'You only 
stand up when you take the oath', you've still got to look to why you adopt the practice". The 
ritualism which surrounds the taking of the oath was in the opinion of the Clerk justified in as far 
as it, "reinforced the importance" of this particular act. However one area which he felt was 
less easy to justify was the placing of some defendants in the dock. He told me of, "..other 
magistrates'courts.. where all the adult defendants were put in the dock regardless of whether 
they were on bail or not. Now I think I would find it very difficult to justify that. I think the system 
we have where only those defendants who are actually in custody are put in the dock, is the 
appropriate system". There were in his opinion a number of good reasons which justify why 
some people do need to be subjected to a higher level of security, "..on the basis that those 
defendants are potentially a risk of some sort. They're either at risk of absconding, or at risk of 
committing further offences, which is why they are in custody, some court has come to that 
decision and I think that a measure of security is practical as well as symbolic".
B2.3.2.1- if there were no rules to govern behaviour in the courtrooms, some
people would take advantage.
'You've got to maintain some sort of dignity in court otherwise they, [the defendants], 
would just sit there, put their feet up and say, 'let's have a chat about it'..". This statement 
summarised the fears of one of the court ushers with whom I spoke, if the rules and procedures 
were relaxed in the magistrates’ courts. The court clerks expressed similar concerns, as one of 
them said, "I think a lot of the people you get would come in with that sort of attitude, who are 
so blase about the proceedings, they think, 'Well let's try it on, I'll go in with my mouth full of 
chewing gum', .. Yes it's the people who come regularly that you seem to get most disrespect 
from, you know coming in with their hats on and slouching about, and I think you've got to 
maintain some standards. .. I think people are losing a lot of respect anyway for the courts so 
you need what little bit you can keep a hold on". The court usher insisted that the courts were 
not demanding anything which was extraordinary, in his opinion all that the rules were designed 
to achieve was, "common courtesy". This theme was also taken up by the Justices’ Clerk who 
argued that, "If the purpose of the ritual, the symbolism, is to reinforce some standards, some 
rules which in themselves have a purpose, then that justifies symbolism, the rituals, the rules". 
He cited, in support of his argument, the attitudes which he perceives among certain of the 
attenders at court, " .. particularly young male defendants whose respect for the law is 
decidedly limited. .. I think there's alf the more reason for retaining some of the rules of order 
within the courtroom .. to preserve the dignity of the court". What did concern the court clerks 
however, was the fact that there are some people who are genuine, who do not realise that they 
are being disrespectful to the court but who, because of their unintentional actions, are also 
made aware of the courts' displeasure. As I was told, " There are some genuine cases, I mean
39
some people come in with hats on because they don't realise, and I think to some extent, yes, 
they might get treated a bit hard. But you tend to tar people with the same brush', which is not 
right at all".
B2.3.2.2 - the authority invested in the decision makers must be safeguarded, but 
the respect is for the law, not the individuals who administer it.
The Justices' Clerk was adamant in his view that the people who have been given the 
authority as decision makers on behalf of the society whom they represent, should also be 
enabled to use that authority to its full extent. As he explained, "Because the bench, whoever it 
is, whether it be the judge or the magistrate, has been given by statute some authority over the 
defendant on behalf of the public at large, then they have got to be able to maintain that 
authority to a degree, if the job that the public expects to be done is going to be done 
satisfactorily. For example, the judge has got to be able to pass a sentence on the defendant 
who has been convicted. He shouldn't be in this sense brought down to the level of the 
defendant to the extent that he has to negotiate a sentence with the defendant". The Clerk, 
however, perceives a problem where respect for the law and respect for the individual 
administering that law sometimes becomes confused, "You've got to look at what the purpose 
is. Now if the purpose is to show respect for the law, as opposed to respect for the individuals 
given the task of administering the law, again I think that supports an argument for retaining 
some of the rituals".
B2.3.3 The argument that the procedures are aimed at demeaning the defendant 
would be quite difficult to justify these days, the fact that some court users 
do is a different matter.
"If it is to suggest that the defendant is to be demeaned, I think that would be quite 
hard to support these days, although I cant help thinking that there are occasions when judges 
and magistrates want defendants to be demeaned in court. There are occasions when the 
advocates want witnesses to be demeaned in court. But I dont think that has anything to do 
with justice". Such was the answer given by the Justices' Clerk when asked to comment on the 
claim that, 'Courtroom ceremony is characteristically organised to degrade and humiliate the 
defendant', (Emerson, 1969, p174). The court clerks' view was that there is evidence that the 
demeaning of defendants still exists in some of the courts. As one court clerk saw it, 
"Traditionally the courts set out to degrade the defendants. Someone coming into court had to 
be made an example of because the public were looking at them. I suppose that was the object 
in a way”. This court clerk then went on to describe the situation which is often seen in the 
Fines Enforcement court, a court in which I had observed and had some experience, a court 
where people who have failed to pay their fines, as ordered by the court, are brought back to 
explain why, and where alternative actions can be imposed if considered necessary, for
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example and in extreme cases, a custodial sentence can be imposed in default. The clerks had 
observed that in these courts the magistrates and court staff were more likely to respond 
adversely to 'uncooperative' defendants, "Quite often the way you would react to somebody 
would be for instance, a lot harder on somebody if he started to be 'lippy'. You know, 'It's your 
fault I've not been paying'. Alright, if you're going to be like that then let's be hard. I don't think I 
could ever go out of my way to deliberately humiliate somebody, but I think, as you say, Fine 
Default, you do take a different tack with people, ..and quite often you have to resort to 
humiliating to get the message across, because sometimes they dont appreciate how serious it 
is. It's just another hire purchase commitment to thepi, 'Oh I pay my catalogue every week', 
What about your fine ? ' As another court clerk observed, "It's weird when you think about 
that, [humiliating the defendant], compared with the thing about giving the defendant a fair go. 
You are giving him a fair go but you're making him feel bloody awful about it". Both of the court 
clerks were in agreement in that they considered the humiliation and the degrading of the 
defendants to be the exception rather than the rule. An opinion which was also shared by the 
court usher whom I interviewed. He again reiterated that he saw the rules, which prohibited 
defendants from wearing hats, or chewing, or putting their hands in their pockets whilst in the 
courtroom, as just requiring a, "..sort of common courtesy and not done to browbeat someone 
into a situation where they’ll agree to anything just so that they can get out". He considered the 
claims that these rules were in existence just to humiliate the defendants to be, "..a totally 
erroneous impression of why it is done".
B2.3.3.1 - the courts and the magistrates need to adapt to the different types of
witnesses who attend court.
During my courtroom observations and experiences, I had seen both defendants and 
witnesses being asked questions by the advocates but being told to address their answers to 
the magistrates, a procedure which quite often created a deal of confusion. Where the 
defendants fail to comply with the instructions which they have been given, ’the defendants 
often find that they are continually rebuked', (Carlen,1976, p24). When I asked the Justices' 
Clerk for his views on this particular topic. He replied, "The word you used was rebuked, well I 
can only tell you that I dont think that 'continually rebuked' is an accurate reflection of what 
actually goes on. I think magistrates from time to time do have to ask witnesses to repeat 
answers and perhaps even to remind them to speak up, but to rebuke, I dont think is a fair 
reflection on what the magistrates are doing". With regard to one person asking the question 
and other people wanting to know the answer, the Clerk continued, 'Yes all advocates these 
days do have a habit of saying, 'I will ask you the question but please face the magistrates 
when you answer'. So witnesses will do it to start with and then forget. Some magistrates will 
react when the witness does forget. I would hope that the reaction would not be, 'You aren't 
looking at me, you aren't doing as you're supposed to'. But to say something to the effect, We
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have to hear the answers because we have to judge the evidence and we didn't hear the last 
a n s w e r" He wfe.nt on to say that in his opinion the courts need to recognise and make 
allowances for thd different types of of witnesses who attend the courts, they need to, "..adapt 
to the witnesses because you will always get the witness who wont be able to speak up, 
they're quiet people anyway. Perhaps, almost certainly they are genuinely nervous about what 
they are going to say and in some cases are really hesitant to repeat it. I only have to think 
about a few cases I've done with young children giving evidence about allegations of indecency. 
You cant ask that young person to speak up, it's ridiculous, and I would hope it would never 
happen".
B2.3.4 The smaller more informal courts can make the court clerks feel vulnerable.
It was pointed out to me that there are a number of different types of court in the 
judicial system and they are ail designed to satisfy different functions. As has already been 
mentioned in a previous paragraph, there is the Crown court with it's 'archaic rules' and 
'symbolism' where the procedure is normally 'to place all of the adult defendants in the dock'. It 
has also been stated that there are a number of similarities between these courts and many of 
the magistrates' courts in the larger cities. Within the Magistrates' Courts system there are also 
a number of different types of courts, the Fines Enforcement court already mentioned, being 
just one of these. At the top end of the scale there is, 'the Criminal court, they’re about 
punishment up to a point and justice". At the other end of the scale there is the Family court, 
"more a sort of 'wise figure' sorting things out between people", where the philosophy is one of, 
"let's all sit down on the same level while we’re talking to one another". But what is seen as a 
satisfactory configuration of seating for one type of court is not always seen as being suitable 
for another. Neither are the smaller informal courtrooms always welcomed by the court clerks 
who expressed a preference for the larger type of courtroom with its tiered seating when 
operating in certain types of court. As one clerk told me, "In No 3 Court with fine defaulters, I 
am always uncomfortable with them because they are there, they are there, (indicating the 
close proximity). If they want to 'sock you one’ they can do. Whereas if you are in No. 1 or No. 
2, you are a bit higher up and it gives you the edge. I did a court a few weeks ago with .., [the 
stipendiary magistrate], there was me, him and the defendants, quite often the usher was not in 
the room and I thought if anybody turned nasty you've no chance. I suppose all these different 
height levels give the impression of being bigger and therefore not as approachable". This view 
of the court clerks' vulnerability in certain types of courts and courtrooms was totally endorsed 
by the other court clerk who participated in the interview.
B2.4 Power and influence.
"I think I would have to go as far as 
to say that I know clerks who have, 
and probably still do, influence decisions"
(the Justices' Clerk)
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B2.4.1 The magistrates are the decision makers, like it or not.
"But yes there is always that conflict there which you have to try and resolve, and of 
course it's the magistrates who get the last word whatever anybody says to them, they have the 
final say". It is obvious from this statement that the court clerk whom I interviewed had no doubt 
who the decision makers are. But does everyone in the magistrates' court system accept that 
this is the situation, and in particular does this include the advocates. I asked the Justices' 
Clerk for his opinion on this particular aspect and he told me, 7 think certainly the regular 
professional advocates have to accept and do accept that the magistrates are going to make 
the decisions anyway" But whether this fact is fully accepted or just tolerated quite often 
depends on the respect or otherwise that the advocates have for that individual magistrate. The 
Justices’ Clerk went on to explain, 7 think in a court where they do get to know each other, 
there will be magistrates who have earned the respect of the advocates. .. These amateur 
magistrates have the respect of the professional advocates, because the advocates know that 
these magistrates will do a good job, will ask the right questions, will not have the wool pulled 
over their eyes and so forth. Having said that, on the same Bench, in the courtroom next door 
perhaps, there will be another chairman, because that's very important, where advocates will go 
along and say, 'It's only so and so, I can get away with 'blue murder' here....".
B2.4.2 Credibility is an important part of the decision making process, but there are 
limits to which the professional court user will go to obtain it.
Not only is it what the advocates think of the magistrates that is important, the level of 
credibility that the court users and particularly the advocates hold with the magistrates can also 
form an influential part of the decision making process. In discussing the validity, or otherwise 
of the statement, 'Most courtworkers are concerned with maintaining credibility with the 
magistrates', (Carlen, 1976, p31), I was told by the Justices' Clerk, "I think there is a very large 
element of truth in there". The first group of people whom we discussed under this heading 
were the court clerks, "The court clerk in my view, not only wants to maintain credibility with the 
magistrates but needs to because the magistrates have to be confident that they're going to get 
proper advice, competent advice and reliable advice from the court clerk. Now you can go 
about that as a court clerk in all sorts of ways and perhaps in one way you retain your 
credibility by giving unpalatable advice and being shown as a person who will give proper and 
confident advice rather than as a 'yes man’. I dont think court clerks, .. who are seen as 'yes 
men', do actually maintain their credibility with the magistrates. I think they are seen as what 
they are". Moving on to the advocates, the Justices' Clerk categorised these under various 
headings. Initially there were those who saw credibility as being of prime importance and, " 
..who are just so concerned to keep in with the courts that they will strive most of all to maintain 
their credibility at all times". At the other end of the scale there are those advocates, "... a few, 
very few, who just couldn't give a 'hoot' one way or another". There are also those advocates 
who on occasions will be prepared to risk their credibility with the bench if, in their opinion, the
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client whom they are representing , " ..is so important to the advocate". Although the more 
common approach by the advocates is to represent their clients in such a way that they 
maintain their credibility with both their clients and the courts. But there are limits to which most 
of the court professionals are prepared to go in order to retain this credibility. As the Justices' 
Clerk explained, "I think that with most of the professional court users there are very restricting 
limits as to how far they are prepared to go just for maintaining their credibility with the bench. 
Having said that, I would still say that most of them would never dream of being rude, 
inconsiderate even, to the bench and in that sense they would maintain a professional standard. 
But we all know that you can maintain a professional standard and still voice your opposition 
and I don’t think many advocates, if it was to the detriment of their client, would be 'yes men', 
just for the sake of maintaining their credibility with the bench. I don’t think that happens".
B2.4.2.1 - credibility is mainly about personalities and performance.
In my efforts to try and determine who does exert the greatest influence on the 
decision makers, I was again left in no doubt by the members of the court staff, that influence is 
a very variable element. On the one hand there are the personalities and the performances of 
the individuals who are trying to influence, on the other hand it can depend upon the 
compositon of the bench and the personalities of the individuals who comprise that bench who 
it is hoped will be influenced. I was told by the court clerks, "So it's all sort of inter-mingling 
personalities involved. I mean it depends on how good your advocates are. ..I mean sometimes 
certain advocates aren’t too bothered, but if they get something they feel strongly about they'll 
put their heart and soul into it. ..The other thing ..quite often is the personalities of the actual 
benches. You will sometimes get some benches who will do anything that is asked of them. 
..and very often without questioning something that is so obvious. But then you go to the other 
extreme of people, [magistrates], who will stick their neck out because they’ve got a particular 
point about something and while you may not possibly agree with it, if they’ve got that in their 
minds, that's going to be what it is at the end of the day".
B2.4.3 The advocates can adapt their tactics depending on the magistrates and the 
other court users, or they can just take the initiative awav from the 
magistrates.
The advocates do recognise that there are differences between the various 
magistrates, benches, and other court professionals. Many of them make it, their business to 
identify what the differences in these perceived abilities and characteristics are and then use 
them in the best interests of their clients. I was told that the advocates move from courtroom to 
courtroom, "and adopt a different attitude depending perhaps on the chairman, depending 
perhaps on the clerk, depending perhaps on the clients". I was told that this 'gleaning of 
information' about the various magistrates and court professionals is quite easily achieved, "..in
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a court where there is a relatively small bench and a relatively small number of advocates, so 
they get to know each other, unlike perhaps, the big city benches where there are largely 
anonymous magistrates". In addition to this 'manipulation' of the magistrates, concern was also 
voiced about the effects of the current practice, already discussed in previous paragraphs, of 
the willingness of the CPS to accept pleas to lesser charges. This was seen, in certain cases, to 
take the intiative away from the decision makers. As I was reminded by one court clerk, "it 
takes things completely out of our hands
B2.4.4 The court clerks, the advisers or the persuaders ?
"I would certainly say at the outset that I agree that the clerk has a massive potential 
for influencing judicial decisions. I think there's no doubt about that based on the professional 
and permanent everyday experience of the clerk and contrasting that with the lay magistrate. I 
think I would have to go as far as to say that I know clerks who have, and probably still do 
influence decisions". This comment which was made by the Justices' Clerk opened our 
discussions on the power of the Justices' Clerks and their court clerks in the Magistrates' Courts 
system. Each, by the very nature of their roles, can influence the decision makers, but because 
of the differing nature of these roles, this influence can be applied , in different ways.The 
Justices' Clerks can exert their influence through Bench policy decisions and particularly 
through their roles as the Bench Training officers. The court clerks are more likely to exert their 
influence in their day to day interaction with the magistrates in the courtroom and in particular 
in their role as the legal advisors in the decision making process in the Magistrates' Retiring 
room. The Justices' Clerk told me, "If a Bench, by which I mean a Petty Sessions area, ..if a 
Bench consistently commits to prison a significantly higher proportion than its neighbouring 
colleagues, then my first port of call would be the Clerk, and particularly the training which the 
Clerk gives the magistrates". Not only do the Justices' Clerks impose their influence on the 
magistrates through their training programmes but they are also responsible for the training of 
the court clerks, "..both in the function of the clerk and in sentencing policies".
B2.4.4.1-the court clerk, an influential force in the Magistrates' Retiring room.
The day to day potential for influencing the magistrates is in the Magistrates' Retiring 
room, a place where because of administrative pressures very few Justices’ Clerks find 
themselves on a regular basis. So the potential for influencing in this area rests mainly with the 
court clerks. Those court clerks whom I interviewed accepted that it was inevitable that they 
would influence magistrates even by just carrying out their everyday basic role of giving 
advice. As I was told, "If a bench hasnt considered something and you advise them what their 
powers are, for example, it is imprisonable, then you are going to influence that sentence, 
..when something has to be drawn to their attention that you think that they have overlooked, it 
quite often results in a different slant being put on it... So I think you do". I then asked the court 
clerks if they ever went into the Retiring room with direct intention of influencing the
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magistrates? The answer given was that they did not, "No never directly". But what is intended 
and what sometimes materialises are occasionally at odds with each other. As one of the court 
clerks explained, "Whatever the bench says, Well we are thinking of so and so', quite often I'm 
afraid my facial expression will reveal something I've been thinking, 'Obviously you dont agree 
then', and it's very difficult sometimes. But I would never go in with a view of doing something 
specifically. Sometimes it does turn out that way and you realise at the end of the day that it 
has gone in a different direction than the bench originally intended and that's because of the 
input you've made".
B2.4.4.2 - the court clerks would find it difficult to ensure that those 'deserving the 
harsher sentences' appeared in front of the 'harder benches'.
In the past some observers have claimed that the court clerks could influence the 
types of sentences which individual defendants received. This was achieved by arranging the 
court lists to ensure that the defendants whom they considered deserved the harsher penalties 
appeared in front of those benches which were more likely to dispense those types of 
sentences. These claims were rejected almost totally by both the Justices' Clerk and by the 
court clerks whom I interviewed. The Justices' Clerk did admit, "I think in theory, yes that's 
possible, but in practice it's highly improbable these days, more so these days than when that 
statement was written. Because first of all, even in a medium size court, you've got so many 
courts to run and so many benches to see to. ..Secondly because in almost all, bar the very 
small courts, these days, the allocation of the cases to the courts is performed by the Courts' 
Listing officer, .. the Rota clerk is allocating the magistrates to the courts... The Justices' Clerk 
and certainly the court clerks will have no involvement in that, or very little involvement in it all. 
So I would discount that one". The court clerks told me that there is some allocation of courts to 
magistrates but this is restricted to those cases which involve the stipendiary magistrate. These 
are cases which are seen as, "particularly complicated" and are more involved with complicated 
legal argument rather than with the intention of meteing out harsher punishments.
B2.4.5 In the magistrates* court there are two areas of decision making, the judicial 
and the administrative, except where they overlap.
During the period of my observations in the courtrooms of the magistrates’ courts, I 
had noted areas of intense verbal and non-verbal communication which I labelled the 
'communication triangles'. These involved two main groups, but each of the groups had its 
common members. The first group consisted of the magistrate(s), the prosecutor and the 
defence advocates, the second grouping consisted of the court clerk, the prosecutor and the 
defence advocates. The former configuration I had found to be used more often in the courts in 
which the stipendiary magistrate adjudicated, the latter was more commonly observed in those 
courts overseen by the lay magistrates. Because of the different levels of emphasis which I had 
observed, I was also concerned whether or not in the lay magistrates courts, the triangle
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consisting of the clerk and the advocates, the 'professional lawyer group' were also acting as a 
decision making group in its own right and to the exclusion of the magistrates. I put these 
matters to the Justices’ Clerk. He agreed with my observations that there were two main 
communication triangles but in his view each of the triangles fulfilled a different function and 
came into operation at different stages of the court proceedings. By way of illustration he told 
me, "If you had reached a stage in the case, the defendant has pleaded guilty, ..and the 
decision is what sentence is going to be passed then I would expect that the triangle is 
advocate-advocate-bench and the clerk has nothing to do with it. Compare that with the other 
extreme, it has been decided that this case.. requires committal proceedings, [it is to be sent to 
the Crown Court to dealt with there], we are trying to fix a date for the committal proceedings. I 
would then expect the triangle to be advocate-advocate-clerk, again almost regardless of who is 
on the bench" However, as he pointed out, not all of the matters fit conveniently into either the 
judicial or administrative decision making scenarios and it is in these 'hybrid' areas, where the 
administrative factors quite often dictate the judicial decisions, that the question of who makes 
the decisions arises. This was described by the Clerk as, "the middle band area and it's a very 
wide band". He continued, "Lay magistrates have little or no practical experience of the 
administrative factors that are going to determine the judicial decision and therefore there is 
much more likelihood that the triangle will go advocate-advocate-clerk". This situation is 
somewhat different in the stipendiary magistrates' court, " ..because he sits everyday and as a 
practitioner,.. he will have the experience and the insight.. to perform the function in respect of 
the administrative elements which the lay bench couldnt honestly be expected to perform. 
Because he, the 'stipe' can perform that function, it means that the clerk doesn't have to, and 
the triangle reverts advocate-advocate-'stipe'..". What has developed in practice has now been 
recognised by statute. I was told that, "The law is moving towards recognising functions that 
have always in the past been believed to be judicial, they really have such a high element of 
administrative about them that the law is in effect legitimising your advocate-advocate-clerk 
triangle but only in some areas". In essence recent amendments to the Magistrates' Courts 
Rules allow the clerk to go in and perform a quasi-judicial function, "..of deciding that this case 
will be adjourned to such and such a date, or to say to a defendant, "You wili be committed to 
the Crown court to stand your trial', but only if it is done with the agreement of the parties and 
only if there are no other arguments". The Justices' Clerk did admit however, that he would be 
extremely concerned, "..if I thought that the advocate-advocate-clerk triangle excluded the 
magistrates from the judicial input".
B2.4.5.1- to the onlooker it often appears that the chairman of the lav bench is just
the mouthpiece for decisions taken bv the court professionals.
I suggested to the Justices' Clerk that when the court chairman announces a decision 
in which the magistrates have had no apparent input, then this can tend to give the onlooker 
the impression that the magistrates are not really the decision makers but more the mouthpiece
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for the court professionals. He replied, "I'm sure that if that happens then that perception is right, 
and certainly in my experience as a younger court cierk and particularly when I was a trainee 
sitting with very experienced clerks I've seen what you have just described many times". But in 
the instances where the decision has been made by the court professionals, the Justices' Clerk 
was still of the opinion that the impression should be conveyed to any onlookers and in 
particular the defendant, that the magistrates have had some input into the making of that 
decision. He told me, "The important thing to me is that even if the triangle below, [the 
advocates and the clerk], has effectively come up with one solution only, the solution and the 
explanation for it should be made dear". The policy which should be adopted would be for the 
clerk to announce the 'proposal' to the whole court and then append the announcement with the 
statement, "..'and if the magistrates are prepared to agree.'. ". As he explained, "That of course 
is perhaps the code ..but it's done more openly, more publicly, I was going to say more 
honestly but it isn't actually, it's still equally dishonest, .. because it creates the impression of 
the magistrates making the decision when the reality still is that the magistrates have had the 
decision made for them. .. But sometimes it is the perception that counts more than the reality 
and the perception that you painted is accurate but unfortunate. The perception that I should 
seek to create is less accurate but it is a better public image. It at least gives some hope that 
the defendant might say, 'At least the magistrates made the decision', whereas from the picture 
you painted, he said, 'Well they clearly didn't make that decision', and to that extent that still 
happens. It really has to be eradicated because whether it be a 'stipe', whether it be a lay 
bench, they have to be seen to be making the decision and if they're not, there is something 
wrong".
B2.5 The court staffs' perception of and relationship with the defendants.
"I try to treat everybody, as far as I can, 
everybody the same. Try and be polite 
to them, ... until they get a bit ratty, 
as sometimes they do, then you change 
your approach a little bit".
(a court usher)
B2.5.1 Defendants are not categorised by the types of crime with which they are 
associated, only bv the level of their experience at court.
"The people who come to a magistrates’ court dont want to go there". This simple
statement made by the Justices' Clerk identifies the defendants as being the reluctant
participants in the coutroom drama. They are not at court of their own volition and it appears
that this is the factor which so often influences their attitudes and behaviour whilst at court, a
topic which has already been referred to earlier. The court usher has the task of 'organising' the
defendants in the waiting areas prior to their hearings in the courtroom and I asked one of the
ushers for his perception of the defendants. His reply was "They're pretty good people by and
large out on the corridor", [the waiting area]. I then asked whether or not the ushers tended to
categorise the defendants by the seriousness of the offences or the types of crime which they
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were alleged to have committed ? I was told, "In the adult court I don't categorise people other 
than, they know their way round or they dont know their way round" He expanded on this 
statement, "You know somebody who's never been in before, you can tell them as soon as they 
walk up the steps because they look totally lost. You can spot them a mile away, no matter how 
they are dressed. [Then there are those people], who are used to the court procedure and 
dont need so much help". As far as linking defendants with their alleged offences he said, 7 
try, I think so do my colleagues, we try to treat not so much the offence, whatever the offence 
is, it's above your head if you like, you dont take any notice of it. You can have sex offenders 
and child molesters or anything like that, which I personally as an idividual would find 
repugnant, but I treat them no different than a guy who is at court for speeding. ... I try to treat 
everybody the same". This particular usher did admit however that this even-handed approach 
is put to the test on occasions, "It's difficult at times, the ones I find most difficult, if I'm honest I 
do tend to categorise, are the youths, the Youth court, because they are something to 
themselves..".
B2.5.1.1 - the defendants' reaction to waiting in court is often dependant on their
level of 'experience* and the reason they are there.
The defendants who attend at court react to that experience and the court 
environment in different ways. From his experience in the waiting areas, the court usher had 
formed an opinion that, " The first timers tend to be a little fearful of you, or the bench, or the 
procedures of the court". He recounted a recent experience which he described as a, "classic 
example when you talk about nervousness". He told me about a lady in her mid-sixties, who 
had been summoned to attend court for failing to keep a dog under control. As he put it, "We 
had a hell of a time with that one. We had to fetch the WRVS out, (the WRVS staffed the snack 
bar), give her drinks of tea. ..She was convinced that she was going to prison and nothing that 
you could say could convince her otherwise". But the usher was quick to add, "But I've never 
actually come across, apart from one or two examples like that, where people because they are 
waiting think the worst..". He then went on to talk about the more experienced attenders at 
court. He told me, Tve yet to come across a regular who's bothered whether he's spending an 
hour or two hours waiting". On the subject of the effect of waiting in the magistrates' courts, I 
also discussed this matter with the Justices' Clerk. I put to him the assertion that had been 
made in the past by researchers that, 'Defendants become more and more nervous, harbouring 
fears, usually unfounded, that they will be sent to prison', (Carlen,1976, p27). His reply was, "I 
would be very surprised if anything other than a very insignificant number of people who arrive 
at this building not thinking that they are going to prison, develop that fear as they are waiting. 
..I dont think that happens on any significant scale. .. My own experience suggests to me that 
the ones who are in some fear of going to prison arrive at the building in that fear". What may 
well affect the defendants' confidence, and particularly those waiting at the Fines Enforcement 
courts is where a committal order is issued and a defendant is committed to prison in default of
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paying an outstanding fine. As the court usher had observed, "What does put the wind up them 
of course, is if somebody doesn't come out They see somebody go in, and I come out and 
shout the next name and they think, ' Where's he gone'? However the Fines court doesn't 
always strike fear into the defendants. In my interviews with the court clerks I was told of an 
incident in the waiting areas which could suggest that those areas are not always places of 
apprehension and despondency. "The other day we had a Fines court, they were all laughing 
and joking outside. According to [the usher], ..there was a big party going on. He went out and 
there were about forty attenders. He asked, 'Is anyone going to pay their fine in full', and the 
whole corridor roared with laughter. So it depends what they're in court for". During my 
discussions, I also asked how the various defendants reacted to the 'squalor* which is 
characteristic of the waiting areas. The usher told me that the newcomers to the court, "They're 
absolutely appalled by the surroundings... There are regular attenders at court and they seem 
quite immune to the surroundings quite frankly and couldnt care less. ..There are those who 
are not so regular but they put up with it anyhow". Even if prolonged waiting does not, in the 
opinion of the court staff, create fear for the majority of people of a custodial sentence being 
imposed, it does have a detrimental effect in other ways. According to the court usher, "They 
get frustrated, they get bored, they get upset". In the opinion of the Justices' Clerk, "I think what 
does happen is the longer they wait the more fed up, the more frustrated they get. I dont think 
they get more and more in fear, I think they get more and more short tempered", and this, as 
has been previously stated, can lead to damage and vandalism in those waiting areas. 
According to the usher the people who are most affected by the waiting in the courts are the 
witnesses, "If anyone gets nervous it's the witnesses. The longer they’re kept waiting without 
explanation, the more they get nervous about coming into court".
B2.5.1.2 - defendants react in different wavs to the sentences they receive.
In the same way that the defendants react differently to the waiting prior to the court 
hearing, I was also told that they react in different ways to the sentences which they receive. As 
the court usher reiterated, "Most people, if they're going down, have a fair idea that they're 
going to be locked up, .. they're half expecting it". There are, however, occasions when their 
worst fears are not realised, ".. and they are quite relieved when they dont go down. You can 
see people, who alright, have had serious offences, it's relief. They're lucky not to go down 
today and they come out, now on their faces, it's relief. ..they fear the worst and it's not as bad 
as they expected". But not everyone who attends the court leaves by the public entrance, even 
when they were expecting to, and even then the defendants' reactions are not always what 
were anticipated. The usher related a recent instance, "There was a case yesterday where a 
lad got.. six months and I would have expected him to have been really surprised when he got 
into court because it wasnt canvassed on his report, [the Pre-Sentence Report]. But even he 
took it quite calmly and even down the corridor he was quite cheerful. It surprises you that 
sometimes". I was also told about some defendants who play a role in court in order to deceive
50
the sentencers of their real thoughts and who on leaving the courtroom project a different 
image. When I put this to the usher, he said, "Yes I have to agree, I've said to my colleagues, it 
would be good sometimes to have a video camera outside the courtroom to show the 
magistrates some of the defendants as they leave court, because whatever their demeanour is 
in court, it's nothing like it when they go out, ...it's not broad but it does happen especially with, 
I'm bound to say it again, the young, regular, persistent offenders, ..who've got quite a record 
and they think that's great, 7 got away with it, that's smashing". I asked if there was any 
evidence whether on leaving court, the defendants imparted knowledge to the people still 
waiting to go into court, about the bench, i.e. 'unofficial coaching'. This court usher was not 
aware of this happening as a regular feature, "Not unless there are two mates". In fact to the 
contrary, he had found that, "They're only too relieved to get out and away, they're down the 
corridor like a shot and away, so that doesn't particularly happen".
B2.5.2 The court ushers are not seen by the defendants as part of the 
establishment.
"I expect each usher develops his own style. ..I try to keep eveybody, as far as I can, 
everybody the same and be polite to them, 'Say, good morning sir, do you want any help' ..Until 
they get a bit ratty with me, as sometimes they do, then you change your approach a bit". This 
was the policy adopted towards the defendants by the court usher whom I interviewed, but he 
did concede that this was not necessarily the approach of all the ushers, not even his 
colleagues who worked in the study area. But what I was interested in was the attitude of the 
defendants towards the court ushers. The usher told me, that by and large they were very good, 
a fact that surprised him when he first started in the job, ".. you're not considered part of the 
establishment and if we compare it to when the police used to run the courts you dont get that 
antagonism towards you, very very rare ..By and large people accept you, ..you're the sort of 
buffer between the court and them, But isn't the gown a symbol of authority? I asked. The 
usher considered that the gown acted as a, "point of reference", rather than a 'symbol of 
authority', "..it's just what they expect to see, somebody in a gown because he's an usher and 
that's it".
B2.5.2.1-the defendants' relationships with their advocates, a Justice* Clerk's view.
I put to the Justices' Clerk, the claims made by some researchers, 'that defendants 
commonly observed that they had found it difficult to decide whose side their advocates were 
on', (Baldwin & McConville, 1977, p85). The Justices' Clerk had no diffculty in associating that 
comment with the Crown court where the observation had been made, and where, ".. the 
barristers are a bit more matey with each other". In the Crown court the advocates' roles are 
also a little less clearly defined. As it was explained, "You are talking about two barristers, one 
of whom today is prosecuting, the other whom is defending. Their roles could equally be 
reversed tomorrow or even this afternoon He did see the situation in the magistrates' court
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as somewhat different because the majority of advocates have clearly distinct functions in the 
Crime courts, they are either prosecutors or else they are defence solicitors. However the Clerk 
did recognise that this only defined their roles in the formal setting of the court. In the informal 
settings, the period of time when the bench have retired and left the courtroom, then the 
situation might well be different and the adversarial stances of the advocates may well have 
been dropped. As the Clerk explained, "If he, [the defendant], sees the guy who he thinks is on 
his side, who's putting his story, chatting to the prosecutor, he doesn't know what he's chatting 
about it may very well be nothing to do with him at all, it could be the next case, it could be last 
night's football, ..but he doesn't know that. He thinks that because this advocate is supposed to 
be his sole prop in front of all these people, that he, the advocate, and the prosecutor must be 
deadly enemies. They mustn't be seen to be talking to each other politely, certainly not in a 
matey, chatty sort of way. I can see why the defendants get a little uneasy about that". Whilst 
appreciating the defendant's point of view, the Clerk insists that from the perspective of the 
courts, "..they cant be opposing each other day in, day out because the system wouldnt work".
B2.5.3 The defendants* understanding, or lack of understanding of what their court
hearings were all about.
"A lot of people do leave the courtroom without fully understanding what has 
happened. .. I always think looking at people, ' He's no idea what's happening, he hasnt a clue 
why he's been committed to the Crown court or why he's being dealt with here' .They just go 
along with their solicitor who tells them, 'Say this and that', and they say it. But I dont think they 
grasp what's been said until later on". This statement summarised the impression gained by a 
court usher on what he perceives as the defendant's understanding of what has happened in 
the courtroom. He elaborated on this by saying that in his opinion the defendant's 
understanding depended to a large degree on the complexity of the decision and its 
announcement. He continued, "If it's just a simple adjournment, We're adjourning it for a 
fortnight..', I think by and large people grasp that, they know they've got to be back, why 
they’ve got to be back they’re not exactly sure. .. But once it gets beyond that... ". Neither did 
this court usher blame this lack of understanding by the defendants on the courts. He told me, 
"Generally in these courts, people bend over backwards to explain to the defendants what's 
happening, what will happen next. Information is first class. .. If they dont understand, it's 
simply because they havent listened right, not because it’s not been explained well or because 
the accoustics are bad or anything like that". This view was not however necessarily shared by 
the Justices' Clerk. He saw the courtroom language as a potential problem and in particular, 
courtroom jargon. He explained, "The jargon is only useful for shorthand if one professional 
court user is dealing entirely with another professional court user, and I include magistrates in 
this. This jargon saves time .. and is understood. But the minute that the client is there it's no 
good using jargon, it is the client who needs the explanation and it's got to be in plain English. 
It's got to be something he understands".
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B2.6 The court staffs' perception of and relationship with the other court users.
"I would certainly agree to start with that there 
are a lot of competing interests in the courtroom 
and I'm not even sure that this ’uneasy compromise' 
is the the right expression, in many cases I'm not 
even sure there is compromise. I think there is just 
straightforward competition. The competition can 
very quickly become a conflict
(the Justices' Clerk)
B2.6.1 The quality of a bench is dependant upon the competency of its chairman.
To find out the court staffs' view of the magistrates, I went straight to the court clerks, 
the people who have the job of assisting and advising the magistrates every day and 
particularly the lay magistrates. They are the people, in my experience, who have to pick up 
the pieces when the, not infrequent, 'gaffes' are made by the lay magistrates. In the opinion of 
these court clerks, "Some lay benches are as good as the stipendiary magistrate, apart from 
the length of time that they have to consider, but I mean the quality of justice that is dished out 
is equally as good. But it depends on the mix of the bench, sometimes it's appalling". Quite 
often the quality of a bench is very much dependant on how competent and proficient its 
chairman is. The clerks continued, "The chairman influences a lot of things, if you've got a good 
chairman, you know it's going to be alright". With a poor chairman presiding on the bench, I 
was told that the court clerk's job can become, "stressful".
B2.6.1.1- sentencing by the lav bench is influenced by the individual magistrate.
combinations of magistrates and bv 'custom and practice'.
As part of my discussions concerning the lay magistrates, the conversation inevitably 
centred on their sentencing function. Once again the clerks emphasised the ways in which this 
can be influenced by the make-up of the individual benches. As I was told, "Quite often it is the 
personalities of the actual benches and you will sometimes get some benches who will do 
anything that is asked of them, .. and very often without questioning something that is so 
obvious and should have been covered... That depends again on the sort of bench you've got, 
if it’s anyone for an easy life". Alternatively, I was told that the court clerks also encounter the 
other extreme, the magistrates who have their own biases, their own likes and dislikes and who 
bring these into play during the decision making process, because, ".. if they've got that in their 
minds, that is going to be what it is at the end of the day". The final decision can also depend 
on the persistence and the resolve of an individual magistrate to win the argument. One of the 
court clerks related a specific instance to demonstrate this particular point. I was told, "Well it 
sometimes depends on how strong minded particular magistrates are. I had a trial the other day 
and it started off with two of them wanting to dismiss and one to convict. Then I came through 
and gave some advice and two of them wanted to convict and the other wanted to dismiss, this 
was after quite a long time of deliberation. The one who wanted to dismiss, she was so .. 
determined that it was going to happen, that ^  what they did in the end". But what was also
identified as an important factor in the sentencing decisions of the lay magistrates is the 'Bench 
Sentencing Policy', or to be more accurate the 'customs and practices' adopted by the Bench 
over time.
B2.6.1.2 - magistrates' courts can be self-perpetuating.
"/ do think that magistrates’ courts.., lay themselves open to criticism of being self- 
perpetuating. The new magistrates are recommended, by and large, by existing 
magistrates.One of the tendencies is to look at each candidate and say, 'Will this one fit in? 
Would I like to sit with this one?' and if not, Well we'll not bother with this one'. Now that's a 
criticism often voiced, I think the criticism can be exaggerated.. but like so many other things it 
is not without foundation". This comment by the Justices' Clerk prompted me to put to him the 
criticism that, 'For new magistrates and for those becoming senior magistrates, the message 
from the other court workers is clear. 'The system works very well thank you, please leave it 
alone'..', (Parker, Casbum and Turnbull, 1981, p66). Whilst partially agreeing with this criticism 
it was not accepted in it’s entirety. The Clerk agreed that there was a great deal of evidence 
which suggested that, ".. the message for the new magistrates is, We've been doing this job 
this way for so long, don't you start trying to tell us how to do our job when you're so new". He 
was quite prepared to concede that the magistrates' courts and their procedures are not beyond 
criticism and that suggestions on how to improve the situation should not necessarily be 
ignored, "Because if you’ve been doing the job ten years, fifteen years, twenty years and you 
are still not sure how to improve it, you recognise it needs improving, but you are not sure how. 
Then I think it's a little unfortunate to say that these newcomers might not have some good 
ideas". In the Clerk's opinion, the magistrates' courts, like most bureaucratic organisations, 
evolve. They do change, but they change relatively slowly. Where sudden change does occur, I 
was told that this would normally be brought about by the actions of one of the professional 
bodies who are a part of that system. As was explained, "It is unlikely that a relative newcomer 
would have sufficient insight to bring about the necessary changes". In elaborating this 
statement, the Clerk told me, ".. the relative newcomer, because of their lack of experience 
and because of the time they would take to gain that experience as a part-timer, who only 
comes once a week, once a fortnight and because they only look at the system from a limited 
viewpoint, without an overall view, even with their high level of experience in their own particular 
field, they might still find it difficult to apply that experience in the right way to the particular 
problems in the magistrates'court".
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B2.6.2 The stipendiary magistrates' courts are 'more professional', •quicker' and
better at dealing with cases which involve 'complicated legal argument'.
I was told by the court usher, "There is a difference, a marked difference when a 
stipendiary is running a court than when a lay bench are running a court. ..the whole 
performance from people is a lot sharper. When the ‘stipe' is running a court, it's a little more 
professional... I’m talking about the actual appearance of the court and the whole atmosphere 
of the court, both from our point of view and the defendant's point of v i e w The court clerks 
also found that there was a considerable difference, "..sitting with the stipendiary magistrate is 
having a bit of a rest to be quite honest because .. apart from keeping the court running you 
don’t need to have your brain switched on". According to the clerks, the stipendiary magistrates' 
courts are much quicker, because the need to consult with colleagues is eliminated. The 
stipendiary magistrates are also less likely to, but are not totally immune from, making 
mistakes in their decisions and their announcements. As has already been mentioned in 
previous chapters, the stipendiary magistrates, because of their training and experience, have 
a much greater knowledge than the lay magistrates about both the judicial and the 
administrative matters which have to be considered as part of the decision making process. It 
is because of this knowledge that the court professionals have a preference that any cases 
which contain complicated legal argument are listed for hearing by a stipendiary magistrate and 
such cases are nomally allocated in this way.
B2.6.2.1- the lav benches are seen as being much 'softer' in their sentencing than 
are the stipendiary magistrates.
But I was also told, it is not always the situation that the advocates have a preference 
to have their cases listed in the stipendiary magistrates' courts. From what one of the court 
clerks told me, there is a definite impression among the advocates, ". that a lay bench is softer 
.. and they can get a lay bench to do what they want.". Another court clerk told me, "You very 
often get advocates grumbling if they’ve been put in front of the 'stipe' with a reports case, [a 
case where Pre-Sentence Reports have been requested]. If they think it's a custody case, if the 
'stipe'is sitting, there's more chance of 'going down', [the defendant going into custody],
B2.6.3 There are areas of conflict between the different individuals and agencies in 
the magistrates' courts, only some of which can be settled by compromise
The different teams involved in the magistrates' courts system do have different aims 
and objectives which are often motivated by their individual or group 'vested' interests. 
Inevitably this can create conflicts, conflicts which sometimes, but not always, can be settled by 
compromise. These were the views expressed by the Justices' Clerk during our discussions on 
the subject of 'Inter-team relationships'. He was certainly of the opinion that, " .. there are 
potentially conflicting interests in the courtroom". He gave examples such as everybody 
wants to have their case heard first,.. defendants, witnesses, advocates, all want to get on, get
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their cases over and go home, all for their different reasons. ..Advocates, because it's financial, 
defendants and witnesses, perhaps just to get it over and get the pressure relieved,.. and when 
it gets to two minutes to one and there are three cases left, the court clerk is thinking about his 
lunch because he's got another court to start at two o' clock". In the final analysis not all of 
these conflicts are going to be or can be settled by compromise. If they cannot, then I was told 
that it is, "..usually down to the court clerk, ..somebody has to make that decision and 
somebody making that decision is going to upset some people". Each of the participants in the 
courtroom is also there to perform a different function, to play a different role. The Justices' 
Clerk continued, "It was said, ..that the defence advocate's job is to get his client off. But the 
prosecution advocate's job is not to get the defendant convicted, it is to present the case fairly. I 
think I would be inclined to the view that the probation officer's job these days is to present the 
court with an appropriate sentence other than a custodial sentence. The witnesses wish just to 
put forward their side of the story as they see it, the truth as they see it. The defence advocate 
may want to get a different version out of them". One of the court clerks also defined what they 
saw as areas of conflict within the courtrooms, "There are conflicts between, for example, what 
we are trying to do and what the CPS are trying to do and increasingly, I think, between 
Probation and the magistrates' sentences, and there seems to be an increasing conflict there, 
where they are putting forward representations in reports .. You get probation officers saying, 
Well I don't think this is serious', and of course the magistrates frequently say, 'Ah, but we do', 
and the defence trying to convince the bench by saying, ' You don't really need to impose a 
custodial sentence do you', But yes, there is always conflict there".
B2.6.3.1- without inter-team loyalties the system would not work.
Within the magistrates' courts, I had observed a number of different groups, but I was 
told that apart from these obvious groups, the court staff, prosecution, defence and the social 
workers, there were also certain wider groupings. It was also quite common for an individual to 
belong to more than one team and this 'dual membership' can sometimes result in an overlap 
of loyalties. As the Justices' Clerk explained, the court clerk is a member of the 'court team', 
which comprises of the magistrate, the clerk, the court assistant and the usher, ".. but I think 
the court clerk also comes into a slightly looser team of the professional court users. Because 
today you as a magistrate are part of the court clerk's team but tomorrow you are not, you are 
not there tomorrow ... ". In the same way the Clerk described the 'defence team', " .. the 
advocate and his client, they form one of today's teams, but tomorrow they don't, because the 
client isn't there tomorrow. Now he's got another client admittedly, but he, [the advocate], is 
also part of the professional court users' team which is made up of the advocates and the court 
clerk and the dock officer and the probation officer who are regulars, they are there everyday". 
He continued, "When you describe the court team, ..the prosecution team, the defence team, 
yes they are all there, those sorts of teams. But they cant be opposing each other day in, day
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out, because the system wouldn't work and in that sense some of the loyalties can be a bit 
divided".
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B3 THE ADVOCATES' PERCEPTION.
B3.1 The role of the defence solicitor.
"What the clients think is good representation 
and what is good representation are not always 
the same thing".
(a defence solicitor)
B3.1.1 A trained lawyer, not the client's parrot.
The defence advocates see their role as giving their clients the best representation 
they can within the rules of the legal system. They are employed to put their clients' side of the 
argument, but they are quick to point out that this does not necessarily mean that they just put 
forward the clients' view of the events, "We represent our clients for their own best interests 
and to the best of our ability in doing that". As one solicitor explained to me, "The client can tell 
us the facts of the incident and it must be our job as a lawyer to see how the facts relate to the 
charge, to decide whether the case is made out, or whether a defence exists, or whether 
mitigation should be put forward. That is why lawyers are trained and why we are employed, 
not merely to be parrots repeating comments made to us by our clients, but interpreting those 
comments and using them for the clients' best interest".
B3.1.1.1 - representation, the path that encompasses all, a tortuous path.
I was told by a number of advocates that there are good and bad solicitors but as one 
solicitor pointed out what is good and what is bad is quite often a matter of individual 
perception. "What clients think is good representation and what is good representation is not 
always the same thing because a lot of solicitors will do their act for the defendants' ears, 
whether it benefits the defendants or not, but because the the defendant likes it. I've seen 
defendants leave court having been very badly represented take the view that they were well 
represented because he, [their solicitor], was rude to the prosecutor". Other solicitors were 
accused Of putting self-interest first, of playing to the gallery rather than focusing on their 
clients. As one solicitor put it, "Some solicitors will play to the gallery because generally they 
are exhibitionists, but to do this job you have to be, they like the sound of their own voice and 
they think it's a good sales trick". A view which was endorsed by a second solicitor who 
condemned certain of his colleagues for being primarily interested in personal gain, "There are 
solicitors who frequently do not act in their client's interest,.. I am deeply offended by solicitors 
who use every single opportunity to gain publicity for themselves, to further their careers. I've 
spent many years trying to avoid publicity because usually it does my client harm".
But if the job of the solicitor is to represent the interests of the client, while at the
same time convincing the client that this is being done, how does the defence solicitor achieve
the combining of what should be two complementary issues ? To quote the words of one
solicitor, "The successful solicitor has got to find the path that encompasses all, whilst keeping
credibility with all, and it is a very tortuous path". In presenting the client's view, all the solicitors
whom I interviewed were agreed that if the client insists on something being said in court and
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providing that it is not seen as detrimental to the client's interest then it should be said. The 
problems arise when the clients wish to have something put before the court which is either 
illegal or which it is deemed will, insult the intelligence of the court" Again all were agreed 
that where the facts indicate that the defendant is in the wrong, then it would be wrong to 
present the case in any other way, "It wouldn't therefore be professional to put forward an 
argument that a client was not in the wrong when they patently were". There are however 
occasions,"When even the most hardened professional defence advocate will be offended by 
the instructions he is given by his client", and it is this dilemma which concerns most 
advocates. As I was told by one defence solicitor, "There is an element of truth in the fact that 
you discount what the defendant says a lot of the time. But I would like to think that I never give 
the client that impression or stand up in court and really give the court that impression. It's really 
back to credibility with the benches, there is a point beyond which you are not prepared to go. I 
mean yes, you have to challenge your client, there are things that they will say to you on which 
you do challenge them hard. But at the end of the day, if a client wants something said and 
unless it is going to be to his detriment if I say it , i'll generally put it across". Another solicitor 
was rather more forthright in his views about the occasions when he is instructed to proceed by 
the client, even though it is contrary to the advice he has given. In his opinion the solicitor 
should put the matters to the court as instructed but with a rider which protects the solicitor's 
crediblity with the magistrates, using words which indicate, "He has specifically asked me to do 
it, I don't think he should, but this ‘dolls-head' wont believe me". While this appears not to be an 
uncommon method by which solicitors distance themselves from some of the views of their 
clients, it is seen by at least one solicitor as a ’cop out', an abdication of responsibility.
B3.1.1.2 - solicitors do prepare their clients for the court hearing, time permitting.
It is also part of the defence lawyer's role to prepare the defendant whom they are 
representing for the appearance in court. The client needs to know what the system is, what to 
expect during the course of the hearing, to be made aware of and be prepared for all the 
possible outcomes, and following the hearing, the often bemused client may need to be told 
what has happened. As I was told by one solicitor, "It's part of our job, an essential part of our 
job to make sure that our clients understand the procedures and to go through those 
procedures carefully and at a pace that the defendants can understand.....". In the opinion of 
one solicitor if the represented defendant does not understand what has happened then, "..his, 
or her, representative has been inefficient or incompetent and has not done the job of acting for 
the individual". Whilst this observation may be all very well in theory, I was told by another 
solicitor that in practice it does not always happen. The pressures of time and workload have 
created a situation where the clients are categorised according to their previous experience and 
their perceived needs. "I know that for anybody who is in court for the first time, I am sure that 
most of my colleagues spend a lot of time telling them what is going to happen, even down to, 
you'll be taken in and you'll be asked to stand, you'll be standing near me, you’ll have to speak
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your name ... . For people who are there more regularly, yes you get lax, you think, 7 haven't 
got the time, I've got to dash off somewhere else'..
B3.1.1.3 - who the solicitor represents in the coutroom is not always of their 
choosing.
Defence solicitors have been accused of only giving training to their clients, ’often in 
the last ten minutes before a case is heard and often by a young solicitor whom they have 
never seen before’, (Carlen, 1976, p91). When I put this assertion to the solicitors during the 
interviews, all agreed that it had a ’ring of truth’, but, by and large, the reasons for it were 
claimed not to be necessarily of the solicitors making. It was conceded that in some firms of 
solicitors it is the policy for a clerk to deal with much of the preparation, therefore some of the 
advocates do not see the client until the case is called into court and this was seen as 
unsatisfactory, "bad form" as one solicitor described it. Solicitors in common with many other of 
the professions like to build up a client base, they would also prefer to, "..see cases from the 
initial instructions and all the way through court, but the system does not allow it". One of the 
main reasons put forward for this failure is the difficulty of time-tabling within the courts. This 
can result in conflict when a solicitor who is required to attend in one court is found to be 
engaged and ’on their feet’ in an adjacent court. If the magistrates insist that the case should 
proceed, and this is not an uncommon occurrence, then the most common solution is to 
transfer the relevant cases to available colleagues from the same firm and who are attending at 
court. This situation does not pose a major problem for the solicitors who all consider 
themselves able "..to pick up a file, read it quickly and know where we are. The client, however, 
may well view the situation from a different perspective because as they see it, Tve told my 
innermost secrets to one person, to find that somebody else Tve never met is now standing and 
talking on my behalf. But that happens, not really of our choosing. That happens because of 
the pressures that are put on us".
B3.1.1.4 - is there a case for coaching the defendants and their witnesses?
While most of the solicitors try to prepare their clients for the courtroom experience, 
the actual ’performance coaching’ of defendants and defence witnesses is not widely used. As 
one solicitor explained, "I don't think that the coaching of defendants and witnesses is anything 
as common as people believe. The lawyers that I know will certainly have their clients tell them 
their version of events and will certainly have their clients read through the statement before 
they go into court on the day. ..But actually I do not know of any that have 'dress rehearsals'. I 
do not know of any lawyers who run their clients and witnesses through their version of events 
time and time again to improve their technique". Some witnesses are assessed to try and 
"perceive how the witness will react in court". When comparing the defence witness with the 
prosecution witness then, as one defence advocate observed, the defence could be placed at a 
disadvantage. The prosecution witness, "is likely to be a police officer or in many cases a
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professional witness, so they have given evidence many times before. They perhaps, have 
been coached at training school or in their jobs, in previous cases, on how to give evidence”. In 
comparing this with the normal defendant or defence witness one solicitor did ponder, "Many 
defendants haven’t been in a court before or have never been involved in trials before and may 
not know how to give evidence and it may well be that we should tell the defendant more about 
the way in which he or she gives evidence and perhaps we don’t do it often enough”.
B3.1.1.5 - there is sometimes a requirement to protect the defendant from the 
bench.
The defence solicitors also consider that part of their job is to 'protect' their clients 
from the magistrates, to restrict the direct contact between the defendants and the magistrates 
and to prevent their clients from making any statements which may be seen as detrimental to 
their case. As one solicitor told me, "The minute that certain magistrates want to speak directly 
to the defendants, the way we generally deal with it is to hse immediately to our feet and try to 
intervene. That’s because we don’t know what our client is going to say and we want to try and 
stop them saying things which are going to drop them in it". But this is not the only reason, as I 
was told by another solicitor, there is also a need in some instances to guard against some 
chairmen in the court who will, "..interrogate young defendants disgracefully".
B3.1.2 A legal practice or a commercial enterprise - an area of conflict.
There is no doubt in the minds of any of the defence solicitors with whom I spoke that 
they operate in a highly competitive market where their businesses are subject to the same 
commercial pressures as any other business. If they are to succeed then they need to attract 
clients, they need to build their reputations and not only among the 'defendant population' but 
also with the other court users. The general view was perhaps summarised by one solicitor who 
told me, "In 1993 because the competition is rife, solicitors enjoy their work by reputation and if 
you sell people short you won’t get work". The same solicitor when discussing the importance 
of credibility saw it as, "..vital, .. You’re self-employed, it's a job, if you do the job badly or if 
people don’t like you, they think you're an idiot, or whatever, you will not be successful, you will 
not make a living". This view was supported by a second solicitor who told me that to be 
successful, legal firms need a high volume of customers, "I think we need to be busy to make a 
living because of the financial constraints that are placed upon us. We have to keep busy, we 
have fewer staff, ... and our staff have to work harder to be profitable". This solicitor also 
bemoaned the change of emphasis which he has experienced, which has been forced upon 
him, from lawyer to businessman. "When I started in law.... we never worried about whether 
there was a profit at the end of the year, because we knew it would be there. Now days we 
have to manage the business and as a sideline we are allowed to become a lawyer. I should be 
concerned at doing my work, giving my advice and conducting myself professionally rather than 
thinking, how do I make a profit, do I make a profit today ?"
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B3.1.3 The role of the prosecutor.
"... you're there as a minister of justice 
not as an avenging angel"
(a prosecuting solicitor)
During the course of my interviews, a view had been expressed that, 'while it is the 
job of the defence advocates to try everything within the rules to get their clients off, it is not 
necessarily the job of the prosecutor to get a person convicted', a view with which the 
prosecutor who was interviewed as part of the study concurred. As he told me, 'You are there 
to see that your version of the facts are fairly put before the court. ..So yes I see my role as 
there to help the court, telling one side of the story so that they, [the magistrates], can make the 
right decision when it comes to sentencingBut in commenting on the adversarial system in 
the magistrates courts he did admit, " There is at the end of the day a winner or a loser. I think 
probably we would be less than human if we don't want to be winners all the time. I think you 
have got to rarefy it a little bit more and say, we've all won provided that just results have been 
reached, the right result. That's the theoretical thing, but of course we're all human and we all 
like to be winners".
B3.1.3.1 - the prosecution can find themselves disadvantaged by the rules.
The prosecutor with whom I spoke felt that in a number of ways and contrary to to 
popular perception, " That the feeling here is that the odds are stacked against us. ..I think so 
far as the guilt or innocence side of the things are concerned, then as a prosecutor my 
perception is that it's stacked in favour of the defendant". In support of his argument he 
claimed that while the prosecution have to openly declare both their intentions and information 
to the defence in advance, "What our evidence is, what our case is, we've given them all our 
statements". The defence do not have to divulge what their defence is , "..until the day of the 
trial or even in the course of the trial". The prosecutors can find in these circumstances that 
they can even be presented with, "..what is known in the trade as an 'ambush defence', 
something you've got to deal with on your f e e t In the adversarial system, which underpins 
the justice system, the burden of proof rests with the prosecution.
B3.1.3.2 - prosecutors also have feelings.
Many of the pre-courtroom decisions which the prosecution solicitors have to make 
are decided without the benefit of the 'human element', they are based upon 'pieces of paper1. 
The reality of human input, gan sometimes be quite revealing. As I was told, "There is no 
human input into our decision making, .. Your own view can actually be altered when you 
actually see the witness in the box, or the defendant. A number of times I've dealt with things 
and it's looked quite bad on paper and then some mousey woman or some poor alcoholic fellow 
comes into the dock. You think, 'What am I here for? Why am I doing him for this or her for this
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and you feel a bit of a heel about It, ..and you think he can't have done that or it’s not in the 
public interest to prosecute, ..and that's something you cant see on paper".
B3.2 Justice and organisational efficiency.
"I certainly feel that we as defence solicitors 
.. are coming under increasing pressure 
to get things done quickly regardless of 
whether we are doing a good job for the client"
(a defence solicitor)
B3.2.1 It is argued that justice delayed is justice denied, but the real reason is 
financial.
There was a strong element of feeling amongst the solicitors whom I interviewed that 
justice is becoming a casualty of government policy. As one solicitor explained in some detail, 
"The emphasis now is on speeding things up on the basis of the argument, 'justice delayed is 
justice denied', that's the basis of it and in my opinion clever people, ..who have a political bias 
and are very professional at this deft art of being able to make things apply to certain criteria,... 
so they adopt that philosophy but with finance in mind". This solicitor was also very critical of 
the Lord Chancellor's Department who he sees as a, "..political and financial institution who 
have moved too far away from the interests of justice". I was told that the criteria which is now 
used to assess the efficiency of a magistrates’ court is the speed with which the workload is 
moved through the system. "Delay becomes the appropriate term not justice and so 
consequently we are eaten up by this business of delay and we must have things dealt with first 
time in,... courts are told that they must do things more quickly, if they don't, they don't get the 
appropriate points and if they dont get them ..they will be in difficulties", [their funding for the 
following year will be calculated using current performance indicators]. This solicitor saw 
change as inevitable, "Things change, times change, you get bureaucrats who want to change 
the world arid the system and because it's finance orientated, it has to change". In accepting 
the inevitability of it all, this solicitor was concerned at the 'other cost', . it's at what cost, now 
if it's at the cost of the interest of the case and justice for the individual then it's too expensive in 
my view". A second defence solicitor offered the opinion that, "The courts themselves are now 
being placed under financial constraints which in my view is reducing the amount of justice we 
will see, Not only was it the defence advocates who were concerned with this financial 
preoccupation in the magistrates' courts, the prosecutor with whom I spoke also volunteered 
the opinion that, "Everything over the last ten years or so seems to have been reduced to 
money and this job or this business, the law, is exactly the same".
B3.2.1.1 - the government's aim is to reduce the effectiveness of the Legal Aid 
system.
The dissatisfaction with central government's approach to the legal system was also 
expressed with regard to the recent amendments to the Legal Aid system. One opinion
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suggested that solicitor performance will be impaired, I was told, "With the cut-backs in legal 
aid, I think you will get comer cutting, you will get solicitors having to be less than what they 
should be, some might say out of necessity". Concern was also expressed for those groups in 
society who will now find themselves outside of the qualifying criteria for obtaining legal aid 
because, " ..only people who are actually in receipt of state benefit, that is in particular Family 
support or Family credit or a financial level similar to Income support, they're the only ones in 
real terms who are going to get meaningful legal aid. Everybody else, even in a poorly paid job, 
are going to have such a massive contribution to pay towards the cost of their own 
representation that I genuinely believe that most people will not have a solicitor". It is further 
claimed that this policy will put an, unfair burden on the clerks of the court who are going to 
have to carefully go through cases with defendants to make certain that they are taking each 
procedural step correctly", a task for which the courts will find it very difficult to devote the 
necessary time. Another solicitor told me that with any reduction in legal aid justice will suffer, 
there will be an increase in unrepresented defendants, " I would say that without legal aid there 
would be a much greater injustice than there is, ..I've seen defendants refused legal aid for 
whatever reason walk into a trial, into a minefield, ..". It is also envisaged that increased 
pressure will be placed on the Duty Solicitor system, with solicitors, "Trying to see people on 
the hoof, getting instructions in a matter of minutes, a glance at the papers and deal with cases 
in court. That's not the proper way to consider a charge if we're talking about criminal matters 
and representing somebody .. and that's the only type of legal aid, it seems to me, that this 
government is allowing to remain. .. This government is not concerned at all in whether we 
have a good service, they are simply trying to put together a very cheap service, ..a second 
rate, cheap 'Public Defender1 system". The sentiments expressed in these views, while being 
generally held by the defence advocates with whom I spoke, were not necessarily shared by 
the prosecutor. It was pointed out that prior to the change in the Legal Aid legislation, "If it was 
being done on legal aid, I suspect there was an interest to make it last as long as you can and 
get what you can". Things have changed with the introduction of fixed fees and, "..now of 
course the most effective way of doing things with fixed fees is to do it quickly". Allowance has 
been made within the system for not guilty pleas, "Because if a defendant pieads not guilty then 
the fixed fees goes up.. and we're not going to make a snap decision about the not guilty there 
and then because it might not be the right one". The prosecuting solicitor was at pains to 
emphasise the fact however, that there are a number of good reasons for not guilty pleas, not 
least, because sometimes the evidence isn't there. I mean not every not guilty plea is a 
device to milk the legal aid fund".
B3.2.2 There is increasing pressure to restrict delays.
"There is a great deal more pressure today than there was to avoid delays". This view 
expressed by a defence solicitor was confirmed by all of the solicitors, whether defence or 
prosecution, who were interviewed as part of the study. I was told by another solicitor, "I've
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noticed in the last five years a massive change. ..pre-eighty seven there was a very good 
working atmosphere, everybody understood everybody's role and the pressure to do things 
wasn't as great. That didnt mean to say that they would adjourn anything for any reason, they 
would look into things and see the sense of it, but if you put forward a sensible reason they 
would grant an adjournment without hesitation". Both sets of solicitors considered that the 
greatest pressure to proceed with cases was exerted by the stipendiary magistrates rather than 
the lay magistrates. There was also general agreement about the fact that when the 
magistrates insist on a matter going ahead this does not always result in the matter being dealt 
with in the most effective way, either financially or judiciously. For example if the magistrates 
insist on pleas being taken then the defence will take the safe way out, "We'll plead not guilty 
and then it goes out for pre-trial reviews etc. and it gets listed for trial and at some point in the 
next three months it dawns on somebody either from our point of view, [the prosecution], that 
it's a non-runner and from their point of view, [the defence], that it's not a runner and you've not 
saved any time. There is an atmosphere that ..progress has to be made every time and 
sometimes it does help to stand back on both sides and take stock before moving on to the 
next stage".
All were agreed that a case should proceed providing there is time to do it on the day 
and where the defendant is not going to be prejudiced by the decision It is also accepted that 
too many adjourned matters can result in the overloading of future court lists which in turn can 
hinder the smooth running of the courts and ultimately that may not be in the defendant's 
interest either.'
B3.2.2.1 - there is a general and falsely held perception that most delays are caused
by the defence solicitors.
The defence solicitors in the study were somewhat incensed by the fact that they 
appear to be held responsible for the majority of delays which occur in the magistrates' courts. 
A perception which one defence solicitor described as "..offensive". In the words of another 
advocate, "I feel as a defence lawyer that this is the general attitude that most people have, that 
lots of delays are caused by the defence, ..lots of pressure appears to be on the defence and it 
doesn't appear as though there is as much pressure on the prosecution to avoid delays, ..a lot 
of my colleagues also feel that the pressure is always on us not to delay". The defence 
solicitors argue that the delays are not normally of their making and maintain that it is in fact 
unreasonable to expect them to proceed, "..if they haven't had the papers which they are legally 
entitled to have and to consider them". As one disgruntled defence lawyer told me, "Day in day 
out I'm handed advanced disclosure on the day of the hearing, seconds before the case is 
called on. That's not good enough, that's not a defence lawyer's fault. That is because either 
the police are not efficient at getting the papers to the prosecution, ..or the prosecution are not 
efficient enough in copying disclosures and getting them out to the defence lawyers, or in my 
opinion, on occasions they simply cant be bothered to get it out quickly enough. I know from
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their file that they often have the paperwork and don't send it out. Whether it's to avoid postage 
because of the financial constraints or whether it's because they haven't had the time to 
consider it and photocopy it I dont know..". Neither was the criticism reserved solely for the 
Crown Prosecution Service, there was also some criticism of the magistrates' court staff who 
deal with legal aid applications, "I may apply for legal aid .. that will almost certainly not have 
been considered before the first hearing date .. . It's grossly unfair to want somebody to 
proceed if you dont know if the solicitor is going to get paid".
B3.2.3 To pressure the defence solicitor is to pressure the defendant.
The defence advocates are also concerned about the effect that the pressure to 
proceed has on the defendant, "The pressure is on us to try and take instructions in 
unsatisfactory conditions, knowing that the court is anxious to get a case done. A defendant 
should not be made to feel that he is being forced to make a decision ..without sitting down 
properly with his lawyer ..it cannot be right or fair". This theme was also taken up by another 
defence solicitor who told me, "I know I'm sometimes forcing people to make a decision about 
their plea quicker than I would like to. Usually I would like an adjournment to go through the 
papers. Even though I'm in court everyday and know the system they are not, defendants are 
not in court everyday, they are new to it, ..I think it's poor at the moment".
B3.2.4 A policy has emerged which is akin to plea bargaining.
It would appear that a system has developed, probably dictated by the current policies 
of cash limiting and efficiency targeting, which involves the acceptance by the Crown 
Prosecution Service of guilty pleas to offences which are considered less serious than the ones 
with which the defendant was initially charged, albeit sometimes reluctantly. When I discussed 
this particular point I was told by one of the defence solicitors that, "Where the CPS know that 
they have only got limited time back at the office, perhaps they're understaffed .. and yes, if 
they can get rid of a file they get 'brownie points' as well. If they can go back to the office with 
five Wes that they've completed then it's going to be better for them at the end of the day, and if 
that means reducing something a bit further than perhaps they'd want to go, then perhaps 
they'll do it". Neither did the prosecution solicitor take any issue with this view. The one proviso 
being that the case needs to be dealt with on the day. As the prosecutor told me, "I think 
possibly if you can get away with a lesser offence and have it dealt with on the day, that's a 
very cost effective way of doing it". But what I asked a defence solicitor does this do to the 
concept of justice, does it not put pressure on the person who is not guilty to plead guilty as a 
matter of convenience? I was told, "Obviously as a defence solicitor if people say to us 'we’re 
not guilty', we never say Well you ought to plead guilty because this is a good offer1, not in 
direct terms. But obviously it's said to them, Well look you could end up convicted of 'x', ..you're 
being offered a plea to 'y', you ought to think about it. So yes, indirectly I would agree with that".
But all of the solicitors agreed that it was certainly not justice to pressure the defendants into 
making 'snap decisions' just because it appears to be cost effective.
B3.2.5. Whatever the outcome of the case the defendants should leave the court 
feeling that they have had a fair hearing.
" .. And now we're down the road of factory production". This was the opinion 
expressed by one of the defence solicitors who regretted the passing of the days when the 
courtroom atmosphere could be more likened to that of the theatre, a place where personalities 
were important. Now time pressures do not allow for individual 'performances'. "We are all, 
every agency now it seems to me, constrained by financial limits. Statistics seem to be 
collected endlessly about how quickly you can get to a certain stage in the proceedings. They 
seem to have taken over, we forget that we are actually dealing with human beings..". It was 
also argued that one of the reasons why people don't understand what has happened in the 
courtroom is that, "..we’re often perhaps doing it too quickly, it all comes back to constraints". 
But a point which was emphasised during the interviews by the solicitors was that if justice is to 
be seen to be done, "The defendant ought to go out of court or to the cells and to his phson 
sentence thinking that he’s had a fair hearing, and this cannot always be the case".
B3.3 Courtroom organisation and the degradation ceremony.
"I certainly think they, [the procedures], are 
there to maintain some elements of respect 
with the court. But I do agree that they should 
be handled, perhaps with sympathy to the 
defendant and generally they are not handled 
in that way". (a defence solicitor)
B3.3.1 There is a need to maintain the dignity of the court.
All of the solicitors whom I interviewed, both prosecution and defence, were in total
agreement that the dignity of the court and the factors which contribute to achieving this should
be preserved. As I was reminded by solicitors from both sides, "It is the court, ..it does act in
the Queen's name and if that means anything there has got to be a bit of dignity about it". In the
opinion of the prosecutor, "If the court does not have dignity then people aren't going to treat it
or its orders with any respect". There also seemed to be a general desire among the solicitors
with whom I spoke to retain the old traditions. As I was told by one, "I'm a traditionalist, ..I
favour the wearing of wigs etc., there's an argument now that they should be gone, but I think
that is a bad move. I think the court area should be treated with the greatest of respect and
generally I think it is by the people who work in i t This view was supported by another
solicitor who told me, "I dont know that I would want the old standards, the old apparent extra
respect we have for the officials, to go. I think that is part of the majesty and I think that kind of
majesty is still needed in some forms of officialdom, certainly in courts". The language of the
court was seen as being one of these traditions which needed to be retained. As one solicitor
explained, "If something is special, or you believe something is special, like judicial
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proceedings, ..I dont see anything wrong in having a special sort of language which marks it 
out as being special, ..such as referring to people as my learned friend". One solicitor did admit 
however that there are people within the profession who do see it as a language of power, 
"..which is what it is, isn't it, because it excludes somebody else, ..and I know barrister 
colleagues who get very upset if they're not referred to as learned".
B3.3.1.1 - and a requirement to demonstrate the seriousness of the occasion.
Again all of the solicitors in the study had no doubts that the defendants should be 
made to realise that an appearance in court is a serious matter. As I was told by one of them, "I 
think it is necessary to maintain the kind of atmosphere in court that identifies it as a serious 
occasion This view was shared by the prosecuting solicitor who objected to the attempts to 
liberalise the courts which deal with the more serious criminal matters, "Even in the most liberal 
things criminal courts are still, well they're not cosy fireside chats. There is something about 
them, everybody knows exactly and almost literally where they stand. So I'm not in favour of 
cosy round table chats for criminal courts because sometimes what you are dealing with is not 
suitable for it". The general feeling was that the control of the courts. "Should be strict and 
should be extremely firm". As I was told by one solicitor, when defendants have been dealt with 
in a firm manner, . it is always remembered". But according to another solicitor, it is not only 
the defendants who require to be controlled, "I think that ceremony in court is not observed as 
much as it should be. We're all getting lax in that, defence advocates to prosecutors, we talk in 
court more than we should. That's largely to get things moving because of the pressures that 
are put on you to get things through. But that shouldn't happen as much as it does. My own 
personal view on ceremony is that it should remain and it, [the courtroom], should be a place 
where there is rigid ceremony because it is a serious occasion".
B3.3.2 The control of the court should not include the humiliation of the 
defendant.
'V dont think that they, [the defendants], need to be degraded ..and I dont think that 
the courts have the right or the authority to do so either..". This view expressed by one solicitor 
was endorsed by all the other solicitors with whom I had discussions. A second solicitor whilst 
reaffirming the opinion that the courts need to be controlled in a firm manner did emphasise, "I 
do not feel, however, that this should extend itself to the humiliation and demoralisation of any 
defendant, ..if he's not holding the court in disrespect". Another solicitor expressed the opinion 
that when defendants are rebuked in the open court this can result in the defendant being put at 
a disadvantage and especially where the transgressions for which they are being admonished 
are as a result of nervousness rather than a blatant disrespect for the court. The prosecutor 
with whom I spoke considered that the practice of humiliating defendants only served to reflect 
adversely on the courts, "Having dignified proceedings doesn't mean you have to exclude 
common courtesy, ..that is just basically being nice to people and that doesn't detract one bit 
from the dignity of the court, it adds to it".
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B3.3.2.1 - unless the defendants treat the courts with disrespect.
* If by their conduct they, [the defendants], are holding the courts in disrepute or if 
they're, as it were, laughing at its powers or whatever it is, then I'm afraid that they are the 
authors of their own misfortunes and they should be dealt with accordingly This opinion 
expressed by one of the defence solicitors was not opposed by any of his colleagues whom I 
interviewed, but they were keen to stress that not all lapses in defendant behaviour are 
intentional, some of it can be due to the occasion or to nervousness. But it was agreed that 
some of the poor behaviour by defendants is intentional. As I was told by a prosecution 
solicitor, "I mean people might have their hands in their pockets, or be chewing gum, or come 
into court wearing a hat because they want to 'cock a snoop' at the system". This type of 
behaviour does appear to be more common among the more, "..experienced defendants at 
court", and it was agreed that in these circumstances then the way in which people are spoken 
to is, "..acceptable to a degree". But the solicitor who made this observation also pointed out 
that defendants are not always aware that they are being disrespectful, "Often they dont realise 
that these are insults to the court. Because of their backgrounds they dont realise that they 
should be taking their hats off or not have their hands in their pockets
B3.3.3 The procedures are not designed to humiliate and to degrade.
When asked for their opinions on the claims that, 'Courtroom ceremony is 
characteristically organised to degrade and humiliate the defendant', (Emerson, 1969), the 
general response was one of rebuttal, but with some reservations. The prosecutor described 
the statement as, "..a bit one sided". Another solicitor replied, "I wouldnt wholely support that 
argument", and went on to explain that all that the courts expected from people was a display 
of "good manners”. A third solicitor told me, " No I dont, I dont think it is, if that's what is being 
sought then it is not working". But while the solicitors were generally supportive of the system 
and the procedures in the magistrates' courts, they were not so positive in their opinions about 
the way that these procedures are applied.
B3.3.3.1 - it is not the procedures but the unsympathetic wav they are implemented.
As I was told by one defence solicitor, "I dont think the procedures necessarily are 
designed to degrade defendants ..but I would say that in some courts, some people have a 
disregard for the feelings of the defendant, ..I certainly think they, [the procedures], are there to 
maintain some elements of respect within the court, but I do agree that they should be handled 
perhaps with sympathy to the defendant and generally they are not handled in that way". 
Another solicitor was even more specific and identified the magistrates as the main offenders 
in the meteing out of this ’unsympathetic treatment'. 'Yes we often feel that the way that 
defendants are spoken to by certain members of the bench is not appropriate at all", The 
stipendiary magistrates in particular were criticised for their treatment of the defendants in the 
courtroom environment. One of the major criticisms was about the way that defendants are
69
sometimes addressed by only their surnames and this was seen as being totally unacceptable 
As one solicitor explained, "I'm particularly offended when I see a court call a defendant by his 
or her surname, without a title or anything else. .. I would never in everyday language talk to 
anyone in that tone". This view was echoed by the prosecuting solicitor who maintained, ".. 
whatever the defendant is, you refer to them by their title, you know Mister, Miss and you 
should find out, particularly from the lady what her title is so that she's addressed properly or 
how she wants ... I never refer to the defendant by their surname only, no matter what they are 
supposed to have done". This solicitor also expanded on this treatment of defendants and to 
the way they are given, or not given, instructions in the courtroom. He recalled, and we've all 
had situations where somebody's not told the defendant that he can sit down and he's stood 
there open mouthed. ..Perhaps the way to deal with it is to say, 'Well would you like to stand 
up? Would you like to sit down? Is there anything you would like to say'? and at least it gives 
the defendant the impression that he is being treated fairly, and that is something which I 
personally feel quite strong about". But within this general area of consensus there was one 
voice expressing a certain level of dissension. One of the defence solicitors concluded, "I dont 
favour the Youth courts' reference to defendants by their Christian names, I dont actually hold 
with that. I dont think that you should say to a kid who's been out and committed a load of 
burglaries and frightened an old woman to death, I dont think you should call them Chris or 
Trev. I think defendants should be referred to, not as Mister either, because they actually lost 
that quality of respect to be called Mister by the reason of the severity of their offending, 
whatever it might be". This solicitor did concede in later dicussion that this could depend upon 
the seriousness or otherwise of the crime committed and on the magistrates' assessment of the 
individual concerned and dependent upon this the defendant should be allowed, "whatever 
degree of respect we thought they would be entitled to".
B3.3.3.2 - the basic right of people to be presumed innocent is not always apparent
in the magistrates' courts.
A further issue on which all of the solicitors, of whatever persuasion, were of one 
accord was the 'presumption of innocence' and its application within the magistrates' courts. 
The impression gained from discussing this matter with the various solicitors is that the English 
lag behind the European courts when it comes to recognising the status of the defendant. I was 
told, "On the continent, continental lawyers manage to persuade the courts more often to treat 
defendants with more respect and to remember that defendants are innocent until proven 
guilty". This solicitor went on to say, "It's far too easy for courts to assume that every defendant 
is always guilty of every charge he faces and is therefore always in the wrong. That is not what 
the law says, the law says that every defendant is innocent until proven guilty and should have 
the benefit of every doubt". In supporting this view, another solicitor suggested that this was a 
very fundamental issue and one which the magistrates always needed to bear in mind, that
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when the defendants enter the court for the first hearing, "These people are charged with 
offences, they are not guilty of anything".
B3.3.4 The wav that the courts are designed and the layouts involved need not
necessarily humiliate the defendant.
Many of the older courthouses in England and in particular the one which was in use 
in the study area throughout the period of the research, were designed and built in an 
era,(1928), and for the function which existed at that time. An era when, "..people were not so 
liberal in their view of things ..when people had a different view about how people charged with 
crimes should be treated, ..I mean I've appeared in courts, magistrates' courts, where it is not 
brass rails, [around the the dock], but it is spikes". Such was one solicitor's concept of the old 
court buildings, buildings which he described as, architectural accidents", and which, " 
..perhaps dont suit the purpose and our perception of how we want to do the job now". While 
conceding that not all of the. buildings are ideal for satisfying their present day requirements, 
this solicitor did not necessarily condemn them because of the 'hierarchical seating 
arrangements of the courtrooms'. In fact he argued that there were good practical reasons for 
retaining this type of arrangement, and in particular the raised levels at which the magistrates 
sit, an arrangement which many court users, including some solicitors, perceive as a, 
"..psychological barrier". He explained, "I think there are good practical reasons for raising the 
magistrates up so that they can be seen. They can be seen to be discharging their function, 
their office, they can be heard to do it and it is after all the magistrates' court and they can see 
what goes on in their court and they can see the person at the back who's chewing and get him 
out if they think that offends their dignity or the dignity of the proceedings". It was however 
claimed by at least one solicitor that the seating arrangements in some courtrooms, and 
particularly those where the defendant is positioned behind their advocate, can severely restrict 
non-verbal communication, "..because you cant make any eye to eye contact with your client if 
you need to try and indicate something to him". Neither should the fact that, 'the distances in 
the courtroom are artificially stretched beyond the familiar boundaries of face to face 
communication', be seen to necessarily cause humiliation to the defendants. As one defence 
solicitor explained, "When I deal with a case, if it is a case which involves some difficult area, 
whether it be some sex case or whatever it is, then I have a tendency to refer specifically to 
reports by number and I think you will have heard me say in many cases, 7 dont wish to deal 
with this matter in open court', and now for example, his means are on his form, [Means Form]. 
../ always discuss things with clients anyway, I'm always concerned about how they are going 
to be treated, because you're representing them and you represent the court.and if they're 
going to get bashed around a little bit then it reflects on you". Having given this version of ways 
of obtaining some protection against humiliation for the represented defendant, this solicitor 
also expressed his views on the situation of the unrepresented defendant, who in many 
instances are unemployed. "This sounds awfully right-wing I'm afraid, but by and large with the
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average toe-rag' criminal, they dont feel that they are being humiliated to talk about paying 
fines, because he's on benefit, because everybody gets the same, so there's no humiliation 
about being unemployed anymore. There used to be, I remember twenty five years ago if you 
were unemployed there was humiliation then. Certainly if you were in work you didn't like your 
wages being talked about
B3.3.5 In order not to disadvantage the defendant the courts need to review some
of their practices, but not at the expense of the dignity of the court.
There was a general consensus among all of the solicitors that improvements could 
be made within the magistrates' court which would be to the benefit of the defendant. However 
all were unanimous in the opinion that none of the changes made should detract from the 
dignity of the court. It was, in the first instance, pointed out that not all of the cases dealt with in 
a criminal court are necessarily suited to an informal setting, "You've got to remember that 
sometimes people are in custody, sometimes people need to be in handcuffs or in a dock, that 
will always continue to happen and that cannot alter, but it isnt the case in every single case in 
the magistrates' court". The prosecuting solicitor did suggest that there could be a better way, a 
more liberal method of dealing with what he described as the 'regulatory type' of offence, "I 
mean so far as motoring is concerned ..we treat motorists who’ve done ninety-five on the 
motorway in exactly the same way as you might treat somebody who's charged with theft or 
assault Perhaps there is scope for greater liberality in those really regulatory offences rather 
than in proper crime". Another area where most of the solicitors considered that improvements 
could be made was in the way that the courts are laid out and in the hierarchical seating 
arrangements. In the words of one solicitor, "We could sit in a more open forum and still have 
respect for the court and the majesty of the law without actually having to stand like frightened 
schoolchildren before the school-masteris desk". But once again it was emphasised that 
whatever changes were made these could not be seen to detract from either the dignity or the 
objectivity of the court. As one solicitor saw it, too much informality would devalue the 
occasion, people would see it as, "You know it's just another day, another day at the 
supermarket and things like that ..I mean where does it end, I mean are you going to have 
solicitors turning up in polo-neck sweaters and things like this".
The solution as proffered by one solicitor would not be to dilute the present traditions 
or the respect for, or the dignity of, the court, but to uprate the level of respect which is shown 
to the defendants. As this solicitor explained, "I dont want to lose the right to treat magistrates 
with respect nor treat my colleagues with respect that the title infers when I call him 'my learned 
friend or a friend'. I wouldnt.want that to go, that's because I have genuine respect for those 
people, as I hope they have respect for me. But I also dont treat the defendants as badly as the 
courts may”.
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B3.4 Power and influence.
"It's like the child leaving the Juvenile 
court and saying, Who are those three 
people sitting behind the judge'
(a prosecution solicitor)
B3.4.1 It is the magistrates' decision, that is the system.
There was a general acceptance among the advocates who were interviewed that the 
magistrates are the decision makers. The enthusiasm or otherwise with which this fact was 
actually accepted did however indicate a degree of variation. One solicitor appeared to have no 
problems with the system at all. As I was told, "I dont find the fact that amateurs, if you want to 
use that word, that amateurs make the decisions. I dont find anything wrong with that". A 
second solicitor acknowledged that it was something over which he had little influence and 
therefore had to accept, it's the judicial system and it's their decision, otherwise why have 
them". Other solicitors whilst accepting the situation, did appear to take some consolation from 
the fact that the system does have some elements of 'damage control' built in. As one solicitor 
put it, "So I think there is a safeguard there with sitting in threes Another solicitor saw the 
effects of the wide variations in the sentencing policies of the different magistrates' courts as at 
least being cushioned, because of the much reduced or limited powers of magistrates".
B3.4.2 Advocacy is all about the power of persuasion.
In trying to determine who exerts the greatest influence over the decision makers, I 
again found it impossible to obtain a definitive answer to my question. In the words of a 
prosecuting solicitor, "There are lots of imponderables, how well the advocates know the 
magistrates, how well the magistrates know the advocates", being just two of these. Another 
important element is the ability and skill of the individual solicitor, the advocate's power of 
persuasion, "..that's what advocacy is all about. ..Can you persuade the tribunal round to your 
point of view? How well you present your application, ..that's part of the skill of the job, knowing 
what to say and what to leave out". The magistrates make their decisions based on what they 
see and hear in the courtroom. "At the end of the day that's what the magistrates, of whatever 
sort, are there for, to make decisions and they are only as good at decision making as the 
material which they have been given by the parties".
B3.4.2.1 - tactics are used by solicitors to avoid the idiosvncracies of some
benches.
All of the solicitors with whom I spoke were in agreement that personalities and tactics 
do have a part to play in how submissions are formulated and presented or even whether a 
case is proceeded with on a particular day, or in a particular courtroom, or by a specific 
solicitor. As one defence solicitor explained, "The same case before two different benches can 
produce stark differences in sentencing and many experienced lawyers will know what that is
and some lawyers will use that to their clients'advantage". This particular lawyer was critical of 
colleagues who operated in this way because it was seen as, ".. a breach of professional 
standards". But he went on to tell me, "I do know it happens and I know lawyers do use that 
knowledge to try and make sure their clients get, in their opinion, a better deal". A second 
solicitor also agreed that advocates do sometimes manipulate the situation in order to avoid 
certain benches but claimed that the instigator of the move is not always the solicitor. It was 
explained, "Yes it would be untruthful to say that there isn’t an element of that, there has to be. 
It usually, to be honest, comes from the client as opposed to the solicitor, because our view, my 
view certainly, is don't nsk adjourning today because you might finish up with a worse bench 
the next time Another solicitor said that on occasions there is a need for solicitors to pass 
their cases to colleagues because of what they perceive as doubtful relationships with some of 
the magistrates whom they have to appear before. "There is a feeling that some solicitors feel 
that certain magistrates have 'downers' on them". The magistrate will refuse an adjournment, " 
..he'll then refer to the criteria and say, 'Ah well my little red book, [the Magistrates Sentencing 
Guidelines], says I've got to refuse adjournments', and you know very well it is because it's you 
and you won't get it. What you do is give the case to another one of your colleagues and let 
them make the application because you know they'll get it, and that I'm afraid is a fact of life".
B3.4.2.2 - credibility is used by solicitors in an attempt to influence decision
making.
As has been indicated previously, the defence solicitors find on occasions, the need 
to distance themselves from some of the claims or statements which are made by their clients. 
Whilst it is agreed that this should only occur as a last resort and when the client has rejected 
the advice of the advocate, it is nevertheless seen by the majority of solicitors to be important 
that their credibility with the bench is preserved. As previously indicated one of the 
imponderables when assessing who or what influences the decision makers is how well the 
magistrates know the advocates. To quote one solicitor who was asked how important 
maintaining credibility with the magistrates was he replied, "In my opinion vital ..you've got to 
aim for a good relationship with all the parties, otherwise the job becomes extremely difficult 
and it won't work out. It's even more important than that with the actual magistrate". Once 
having gained that credibility then it is something which the solicitors from both ends of the 
adversarial process try to utilise in an attempt to win the argument. As one solicitor told me, 
"You see it from defence solicitors when they try to impose their credibility on the bench by 
saying, "You can believe, me whdrt I tell you he will not do it again'. You see it from the 
prosecution solicitors when they express the opinion, 'This is the worst assault I have ever 
s e e n ' However in the opinion of one solicitor, this type of approach should be rejected by 
the magistrates, "Both of these opinions should be excluded by a competent court and seen as 
no more than window dressing. That's the magistrate's role in life to look through the window 
dressing and see the facts of the case". This view was also shared by a prosecutor, but this
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solicitor expressed some doubt as to whether the lay magistrates possess the ability to 
separate the facts from the trimming. "You rely on the magistrates' ability to cut through the 
mitigation they've heard and the stuff they've read and perhaps get to the real sub-text of it and 
sometimes magistrates don't do that". Credibility with the magistrates appears to be neither 
automatic nor permanent and can be forfeited by advocates who are in the habit of of making 
unsustainable applications and submissions, these can, on occasions, rebound on both the 
solicitors and their clients. In the opinion of one solicitor, ".. you've got to get the balance right, 
you've got to be prepared not to go that one step too far where the magistrates would tend to 
say, 'It's her again or it's him again with a ridiculous application'. Because I think if you do lose 
your credibility then it's going to be very difficult when you've got a good application with a lot of 
merit in it. I like to think, I'm certain that other solicitors like to think, that if they do a good job 
and if they've got a case with a lot of merit, magistrates are going to say, 'Well she doesn't 
make applications like that very often, or he doesn't come out with that very often, so there 
must be something in it'. You know we like to think that, so to that extent credibility is 
important".
B3.4.3. The professional lawyer influence, decisions which exclude the magistrates 
are only taken on minor matters.
When asked about the 'professional lawyer1 influence, that involving the court clerks 
and the advocates, it was admitted that some decisions are taken by these court users and 
without reference to the magistrates, but it was emphasised that these types of decision only 
involve matters which were, "..really mundane things, .. it's those kind of peripheral points 
which wouldn't be of any actual interest, I don't think, to the magistrates, and again it's just to 
get things moving quickly". That was the view of one solicitor, but another solicitor was of the 
opinion that in practice it did often appear that, ".. the magistrates are presented with a 'fait 
accompli', which they are there to rubber stamp. That happens, it's bound to happen". This 
solicitor felt that for the sake of appearances, the impression should always be given that it is 
the magistrates who have made the decision, and this does not always happen. "Some people 
say 'We've agreed', I don't, I do it as an application and a suggestion, so that the magistrates 
know it's their decision. That is what I think about it, but it's their decision, 'If you agree that he 
should be bailed. What about these conditions' ?.. I know some people don't and I suspect that 
to someone sitting at the back, it appears that whatever those people do, [the magistrates], it's 
nothing to do with them. It's like the child leaving the Juvenile court, [now replaced by the Youth 
court], and saying, Who were those three people sat behind the judge, [the court clerk)7 and 
that has happened".
B3.4.4. If the court clerks wish to influence the bench they can do so.
As I was told by one solicitor, who during his career had worked as a court clerk for a 
period of time, "I never realised how powerful the clerk was until I stopped being one". Not only
75
is the clerk powerful within the courtroom setting, because they can, make appearing before 
the court either a pleasure or a right pain", but they can also be very influential in the 'behind 
the scenes area', in the Magistrates' Retiring room. As this solicitor explained, "I know a little of 
what goes on around the back as well and if you want to influence a bench you can do so". This 
it appears can be done in two ways, the direct approach, "Blatantly telling them", or the indirect 
approach, drawing things to their attention. Perhaps getting again to the sub-text of what 
they've heard and addressing their minds to that".
B3.5 The advocates' perception of and relationship with the defendant.
"It maybe quite wrong to say that I have 
respect for the defendant, but certainly I 
am sympathetic of their feelings and the 
situation they are in".
(a defence solicitor)
B3.5.1 "Many defendants are culturally ill-equipped to participate effectively in 
the proceedings in the magistrates' courts".
Whilst the quotation used above was made by a defence advocate during one of the 
interviews which I carried out, this could not be claimed to be the universal view of all the 
solicitors with whom I spoke. As has been seen from opinions expressed by the various 
solicitors in the earlier sections, the defendants are often seen as the victims of an 
unsympathetic setting, not necessarily because it is designed that way but more because of the 
way that the system and procedures are applied by the magistrates and some of the other 
regular court users. It has also been indicated that some of the problem rests with the 
defendants themselves who, either through ignorance or by intent, can become the, "Authors of 
their own misfortune". During the course of the interviews, defendants were variously described 
as being, "sometimes silly", or "unscrupulous", or "criminal people". I was told that, "..a lot of 
defendants" were culturally inadequate and incapable of participating effectively in the 
magistrates' courts system. They "..have difficulty in stringing words together by means of lack 
of education or limited stimulation when young, a million t h in g s These limitations can quite 
often extend to their knowledge of the law, particularly in relation to the offences which they are 
alleged to have committed. As one solicitor explained, "A client never thinks they're in the 
wrong, they often think they’re treated wrongly, ..It must be a case that at least some of the 
defendants are in the wrong".
B3.5.1.1 - the defendant.' the object of the game '?
As has been indicated in some of the previous chapters, for many defendants and in 
particular those attending at court for the first time, the court appearance can be a very 
traumatic, unnerving and distressing experience. But as one solicitor pointed out, this does not 
necessarily apply to all defendants and one needs to draw distinctions between the different 
types of defendant. "..But your regular offender, they know as much about the system and 
procedure as a lot of solicitors and magistrates and clerks do themselves. A lot of them are not
stupid, a Jot of them are very bright, they talk a lot to one another. They come to court and they 
say, 'Who's on the bench', ... that's the kind of approach you get from defendants, 'It's not the 
one who sentenced me last time is i t ? ' When asked, 'Do you feel that the defendant is the 
object of the game'? this solicitor certainly did not see the 'experienced' defendant in that role. 
In answering the question I was told, "No not really, no, because nowadays you tend to find the 
same people are coming back time and time again, so they're the creators of the game really 
rather than the objects of the game... They're not really the victims of the game they're part of 
the game, but they're not the ones at the losing end of it always. They're very streetwise, put it 
that way, you know they are". Neither do all of the defendants display their true emotions whilst 
they are in the courtroom, some are guilty of subterfuge. I was given an insight into the world 
of, "..the skilled punter who has contempt and hatred, [for the court], and would give entirely 
the opposite impression. Because there you have got the classic case of a person looking at 
the system and saying, 7 dont like the system, I dont respect it, I dont agree with it'. .. but they 
feel that they get a better deal by 'bowing and scraping', and courtesy costs nothing".
B3.5.2 Defendants experience varying emotions towards the court.
When asked to express their opinions about the defendants' attitudes towards the 
court and asked if past observations of 'indifference, fear, contempt or hatred', (Carlen, 1976, 
p33), are still the most prominent features, I was told by one solicitor that there is still much 
evidence of this. It was thought that some of the problem could be created because the 
defendants "..dont understand or they are not given enough information about the courts ..". It 
could also be because of the circumstances in which the defendants find themselves at court, 
"People who are guilty of an offence will presumably be afraid of appearing in court because of 
the sentence which will be imposed on them". Alternatively the defendant who is innocent may 
quite well display a different set of emotions, "People who are innocent of an offence and have 
therefore been wrongly charged will quite obviously be contemptuous of the court itself because 
of the procedure they are forced to go through when they have done nothing wrong". So in the 
opinion of this particular solicitor it was not difficult to see how the impressions gained by 
previous researchers had derived, "I can understand that kind of comment and that kind of 
reaction from defendants and I think, yes, perhaps it is accurate that many defendants feel that 
way towards the court".
During my experience and observations in court I had gained the feeling that many 
magistrates were of the opinion that when some defendants left the courtroom they gave the 
impression that they were 'laughing at the court'. In the course of the interviews I asked if this 
was an impression which was also shared by the solicitors. This perception was generally 
rejected, although it was not denied that defendants do often leave the courtroom laughing. As 
one solicitor admitted, "Yes they do leave the court and laugh, they do leave the court like that, 
but does it mean to say that they think that the court is inept or is it something more?
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Defendants do behave in that way on occasions, perhaps it is nothing more than a release of 
tension.. releasing the tension that has built up because of the fear of the sentence". This view 
was supported by a second defence advocate who explained that the solicitors can be seen to 
be failing in their duty to their clients if they do not explain all of the possible outcomes in 
sentencing terms. "We say there's a prospect of you losing your liberty etc. etc.. You've got to 
do that otherwise the defendants are not property prepared, he’s not warned, he'll not turn up 
with his toothbrush, his 'fag' papers and things like that. So sometimes when they don't go, it 
might not be a particularly lenient let off, but he might be so frightened ..that they walk out 
laughing because they think they've done well, they might be laughing at what the-penalty was 
but I'd be very surprised if they were laughing at the magistrates or the court..".
B3.5.3 The defendant's understanding of what has happened in the magistrates’
court.
One of the main criticisms that has been levelled at the magistrates' courts as a result 
of previous studies has been the defendant's apparent lack of understanding about what has 
taken place during the court hearing, (Carien,1976, p22-23: Baldwin & McConville, 1977, p83). 
When asked to express their views about this, the solicitors with whom I spoke accepted that in 
respect of the unrepresented defendant they had no doubts that this is the situation which still 
persists However if this criticism was also seen as applying to the represented defendant then 
there was something seriously amiss. As I was told by one solicitor, "The majority of 
unrepresented defendants don't really understand what goes off". Even the represented 
defendant often leaves the courtroom not having understood what it was all about, but at least 
there is someone available after the hearing to explain what has happened. The reasons for 
this lack of understanding can be numerous. One defence solicitor relating his experiences told 
me, they'll tell you a number of things, one, 7 didn't hear1, or two, 'I didn't understand it', or 
three, to be honest I wasnt listening, not out of disrespect but I was so bloody frightened that 
my knees were knocking and I was so upset'. Invariably people will ask when they come out, 
they'll ask you what they've got, and it fascinates me, they were there and you know what they 
got, ..they didnt". I was also told that even when the defendants are asked by the magistrates if 
they have understood what has been said, a very frequent question, they will invariably say yes 
even though they have not. "They say that for two reasons, .. they don't understand and they 
daren't say so, or they dont understand and they just want to get out". But there was total 
agreement that if the represented defendant did leave the courthouse not fully understanding 
what had happened and what the consequences of this were, then the fault lay with the solicitor 
and not with the defendant. As one defence solicitor admitted, "If after investigation it was 
found that a majority of defendants who were represented by a solicitor didnt understand then 
there is something lacking in our ability as defence lawyers". A second solicitor, whilst 
agreeing with this view, was critical of some of the language which is used in the courtroom, 
particularly when the defendant is being asked to make decisions on venue, that is, where an
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offence is suitable to be dealt with either at the magistrates' court or at the Crown Court. As this 
solicitor told me, "The venue, the election, we do explain that to them but I'm quite sure they 
don't understand it It's a long unwieldly expression that the clerks have to read to them, ...of 
course they dont understand it, because it’s too much for them to take in". But ail of the 
solicitors were agreed about the importance of trying to ensure that the defendants do 
understand what has taken place and what the outcome means. This was best summarised by 
one solicitor who said, "If he, [the defendant], is unrepresented, then I think the duty falls on 
everybody to make sure that the defendant understands,.. They must, whatever the constraints 
are, because it would be unjust not to do so and that is what the whole thing exists to do". This 
solicitor also expressed the opinion that the magistrates' court system has progressed during 
the last two decades, "Well I hope we've progressed since then. It is explained, people do know 
what is going to happen to them and that seems only right. Because if people dont understand 
it they're going to have no confidence that they've had a 'fair crack of the whip', whether they 
are guilty or innocent. They’re going to have no respect for the institution and the wider thing 
called law if that is how they are treated".
B3.5.4 The client's perception of the solicitor - the solicitors view.
Tve got a bad barrister', .. 'That barrister got me five years', nothing to do with the 
offence. 'That barrister got me five years. If he'd have told him that my girlfriend was pregnant I 
wouldn't have got five'. .. Tve actually had 'punters', [the clients], tell me that". As has already 
been indicated in previous chapters what the client considers to be good representation and 
what the solicitor thinks is good representation are not always one and the same thing. The 
solicitor who made this opening statement was also concerned about this aspect of 
representation because when this conflict arises then it often brings into question the 
advocate's loyalty to the client. An example given to illustrate this is, "There are times when 
you say to a defendant, you are wasting your time applying for bail'. He says 'Whose side are 
tha' on?' So if you dont apply for bail you lose your credibility, he thinks you're on somebody 
else's side not his". The net result of this dilemma is that if the solicitors do not represent the 
defendants in the way they have been instructed, inevitably the defendants, when the results 
go against them, see the fault as being with the solicitors. It appears, and not unnaturally, that 
the defendants assess success or failure on the results achieved and not on the quality of their 
advocates' performances. I was told, "I have seen particularly poor barristers get a good result 
because the case merited it and the defendants have been back in my office saying, When I 
have to go back to Crown Court I want that barrister because he's bnlliant', when in fact the 
man is a fool". It is also seen to be an important factor when representing defendants that the 
solicitors demonstrate to the defendants that they are 'in their comer'. Whilst on the surface this 
appears to be a basic requirement, this is not always apparent because of the 'friendly 
relationships' which often exist between the advocates of either persuasion and which are often 
witnessed by the defendants within the courtroom settings, (Baldwin & McConville, 1977, p85).
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As I was told, 'We do work in a relatively small profession, in a relatively small town, so it's in 
our interests to get on". But it was generally agreed that it is important that this friendliness 
should not be demonstrated in front of the defendant. As one solicitor explained it, "Again it's 
justice being seen to be done and whilst with my client being out of court I'll be as friendly with 
the prosecutor as I want to be, I always try and maintain a degree of separation in court. Now I 
know it's a facade but the defendant has got to see, from his point of view, that you are on his 
side". This view was also shared by one of this solicitor’s colleagues who did point out some of 
the difficulties in maintaining this facade, "... because you're at work and you cant keep up a 
war of attrition all of the time. ..Yes there is that difficulty but defendants do think you should 
fight their comer to the death and that you should dislike them, [the prosecutors], and dislike 
policemen and that’s one of the things you've got to be conscious of and I dont do it, [have 
discussions with the prosecutor in the presence of the client], because I think that it's dangerous 
professionally and it's bad business,.. but if you've got to discuss cases, the only time you can 
do it sensibly is when the bench is out... But I dont do it because I think it is a bad advert, your 
client is going to get a false impression and the impression he is going to get is false because 
you're not going to give any quarter to these people when you're actually doing the job". All of 
the solicitors in the study were in agreement that this problem is much more prevalent in the 
Crown Court where the system is one of barristers regularly inter-changing between the role of 
prosecutor and defence and where opposing advocates may well work out of the same 
chambers. It was agreed that this does make for some confusion. As one defence solicitor 
observed, "In the Crown Court I agree it's abominable and even as a solicitor sitting in the 
Crown Court, sometimes on particularly big cases if we go along, it is difficult to decide from the 
word go whose side certain hamsters are on because they are so closely inter-linked, ..in the 
magistrates' court I think it's a lot better".
B3.5.5 Neither do the solicitors just go through the motions of representation.
sometimes it can be for real.
Solicitors cannot always remain dispassionate about a case in which they are 
involved, there are times when a result goes against them and it does personally affect the 
advocate. ”There will obviously be cases where you personally think it's right that they, [the 
defendants], should have bail or they should be found not guilty and it would be a fool who 
would say that they are totally detached at all times, that they merely present their case. There 
are people like that, I dont fall into that category, and I get very concerned when it's a case of a 
man who's innocent... I get very worried about that because I dont want it on my conscience 
when I leave the courtroom, for somebody to have been found guilty when they're not. And yes, 
if you get a result which you dont agree with, then you get very uptight about it".
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B3.6 The advocates' perception of and relationship with the other regular court users.
" Often criminal matters are dealt with 
by compromise, because both sides know 
that they cannot win the argument one hundred 
per cent, and you have to meet somewhere in 
middle. Any advocate who has been at the bench 
for a few years realises that no case is just black 
and white".
(a defence solicitor)
B3.6.1 Inter-agency alliances are formed for a number of reasons.
B3.6.1.1 - commercial gain or mutual respect ?
"A solicitor is a professional, it is his living, it is his job, it's what he pays his bills with 
and his staff with, and a solicitor who can't get on with people is a solicitor who wont enjoy an 
awful lot of success. So commonsense dictates that it pays for you to get on with people As 
this solicitor indicated there is at least one reason, a commercial reason, why some of the 
regular court users need, to have good relationships. This commercial aspect was also 
mentioned by a second solicitor who described some relationships as being financially 
beneficial to one or other of the parties in the alliance. I was told, 'Yes there are alliances, I've 
seen examples of alliances specifically with some advocates and social workers for example. 
Because I know of a massive amount of work which goes from social workers to solicitors and 
it's patently obvious that a number of people abuse that and make a great deal of money from 
it". Having made this claim however this particular solicitor did stress that, rather than 
underhanded alliances, I think the alliances that often exist are simply professional respect. So 
for example, a policeman who's been working in an area for many years, may actually form an 
opinion that such and such a solicitor is competent and reasonable .. and it's a natural reaction 
to say, 'You need help, you have a problem, go and see so and so I know he's good, 
competent, whatever1. That will always happen, that's not always creating an alliance falsely, 
that is simply respect from one person to another".
B3.6.1.2 - good inter-agency relationships aid the dispensing of justice.
Not all advocates see the need for good relationships with the other court users, but 
according to the solicitors with whom I spoke, these people are very much in the minority. As 
one solicitor explained, "I know some people will say it doesn't matter, you dont have to get on 
with the people who are prosecuting, or get on with the Probation Service, or get on with the 
clerk. But I actually think that it's vital that you do, I think in the end of the day we are all 
working in the same direction, we're all trying to get cases dealt with expeditiously, but properly, 
and to treat people who are perhaps not guilty of offences to try to get them through the court 
with as little problem as is possible". Another solicitor told me that in his opinion he did not feel 
that having good relationships necessarily obtained, "..a better deal ..I dont think it's that, I just 
think that you wifi be able to achieve what's right more quickly by having a proper liaison".
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B3.6.1.3 - most of the alliances are formed on a reciprocal basis.
"My view is that I like to try and get on with everybody and it's selfish in parts. ..So I 
think anyway, that if I go out of my way to be cooperative as far as I can with everybody then to 
a large extent I find personally that most agencies are cooperative with me. I dont find that I 
have a lot of problems". This was the reciprocal approach which was favoured by one solicitor. 
But how does one actually compromise and how does justice emerge from these areas of 
compromise? In the opinion of the prosecuting solicitor with whom I spoke, compromise can in 
some cases be seen to be both expedient and acceptable to the justice system. I was told, 7 
think if perhaps in so far as it is consistent with duty, you can make life easier, it's very much in 
your interest and the system's interest to do so. So you know you accept pleas, you sometimes 
soft pedal on the facts, dont make as much of what you've got as you could do and do it that 
way, and then when your turn comes round for a favour, when you need one, you ask and by 
and large it is given". But what happens if the favours are not reciprocated or if one finds 
oneself facing an adversary who is not interested in compromise? In the words of one defence 
solicitor, " ..human nature being what it is, you'll have certain prosecutors who you don't get on 
with, who you will not cooperate with and ..if a prosecutor has been particularly naughty to me 
and unfairly cooperative, ..then I'm afraid I will be particularly uncooperative with them. Having 
said that, I wont in doing that ruin a case or hurt anybody..".
B3.6.1.4 - inter-aroup relationships can be difficult at times.
Whilst all the solicitors with whom I spoke were in agreement about the benefits which 
were obtained from both individual and group cooperation, this does not guarantee that these 
relationships necessarily operate trouble free. In the opinion of one solicitor, "I feel that we all, 
all the agencies, ought to be a little more understanding at times, I think we are all very quick to 
criticize each other, ..But it's difficult at times, there are tendencies to want to shout and bawl at 
say the prosecution, or say the probation, if they have not done something they've said they'll 
do".
B3.6.2 Good relationships with ones adversaries are important.
B3.6.2.1 - the idea is to resolve the problem not just to have a good fight.
By and large it was agreed by the defence advocates whom I interviewed that, "With 
the prosecutors it is very important to have a good working relationship". It is a fact, as has 
been indicated in previous chapters, that some defence solicitors are highly critical of the 
Crown Prosecution Service as an agency, one the reasons already discussed being the late 
availability of the advanced disclosure informatidn, that is the prosecution information about 
the case to which the defence and the defendants are legally entitled to have sight of before 
the case can proceed. Despite this there appears to be a genuine desire by the two sides to
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maintain good relations based on compromise. As has been previously stated one of the 
reasons for this appears to be the size of the court and the relatively small number of lawyers 
regularly involved in the business of the court. In answer to a suggestion that most of the 
relationships in the magistrates' court are ones of 'uneasy compromise', (Carlen,.1976, p43), 
one defence solicitor replied, “You said uneasy compromise, I dont find that because in .. 
where i work, I get on very well with the other agencies whether it be my adversary from the 
CPS or whether it be other members of the court. .. i dont need an adversarial approach with 
everybody, because most of us get on fairly well together and work together to resolve the 
problem rather than going into every problem as though it were a fight .. I know that in big 
cities, in the magistrates' courts, that is very, very different. The bigger the city the more 
adversarial the approach will be".
B3.6.2.2 - exploiting the inexperience of the opposition is within the rules, but only 
if you are a defence advocate.
Following up on a comment made by a stipendiary magistrate that 'young prosecutors 
are disgracefully manipulated by experienced defence solicitors', I was told by a prosecutor 
with considerable court experience, that this type of tactic was quite legitimate and acceptable 
within the adversarial 'rules'. I was further told that, in the opinion of this solicitor, if the defence 
failed to exploit such a situation then they would be failing in their duty to their client. In the 
words of the prosecutor, "That must happen, again it's their duty to do so, to get the best for 
their client. So short of being downright dishonest, if you can do that and manipulate the other 
side you've got to do it". But this type of tactic is not reciprocal, it would appear that it is a 
weapon which is only available to the defence. The prosecutor continued, "However 
prosecuting, it's a bit different, I would hope my colleagues would not take advantage of an 
inexperienced solicitor on the other side. It comes back to our first point doesn't it, about what 
the role of the prosecutor is, ..being there to achieve the just result, not the result perhaps that 
you want".
B3.6.3 The magistrate - the advocates' perception.
B3.6.3.1 - middle aged, middle class and not very streetwise ?
The advocates whom I interviewed were unanimous in their opinion that the lay 
magistracy are middle aged and are middle class but they were not of the opinion that they are 
necessarily not very streetwise. In expressing an opinion one solicitor did concede that 
magistrates are both middle aged and middle class but also questioned whether this had 
transpired because of circumstances rather than it being an organised and deliberate policy. In 
his view, "Perhaps it happens non-intentionally, but simply it's not until people become middle 
aged and successful in life that they can afford to give up the time from their Jives to be a 
magistrate for no pay, ..because other members of society cant afford to sit on the bench for 
however many days a year you must sit". This solicitor did conclude that this narrow
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representation of society on the bench was a deficiency in the system , "That is a fault which 
should be redressed very quickly. Because ..you only get a small section of society represented 
on the bench, that must be wrong". This view was supported by a second solicitor who also 
agreed that magistrates are ".. mainly middle aged and I suppose they are mainly middie class 
as well. They are the people who've got the time to do it". This solicitor was also convinced that 
magistrates are not truly representative of the society from which they are drawn. He told me 
about a bench where he had worked, if the.. Bench was typical of the population of the town, 
fifteen per cent of them would be millionaires".
A third solicitor suggested that perhaps, "You only become streetwise, substantially by 
reason of age". This solicitor also expressed the view that, "I'd be a little unhappy appearing 
before a twenty-one, twenty-two year old magistrate". Another solicitor did offer the opinion that 
the higher up the social scale the magistrate is in everyday life, the more remote they are from 
the world of those on whom they sit in judgement, "If you get some lady of sixty to sixty-five 
who dines with the Lord Lieutenant and spends her time in crocheting classes, I think she might 
find it difficult to understand the mores of the criminal sub-culture". In the opinion of this 
particular solicitor the magistrates with the best credentials are, people who have worked in 
industry or the professions who have a lot of contact with the general populace, are the ones, in 
my experience, who are the most streetwise". The claim that magistrates 'are not very 
streetwise' was also queried by a fourth solicitor who told me, "I actually dont agree with that 
quote, that they are not very streetwise, because I think that particularly in courts like [  ], we 
have an awful lot of streetwise magistrates sitting on the Bench".
B3.6.3.2 - magistrates, in theory are appointed to provide the 'common touch', but
in practice this does not work.
A number of advocates saw the need to expand the range of backgrounds from which 
the magistrates are selected, ".. in age, social background, ethnic background and through 
training maintain the common sense that everyday people bring to the bench such was the 
view of one solicitor. Another thought that, "There is a lack of, what you could conveniently 
label as working class women on the bench, they seem to be somebody who are totally 
unrepresented". In the opinion of one advocate, the theoretical function of the magistracy does 
not always work in practice, "Lay magistrates were specifically appointed to bring the common 
touch,.. the touch of the common man, that is the theory behind the magistrates, I dont think it 
works in practice because in the early days when a magistrate is just starting on the bench, .. 
he or she will have a lot of feeling from everyday life. The more they sit on the bench, the more 
they become accustomed to the way things are done and they lose their on'ginal feeling from 
everyday life".
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B3.6.3.3 - even magistrates appointed from working class backgrounds adopt
middle class values and the norms of the court.
Throughout the course of the interviews with the advocates from both the defence 
and the prosecution, it emerged that most of the solicitors considered that the majority of 
magistrates do modify their views over time and do conform to the norms of the bench. This 
particularly applies to those magistrates who were appointed from working class backgrounds. 
The reason for this according to one solicitor, ".. may well be peer pressure. Let's say a 
magistrate with a very strong working ciass background sits often enough with magistrates from 
a different social background and day in and day out on the bench, he sees the way sentences 
are passed and the way everyone expects him to behave, perhaps he or she doesn't want to be 
the odd one out, doesn't want to be continually arguing against his colleagues". Another 
solicitor saw the change in the working class lay magistrate as part of the, " ..bourgeois 
education of society, .. you know you become a justice and you sit on the bench and you 
become 'respectable' and probably other things are happening as well, .. greater responsibility 
at work, you become an home owner Another contributory factor which influences 
magistrates to conform to 'bench practices', was the influence of the more senior magistrates. I 
was told, ''As a younger magistrate sits with an older magistrate, they often follow into the 
pattern of sentencing that the town has developed rather than bringing their own fresh ideas, 
and that again is sad".
B3.6.3.4 - there is a danger that the lav magistrates can 'fall between two stools'.
According to one of the solicitors with whom I spoke, these changes in the attitudes 
and perceptions of the lay magistrates can result in an unsatisfactory situation and one which is 
not necessarily in the best interests of justice. In this solicitor's opinion, "I think we come to the 
dangerous situation of somebody who is following a pattern of procedures or sentencing who 
has lost the common touch but has not gained the legal training to be a professional. So by that 
point in time we can have achieved the worst of both worlds and lost the best of one''.
B3.6.3.5 - the lav magistracy can turn justice into something of a lottery.
During my courtroom observations, one solicitor described justice in the magistrates' 
courts as 'a lottery'. This was, therefore, a topic which I raised with other solicitors during our . 
discussions. It was admitted by one solicitor to be just that, "That's fair enough, yes. A lot 
depends on who you've got on the day, which side of the bed they've got out of, yes". Another 
solicitor whilst agreeing that it could well be, qualified the reply by saying, "I would agree to 
some extent, it could be a lottery but I dont find that in the majority of cases, I find that in just a 
few". By and large the presence of the lay magistrates was actually welcomed by the 
advocates in the study group. In the opinion of one of them, they brought qualities and vision to 
judicial proceedings which are sometimes absent in the regular court professionals. "They
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might see something you've missed because looking at it in legalistic terms, you might have 
missed something".
B3.6.3.6 - the advocates' perception of the stipendiary magistrates.
The stipendiary magistrates were seen by the advocates with whom I spoke as being 
very much like the 'curate's egg', excellent in parts. The courts in which the stipendiary 
magistrates presided were generally seen, when compared to those of the lay magistrates, as 
being, "More efficient" in terms of time. The stipendiary magistrates are considered to be, "Far 
more skilled at communicating with the court and the defendants". They are "..legally qualified", 
and they are better at "reading between the lines”. However the stipendiaries were also 
identified, by some of the advocates, to possess what were considered to be a number of 
weaknesses. One solicitor queried how streetwise the stipendiary magistrates are, "..in the 
sense that stipendiaries are from even more coveted backgrounds and have seen less of real 
life than some of the lay Bench have". The stipendiaries were criticised for their apparent 
preoccupation with the speed with which they dispensed their workloads. As one solicitor told 
me, "I find that the stipendiary magistrates are too keen to get work moved through quickly". 
The 'stipes' were also accused of being too ready to prejudge a case before all the matters had 
been put before the court. In the words of one solicitor, "In a lot of cases, I often find that a 
decision has been made before I get to my feet and there is no effort to cover that up, ..and I 
think that's poor from the point of view of justice being seen to be done". The stipendiary 
magistrates were seen as being more selective in what they wanted to hear when compared to 
the lay magistrates. A reason for this was suggested by one of the solicitors as, "Perhaps 
because they are in a lot of cases ex-solicitors or barristers themselves, and perhaps they 
come in a bit more cynical and they dont want to hear it all, but I think they ought to from the 
point of view of our system,.. where you are entitled to a fair hearing".
B3.6.4 Stipendiary magistrates' courts are more efficient than the lav magistrates.
but not necessarily in terms of justice.
The previous paragraph identifies that there are a number of marked differences 
between the stipendiary magistrates and their lay colleagues. The solicitors whom I interviewed 
were also in agreement that these differences also extended to the courts over which the 
'stipes' presided and in which they adjudicated.
B3.6.4.1 - stipendiary magistrates' courts are more daunting for the advocates.
As has already been discussed the stipendiary magistrates' courts are seen as being 
efficient in terms of time, if for no other reason than the 'stipes' sit alone and have no 
colleagues on the bench with whom they have to consult. Because of this, the stipendiary 
magistrates are in a position where they are able to indicate to the advocates their views on a 
case and how their minds are working in terms of a disposal. In the words of one solicitor, "If
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that happens, and if his mind is working on the same lines as my mind is working, then I dont 
need to go through the whole story to get him to my point of view". It Is also possible in some 
situations to anticipate how the magistrates think and how a case should be presented in order 
to obtain the maximum advantage. Once again it is easier to do this with a single magistrate 
who sits frequently than it is with a group of magistrates who sit infrequently and can adjudicate 
in any combination of three. As I was told "... you know what the stipendiary magistrates like, 
what he likes to be told.... ". But appearing before the stipendiary can also be quite a daunting 
experience, "You cant get away with as much .. .Because a stipendiary magistrate is legally 
qualified, if you go in unprepared he's more likely to notice, than say a lay bench is. ..So yes 
when you are appearing before a professional tribunal it does affect your delivery". This view 
was also shared by a second solicitor and particularly in respect of trials, "Trials are the most 
significant difference, .. There are results obtained in front of lay benches that you do come out 
thinking, you would never have got that in front of a professional. Yes, ..there's more that you 
can put forward in front of a lay bench by way of a defence. ... Yes you can get some odd 
decisions". Despite these variations which can be interpreted, in some instances, as 
shortcomings within the lay magistrates' courts, one solicitor did identify one area of difference 
between the two types of court where the advantage was with the lay magistrates, and that was 
their willingness to listen. "Lay benches have an advantage over a stipendiary magistrate 
because they are at least prepared to listen to what the defence advocates have to say. I'm not 
saying that they agree with what they say, but they are prepared to listen".
B3.6.4.2 - stipendiary magistrates are harder in their sentencing policies.
There was also a high level of consensus that the stipendiary magistrates, " ..are 
usually quite a lot harder than most lay magistrates". This point was expanded upon by another 
defence solicitor who declared, "Yes there are times when we go into court and we prefer the 
fact that there is a lay bench, because I genuinely think that lay magistrates dont send people 
to custody as often as stipendiaries do".
B3.6.4.3 - the case for an all professional magistracy.
The prosecuting solicitor whom I interviewed left me in no doubt that if he had a 
choice he would prefer an all professional judiciary, including an all professional magistracy. 
The reasoning behind his view was, "If somebody gets tried at the Crown Court, it goes before 
a professional judge who is learned in law. If it goes before a lay bench, you're very much in the 
hands of your own skill of persuasion, how good the clerk is, so that the relevant law can be 
explained to the tribunal. There's a lot that is said, which perhaps before a stipendiary 
magistrate wouldn't need to be said". For example, "With the lay magistrate, you might tell them 
but whether they appreciate it is another matter and he, [the stipendiary magistrate], can 
sometimes get to the sub-text of it, the stuff which isn't actually said but it is there 
nevertheless".
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B3.6.5 The advocate's overriding view of the lav magistrate is one of respect.
Achieving credibility with the magistrates is seen by the majority of advocates as 
being important and even vital in the opinion of one of the defence advocates. But according to 
another defence solicitor, not of all of his colleagues necessarily see it in that way. He told me, 
"It depends on the solicitor, a lot of people think it is the most important thing. ..I try very hard 
not to lose my credibility. But there certainly are advocates who are not interested whether or 
not they are credible. They may either tell a story flamboyantly, ..or may exaggerate the story. 
To some people credibility isn't important". But again what the lay magistrates perception of 
credibility is, was queried. As one solicitor suggested, some credibilty might well be personality 
based, "I suspect there's a bit of, if Mister 'X' thinks that and said that, then it has happened".
When I asked how the professional advocates saw their relationships with the lay 
magistrates, I was told, "There’s a tendency sometimes to think, Tm legally qualified, I’ve done 
a lot of training etc., and they're sitting up there and they've no idea what I've got to put with out 
here', ..but that's not the overriding view. The overriding view, I like to think, is one of respect 
shown to the lay magistrates".
B3.6.6 The Probation Service comprises of ideologically motivated people.
In passing an opinion about the advocates’ relationships with the probation officers, 
one of the prosecutors was quite definite in his opinions. He told me, 7 think there are people 
who are ideologically motivated to arrive at a particular result and that's the social workers and 
the probation officers, whatever they might say. I mean that's what they are there for isn't it, 
they are there to keep people out of prison, and sometimes the only just way of dealing with 
somebody for something is to send them to prison". Therefore, the Pre-Sentence Report was 
seen by this solicitor as being a very influential document in the sentencing process, the last 
thing the magistrates see before they retire ..to consider the disposal of a case, ..is the report 
prepared by somebody who has ideological objections to somebody going to prison".
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B4 THE PROBATION OFFICERS' PERCEPTION.
B4.1 The probation officer's role in the courtroom.
B4.1.1 The probation officer's dilemma.
"I don't bow. I think that's to do with the 'fish or fowl bit', 
about knowing whether I'm actually part of the structure of the 
court. I'm not one of the clerks, I'm not one of the prosecutors,
I'm not one of the defence, I'm just not part of the court structure".
(a probation officer)
This statement in many ways summarises the almost constant quandary experienced 
by the probation officers who work in the magistrates' courts. The probation officers feel that as 
a group they are somewhat apart from the other court professionals, " we’re stiil the officers of 
the court, yes, we're of the court but in another sense, no we're not". So where do the probation 
officers fit within the structure of the magistrates' court? Are they officers of the court, the 
champions of the defendants, or the standard bearers for the Probation Service? Do the 
probation officers see themselves as an important part of the court structure or just someone 
on the periphery who should only speak when spoken to?
B4.1.2 An officer of the court, an ally of the defendant, an agent of the service. - a
matter of conflict.
B4.1.2.1- the ' administrative assistant' .  a provider of information.
As officers of the court, the probation officers are seen as a source for providing 
information to the sentencers and to the other court users. Many probation officers would 
concur with the view that their main contribution to the courts is assisting and advising the 
magistrates by supplying them with such information about defendants, and other information 
that is pertinent to the offence, which will allow the magistrates to reach the appropriate 
decision in respect of that particular defendant. Such information is normally provided by 
means of a Pre-Sentence Report (PSR). In the opinion of the probation officers with whom I 
spoke, this aspect of their role takes up a disproportionate part of their time, time which could 
be better utilised at the 'sharp end' with the defendants.
B4.1.2.2 - a trained 'social worker', the friend of the defendant.
The 'classic view ' of the probation officer's role in court is to 'assist, advise and 
befriend the defendant', a role in which many probation officers consider that they are under­
employed. As one officer commented, "and that role is overlooked because of other pressures 
and i think personally that is a serious role which needs review This was an opinion which 
was echoed by all three of the probation officers who were interviewed as part of the study.
The probation officers do not see their role as the defendant's 'advocate', in fact this
is a term from which they are very keen to disassociate themselves. They see their role much
more in the context of a 'mentor'. The probation officers express real concern for the defendant
89
who they see in the court as being " very isolated" and also "feeling very unsure of themselves". 
As one probation officer insisted, "I dont care who you are in court, it's a very distressing 
experience". The officers have a number of objectives, in the first instance it is to attempt to 
make the waiting period prior to the court hearing a little less traumatic for the defendants. 
Secondly, and where they are directly involved with a client, they also try to ensure that 'their 
clients know what the rules of the game are, ..as it were stepping them up a grade or two in 
front of all the other court users, so that they start off from a better position”. Finally, the 
probation officers see their role as making certain that their client is viewed by the court as a 
human being, 'to put the flesh on the bones of this burglar and say 'he is a burglar, but he is 
also a married man with children and responsibilities ..' and I think, hopefully, try to bring the 
individuality of that person so that the sentencing matches the individual".
B4.1.2.3 - the probation officer has direct personal contact with the defendant which.
when compared with that of the other court personnel, is unique.
The probation officer’s concern for the defendant results not only from their innate 
qualities and their training but also because of the very nature of their work. One probation 
officer with whom I spoke claimed that the probation officer-defendant relationship was totally 
different to those of any of the other regular participants in the magistrates' court system. I was 
told, "I think it's very easy for people to sit up on the bench and not to be involved with people, 
...We have the opportunity to sit down with people and you cant sit with people without 
something rubbing off between you". This was a view which was supported by a second officer, 
"The very fact that you've actually sat down and discussed with the defendant the offences, the 
circumstances of those offences, the personal circumstances. That makes them more human 
because it puts flesh on there, because you see their despairs, their happiness ..Probation 
officers see the defendant's side of the story. They are the only ones who actually have contact 
with the defendants outside of the court arena".
B4.1.2.4 - a representative of the 'corporate policy'.
The probation officer, on behalf of the Probation Service, is also expected to advise- 
the courts about both the existence and the availability of the resources provided by the service 
and to promote, within the Criminal Justice system, both the resources and especially the 
policies of the Probation Service. This is a facet of their role which the probation officers have 
not always found to be easy, often because by promoting these policies they have found 
themselves in conflict with the sentencers, ".. probation officers were pressured by their own 
management to make recommendations which did not meet the criteria required for that 
specific defendant". A situation which has not been improved by recent legislation. The 
emphasis on punishment in the Criminal Justice Act 1991, has now increased the difficulties for 
the probation officer who wishes to argue for the 'assisting of the defendant' by means of a 
Probation Order. The emphasis on punishment has, as seen through the eyes of the probation
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officer, demanded a considerable adjustment to the basic philosophies of the Probation Service 
and its representatives. As I was advised, "There’s a thing tied in with the current bit about 
probation services that we need to be harder, it is more punitive now. The days of the self- 
employed independent probation officer doing good in the community are gone. You are now 
more of an employee of a corporate policy and paid to implement that policy".
B4.1.2.5 - the court or the defendant - a matter of conflict.
you occupy the ground between the offender and the courts 
..Assisting courts and offender to make sense of each other 
and assisting with sentencing, it sounds a bit of a tali order, 
doesn't it? Needless to say, it is complicated".
( Jones et al, - The Probation Handbook, p74)
This sentiment was shared by all the probation officers with whom I conversed during 
my study. An 'officer of the court' or a 'friend to the defendant', two roles which can be seen by 
the various participants in the court scene as, at best different, at worst irreconcilable. So how 
does the probation officer cope with a situation which is very real and which 'has to be 
managed'? To quote one probation officer, "We straddle and that is our job. Our task is to 
straddle ... Can you help and assist and yet at the same time be seen to be punishing? In the 
court context, I'm not sure, I dont think you can. Hence you get this confused, fuzzy 
relationship. The probation officer must be seen not to be a part of the court process, in the 
sense of being one of them. Equally, the probation officer must not be seen as being the client's 
advocate... That is not their job either". However in spite of a personal preference intimated by 
most probation officers, they feel that in practice, their role in the courtroom does involve them 
to a greater degree as officers of the court and much less as a friend and adviser to the 
defendant. If however, the probation officer is representing one of his, or her, own clients in the 
courtroom then this emphasis may shift.
B4.1.3 Probation officers are pressured to demonstrate their loyalty to the court.
The probation officers are accutely aware that there is a great deal of pressure 
exerted upon them to ally themselves with the court. "All too often you feel under pressure from 
the court to ally yourself with the clerks, the solicitors, the magistracy Pressures are 
imposed by the clerks, "The bench may want certain things doing, maybe unrealistically in 
terms of time or what they want. You may be in conflict with a solicitor over a proposal they 
don't want to follow through or which they want to object to". Neither is the courtroom the place 
which the probation officers see as. their first priority, they maintain that these demands to 
demonstrate their allegiance to the court must be resisted if they are to perform effectively in 
the system. They see their skills being best utilised at the 'sharp end', in the waiting areas, 
where there appears to be that ".. air of despondency, of dejection, the feeling is one of 
separateness, that they, [the defendants], are apart". As I was told by one probation officer, 7f's 
a squalid place to be and it's a place where we belong, the Probation Service, and I dont get
enough time to spend with the people in there because I'm spending a lot of time in the actual 
court".
B4.1.3.1 - some of the barriers are physical.
While some of the barriers which prevent the probation officers functioning in the way 
that they would choose are psychological, there are also some which have physical 
characteristics. One example of these barriers is when the probation officer is required to 
communicate with, and assess, a defendant who is being held in custody within the cells area, 
a situation which was graphically described to me, Tve got to actually go down into the cells, 
I've got to talk to these people who are our clients, they’re my bread and butter, so I try to break 
down the barrier, but it's very difficult because the structures are there. The people are 
manacled to other people who are going to take them out, for security purposes. The barriers 
are there, the physical barriers to prevent them communicating effectively".
B4.1.4 A 'passive clerk' or a 'Don Quixote tilting at the bureaucratic machine'.
Because of the varying conflicts of interest which have been outlined in the previous 
sections, the probation officers also feel that they face another problem, how to project 
themselves in the courtroom. The general perception of the probation officer is that they are 
seen in the passive mode. Apart from actually providing the court with information in the form 
of the Pre-Sentence Report, [formerly the Social Enquiry Report], the probation officers have 
normally chosen to keep a low profile. This is seen by some as the best method of enabling 
them 'to maintain the impression of neutrality between the court and the defendant'. Others 
would argue that they have little choice in the matter, but that the passive role is dictated by the 
way the courts are organised and operate and by the way that relationships are formed. As it 
was explained by one probation officer, "I dont have a part within the one-act play. The first 
scene is bringing in the defendant, that's the court usher's role. The second scene is the court 
clerk establishing who the defendant is and making out the charge and so on. The prosecutor, 
the defence, each have their own little 'marionette place' within that. But no place for the 
probation officer and there's a certain sort of hesitancy about interrupting a bureaucratic 
machine because one's experience of bureaucratic machines is that they steamroller individuals 
and carry on regardless, and there's also the question about what useful impact is there for the 
probation officer in a direct, up front at the footlights bit. But I certainly am active in the grounds 
behind the scenes".
Others do argue however, that to say that probation officers prefer to play a passive 
role in the courtroom is too much of a generalisation and purport that the probation officers do 
have a choice in the way they project themselves . Indeed some officers do undertake a much 
more pro-active role, "..and still represent to the defendant as being on his side., by being up on 
your feet and questioning". To perform this role does require a measure of confidence by the 
officers in their ability to participate in the courtroom setting, an ability in which some probation
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officers appear to have doubts. Because of this they assume the low profile of "..an admin 
person writing results". The danger of adopting this type of guise is, in the opinion of one 
probation officer, "..that other court users might see passivity as passivity and nothing more, all 
very ineffective".
B4.2 Justice and organisational efficiency.
"...the throughput of work seems an overriding aspect 
as opposed to the actual individual, in this case justice , 
for the individual.., and that is something which I think 
everybody conspires with within the court organisation".
(a probation officer)
B4.2.1 The courts of justice can take on the characteristics of a factory production 
line.
All of the probation officers who were interviewed as part of the study concurred with 
the view of some observers that 'justice is subjugated to organisational efficiency in the 
magistrates' courts', (Carlen 1976, p20). All too often the courtroom is seen not as a place in 
which justice is dispensed, but more as a place where the defendant is processed. As one 
probation officer explained, "..that does come over in court, that he, [the defendant], is being 
processed and dealt with, and that clears the sheet in that particular case. The individual has 
not been dealt with as he should have been dealt with". Some officers compared it to a 
conveyor belt where the main emphasis is placed on getting through the workload.
B4.2.1.1 - the probation officer occasionally attempts to challenge the 'production 
line' mentality' but all too often they become engulfed bv the system, just 
part of the process line, until......
One officer did emphasise that probation officers do challenge the system if they 
consider that the drive to move a case through the system quickly, by minimising the length of 
an adjournment for example, is not considered to be in the defendant's interest. "So yes I think 
we try to resist that, we're conscious of it, ..but sometimes we all get sucked into this I'm 
afraid". This officer went on to describe the frustrations of their life on the 'production line' but 
then how, on the rare occasion, the routine is punctuated by a different type of case. "It is like a 
conveyor belt and sometimes when we're writing our fifteen reports a month you feel that you 
are part of the conveyor belt I'm afraid ..and you feel as though you are processing people 
sometimes. I think what breaks it, is when you get a different type of case, the one which 
appeals to your social work training, who makes demands on you, who actually gets to you .. 
and then you start to think, he's bringing.me back to earth again, I'm not on the process line".
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B4.2.2 There are times when the court proceeds almost in spite of the presence of the 
defendant.
"That would certainly fit with the picture I have at times, that the defendant is almost 
an irrelevancy in the court and everything goes on between everybody else..". Neither is this 
impression, expressed by one probation officer, an isolated view. An even more pointed picture 
was described by another officer who was concerned that the person who was vital to the court 
proceedings, the defendant, was almost totally excluded by the procedure, "You could as easily 
have one of those cut out models standing there and let the rest of the players carry on 
regardless". A third officer commented, "If the solicitor was to turn up with the defendant's 
name and a signed chitty saying 'yes you can represent me', it would be almost all that would 
be required ...everything goes on between the other people, it doesn't include the defendant. 
Every court I've worked in, they, [the defendants], are either towards the back or off to one side 
and very separated off, and everything else goes on around this bit", [the body of the court]. 
Even the defendants who are represented cannot always be certain that their views will be 
made known to the court. "If they've got a representative they dont know what he's going to 
say". Some probation officers are also of the view, not without foundation, that the magistrates 
tend to deal with the perpetrator of a crime and as a result of this the penalty imposed only 
recognises the 'norm' for the crime, often to the exclusion of the individual who stands before 
them. The view expressed to me was, "I'm sure that you on the bench must think, 'Now what do 
we do with this one, because we’ve had three or four this aftemoon.What is the tariff for this 
afternoon?' and the impression given is that people are being processed".
B4.2.3 The courtroom procedures are designed to facilitate the control of the 
defendants, the systems are intentionally kept opaque.
"Yes if you can keep them guessing it makes you and your system more important, it 
acknowledges power. If you can keep the poor beggars guessing you can control them, .. 
there's nothing worse than a defendant who knows his rights". Such is one probation officer's 
theory on why the courts are organised in the way they are. Others see the defendants in a 
state of uncertainty, not knowing when or how to present their version of events, not knowing 
when they are supposed to stand or when they are allowed to sit, definitely not being allowed to 
challenge either the procedures or the system, " ..and they're not certain whether they can say 
anything, or if they try to they're told to shut up straight away. So that's the uncertainty of what 
they are to do. They're not well versed or rehearsed in what they are allowed to say".
B4.2.4 Efficiency and the need to proceed takes precedence over a requirement 
for accurate communication.
As one probation officer indicated, if one of the criteria for efficiency was effective 
communication then the magistrates' courts would be adjudged to be inefficient, "I would say at 
best people understand very little and at worst they understand nothing". Magistrates and clerks
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appear to go to some lengths to ascertain that the defendant does have an understanding of 
the event, but the urgency to proceed does demand that provided that some indication of 
understanding is conveyed by the defendant then this is accepted as sufficient justification to 
continue. The probation officers recognise that too often the ideal has to give way to the 
practical, "But you have to draw the line, reality draws the line, .. we're back into potential 
conflict with the organisation and throughput, otherwise you've got a waiting area full of a 'days- 
worth' of defendants if you're labouring over one particular situation, minutely explaining".
B4.2.5 The quest for courtroom efficiency can quite often be financially motivated.
The probation officers acknowledge that they now operate in a world of cash limiting, 
cost effectiveness and business failures. An environment where deals are agreed between the 
different agencies because they are seen to be cost effective. Deals where, in the opinion of at 
least one probation officer, it appears "..that the least considered person is the defendant". It is 
conceded that in some situations, the acceptance of a lesser plea or a discontinuation, the 
defendant can be seen to have gained, but where does this leave justice? As one probation 
officer stated, "I mean money really affects whatever your perception of justice is". Neither are 
the courts immune from the need for businesses to demonstrate commercial success. The 
probation officers recognise that solicitors not only have a responsibility and a duty to the client, 
but also to a business and the people whom they employ. Whilst many probation officers do 
condemn the approach of some solicitors, they also concede that they may have difficulties, "I 
think a lot of the time, in a lot of courts, a lot of solicitors are unprepared and I would criticise 
them for that However if they are trying to keep a firm afloat, they need as many clients as 
possible, processed as quickly as possible".
This view, however, does contrast qUite markedly with that of another probation 
officer who made the comment that, "When the bench are out, one overhears solicitors 
boasting about their latest yachts".
B4.2.6 The word 'efficiency' is somewhat misplaced when used in the context of the 
magistrates' courts.
Any observer within the magistrates' court system cannot help but note the apparent 
lack of order, at times almost verging on chaos, which pervades |n the courtroom. This view 
was summarised by one officer who deemed, "Efficiency does sound a little misplaced in the 
context of the magistrates' court, which does strike me so often as being totally disorganised 
and hinging on the presence or otherwise of key individuals. For instance if a solicitor is held up 
at another courtroom ..then the whole thing seems to ground to a halt. So the word efficiency is 
a misnomer".
95
B4.2.7 The corollary of excluding the defendant from the proceedings is to
promote a negative response to the judicial system.
But what is the effect on the defendants, this preoccupation with efficiency, One 
probation officer was keen to point out the negative effects and claimed, that if defendants are 
treated like spectators and only allowed a very restricted level of participation, and if the 
defendants are also denied that level of respect to which they are entitled, then this will militate 
against the effect of the sentence and will only result in reinforcing the negativity of the system.
B4.3 Courtroom organisation and the degradation ceremony.
"I'm sure there must be other ways of dealing with all the 
elements that need to be dealt with, without having to 
humiliate and degrade the defendant in that type of way".
(a probation officer)
B4.3.1 The use and abuse of rules in the magistrates* courts.
B4.3.1.1 - there is a need for rules.
All of the probation officers who were interviewed believe that rules are essential to 
the running of the magistrates' courts Without rules, the system, which by its very nature is 
adversarial, would be almost impossible to operate and control. The rules have been 
formulated over time with the aim of bringing and maintaining order in what can quite often be 
seen as a complicated process. As one probation officer said, "I would hope that the intent was 
actually to keep a very complex set of circumstances in some sort of workable, logical 
framework. If you didnt have rules when people could and could not speak, you'd have bedlam, 
people shouting at every verse end, at something they disagreed or agreed with. There have to 
be rules, but do they have to dehumanise
B4.3.1.2 - the (abtuse of the rules.
It was this final point which concerned the majority of'the probation officers with 
whom I spoke. Whilst the need for rules is widely accepted, it is the way in which the rules are 
applied which the probation officers find disturbing. The impression gained was that these 
people consider that the application of the rules is asymmetrical, because in practice it appears 
that the rules are only invoked in respect of the defendants. It was said that behaviour which is 
condemned in the defendants can with regularity be enacted with almost total impunity by the 
sentencers and other court officials. An example of this one-sided application of the rules was 
recalled by one probation officer who told me, "Yes I've seen all those things", [the various 
sanctions imposed on the defendants in the courtroom setting], "I've seen people told ' 
whatever you've got in your mouth take it out'.. and I contrast this with Judge S.. popping 
Nuttall's Mintoes into his mouth throughout the whole of the proceedings in his court. You know 
one rule for one and one rule for another". Not only are the rules seen as being applied unfairly, 
the overall impression is that the consequence of the way in which the rules are applied,
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intentionally or unintentionally, is that the defendant is frequently demeaned, As one officer 
remarked,".. and yet I don’t know whether the original intent of all the procedures and the rules 
was to actually debase the defendants, but it's certainly one side effect".
B4.3.2 The organisation of the courtroom and its procedures. - a demonstration of 
impartiality or part of the degradation ceremony ?
When asked the question, 'Is the setting up of the defendants in a guarded dock and 
at a distance artificially stretched beyond the familiar boundaries of face to face communication 
and asking them to describe or comment on intimate details of their lives, designed to degrade 
and humiliate the defendants'? The responses received from the various probation officers 
could all be included under the heading of a 'qualified yes'. As one officer commented, "But 
isn't this part and parcel of the whole machinery? If someone is going to be humiliated then you 
arrange the stage. ..The whole purpose has got to be bawled from one end of the stage to the 
other". Others also saw that the way in which the courtroom was organised and the way in 
which the participants were arranged did have the effect of humiliating the defendants but they 
were not all convinced that there is a policy calculated just to humiliate the defendants. In the 
words of one officer, "I can see a lot of that occurring, I don't know how deliberate it is". Another 
officer, whilst expressing concern about the spatial aspects of the courtroom organisation, also 
recognised that there is a need to demonstrate the impartiality of the sentencers. As he told 
me, 7 think the fact of who's involved has a direct relevance on the seating arrangements. I find 
a part of me says no, keep the distance thing, I think that is possibly the emotion to do with 
tradition. The visual distance bit is important, it says that the magistrates who are making the 
decision, are making the decision and they are not in cahoots with the prosecutor who is sitting 
round a table to their left within note passing distance. I think that is important". The same 
officer did go on to say that in their efforts to distance the sentencers from the rest of the court, 
some courts and particularly in the older buildings, do take it to ridiculous extremes where, 
"..the judge sits in this farcical sort of isolation between these hugely carved things... I mean it 
makes him look totally foolish as opposed to giving some impression of majesty, it simply 
makes it a farce".
B4.3.3 A matter of policy or a misuse of personal power - a conspiracy of ego 
inflation?
"I've seen examples of people being made to feel extremely uncomfortable when 
there was no need to do that, ..where certain chair people have actually made clients extremely 
uncomfortable when the need wasn't there. The client was visibly shaken in my view and 
there's no need for that, it was an overkill situation". This was one probation officer's experience 
of the way that the defendant is treated in the courtroom situation.The overall view of the 
probation officers with whom I spoke, was that officious and disrespectful orders are given to 
the defendants by both the magistrates and by the other court professionals. I was told by
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another officer, Tve certainly noticed that the professional magistrates tend to say 'Stand up 
Smith', and then proceed to address them in that sort of impersonal way". A third officer voiced 
his concern at the lack of politeness in the way some clerks address the defendants, "I see it 
when certain clerks snap, 'What is your name, date of birth, address'? and dont say 'Thank you' 
or give a title 'Mr'... Those lubricants are missing and the sorry story goes on". All this adds up 
to a very impersonal environment, a situation which led this probation officer to compare it to a 
cattle-market. "Yes I see it very much as cattle-market on occasions. I see it very much in the 
way they, [the defendants], are brought into court and everyone turns and stares.... Everyone, 
as when the beast is brought into the auction ring and is paraded there. Now this is a dramatic 
overstatement but I think there's an essence of truth in there". But what of the defendants' 
representatives, the defence solicitors, and their part in protecting the client ? This same 
probation officer was quite scathing in his opinions on that point, "It's something that I despair 
of, how can one possibly hope to improve when the very person who's supposed to be 
representing the offender is colluding with the whole system and indeed exacerbating the 
system by treating them as, just again, an article in a cattle-market". One theory which was 
proffered suggested that one of the reasons for the demeaning of the defendants by the regular 
court users was to, ".. heighten the self-importance of the ones who conspire together in this, 
..to make it our club and we are feeding on, if you like, these people who come through the 
courts, ..they are not one of us, they are a different breed. Nobody actually says that, but that's 
the message". Not, it must be emphasised, are all of the regular court users categorised under 
the one heading. While agreeing with the overall sentiments, another officer did say, "I'm sure 
there are elements of that in there, but I've also watched court personnel actively work against 
that by calling a defendant by their name .. They treat people in a very encouraging way to 
make somebody feel more comfortable than degraded”.
B4.3.4. There's got to be a better wav - the probation officers view.
"It seems to me that there's got to be a way where people could be physically closer 
together, I think that reduces the barriers to some extent. I personally think that things could 
be dealt with in a much more humane way". Such was the view of one probation officer, a view 
which I found was almost univerally shared by his colleagues. In order to justify this claim this 
officer describes the procedure in the Juvenile Court where, "It seems much more civilised 
somehow”, where people, among other things,are ".. addressed by their first names". I was also 
told about other cases, some involving 'relatively serious matters' which were actually dealt 
with in the Magistrates' Assembly room. Where, in the words of the probation officer, "I thought 
that justice was dispensed in a proper manner, without the barriers there. We were sat around 
the table, including the defendant.. The defendant wasnt as nervous". Whilst a greater degree 
of informality would be welcomed by the probation officers whom I interviewed, one officer did 
query how such a move would be viewed by the people outside of the court arena. He 
pondered "I wonder if that setting would sit uneasily with the 'public good bit' and the
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demonstration of justice being done". Another officer argued that no matter how a room is laid 
out, the fact that people have defined roles and defined responsibilities for those roles, "..even 
that tells you where and how you fit in, how you actually act within the court. That occurs 
anyway and would occur whether we all sat round one table or not".
It was accepted that, "..you need solemnity for the occasion" to mark its importance, 
but it was argued that this aspect is already evident by the fact that defendants have go to a 
special building, where they are dealt with by people who they do not usually meet in their 
everyday activities. They have a specific date and time at which to attend, a reason for being 
there and "..knowing that they are up in front of ‘the Beak', all these factors mark it as special 
without the rest surely..". Another view which was also expressed, concerned the possible 
negative affects of humiliatng the defendant. As one officer said, 7 think humiliation breeds 
resentment, it breeds a feeling of Tm going to get back at you somehow, you may not be the 
person but I'll get back at the system. So no, I don't feel that humiliation should be a tool.. I think 
that one can achieve one's intent, possibly achieving more by courtesy, by carefully following 
the social rules so that one is not seen as abusing power,f.
B4.4 Power, influence and Pre-Sentence Reports.
" A lot of settings and the courts specifically, 
are personality based and credibility based, 
consequently the power, the decision making, 
could be rested in any number of people, the 
magistrates, the clerks or the advocates 
depending on the strength of their personalities 
and the degree of credibility they possess"
(a probation officer)
B4.4.1 In court the magistrates announce the decisions, but who actually makes
those decisions?
This question was put to all three of the probation officers who were interviewed and 
their initial replies were all fairly consistent. They apparently had no doubts that the decision 
makers were the sentencers, the magistrates. What was not quite as clear cut was who, or 
what, has the greatest influence on the magistrates in their decision making process?
B4.4.2 The magistrates, ’it's their decision and they're the people with the power'.
As I was told by one probation officer, when dealing with clients it is important to 
make them understand that it is not the probation officers who make the decisions. Probation 
officers only make proposals, advocates present the facts and put forward mitigation and the 
court clerks give advice, but at the end of all this, "..clients have to be made to realise that the 
bench make the sentencing decisions, the other people are only there as the providers of 
information". So in practice the decision making is, in the vast majority of magistrates' courts, in 
the hands of a group of part-time amateur members of the public, the lay magistrates. I asked 
the officers for their views, as professional court users, on this aspect of the magistrates' courts 
system. Their overall opinion was perhaps best summarised by the comments of one officer,
"Some lay benches are good, some are appalling, but irrespective they are the decision 
makers, it is their decision and they're the people with the power and I think as professionals 
working in the court situation, you've got to live with that or you cant do the job".
The power of decision making is not the only power which the magistrates possess, 
they also have a great deal of inter-personal power. The extent of this power was emphasised 
by another probation officer who talked about the power relationship between the magistrates 
and the other court users, "You cant argue with the bench", and in particular he stressed the 
wide discrepancy of power which exists between the magistrates and the defendants, "..there is 
a power relationship there and the bench is untouchable, utterly untouchable, you cannot 
answer the bench back. If the bench chooses to criticize one, you cant stand there and say 
'you're a damned fool', maybe everyone in the courtroom knows that, but you're not allowed to 
say that, least of all the defendant..".
B4.4.3 Power and influence - a matter of credibility
"I dont really know who has the greatest influence, because at times i've seen 
powerful prosecutors make a great impact on the sentence, assisted on occasions by very 
weak defence barristers or defence solicitors and at other times I've seen the reverse". The 
same probation officer then went on to talk about the influence of the probation officer in court, 
'Tve seen occasions where the Probation Service report, or a comment made by a probation 
officer who's been asked to give evidence, has been useful and has swayed the case in favour, 
maybe, of the proposal that was put forward. So it is difficult to s a y This difficulty was also 
commented on by another officer who indicated that one of the difficulties in assessing who in 
the court holds the most influence is the probation officer’s own standing in the court system, 
"It's extremely difficult, I think, from somebody who's excluded from a lot of that to say where 
the power rests".
B4.4.3.1 - a powerful network, the professional lawyer influence.
One probation officer identified what he considered to be a powerful group of people 
within the magistrates' courts, 'the professional lawyers', the court clerks and the advocates. A 
group from which the both the amateurs and the non-legally trained members of the court 
scene are excluded. I was told, "I dont think we're part of it, I dont think we are powerful 
enough in court to be a part of it. We are certainly outside the circuit of the clerk, the defence 
and the prosecution. There's a very powerful network there, I think you, [the lay magistrates], 
are excluded, you'll never be a part of that, ..and we, like you, are amateurs, we're not 
professionally trained in law in any case: So we're not included in that and I think that has a lot 
to do with our role in court, the fact that we're not professional lawyers". I was told of decisions 
that are made by this group and to the exclusion of the magistrates, often, but not always, when 
the magistrates have retired from the courtroom, "A lot goes on in front of the bench that we
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dont hear or know of and I can give you incidents where deals have been made on the 'front 
bench'', and while the lay magistrates have been out, about how something will operate
B4.4.3.2 - the power of the court clerk. What happens behind closed doors ?
The power of the court clerks was also discussed in the context of the influence they 
exert when giving advice to the lay magistrates. A contrast was made by one probation officer 
between the information which is presented by the other court users in the open court and that 
information which is given to the magistrates in the confidential confines of the Magistrates' 
Retiring room. "The solicitor standing up and presenting facts and dealing with matters is 
generally very open and is heard by all concerned. A report is not quite so open but it is subject 
to scrutiny by quite a number of people. .. But the vast majority of how decisions come about, 
through the magistrates or in connection with the clerk, are as it were, behind closed doors. .. 
There's a lot of power held by the clerk, in terms of their knowledge base and hence the advice 
they can produce. One cannot be but suspicious sometimes, in personality terms, as to what 
goes on behind closed doors, I wish I knew".
B4.4.3.3 - the probation officers, the 'Cinderellas' of the court structure.
It is evident from some of the statements volunteered by probation officers in the 
preceding sections, that they do not see themselves at the forefront when it comes to 
influencing the decision makers. Comments such as, "We're not powerful enough in court to be 
a part of it", or "It's extremely difficult I think for somebody who's excluded from that to say 
where the power rests". Perhaps the probation officers' perception of where they stand in 
relation to the power and influence debate is summarised by the feelings expressed by one 
officer, "You cant argue with a bench or a judge, the probation officers, possibly because 
they're the weakest, they are the ones who hold least power within that court structure".
B4.4.3.4 - credibility is important, but what is it ?
An oft-used word when discussing power, influence and relationships within the 
magistrates' courts is 'credibility', and particularly gaining and maintaining credibility with the 
magistrates. In my discussions with the probation officers I found that their attitude on this 
subject varied little with that of the other court professionals. They see credibility as an 
important factor in their ability to function effectively and specifically in the way that their 
reports are viewed by the magistrates. The probation officers were under no illusions that the 
"acceptance of the PSR, (the Pre-Sentence Report ), and its conclusions can be highly 
influenced by the credibility element of the individual writing the report and if what is being 
suggested links in with that particular magistrate's point of view, especially if that person 
happens to be in the chair..". This view was emphasised by one probation officer who talked 
about the need to impress the magistrate, "If you want to get your proposal accepted you've got 
to make your report credible and therefore, do you write for an audience? Do you play to the
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gallery, the gallery being the magistrates? Do you play upon their prejudices and persuade this 
particular bench? If I dont, if I put in a report that is incredible I'm wasting everyone's time, I 
may feel myself spiritually pure, but I've not achieved a great deal".
But while it is agreed that credibility, particularly with the magistrates, is essential, 
concern was expressed about the way in which that credibility is perceived. As has already 
been stated, the courts are seen as being "..personality based and credibility based", and in the 
opinion of one probation officer problems occur when these two factors become confused. "A 
lot of credibility is gained by ones personality, not necessarily by the quality of their work, ..it is 
this that bothers me because where a false credibility is gained then justice doesn't come 
anywhere near". One of the reasons that lay behind this concern, I was told, is that there are a 
number of the regular court professionals who believe that they can "pull the wool over the 
eyes of the lay benches".
B4.4.4 The Pre-sentence Report - an aid to decision making or a usurping of power.
"I think they, [Pre-Sentence Reports], can be powerful if they are well argued, ..I think 
sometimes the Pre-Sentence Report can be very influential, I bear in mind that it is one of the 
last documents that the sentencers will read before making their decision and I think that the 
things you read last tend to stay in your mind the most". This was the view of a probation officer 
when discussing one of the most important 'tools' used by the Probation Service in influencing 
the magistrates.
B4.4.4.1 - the objectives and preparation of the PSR. a change of style.
The central theme of a Pre-Sentence Report is the defendant, but at the same time 
the probation officer needs to bear in mind that an important aim, if not the major aim, is to 
persuade the magistrates to accept and implement the proposals which have been suggested 
in the report. In order to achieve this, the report must be seen by the sentencers to have a high 
degree of credibility. As one officer explained, "You are writing it with the interests of the 
defendant in mind because you are a probation officer, because we take the point of view of the 
underdog, ..and some officers take that point to its extreme and hence, I think, devalue their 
reports, ..and if you want to get your proposal accepted you've got to make your report 
credible". Another officer with whom I spoke felt that probation officers and their reports had 
suffered in the past due to the policies imposed on them by the Probation Service 
management, "..in the past I think we've been pushed quite strongly, management have said to 
us, ' we expect you to guide sentencers by coming up with proposals', and when faced 
sometimes with people who've had everything that's available to them, supervision, custody, 
the works, sometimes in the past I've felt very much, I dont know what the hell to recommend 
to the court in respect of this bloke". The general opinion among the probation officers was that 
recent legislation has brought about changes for the better, as one officer concluded, "I 
certainly think that the new Criminal Justice Act,[ 1991 ], has encouraged us to be more objective
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and to look at the aggravating and mitigating features in peoples lives, ..I personally feel, that in 
the last twelve months, I've had to look more carefully at what I write in my reports to support 
my comments". It is also recognised by the officers that their reports, by and large, only 
represents one part of what can sometimes be a very complex picture, "You have to constantly 
remind yourself, you are writing a report, you are reflecting very particular bits of this whole 
scenario. But the bench has to take into account not only the personal bits, but also the public 
bits, which are in many ways beyond the ken of the probation officer. They should consider that 
in their report, acknowledge it, but that really is the preserve of the bench".
B4.4.4.2 - a matter of presentation - how not to alienate the magistrates.
Previous studies have found that some magistrates were very critical of the 
recommendations which were contained in the Social Enquiry Reports, as they were then 
called, and resentful of what they interpreted as a usurping of their power, (Parker et al, 1989). 
When I discussed these findings with the probation officers, I was told that this resentment still 
prevails, "That comes across often, not necessarily within the court setting, but it does come 
out through other meetings and discussions that occur". I was also told by another officer that it 
is a problem which has now been addressed nationally, "One thing we have been told latterly 
by National Standards is not to be seen to be trying to usurp the benches prerogative on 
sentencing, we now have to use words like proposal ..and couch it in such a way as not to 
offend sensibilities. Because I think in the past, and probably in the present as well, report 
writers have been careless in their use of language and have succeeded in antogonising the 
bench".
When I queried whether reports were written and presented with a particular audience 
in mind, I got a number of variable answers. It depended not only on who was writing the report 
but also on whether the report was being presented to a stipendiary magistrate or to a lay 
bench. One of the major obstacles for the writer of the report is, that in most instances, neither 
the type or composition of the bench is known until the day of the hearing, Even where a case 
has been reserved by the stipendiary magistrate to be heard in his court, this knowledge cannot 
always be put to use by the writer, As I was informed by one officer, "I dont think I know the 
'stipe' well enough to be able to do that. So I dont think that applies really". Another officer 
claimed however, "I think in terms of base material and the base of what I wanted to say it 
would be common to whoever it was. But maybe the way it was presented or possibly 
emphasised to try and achieve what you were suggesting, yes it would definitely be different". I 
was told that with the introduction of the stipendiary magistrate as a permanent member of the 
Bench there had been a very positive effect on the report writers. According to one of the 
officers, "I think standards have been jolted by the presence of the 'stipe' and I dont think that's 
a bad thing".
When I asked how receptive magistrates in the study area were to accepting the 
proposals which were contained in the reports, I was told by one officer, who had worked at and
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had considerable experience of a neighbouring bench, "In a way I was used to writing reports 
for punitive courts and in some instances not getting the proposals that were being put forward 
accepted. I've come to work here ..there is a more receptive audience towards constructive 
proposals".
B4.5 The probation officers' perception of and relationship with the defendant.
"I think by temperament, by self selection almost, 
probation officers see the defendant's side of the story.
..We certainly are temperamentally inclined to see the 
side of the underdog".
(a probation officer)
B4.5.1 The welfare of the defendant is not always the prime concern of the court.
From the opinions expressed in some of the preceding sections, the probation officers 
see the defendants who appear in the magistrates' court, as a group of people who are 
regularly disadvantaged by the system. The overall view conveyed is, that defendants tend to 
be processed by the courts rather than being dealt with effectively as individuals.lt was said 
that the defendants' interests can be sacrificed to the competing interests of cost effectiveness 
and inter-group compromises, although this can and does on occasions work to the benefit of 
the defendant. Defendants are subjected to rules and procedures which not only restrict their 
opportunity to participate effectively in the proceedings, but the way in which the rules are 
applied, intentionally or otherwise, can often have the effect of humiliating and degrading them. 
Their treatment by some, but not all, of the regular court users is seen as disrespectful and 
officious, the corollary of this type of treatment is that it can produce a negative reaction which 
fosters a feeling of resentment against authority as a whole and the Criminal Justice system in 
particular. One probation officer went as far as describing the defendants as 'cannon fodder1 for 
the court system.
B4.5.2 Defendants can be disadvantaged bv emotional, intellectual and social 
factors when attending court.
B4.5.2.1 - even the most hardened criminals experience anxiety when they have to 
attend court.
All of the probation officers with whom I spoke were unanimous in the view that the 
majority of defendants, when they attend court, are affected to some degree by feelings of 
apprehension. This can range at one end of the scale as a simple feeling of uncertainty, whilst 
at the other end of the scale people can be gripped by a sense of fear. I was told by one officer, 
"We deal with a lot of people who aren't all that experienced in court. ..There is a hard core of 
people who are in and out of court all of the time. But a lot of people come through our hands 
..who aren't all that experienced or well versed in what's going to happen and there's always 
that fear, it's such a real fear amongst the people we deal with". What of this 'hard core', the 
regular attenders, has familiarity with the syst^n resulted in a 'couldn't care less, I've seen it all
before attitude'? The opinion expressed by the probation officers definitely dispelled this theory, 
"..even the well tattooed young man who attends and you, [the magistrates], think he's got a 
record as long as my arm, he's still unsure of himself . This could be because, as a persistent 
offender, he may well be in fear that a custodial sentence will be imposed. But there are always 
those who don't appear overly concerned, as I was told, there are always the optimists, "Who 
think I'm going to get away with it".
B4.5.2.2 - defendants are disadvantaged by both emotional and personal
characteristics.
The effect of this apprehension, often combined with personal shortcomings, for 
example limited intelligence, is thought to put many defendants at a distinct disadvantage when 
appearing in the courtroom. In the opinion of the probation officers with whom I conversed, this 
resulted not only in them not understanding the procedures, but of even more importance they 
didn't even appreciate what had happened to them or why. As one officer explained, "The very 
limited individuals haven't got a clue, ...there are some who really are very bright, not bright in 
the conventional sense but streetwise and know what the score is. But a lot of people dont and 
it's so painfully obvious that they dont understand". The defendants' emotional state was also 
underlined as a cause for their lack of understanding of events. "You've got somebody so 
wound up that they cant concentrate and especially if they are fresh to everything, I dont think 
they even listen sometimes. I mean your hearts beating too fast, too loudly in your ears It is 
not only the inherent characteristics which have the effect of putting defendants at a 
disadvantage, dress can also have a discriminatory effect. As one officer described the 
situation, "The defendants are dressed in a different uniform to us arent they? We're all part of 
the 'old boy network'. .. We're all one, the solicitors wear their whatever, we all carry brief 
cases, we look business like. The defendants look different to us normally, not always;■ and in a 
way, in that situation, he's put down immediately".
B4.5.3 - Probation officer-client relationships.
The probation officers' perception of their relationships with the defendants, their 
clients, have already been touched on previously. These relationships when compared with 
those of the other regular court users are perceived by the officers as being very different, if 
not unique. While they do not wish to be seen as the defendant's advocate, they do see 
themselves cast in the role of a 'mentor', someone charged with the responsibility to 'assist, 
advise and befriend' the defendant. Someone to take the defendant’s side, to try and provide 
some help for the people who they view as the underdogs in the Criminal Justice system.
B4.5.3.1 - defendants are actually human when you get to know them.
The probation officers see themselves as having positive relationships with the 
defendants. They are disposed not to be judgemental of their clients and admit to having a fair
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degree of empathy with the client's situation, in other words they are inclined to see the 
defendant's point of view. As one officer explained, "The very fact that you've actually sat down 
and discussed with the defendant the circumstances of those offences, the personal 
circumstances, that makes them more human This statement was not only supported but 
was also expanded upon by one of this officer's colleagues, "I think once you sit down with 
people and engage in a sort of rapport with them it's very unlikely that you are not going to look 
for some good aspects of that person's background, personality and so forth to offer to the 
court. So I think inevitably we get caught up with people and that's the end p r o d u c tThe 
probation officers realise that in some instances they can become a 'privileged confidant' of 
their clients, but all of the officers with whom I spoke were at pains to stress the need for them 
to retain both their objectivity and their professionalism. Many of their clients have quite difficult 
and sensitive areas in their lives which need addressing, drink problems and marital difficulties 
being just two amongst many, but if the probation officers allow themselves to become too 
enmeshed in these problems, this might not necessarily benefit the situation. One officer 
summarised his own views on this particular aspect, "I think in a way we've got to distance 
ourselves from the client. If you get too close to the client you're not helping them, there’s got to 
be a professional distance".
B4.5.3.2 - concern for the defendant is not the only reason for maintaining a 
professional distance.
There are times when the writer of a Pre-Sentence Report will use words or phrases 
which have been developed with intention of distancing the views of that officer from those of 
the client. These phrases are used where either statements or claims made by the client have 
not been able to be checked out by the officer, or in some instances where they are considered 
to be rather dubious, when it is thought that the client, to quote one officer, is telling 'pork 
pies' here", and the probation officers do not wish to jeopardise their credibility with the bench 
by just appearing to go along with those statements. "So there are things about self- 
preservation, there are things about this lads trying to pull a fast one, I cant let him make a fool 
out of me". So the probation officer will sometimes include a 'disclaimer', hidden between the 
lines of the report, phrases such as , ' The defendant tells me ..'. The reason for this is not 
primarily to 'hoodwink' the client, it is more to do with maintaining credibility with the 
magistrates. The balancing act which the probation officer must strive to achieve is one of 
maintaining credibility with all sides.
B4.5.3.3 - a good relationship is not a one-way street.
Whether or not clients see the probation officers as being part of 'the system', quite 
often depends on the person's past experiences with the Probation Service, or with any of the 
other agencies which they associate with 'the system'. As one officer explained, "Sometimes 
people who have had lots of contact with us over the years speak fondly of a probation officer
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who was extremely useful at some point in their lives, maybe when they were most receptive to 
receiving it". In order to illustrate that clients do not always look back on their contact with the 
Probation Service in quite the same way, I was also told a story about a particular client, " .. 
who's got a very long record and a lot of 'custodial'. He's been virtually brought up in care and 
spent most of his time in and out of institutions. He's quite embittered about all of us, he groups 
us all together, the system' as he calls us. Magistrates, judges, solicitors, probation officers and 
social workers, have all dealt with him and the upshot of it is, he's spent most of his life in 
prison and therefore no one has helped him.. So it depends at what point you engage people in 
their lives as to whether we can be helpful and whether we can be seen to be useful".
But what is a good officer-client relationship? In the opinion of one officer it must be 
based on a give and take relationship, the relationship is not a 'one way street', "What is not 
needed is a constant giving approach, there has to be an approach that demands certain things 
as well". The client must be taxed and asked for explanations and reasons for their behaviour. 
This particular officer did concede that he was not necessarily expressing the views of all his 
colleagues, but he did go on to say that in his opinion, "If a probation officer is seen as soft by 
the magistrates, I think there's a good chance that the probation officer will be seen as soft by 
the client, ..and the client will despise someone who is just a waste of time".
B4.6 The probation officers' perception of and relationship with the other regular court 
users.
"I still maintain that the Probation are marginalised,
I think that there has been more progress towards, 
not us being equal members playing our different 
roles, but we've notched up a bit, we've been accepted 
more".
(a probation officer)
B4.6.1 The probation officers do not identify with the other court professionals 
although they do engage in relationships of 'reciprocal privilege*.
B4.6.1.1 - 'we are there in body but not in spirit'.
As we have seen in the preceding chapters, the probation officers do not readily 
identify with the other court professionals. As was indicated by one officer, they are officially 
officers of the court and yet in other ways they see themselves in a different role. They do not 
consider that they have the same pecuniary interest in either the court or the defendant as do 
some of the other court professionals. To quote one officer, "I'm not sure whether Probation 
have a vested interest in there. This is the theme which keeps coming into my head, about 
whether we are there in body but not in spirit, could we care less who gets the carcase .. I for 
myself couldn't give a carrot which bit of the carcase solicitors get or the clerk gets or whoever 
gets, I'm an observer of the passing scene..". The officers find that on the one hand there are 
pressures from both the magistrates and the court professionals for them to ally themselves 
with the court, but then again they feel that they are excluded from the arena of power and
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influence, the 'professional lawyer network’, and because of this they do see themselves as 
being 'marginalised'.
B4.6.1.2 - it is an 'uneasy truce* but there are some good working relationships.
"Yes any system works I guess on the basis that, 'You'll scratch my back and I'll 
scratch yours', and yes I've participated in that sense. Within my needs' within that system, I've 
scratched peoples' backs This was the admission of one officer and something to which all 
of the officers whom I interviewed admitted to participating in. So relationships are formed by 
all the professional agencies, including the Probation Service, where it is seen to be to the 
mutual benefit of both parties or as part of a reciprocal arrangement. Whether these 
arrangements benefit the Probation Service and its officers to a greater or a lesser extent 
seems to be open to debate. As one officer told me, "Liaisons are formed, ..I think we have an 
uneasy truce in courts, but the situation works reasonably well. But the Probation Service does 
not have any special relationships with any of the firms of solicitors or anyone else, but we do 
have some good working relationships". A second probation officer sounded somewhat less 
enthusiastic and voiced the opinion that the standing of the Probation Service fluctuates and is 
dependent upon how useful they are seen to be at a particular time. "I think police, solicitors, 
clerks, anybody really, and prosecution, if we are seen as being useful to them then we're in 
effect given more of a position than marginalised and it is very influenced by that". But 
underlaying all of these liaisons is the fact that the system is predominantly adversarial and to 
repeat the view of one officer, 7 think overall the adversarial element does influence everything 
that operates".
B4.6.2 Magistrates - the probation officers' perception.
As previously stated, the probation officers have expressed several opinions about 
the magistrates and their role. These have included topics such as the authority which they 
possess, the way they act towards other court users and the way in which their conduct is 
reciprocated. The opinions expressed depict the magistrates as sometimes good, at other times 
abysmal, but they are the decision makers, a fact which all of the court users need to adjust to 
and accept if they are to perform effectively. The magistrates also appear to have great inter­
personal power which can be, and is on occasions misused to the detriment of the other court 
users and of defendants in particular. Magistrates also vary in their assessment of the abilities 
of the other court users. Whilst obtaining and maintaining a high level of credibility is seen as 
an important asset by all of the probation officers with whom I spoke, there is some concern 
that in identifying what constitutes credibility, magistrates can confuse the two attributes of 
personality and ability. Magistrates do have a jealous concern for their sentencing powers and 
do resent other court users attempting to usurp this power, this applies to the probation officer 
and particularly to the proposals contained in Pre-Sentence Reports. Even though the 
magistrates do occupy the position of power, an opinion expressed by one officer indicated that
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the lay magistrates are seen as gullible by some of the professional court users and are 
therefore susceptible 'to having the wool pulled over their eyes'.
B4.6.2.1 - the lav magistrate is a positive good.
In the opinion of at least one probation officer the lay magistrates are an important 
asset to the legal system because of their independence. Their greatest strength is seen to be, 
that unlike the professionals who participate in the court and Criminal Justice system, they are 
not inhibited by vested interests. As one probation officer explained, *When a professional puts 
forward a point of view, they're putting forward a vested interest, or a perception of a vested 
interest The generalist, the magistrate who comes in, can surely be an invaluable dose of 
commonsense, other worldliness, non-vested interest, call it what you will, but at least they are 
questioning this established set up".
B4.6.2.2 - magistrates are still mainly middle aged and middle class.
Magistrates are still seen by probation officers to be mainly middle aged and middle 
class although it is recognised that there are some positive efforts being made to broaden the 
'class' base. The Lord Chancellor's Department through its Local Advisory Committees are, in 
some areas targeting the 'working class districts' by advertising, "for potential magistrates to put 
themselves forward or to be put forward, particularly people from certain districts where one 
would expect manual workers to come from and is asking for 'working class' people to join the 
Bench This strategy according to one officer is succeeding in so far as, "I think there's an 
increased number of people who are lay magistrates now who come from a much broader 
perspective than there were fifteen years ago". But magistrates still appear to be drawn from 
that section of the community who have the free time, who either don't work or who have the 
flexiblity of working arrangements which allows them the time to participate as magistrates. 
This type of magistrate is perceived by one officer, "..to come from a very different world to the 
people they deal with".
B4.6.2.3 - working class magistrates do assume middle class values.
In answer to the question, 'Do magistrates appointed from working class backgrounds, 
after appointment, assume middle class ideals and values'? The probation officers whom I 
interviewed were in no doubt that this shift in attitude does occur. The common opinion was 
that the magistrates who originate from working class backgrounds tend to be harsher in their 
sentencing, they see the working class defendant as lacking moral stamina, 7 pulled myself up 
by the boot straps lad, I dont see why you couldnt have done', and because of this, "..their 
adjudications were far harsher than the middle aged, middle class magistrates The officer 
who put forward this view then went on to say that in his opinion the working class magistrates, 
" were aspiring so hard that they over reached themselves and became more punitive, whereas 
the 'naturals', if / can put it that way, ..didnt need to try they were already middle class".
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Agreeing with the basic sentiments of this assessment, a second officer said that a shift in the 
attitude of working class magistrates was almost inevitable, " I think we cant help but do that, 
it’s the same with probation officers, because of what we're drawn into and the way we have to 
function and the way we're forced into thinking, forces us more into that way. But I think the fact 
that people have been drawn from other settings, hopefully people retain something of that".
B4.6.2.4 - magistrates are subject to prejudices and presuppositions.
Also intimated during my interviews with the probation officers, was the fact that 
magistrates, in the same way as other members of the society from which they are drawn, have 
their own prejudices and make their own. assumptions and this can result in them being swayed 
by the apparent moral status of the defendants rather than the merits of the case. I was 
reminded that magistrates can quite often make the assumption that, "..young men with tattoos 
are both experienced in the ways of the courts and are also likely to have previous criminal 
records", assumptions which can be erroneous. Magistrates were also criticized by the 
probation officers because it is considered that many of them are likely to devalue any 
arguments in favour of the defendant, "..which smack of leniency".
B4.6.2.5 - magistrates can be subject to personal vanity?
One probation officer did question whether or not some magistrates can, on 
occasions, get carried away with their own importance and confuse the respect which is shown 
to the court as an institution, with respect for the individual. As was explained, " I like to think 
that when the magistrates come in, [to the courtroom], and people stand and whatever, [bow], it 
is directed, not towards the magistrates as individuals, but towards the court as an institution. 
But I often wonder whether magistrates get that a little mixed up in their own minds and I 
wonder sometimes whether they sometimes get a sense of their own personal importance".
B4.6.2.6 - magistrates are seen at many levels of ability.
As has already been indicated, magistrates in general and court chairmen in 
particular are seen at many levels of ability, some are seen as good and others have been 
described by probation officers as abysmal. Court chairmen are criticized in the main because 
of their apparent inability to communicate with the rest of the court. The general view can be 
summarised into the comments of one probation officer, "Chairmen are human beings like 
everyone else, there are good and bad. I think a lot of chairmen want the clerk to do things .. 
even though you are put in a position of authority on the bench some aren't very good at public 
speaking, ..they may be good at chairing magistrates but when it comes to the actual speaking 
in a busy court it must be quite difficult". To overcome this difficulty some chairmen prefer to 
'read their lines' but even this can have a different effect to that intended. As I was informed by 
a second officer, "I cant speak on behalf of the defendants, but from my point of view 
sometimes that has made me shut off as you are reading. It sometimes gives the impression
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that you, [the magistrates], dont know what's going on because you've had to read it out. 
Certainly when one or two of your less articulate colleagues have read it out and mis-read it as 
well and then have to go back or have the error pointed out, it just adds to that view and 
interpretation".
B4.6.3 Probation officers are not infrequently humiliated by the magistrates.
The relationships that exist between the magistrates and the probation officers are 
dependent on the individuals involved, the levels of respect that exist between those 
individuals and the circumstances pertaining to the particular occasion. As a general rule, one 
officer with whom I spoke did find that the relationships between the magistrates and the 
probation officers, particularly those who work in the Court team, were considerably better in 
the study area than in other courts where he had worked, "When I came here I couldnt believe 
the things that went on at the liaison panel, [the Probation Liaison sub-Committee], people were 
friendly for a start. It was amazing because we had an official sort of meeting at —  . I've got 
used to the more relaxed atmosphere, not that I mean more relaxed in a negative way". This 
was also the view which was expressed by other probation officers with experience of working 
in other petty sessional divisions. But there are also down sides to the relationships and these 
were blamed by one officer on the lack of awareness on the part of the magistrates about the 
role of the Probation Service, "I'm not sure that a lot ofsentencers understand what we do". As 
has been indicated in earlier chapters, the major 'bone of contention' between the two areas is 
the Pre-Sentence Report, or to be more precise the suggestions for disposal which are 
contained within it. As one officer observed, "As your colleagues were saying, [at the Probation 
Liaison sub-Committee], with this, [the PSR], and the Unit Fines system, [now repealed], and 
what have you, you felt very much that you were 'straight jacketed' with what you could do. 
That must anger you as well". It is also these factors which are considered to be the main 
contributing factors in influencing the behaviour of some magistrates towards the probation 
officers who, "..are not infrequently humiliated by either deliberate or careless remarks from the 
bench".
B4.6.4 Professional or lav bench, a matter of preference.
"I must personally say that I prefer to work with the 'stipe', I know where I stand with 
him and because the lay benches are so unpredictable, because the constituent members of 
the lay bench make up a different panel from one bench to another". This preference was 
echoed by the other probation officers whom I interviewed. Another statement which also 
summarised the general feeling was, "If I work with the 'stipe' I know he's going to be tough and 
I know I'm going to have to argue my comer all of the time... With a lay bench, I can sometimes 
get away with a lot more than I can with him". So it is acknowledged that because of the 
stipendiary magistrate's superior knowledge and experience he can be far more difficult to 
convince about a specific point or a certain course of action than a lay bench. Despite this the
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consensus among the probation officers was that they would rather do 'battle with the stipe' 
than take part in a 'lottery with the lay magistrates'. In the words of one officer, "With a lay 
bench learning what their thinking is and what influences are needed is very difficult, with the 
1stipe' it's easier in that there are certain constants
B4.6.5 Solicitors - the probation officers' perception.
B4.6.5.1 - there is a stark difference between the defence advocates and their clients.
I found that of the many topics discussed with the probation officers, the subject on 
which they were most outspoken was 'solicitors', and in particular the defence advocates. In the 
main they were viewed by the probation officers in an unfavourable light. One of their major 
criticisms of defence solicitors is the way that they are seen to treat the defendants, their 
clients. As one officer noted, 7 think it's squalid the way they talk about their clients", and it is 
not only the fact that they discuss them, the treatment of the clients by some solicitors within 
the confines of the court was also a matter of some concern. This was a point which was 
expounded upon by another officer, "I think this is part of the squalor in terms of solicitors, their 
attitude towards their clients, not all solicitors but certainly some solicitors .. Even though 
interview rooms are at a premium, there may be one vacant but they choose not to use it, they 
choose to sort of sit on their bums, [in the general waiting area], because their client is just one 
of many, all the others are around... .So what? Why should this person need any privacy?.... 
and all the questions that begs about the attitude of a solicitor, again not treating that person 
with basic courtesy. Maybe it is someone they see week in-week out professionally, does that 
lessen the need?". The solicitors are therefore seen as colluding with a system in which, as has 
already been stated, the welfare of the defendant is not seen as the prime concern. The 
solicitors are also seen as being over concerned with the pecuniary aspects of the legal 
system, this was illustrated by a probation officer who drew comparisons between the life-styles 
of the solicitors and those of their clients. "One overhears solicitors boasting about their latest 
yacht and this sits oddly with what sits outside, [the clients], who are the ones in a sense 
indirectly providing those yachts. I know it’s been said before but the contrast nevertheless 
strikes me".
B4.6.5.2 - the solicitors appear, on occasions, to be unprepared.
In answer to the question, Are defence solicitors still considered to be 'money making 
plagiarists'? The responses which I obtained exhibited only a slight degree of variation. One 
officer answered, "Yes there's a constant theme amongst probation officers that they write a 
report and the solicitor stands up and reads it to the magistrate and gets paid a fat fee". Another 
officer was somewhat less critical but still suspicious of some of the solicitors for what was seen 
as a lack of preparedness and the subsequent reliance upon the probation officer's report. "I 
dont know whether I'm right or not but I suspect they havent done their homework and I feel
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that a lot of them come rushing in, you ought to see the look on their faces when they see a 
PSR..., ’Thank goodness for that’. There is a feeling that we Ve done the groundwork for them”. 
This last view was also endorsed by a third probation officer but it was conceded that generally 
solicitors now tend to make use of the reports rather than relying upon them totally.
B4.6.S.3 - many solicitors are seen as failed Thespians.
In the opinion of one of the probation officers who was interviewed, the solicitors and 
particularly the barristers who are part of the court scene are failed Thespians who, love to 
dress up and perform in front of an audience and that in the waving of the arms they’re 
disclaiming, not really to the bench, but to the whole world who happens to be passing through 
the courtroom. That’s not for their clients benefit, not at all, that’s for their own benefit, they love 
the sound of their own voice. ”
B4.6.5.4 - the Probation Service is marginalised by both the prosecution and the
defence.
According to its probation officers, the Probation Service finds itself somewhere 
between the prosecution and the defence, two agencies which have to be dealt with in different 
ways and using different subject matter. The Probation Service is, according to one officer, 
’’..either treated with suspicion or even disregarded". Another officer did consider that 
relationships with the Crown Prosecution Service have improved in recent times, but only in so 
far as the demands of the Children Act are concerned.
B4.6.6 The police - the probation officers' perception.
The probation officers were unanimous in their views of the Probation Service's 
relationship with the police. As one officer stated, ”The probation officer who thinks he’s got a 
good relationship with the police is self-deluding. The police do see us as soft, well meaning, 
naive, gullible, all of which I’d go along with, that’s why I joined the Probation Service”. This 
perception was supported by a second officer who said, "The relationships with the police are 
very distant, we have very little in common with the police. ..There’s always been suspicion 
between the two services naturally, they think we’re soft do gooders and we think they’re after 
something when they contact us”. These points were reiterated by the third officer who said, 
"Overall we would be seen as do gooders, acting on behalf of the ‘toe-rags’
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Appendix C.
ILLUSTRATIONS.
Fig. 1 No.1 Court in the old courthouse. A view from the bench showing the progressively 
raised seating, used by the various court professionals, and the elevated public gallery 
which overlooked the proceedings. Latterly this gallery was not used, the public being 
relegated to the 'restricted view1 seating located at the rear of the court and to the left of 
the exit.
Fig. 2 No.3 Court in the new courthouse. The scene is from the public seating which is at 
ground level. Note that the bench even in the modem courthouse is raised, as is the 
seating of the court clerks. The dock is located to the left of the picture.
Fig. 3 The dock in No.1 Court in the old courthouse. The brass railing demonstrates the 
symbolism which characterised many of the traditional courts. Those defendants not 
produced from the cells occupy the seats which are located immediately below the dock.
Fig. 4 The dock in No.10 Court in the new courthouse. This dock has none of the symbolic 
furnishings of the past but was designed solely as a secure area. The dock is used only 
for those defendants who are being produced from the cell area. Other defendants use 
the seats immediately in front of the dock and behind those of their advocates.
Note that Figs. 3 & 4 illustrate the view from the bench and as seen by the court 
chairman.
Fig. 5 The formal design and layout of an Adult Crime courtroom. The scene is as viewed from 
public seating. It illustrates the elevated bench and the raised seating of the court clerk. 
Facing the bench are the tables and seating used by the advocates. The two rows of 
seats in the foreground and at right-angles to the bench, are reserved for use by the 
Probation Service, the court ushers or any other 'special' visitors. The grills are evidence 
of the court's air conditioning system.
Fig. 6 The informal layout of the Family court where the participants sit around an arrangement 
of tables. Note that the bench is screened by curtains.
Fig. 7 The main waiting area in the old courthouse which amply demonstrates the 'squalor of its 
environs'. Note the seating arrangements which often resulted in defendants and 
prosecution witnesses being 'face to face' across the corridor.
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Fig. 8 A 'large open public waiting area' in the new courthouse with its modem design and 
emphasis on natural lighting.
Fig. 9 The reception area in the new courthouse showing the kiosk which is manned during 
normal working hours.
Fig. 10 In the new courthouse a clear system of signs are displayed to guide the unfamiliar 
court users around the 'public' areas.
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Appendix D.
A chronology of relevant legislation.
1957 Magistrates'Courts Act.
1967 Criminal Justice Act.
1973 Powers of Criminal Courts Act.
1977 The Criminal Law Act.
1980 Magisrates'Courts Act.
1981 Transport Act.
1982 Transport Act.
1982 Criminal Justice Act.
1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act.
1985 Prosecution of Offences Act.
1987 Criminal Justice Act.
1988 Criminal Justice Act.
1988 Legal Aid Act.
1988 Road Traffic Act.
1988 Road Traffic Offenders Act.
1989 The Children Act.
1991 Criminal Justice Act.
1991 Road Traffic Act.
1993 Criminal Justice Act.
1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act. 
1994 The Police and Magistrates' Courts Act.
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